Indivisibility and interdependence of human rights; should there be limits to the European Court of Human Rights reading significant socio-economic elements into Convention rights? by Marochini, Masa
University of Dundee
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Indivisibility and interdependence of human rights;  should there be limits to the
European Court of Human Rights reading significant socio-economic elements into
Convention rights?
Marochini, Masa
Award date:
2012
Awarding institution:
University of Dundee
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 17. Feb. 2017
  
 
INDIVISIBILITY AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS – SHOULD THERE BE LIMITS TO 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
READING SIGNIFICANT SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
ELEMENTS INTO CONVENTION RIGHTS? 
 
 
Maša Marochini 
 
 
Submitted in accordance with the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
The University of Dundee 
School of Law 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2012 
 II 
 III 
Table of contents 
Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ XI 
Abstract...............................................................................................................XIV 
Table of cases .....................................................................................................XVI 
European Court of Human Rights .................................................................................XVI 
European Commission on Human Rights....................................................................XXV 
European Social Rights Committee ...............................................................................XXV 
COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS...............................................................................XXV 
CONCLUSIONS....................................................................................................XXVIII 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ............................................... XXX 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights............................................................ XXX 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights........................................................XXXI 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.....................................................................XXXI 
United Kingdom.............................................................................................................XXXI 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights- Concluding Observations, 
Reports and General Comments..................................................................................XXXI 
Human Rights Committee General Comments....................................................... XXXII 
The CPT Reports and Public Statements ................................................................. XXXII 
Table of legislation....................................................................................... XXXIV 
Council of Europe .......................................................................................................XXXIV 
United Nations.............................................................................................................. XXXV 
 IV 
European Union ..........................................................................................................XXXVI 
Inter-American System ...............................................................................................XXXVI 
African System ........................................................................................................... XXXVII 
Abbreviations............................................................................................. XXXVIII 
CHAPTER I............................................................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1 
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE .......................................................................................... 1 
1.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS..................................................................................... 2 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS................................................................... 9 
1.4 METHODOLOGY...................................................................................................14 
1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE THESIS TO THE EXISTING LITERATURE16 
1.6 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................18 
CHAPTER II ........................................................................................................ 19 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS- 
INDIVISIBLE OR SEPARABLE?....................................................................................19 
2.1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................19 
2.2 CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
.............................................................................................................................................20 
2.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS - ARE THERE ANY? ....28 
2.4 TRIPARTITE TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS ............................................34 
 V 
2.5 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................39 
CHAPTER III.......................................................................................................42 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM....................................................................42 
3.1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................42 
3.2. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS.......................42 
3.3 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ........................................44 
3.3.1 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION.............................48 
3.3.1.1 JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT METHODS OF 
INTERPRETATION ..............................................................................................50 
3.3.1.2 JUDICIAL ACTIVIST METHODS OF INTERPRETATION.........53 
3.4. THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS ................................................................58 
3.5 THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER.............................................................64 
3.6 THE COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS SYSTEM.................................................66 
3.7 INTERPRETATIVE METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTTEE 
ON SOCIAL RIGHTS....................................................................................................69 
CHAPTER IV .......................................................................................................75 
THE RIGHT TO SATISFACTORY DETENTION CONDITIONS AND THE 
RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN PRISONS ...................................................................75 
4.1 INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................75 
4.2 ARTICLE 3- PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, INHUMAN OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT ..............................................76 
4.3 THE CPT IN GENERAL AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORK OF THE 
COURT ..............................................................................................................................78 
 VI 
4.4 VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 BASED SOLELY ON POOR 
DETENTION CONDITIONS AS A RESULT OF DYNAMIC AND 
EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION .........................80 
4.5 EXECUTION OF THE JUDGEMENTS CONCERNING POOR 
DETENTION CONDITIONS ....................................................................................88 
4.6 THE CASE-LAW ON PROVIDING SATISFACTORY HEALTHCARE IN 
DETENTION ..................................................................................................................92 
4.7. EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING HEALTHCARE 
IN DETENTION............................................................................................................94 
4.8 THE CPT ON THE RIGHT TO HAVE SATISFACTORY DETENTION 
CONDITIONS AND ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN PRISONS ...99 
4.9 COULD THE DETENTION CONDITIONS BE DEALT WITH 
EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH THE WORK OF THE CPT? ...............................101 
4.10 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................104 
CHAPTER V....................................................................................................... 107 
THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT..................................................107 
5.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................107 
5.2 ARTICLE 8 OF THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................................................109 
5.3 EXECUTION OF THE ARTICLE 8 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL JUDGMENTS’
...........................................................................................................................................119 
5.4 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL CASES’ DECIDED UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
CONVENTION.............................................................................................................122 
5.5 EXECUTION OF ARTICLE 2 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL JUDGMENTS’.....126 
 VII 
5.6 CONCLUSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES DECIDED UNDER 
THE ECHR.....................................................................................................................127 
5.7 DISCUSSION ON ADOPTING AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................................................130 
5.8 THE ESC AND THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT........132 
5.9 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO A 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT...................................................................................134 
5.10 THE REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE ESC CONCERNING THE 
RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT........................................................137 
5.11 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................140 
CHAPTER VI ..................................................................................................... 143 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE.................................................................................143 
6.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................143 
6.2 THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE...................................144 
6.2.1 POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
CONVENTION.........................................................................................................145 
6.3 ARTICLE 2 AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN GENERAL ......145 
6.4 ARTICLE 2 AND THE ISSUE OF HEALTHCARE IN DETENTION...151 
6.5 ARTICLE 8 AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE ...................................153 
6.6 ARTICLE 3 DEPORTATION CASES IN THE HEALTHCARE 
CONTEXT......................................................................................................................157 
6.7 EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER AND THE RIGHT TO THE 
PROTECTION OF HEALTH....................................................................................161 
 VIII 
6.8 THE REPORTING PROCEDURE AND ARTICLE 11 OF THE ESC ....163 
6.9 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE...167 
6.10 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................171 
CHAPTER VII.................................................................................................... 173 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING................................................................173 
7.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................173 
7.2 THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING AND THE ECHR .................174 
7.3 CASE-LAW OF THE COURT ON THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE 
HOUSING ......................................................................................................................177 
7.3.1 THE FIRST GROUP OF CASES..................................................................177 
7.3.2 THE SECOND GROUP OF CASES...........................................................181 
7.3.3 THE THIRD GROUP OF CASES ...............................................................191 
7.3.4 THE CASE OF M.S.S V GREECE AND BELGIUM..............................196 
7.4 RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
SOCIAL CHARTER......................................................................................................199 
7.5 REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE ESC AND THE RIGHT TO 
HOUSING ......................................................................................................................200 
7.6 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS ON THE RIGHT TO HOUSING............205 
7.7 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................212 
7.8 CONCLUSION ON THE CHAPTERS IV, V, VI AND VII OF THE 
THESIS ............................................................................................................................213 
CHAPTER VIII .................................................................................................. 217 
 IX 
THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE COURT’S JUDGMENTS ................................217 
8.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................217 
8.2 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY..........218 
8.2.1 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HEALTHCARE IN 
PRISONS, HEALTHCARE IN GENERAL, AND HEALTHCARE FOR 
ASYLUM SEEKERS..................................................................................................220 
8.2.2 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT..........223 
8.2.3 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING........................225 
8.3 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................229 
CHAPTER IX ..................................................................................................... 230 
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT..............................................230 
9.1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................230 
9.2 THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT...................................232 
CHAPTER X....................................................................................................... 239 
CONCLUSION...................................................................................................................239 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 248 
Books.....................................................................................................................................248 
Book Chapters......................................................................................................................253 
Journal Articles.....................................................................................................................255 
Newspaper articles, speeches and web pages ..................................................................261 
 X 
Committee of Ministers Recommendations and Resolutions.......................................265 
Committee of Ministers, Current state of execution of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights ......................................................................................................267 
Committee of Ministers documents..................................................................................269 
Other Rules, Opinions, Reports and Recommendations ..............................................269 
 
 
 
 
 
 XI 
Acknowledgments 
 
It would not have been possible to write this doctoral thesis without the help and 
support of a lot of people, to only some I will give particular mention here. 
I would like to thank my supervisors at the University of Dundee, first of all to 
Professor Robin Churchill for his help, support and patience during the last three and a 
half years. I very much appreciate everything he has done in the course of the 
supervision of this thesis while his expertise and unsurpassed knowledge in the 
international law have never ceased to amaze me. I also wish to thank my two co-
supervisors. Professor Janet McLean’s advice, support and friendship have been 
invaluable on both an academic and a personal level, for which I am extremely grateful. 
Without her encouragement and belief in me my academic path might have been 
completely different. Finally, but not least, I would like to thank Padraig McAuliffe, who 
generously offered to be my second supervisor and helped me a great deal, both as a 
supervisor and as a friend. 
I must particularly thank Professor Miomir Matulović from the University of Rijeka, 
who discovered the beauty of academic work for me, believed in me, and who knew, 
sometimes even better than me, where I will find the necessary intellectual challenge. I 
am also grateful to Professors Ivan Padjen and Vesna Crnić Grotić for helpful 
discussions.  
Financial help I received from the Open Society Foundation, University of Rijeka and 
Faculty of Law Rijeka, have helped a great deal through this PhD ‘journey’, allowing me 
to worry only about the academic, and not financial, matters. Through the support I 
received from them I have been able to spend  periods of time working on my research 
and have been afforded opportunities  to present my research in progress to my peers at 
conferences. Due to their financial support, I visited Strasbourg and the European 
Court twice where I spent time with some amazing people, experts in the field and 
enjoyed in really challenging conversations.  
Occasionally, my arrival to Dundee was somewhat difficult, due to various natural 
disasters, but all this has been forgotten once I got to Dundee and had a nice talk with 
my colleagues and friends, Justin, Daniel, Genevieve and Luc. Not only have they saved 
me from trouble of looking for an accommodation but they have made me feel like 
 XII 
home while in Dundee. Special thanks go to Genevieve and Daniel for kindly agreeing 
to proof-read this thesis. 
I also thank my friends, Tihana, Lana, Lorena, Dea, Irena, Koraljka and numerous 
others who have provided me support and friendship that I needed, particularly during 
the lonely process of writing my thesis. Maybe unconventional, but I need to mention 
my dogs here, whose unconditional love and simplicity helped me remember the small 
things in life.  
As ever, my family have been there for me in different ways. I am very grateful for the 
support of my parents, Mirjana and Andrej, and other members of my family, some of 
which are unfortunately not with us anymore but are in my thoughts all the time. 
During the last three years it has not always been easy with me and I thank Vlado for 
sticking with me and supporting me when I have needed it the most.  
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my Mum, without whom I would not be half the 
person I am today.  
 XIII 
 
The candidate confirms that she is the author of the thesis and that the work submitted 
is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to 
the work of others. 
The work of which the thesis is a record has been done by the candidate and it has not 
been previously accepted for a higher degree.  
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that 
no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgment. 
 
© 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
 
Maša Marochini 
 
 XIV 
 
Abstract 
The main focus of this thesis is on the work of the European Court on Human Rights 
(the Court, ECtHR), namely on judgments by which the Court reads into the European 
Convention on Human Rights (the Convention, ECHR) rights with significant socio-
economic elements already guaranteed under the European Social Charter (the Charter, 
ECS) and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ECPT). Reading in such rights into the 
Convention raises numerous problems, from practical ones concerning the 
implementation of judgments and the increase of the Court’s workload, to the problem 
of the Court’s inconsistency and finally to this being a threat to the Court’s legitimacy. It 
will be argued that, despite the Court’s wide powers when interpreting the Convention 
rights, there are rights already guaranteed under different Council of Europe (CoE) 
instruments and the Court should not extend the scope of the Convention into these 
areas, nor does it have the legitimacy to do so.  
The thesis first sets out theoretical framework, research questions and methodology. 
The second chapter presents the current position of civil and political and economic 
and social rights within the regional and global human rights instruments. This will be 
followed by the theoretical approaches to differences among these two categories of 
rights, if any. The third chapter will be an introductory chapter to the European human 
rights system. In chapters IV, V, VI, and VII the case-law of the Court concerning 
judgments with significant socio-economic elements will be discussed. These chapters 
focus on four areas where this has happened: detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons, the environment, healthcare in general, and housing. These rights are not 
guaranteed under the Convention, but are under the ECPT and the ESC. After 
presenting the Court’s jurisprudence, the problems surrounding such Court’s practice 
will be analysed. Furthermore, it will be questioned whether the Convention is suitable 
for protection of these rights, since there are other European instruments under which 
these rights are guaranteed. For that reason, the practice of the CPT and the ECSR will 
be analysed to show that the protection of the above stated rights is better left for these 
mechanisms to deal with. Another problem is that the Court when delivering judgments 
with significant socio-economic elements is often not setting clear standards and is 
being inconsistent, creating even more uncertainty among states regarding their 
 XV 
obligations under the Convention. The inconsistency of the Courts reasoning in the 
case-law discussed in chapters IV-VII is discussed in chapter VIII. Chapter IX discusses 
the Court’s legitimacy in the context of the above mentioned issues. The final chapter 
concludes by summarising the findings in relation to the research questions. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. SETTING THE SCENE 
The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention, ECHR)1 is generally 
considered to be the most effective system in providing individual protection of civil 
and political rights. Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights (the Court, 
ECtHR), the body that deals with individual applications alleging violations of the 
Convention is overwhelmed with applications and takes years to deliver judgments. 
Furthermore, even after the judgments become final, it takes several years for some of 
them to be executed. Some of the reasons for this situation are the greater awareness of 
individuals of their rights; the enlargement of the Council of Europe (CoE) with the 
accession of Central and Eastern European states; and, most importantly for this thesis, 
the Court’s wide interpretation of Convention rights. The judges of the Court, when 
interpreting the Convention, can use either the self-restraint or the activist method of 
interpretation. In order for the Convention to be effective in the protection of rights, 
judges mainly resort to activist methods. On numerous occasions the Court stressed 
that the interpretation of the Convention text needs to be dynamic. Also, it has always 
been important to interpret the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ and to improve the 
protection of human rights in Europe by interpreting rights in a way that will make 
them practical and effective, instead of theoretical and illusory. However, the question 
that can be raised is whether interpreting Convention rights too extensively has only 
positive effects on the human rights protection or whether it might produce certain 
negative consequences. The Convention is intended to protect only the civil and 
political rights enumerated therein, to whose judicial protection states agreed when 
ratifying the Convention.   
At the time when the Convention was being drafted, the overall scepticism towards 
giving economic and social rights the same protection as civil and political rights within 
the CoE was due to implementation-based reasons. The latter related to the perception 
                                                 
1 The European Convention on Human Rights 1950, 87 UNTS 103; ETS 5.  
 2 
of the two sets of rights as fundamentally different in their normative character. Civil 
and political rights were considered ‘negative’ rights that impose obligations on states to 
refrain from action, precise, cost-free and subject to immediate implementation, 
whereas economic, social and cultural rights were regarded as ‘positive’ rights that 
impose obligations on states to take action, vague and resource-demanding rights 
subject to progressive realisation. This reflected a well-established view that civil and 
political rights were duties of restraint, preventing the state from interfering with 
individual freedom rather than casting positive duties on the state to act. 2   
However, nowadays it is acknowledged that it is not always possible to separate civil and 
political rights from economic and social rights. The Court has shown its awareness of 
this fact. For example, in Airey v Ireland it stated: “While the Convention sets forth what 
are essentially civil and political rights, many of them have implications of a social or 
economic nature. The Court considers … that the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social or economic rights should not be a 
decisive factor against such an interpretation [i.e. the interpretation of Article 6 
proposed by the Court]: there is no water-tight division separating out that sphere from 
the field covered by the Convention.”3 Nevertheless, despite this acknowledgment, the 
Convention was drafted with the intention that it should primarily protect civil and 
political rights. Separate instruments for the protection of economic and social rights 
have been drawn up by the CoE.  
 
 
1.2 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The main issues for this thesis are the problems that arise when the Court delivers 
judgments interpreting the Convention so as to read rights with significant socio-
economic elements into the Convention,4 especially where this leads the Court into 
                                                 
2 Ida Elisabeth Koch Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-economic Demands under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), 7. 
3 (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 305 [50]. 
4 On the inclusion of certain social and economic rights under the Convention see Colin Warbrick 
'Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights' in Mashood A. Baderin 
and Robert McCorquodale (eds) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007), 241; Eva Brems 
'Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights' in Daphne Barak-Erez and 
Aeyal M. Gross (eds) Exploring Social Rights Between Theory and Practice (Hart Publishing 2007); Ida Elisabeth 
Koch Human Rights as Indivisible Rights… (n 2); and Ellie Palmer ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights 
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areas that fall within the sphere of other CoE instruments, in particular the European 
Social Charter (the Charter, ECS)5 and the European Convention for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ECPT).6 The term 
'rights with significant socio-economic elements' is used in this thesis is to mean rights 
that are related to socio-economic rights and that are already guaranteed by the ESC and 
the ECPT but not explicitly by the Convention. The main characteristics of such rights 
are that their execution can only be achieved progressively with the expenditure of large 
financial resources and that they usually concern a large group of people, and not just 
one individual. 
The thesis focuses on four areas where the Court started interpreting the Convention so 
as to read rights with significant socio-economic elements therein: detention conditions 
and healthcare in prisons, the environment, healthcare in general, and housing. The 
reason for looking at the right to satisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons, the right to a healthy environment, the right to healthcare in general and the 
right to adequate housing is because there is a significant body of case law of the Court 
in these areas (as well as considerable experience with implementation of the judgments) 
and they are all rights that are found in the ESC and ECPT (unlike the socio-economic 
rights found in Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol 1). Despite the Court’s wide interpretative 
powers it cannot be said that the states could have reasonably expected that the Court 
would extend the Convention into these areas. It can be said that by reading in these 
right the Court not only widely interpreted Convention rights but started guaranteeing 
new rights already covered under other CoE instruments. 
It will be argued that the Court’s actions raise a number of concerns. They include both 
practical problems, notably in relation to the implementation of judgments and the 
Court’s workload, as well as issues such as the lack of consistency in the Court’s 
judgments and the legitimacy of the Court’s actions. Each of these points is developed 
in more detail below. It will be further argued that as the areas in question are already 
covered by the instruments referred to, each of which has an adequate compliance 
                                                                                                                                          
through the European Convention on Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2009) 2(4) Erasmus L.Rev. 397. 
5 Original ESC, opened for signature on 18 October 1961 and entered into force on 26 February 1965, 
ETS No. 035 and Revised ESC, opened for signature on 3 May 1996 and entered into force on 1 July 
1999, ETS No. 163. 
6 The ECPT, signed on 26 September 1987, entered into force on 1 February 1989, ETS No. 126. Text 
amended by Protocols No. 1 (ETS No. 151) and No. 2 (ETS No. 152). 
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mechanism, the Court should not extend the scope of the Convention any further into 
these areas.  
This issue is particularly important when it comes to the right to a healthy environment, 
the right to healthcare in general and the right to adequate housing which are already 
guaranteed under the ESC since not all States parties to the Convention have ratified the 
Charter nor have they all accepted provisions guaranteeing the right to health (which 
includes the right to a healthy environment) or the right to housing. Finally, only 15 of 
them have accepted the Collective Complaints Protocol.  
It is also appropriate to point out now that the choice of Article 3 and the right to 
satisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in prisons is rather different from the 
other areas discussed. Providing satisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons is not guaranteed under the ESC but under the ECPT. Also, for the cases 
concerning the detention conditions and healthcare in prisons the key socio-economic 
issues relate to the execution of the judgments (although, even detention conditions 
have some socio-economic normative elements) whereas for the others it relates to the 
normative content of the rights themselves. The issue of detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons on most occasions impacts the whole population of a detention 
centre and requires large financial expenditure and only through progressive 
implementation can the state improve the situation. This is the reason for an 
examination of Article’s 3 detention conditions and healthcare in prisons under this 
thesis, despite its considerable difference with the other rights discussed. 
The reason for not selecting the right to work is because the Court's case law is quite 
limited and the reason for not selecting the right to social security is because the cases 
are largely concerned with procedural issues under Article 6 and not with the substance 
of social security.7  
Looking back at the problematic issues stated above, regarding the implementation of 
judgments concerning the right to satisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in 
                                                 
7 See case Sidabras and Dziautas v Lihuania, App nos 55480/00 and 59330/00 (ECtHR, 27 July 2004) on 
the right to work in the context of the Article 8 right to respect for private life and Article 14 prohibition 
of discrimination. This case involved the dismissal and ban from access to public and private sector 
employment of the applicants for a period of ten years, because of their status as former agents of the 
KGB and where the Court was prepared to accept that the right to private life can encompass the 
applicants’ right to work. As to the cases concerning the right to social security see cases Feldbrugge v 
Netherlands (1986) 8EHRR 425, Schuler-Zraggen v Switzerland (1993) 16 EHRR 495, and Salesi v Italy (1993) 
26 EHRR 187.  
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prisons, the right to a healthy environment, the right to healthcare in general and the 
right to adequate housing, the execution of judgments concerning all these rights often 
brings considerable difficulties for the states concerned. In most cases, compliance with 
such judgments is financially demanding and time-consuming, and requires general, 
rather than individual, measures to be taken.  
Secondly, by reading socio-economic elements into many Convention rights, the Court 
encourages more applications, thereby adding to its already excessive workload. With 
the accession of Central and Eastern European states, the CoE now consists of 47 
Member States with 800 million citizens, all possible applicants to the Court.8 Despite 
the substantial increase in the Court’s productivity and its output in general, the caseload 
continues to rise considerably, putting the effectiveness and credibility of the 
Convention system in serious danger. In 2011 alone the total number of pending 
applications allocated to a judicial formation was 151, 600.9 So far, the scholars and the 
experts who have focused on the problem of the Court’s overload have looked at 
possible solutions within the Convention system itself. The main solution provided so 
far is Protocol 14 (discussed in chapter III below). However, Protocol 14 itself is not 
sufficient to solve the problem of the Court’s overload. Further solutions should be 
looked for outside the Convention, but within the CoE system. It will be argued later in 
the thesis that there are other CoE mechanisms besides the Court that could provide 
effective human rights protection for some of the matters currently dealt with by the 
Court, and that if the Court were to recognise and act upon this, it could lead to an 
appreciable decrease in the Court’s excessive caseload. 
The reading of socio-economic elements into Convention rights by the Court has been 
achieved through various interpretative methods. The right to have satisfactory 
detention conditions and healthcare in prison of a certain standard has mainly been 
introduced through the Court’s use of the living instrument doctrine. Although not 
using the term ‘living instrument’, it can be concluded that the Court started interpreting 
Article 3 in a way that unsatisfactory detention conditions can give rise to its violation 
                                                 
8 The number of applications is likely to increase further if/when the European Union becomes a party to 
the Convention. The accession of the EU to the ECHR became a legal obligation under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (see Article 6 (2)). The legal basis for the accession 
of the EU is provided for by Article 59 (2) ECHR, as amended by Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR. 
9 European Court of Human Rights, Statistics 2011, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/7B68F865-2B15-4DFC-85E5 
DEDD8C160AC1/0/Stats_EN_112011.pdf> accessed on 13 July 2012.  
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through the use of the living instrument doctrine.10 Another doctrine of interpretation 
used by the Court is the doctrine of effectiveness, which allows the judges to give the 
fullest weight and effect to the Convention. By using this doctrine the judges started 
introducing into the Convention rights already placed within the ESC, such as the right 
to a healthy environment, the right to healthcare and the right to adequate housing. It 
will be argued that when the Court has used these methods of interpretation in this way, 
it has not done so in a consistent manner. The degree of inconsistency is such as to 
create considerable uncertainty for the State parties as to the law and their obligations. 
In reading in rights with significant socio-economic elements that are already guaranteed 
under the ECPT and the ESC into various Convention provisions, the Court also 
threatens its legitimacy since one of the preconditions of its legitimacy is a commitment 
to the rule of law. Commitment to the rule of law must include things like an equal or 
impartial application of law, the predictability of law, and that law is applied in a non-
arbitrary way.11 The problematic issue in the context of judgments with significant socio-
economic elements that will be discussed in the thesis is the equal application of law and 
its predictability or the lack of it. While it is legitimate for the judges of the Court to 
interpret the Convention,12 in order for interpretation to stay within the ambit of 
legitimacy it should not read new rights into the Convention, but give meaning to 
existing rights. Furthermore, although not bound by precedents, the Court should 
deliver its judgments in a consistent manner. The Court threatens its legitimacy by 
imposing on states obligations that they have never signed up to, by often not setting 
clear standards when interpreting the Convention, and by being inconsistent in its 
judgments, thereby making it impossible for States parties to know their obligations 
under the Convention.  
                                                 
10 “Having regard to the fact that Convention is a ‘living instrument which must be interpreted in the light 
of present-day conditions’, the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as 
‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be classified differently in future. It takes 
the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights 
and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of 
the fundamental values of democratic societies.” Selmouni v France (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 403 [101]. By 
analogy we can conclude that what used to be interpreted by the Court only as unsatisfactory detention 
conditions without actual violation of Article 3 will in some cases nowadays be considered as violations of 
Article 3. 
11 Jeffrey A Brauch, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-2005) 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 113, 124. The Court itself 
also pointed out that it is in the interests of legal certainty, forseeability and equality before the law that it 
should not depart, without good reasons from its previous case-law. Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 
E.H.R.R. 18 [70]. 
12 Dragoljub Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law, An Essay on Judicial Creativity (Eleven 
International Publishing 2011); Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 
527. 
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It will be questioned in later chapters whether the Convention is suitable for protection 
of the rights considered in this thesis (the rights to satisfactory detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons, to a healthy environment, to healthcare of a certain standard, and 
to adequate housing), since there are other CoE instruments that address those rights, 
namely the ESC, with the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) as its principal 
compliance mechanism, and the ECPT, with the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) as 
its compliance mechanism. The practice of the ECSR and CPT will be analysed in later 
chapters in order to try to show that the protection of the above-mentioned rights is 
better left for these mechanisms to deal with.  
It is appropriate here to introduce the ESC and ECPT.13 The ESC, as it name suggests, 
is a treaty on economic and social rights that places obligations on states to guarantee 
the rights by which they have agreed to be bound.14 Not all State parties to the 
Convention have ratified the Charter, and only fifteen of them have ratified the 
Collective Complaints Protocol, which provides a quasi-judicial protection for Charter 
rights by means of a collective complaints procedure. In some aspects, through its 
interpretative methods, the Court has started guaranteeing rights already protected 
under the Charter and not by the Convention, and by doing so, it has started placing 
obligations with significant socio-economic elements on states to which they have not 
agreed when ratifying the Convention. The Court has also not taken sufficient account 
of the fact that not all State parties to the Convention are parties to the Charter, or to 
the Collective Complaints Protocol. The reason that some states have not (yet) accepted 
the Collective Complaints Protocol may be because they do not agree that economic 
and social rights are justiciable.  
The ECPT is not a treaty on economic and social rights but deals exclusively with 
Article 3 of the Convention, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. The ECPT established the CPT to supervise the treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the 
protection of such persons from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.15 The CPT regularly conducts visits to places of detention and examines 
                                                 
13 Discussion of the ESC will be relatively brief as it is dealt with in more detail in chapter III. 
14 Under the ESC States parties are not required to accept all the rights that it contains. This matter is 
explained further in chapter III.  
15 ECPT, Article 1. 
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whether persons deprived of their liberty are provided with satisfactory detention 
conditions and healthcare. The CPT, although a non-judicial body, has so far established 
numerous standards on detention conditions and healthcare in prisons that the states 
should comply with. It expects states to gradually bring their detention situations in 
conformity with those standards and regularly examines their progress. The Court has 
started using the CPT standards when finding whether a violation of Article 3 occurred 
in respect of detention conditions and healthcare in prisons. This has led to numerous 
new applications being made to the Court. Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers 
(CoM), when examining whether a state has executed a judgment concerning detention 
conditions or healthcare in prisons, looks mainly at the CPT reports or the state reports 
(usually sent both to the CPT and the CoM).  
Leaving the CPT to deal exclusively with those issues would in no way lesser the 
protection of these rights, since the CPT, despite being a non-judicial body, co-operates 
with states successfully and all member states of the CoE are also parties to the ECPT. 
Through its political pressure the CPT can and does prompt states into taking positive 
steps regarding detention conditions. Despite the non-binding character of CPT’s 
reports, states have shown a willingness to bring the situation in their detention centres 
into conformity with the CPT standards. As will be argued, whether the Court has 
delivered a binding judgment concerning detention conditions or the CPT has adopted 
a report does not make any difference when it comes to states bringing detention 
conditions into conformity with the required standards.  
In summary, what this thesis argues is that, instead of placing obligations on states 
concerning rights with significant socio-economic elements to which they have not 
agreed when signing the Convention and which are already protected by the ESC and 
the ECPT, the Court should focus on its primary obligation – protecting rights already 
guaranteed under the Convention – and leave the rights protected under other CoE 
instruments for the compliance mechanisms of those instruments to deal with. Despite 
the lack of judicial powers of those mechanisms, they can provide effective protection 
of rights guaranteed under their respective treaties. 
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1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The second chapter of the thesis will present the current position of civil and political 
and economic and social rights within regional and global human rights instruments. 
This presentation will be followed by a discussion of the theoretical approaches to 
differences between these two categories of rights, if any. Nowadays it is widely 
accepted among scholars that civil and political and economic and social rights are 
generally not different in their nature,16 and that both categories of rights can impose 
three different types of duties: to respect, to protect and to fulfil.17 This indivisibility 
among rights has also been proclaimed in conclusions of various human rights 
conferences.18 Although in theory the interconnection and indivisibility of all human 
rights have been stressed from the very beginning of the human rights discussion, in 
practice they have never been equally protected. The reasons for that kind of 
discrepancy will also be analysed. The situation with civil and political and economic and 
social rights within UN human rights system and the American, African and European 
regional systems will be presented to see the situation regarding the protection of rights 
within these systems.  
Since the first point of the research hypothesis is that it is undesirable for the Court to 
interpret the Convention so as to place obligations with socio-economic elements in 
relation to the rights in Articles 2, 3 and 8, a chapter on the protection of rights within 
the CoE is essential. Therefore, the third chapter will be an introduction to the 
Convention and the Court (including its working methods) and to the ESC and the 
ESCR. Since the CPT and the ECPT will only be analysed under chapter IV (on the 
                                                 
16 Theo van Boven, ‘Categories of Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli et al. (eds), International Human Rights Law 
(OUP 2010), 173; Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, ‘To Affirm the Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ in Yash Ghai and Jim Cottrell (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Practice, The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Interights 2004); and Craig Scott 
‘Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”’ (1999) 
21 Hum. Rts. Q. 633.  
17 Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University Press 1980), 52; 
Asbjørn Eide, UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, The Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right: 
Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, (1987) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23, 67–69. See also Asbjørn 
Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide et al. (eds) Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, A textbook (Kluwer Law International 2001), 23-24.  
18 Proclamation of Teheran, Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 22 
April to 13 May 1968, (1968) U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 [13]; UN General Assembly, The Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action from 1993, A/CONF.157/23, [5]; UN General Assembly, 2005 
World Summit Outcome: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1 [121]; UN 
General Assembly, Human Rights Council: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 3 April 
2006, A/RES/60/251, preamble [3]. 
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detention conditions and healthcare in prisons) the work of the CPT will be discussed in 
that chapter. The interpretative methods used by both the Court and the ESCR when 
delivering judgments and decisions will also be discussed, since it was exactly the use of 
activist interpretative methods that allowed the judges of the Court and the members of 
the ECSR to extend the scope of certain rights. Finally, in chapter III, the CoM, the 
body that monitors the execution of the Court’s judgments and of the ECSR decisions 
and conclusions, will be discussed. As will be seen, there have been numerous criticisms 
of the CoM’s work, both under the Convention and under the ESC system, since it is 
quite mild and non-critical as a supervisory body.  
There are several important issues in the context of the Court’s judgments with 
significant socio-economic elements that will be presented in the following chapters. In 
the discussion of the Court’s jurisprudence, the focus will be on three Convention 
rights, namely certain aspects of Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the right to 
freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and Article 
8 (the right to respect for private and family life and the home).  
First, in chapter IV the Court’s jurisprudence concerning Article 3 prohibiting torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment of the Convention will be 
analysed. Greatest attention will be given to detention conditions and the right to 
healthcare in prisons. The Court started interpreting Article 3 of the Convention so as 
to guarantee the right to have satisfactory detention conditions and the right to 
healthcare in prisons only from 2001 and there have been numerous cases since. 
Furthermore, the work of CPT will be examined and presented. The CPT now 
represents the most effective machinery for dealing with unsatisfactory detention 
conditions and healthcare in prisons. It will be argued that the way to deal with 
unacceptable detention conditions is through the work of the CPT instead of through 
the Court’s jurisprudence. Doing that would allow the Court to deal with the more 
serious and individualised cases of Article 3 violations and the CoM to focus on the 
execution of judgements that objectively can and must be examined more individually 
and speedily. Although this chapter does not deal directly with economic and social 
rights or with the ESC, this is rather an important issue to discuss. Violations of Article 
3 based solely on poor detention conditions or on unsatisfactory healthcare have 
numerous socio-economic elements. As will be seen, when the Court finds such a 
violation, those judgments generally apply not only to the individual applicant(s) 
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bringing the case, but to all persons in that (and similar) detention centres. Also, 
execution of these judgments usually has large budgetary implications and it takes years 
for the state to bring the situation into compliance with the judgments. On most 
occasions, the Court relies on the findings of the CPT, and the CoM does the same. So, 
instead of dealing with the large number of applications concerning healthcare and 
living conditions in detention, the Court would be better leaving these situations to the 
CPT which deals exclusively with those matters. This will also help to reduce the 
Court’s workload. 
Chapter V will look at the right to a healthy environment, first as dealt with through the 
Court jurisprudence. The Convention contains no explicit or implicit reference to the 
right to a healthy environment. In 2003 and 2009 the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights (CLAHR) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
stated that adding a protocol to the Convention on the right to a healthy environment 
was not a good idea.19 Nevertheless, the Court has through its jurisprudence, particularly 
on Article 8 of the Convention (and in certain situations on Article 2), started 
interpreting the Convention so as to include the right to a healthy environment. When 
the Court finds a violation of the right to a healthy environment under the Convention, 
execution of a judgment in its entirety usually requires the introduction of numerous 
general measures. The ESC also does not explicitly include the right to a healthy 
environment. Nevertheless, it does so implicitly under Article 11(3) of the Charter 
which obliges State parties to take appropriate measures to prevent, as far as possible, 
epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as well as accidents.20 This provision seems much 
more suitable for interpretation in such a way as to guarantee the right to a healthy 
environment than Articles 2 and 8 of the Convention. Already in its conclusions in the 
Reporting system, the ECSR started interpreting the Charter so as to guarantee the right 
to a healthy environment and this has continued in the ECSR decisions on collective 
complaints. Therefore, as will be argued, the right to a healthy environment is now, 
through the interpretation of the ECSR, included in the ESC. Consequently, the right to 
a healthy environment is more suitable and better placed under the ESC than the 
Convention. 
                                                 
19 Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Preparation on an additional protocol to The European Convention on 
Human Rights, on the right to a healthy environment’, Opinion, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human 
Rights, Doc. 9833, 19 June 2003; Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Preparation on an additional protocol to The 
European Convention on Human Rights, on the right to a healthy environment’, Opinion, Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 12043, 29 September 2009. 
20 Article 11(3) of the Revised ESC (n 5). Under the Original ESC there is no reference to accidents.  
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The chapter on the right to a healthy environment will be followed by a chapter on the 
right to healthcare. Just as with the right to a healthy environment, the Convention 
contains no reference to healthcare rights. Unlike the Convention, the ESC has an 
exhaustive provision on the right to healthcare, Article 11. It will be argued that the 
Court has shown much more reluctance when it comes to reading a right to healthcare 
into the Convention than it has in guaranteeing the right to satisfactory detention 
conditions, healthcare in prisons and the right to a healthy environment. The issue of 
providing a right to a healthcare has mainly been raised before the Court in relation to 
Article 2 of the Convention on the right to life, and sometimes in relation to Article 8 
and the Court has started giving indications that it might enter this sphere. It has also 
been raised under Article 3 deportation cases. Despite the fact that the ESC system, 
particularly the Collective Complaints procedure, is accepted by considerably fewer 
states than the Convention, this is not an area where the Court should enter, since the 
ECSR has so far proven to be successful in formulating clear standards regarding states’ 
obligations under Article 11 of the ESC, both in its conclusions under the Reporting 
system and in its decisions on collective complaints. 
In chapter VII, the right to adequate housing will be presented as another economic and 
social right. It is guaranteed under three provisions of the ESC, Articles 31, 23 and 16. 
Unlike the Charter, the Convention contains no guarantee on the right to adequate 
housing, but again the Court has started interpreting the Convention as though it might 
include a right to adequate housing. In this chapter the Court’s jurisprudence on right to 
adequate housing will be divided into three groups. The first group will represent the 
cases where the state was directly the cause of the applicant’s homelessness: these cases 
are not problematic or controversial. The second and the third groups of cases, which 
concern situations where homelessness resulted from, respectively, lawful actions by 
state bodies or the absence of positive measures by the state, are the problematic ones. 
Again, the Court has entered the socio-economic sphere and done so in a somewhat 
discretionary and inconsistent manner. The ECSR, on the other hand, has shown itself 
to be much more consistent and appropriate for dealing with the issues concerning the 
right to adequate housing. It has created certain standards that it applies through its 
conclusions under the reporting system and decisions on collective complaints. Unlike 
the Court, it does not approach the issue on a case by case basis, but deals with it on a 
more consistent level.  
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The right to life, the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment and the right 
to private life, family life, home and correspondence are traditional civil and political 
rights. Although progressive interpretation of Convention rights is generally to be 
welcomed, there are certain problematic issues arising out of giving those rights a socio-
economic dimension through interpretation. Within all the four chapters on the 
Convention provisions summarised above, the work of the CoM will also be analysed. 
The CoM reports on the state of the execution of judgments with significant socio-
economic elements will be presented since they represent a clear indicator of the 
progressive nature of these judgments and their strong budgetary implications. It will 
also be suggested that, regardless of whether the CoM supervises the execution of a 
binding judgment or of a non-binding decision of the ECSR, the pressure that it places 
on states does not differ much and in both cases is weak.   
The problems of the uncertainty and inconsistency of the Court’s case-law will be 
presented in chapter VIII. The emphasis will be on the cases analysed in chapters IV, V, 
VI and VII where the judges of the Court widely used their interpretative powers and 
through the use of these powers started placing obligations on states to which they have 
not agreed when signing the Convention and which have significant socio-economic 
elements. By doing that, the Court made it hard or even impossible for the States parties 
to know their obligations under the Convention. This uncertainty is further enhanced by 
the Court’s inconsistency when reaching different conclusions in cases with similar 
factual situations. The problem of inconsistency is least problematic in cases concerning 
unsatisfactory detention conditions and the healthcare in prisons. On the other hand, in 
the cases concerning the right to a healthy environment and the right to adequate 
housing, inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning is quite visible and problematic.  The 
Court’s inconsistency is therefore only creating even more uncertainty within the states 
regarding their obligations under the Convention and as such, it will be analysed.  
Finally, in chapter IX legitimacy issues concerning the reading into the Convention of 
new rights with significant socio-economic elements by the Court will be analysed. 
Legitimacy is an extremely important attribute for legal institutions like the Court. The 
Court relies on its legitimacy to gain respect for and observance of its judgements by 
States parties to the Convention. In discussing and analysing issues of legitimacy, five 
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models of legitimacy will be used, following the approach of Joshua L. Jackson.21 Those 
are: formal legitimacy, procedural legitimacy, social legitimacy, normative legitimacy, and 
legal legitimacy. As will be seen, the most endangered nowadays is the procedural 
legitimacy since it depends on a function being publicly perceived as legalistic. With the 
Court reading significant socio-economic elements into Convention rights in ways that 
duplicate other CoE instruments and by doing so inconsistently, the procedural 
legitimacy of the Court, dependent on a commitment to the rule of law, is brought into 
question.  
 
1.4 METHODOLOGY 
The approach to the issues dealt with in this thesis has been a practical and pragmatic 
one, based on a largely positivist philosophy of law. The methodology used in 
researching and writing this thesis has, not surprisingly, been the traditional desk-top, 
library-based approach used by many positivist legal scholars. In particular, no empirical 
research has been carried. It might have been desirable, for example, to test the 
hypothesis of this thesis by interviewing judges of the European Court of Human 
Rights. However, even if the judges had been willing to be interviewed in this way 
(which may be doubtful), this was not a practical possibility for reasons of time and 
cost. The lack of interviews with the judges is mitigated by the fact that many of them 
have publicly expressed their views on many of the matters discussed in this thesis both 
judicially (in separate and dissenting opinions) and extra-judicially (in academic writings). 
These materials are drawn on at appropriate points in the thesis. In general, the 
materials used in this thesis are those in the public domain and, for practical reasons, are 
confined largely to those written in English. 
The primary sources used for writing this thesis included, above all, the relevant 
jurisprudence of the Court on the right to satisfactory detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons, the right to a healthy environment, the right to healthcare and the 
right to adequate housing. In addition, relevant CPT general reports and reports to 
states were examined, together with the relevant provisions of the ESC, and the ECSR 
conclusions under the Reporting system and its decisions on collective complaints 
                                                 
21 Joshua L. Jackson, ‘Note: Broniowski v Poland: A Recipe for Increased Legitimacy of the European 
Court of Human Rights as a Supranational Constitutional Court’ (2006-2007) 39 Conn .L. Rev. 759.  
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relating thereto. Furthermore, reports of the CoM on the execution of the Court’s 
judgements were analysed, as well as the CoM’s resolutions and recommendations on 
the conclusions and decisions of the ESCR. Useful statistics regarding the Convention 
system and the ESC system were found on the CoE’s website.22 This website also 
contained a lot of helpful information regarding the work of the Court, ESCR and the 
CoM. 
Turning to secondary sources, the authors whose books and articles were found 
particularly helpful when researching the Convention and the ESC system in general as 
well as their specific provisions included A. Mowbray,23 P. Leach,24 D.J. Harris, M. 
O’Boyle and C. Warbrick,25 M.W. Janis, R.S. Kay and A.W. Bradley,26 F.G. Jacobs, 
R.C.A. White and C. Ovey,27 S. Greer,28 U. Khaliq and R. Churchill,29 M. Langford, 30A. 
Nolan,31 D.J. Harris and J. Darcy,32and G. de Burca and B. de Witte33. The thoughts and 
                                                 
22 CoE’s website <http://www.coe.int/> accessed 13 July 2012.  
23 Alastair Mowbray, Cases and Materials on The European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed, OUP 2007); 
Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004); and Alastair Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 57. 
24 Philip Leach, Taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights (3rd ed, OUP 2011); Philip Leach, Helen 
Hardman, Svetlana Stephenson and Brad K. Blitz, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations - An 
analysis of pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and their impact at national level (Intersentia 2010). 
25 David Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (2nd 
ed, OUP 2009). 
26 Mark W. Janis, Richard S. Kay and Anthony W. Bradley, European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials 
(3rd ed, OUP 2008). 
27 Robin C.A. White and Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed, OUP 2010). 
28 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (CoE 2000); Steven Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and 
Prospects (CUP 2006). 
29 Urfan Khaliq and Robin Churchill, ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular 
Challenge?’ in Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy 
(CUP 2012); Urfan Khaliq and Robin Churchill, 'The European Committee of Social Rights: putting flesh 
on the bare bones of the European Social Charter’ in Malcolm Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence, 
Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2008); Robin Churchill and Urfan Khaliq, 
'Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Current Use and Future Potential of the 
Collective Complaints Mechanism of the European Social Charter' in Baderin and McCorquodale (eds), (n 
4); and Robin Churchill and Urfan Khaliq, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social 
Charter, An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?’ (2004) 
15(3) Eur.J.Int.Law 417.  
30 Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence… (n 29); and Aoife Nolan, Bruce Porter and Malcolm Langford, 
The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal (Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice Working Paper Series No. 14, New York University and the Committee on Administration of 
Justice Northern Ireland 2007). 
31 Aoife Nolan, ‘“Aggravated violations”, Roma housing rights and forced expulsions in Italy: recent 
developments under the European Social Charter collective complaints system’ (2011) 11(2) H.R.L.Rev. 
343; Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 29); and Aoife Nolan ‘Addressing economic and social rights 
violations by non-state actors through the role of the state: a comparison of regional approaches to the 
“obligation to protect”’ (2009) 9(2) H.L.R.Rev. 225. 
32 David Harris and John Darcy, The European Social Charter (Ardsley N.Y. 2001). 
33 Grainne de Burca and Bruno de Witte, Social Rights in Europe (OUP 2005). 
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opinions of A. Eide,34 H. Shue,35 I.E. Koch,36 and S. Fredman37 on important theoretical 
issues, particularly regarding the difference between economic and social rights and civil 
and political rights, were also of great help. As to the interpretative methods used by the 
European Court and related issues of legitimacy, the opinions and writings of 
acknowledged political and legal philosophers and theorists, such as T. Franck,38 G. 
Letsas,39 D. Popović,40 J.L. Jackson,41 P. Mahoney42 and others, were of great use.  
 
 
1.5 RELATIONSHIP OF THE THESIS TO THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
The contribution of this thesis to the existing literature is that it deals with some issues 
that have not been examined in the existing literature on the Convention system. The 
authors mentioned above do not question the legitimacy of the Court in interpreting the 
Convention as to new, positive obligations with significant socio-economic elements. 
Of course, there are authors that discuss the Court’s legitimacy43 as well as the authors 
that write on the development of positive obligations under the Convention, and even 
on positive obligations with socio-economic elements, but none of them argue that 
those issues are interconnected and problematic.  
In his book, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, Alastair Mowbray writes on the development 
of positive obligations through the Court’s interpretation of Convention rights. This 
book provides an extremely good guide to the Court’s case-law on positive obligations. 
However, it does not deal specifically with judgments having significant socio-economic 
elements nor does it question the negative consequences of delivering such judgments. 
Furthermore, Mowbray does not look at the process or difficulties of implementing 
                                                 
34 Eide et al. (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A textbook (n 17). 
35 Shue (n 17). 
36 Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights… (n 2). 
37 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008). 
38 Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (OUP 1990); and Thomas Franck, ‘Why a Quest 
for Legitimacy?’ (1987-1988) 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 535. 
39 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2009). 
40 Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12); and Dragoljub Popović ‘Prevailing of 
Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2008-2009) 42 Creighton L. Rev. 361. 
41 Jackson (n 21).  
42 Paul Mahoney, ‘Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: two 
sides of the same coin’ (1990) 11 Hum.Rts.L.J. 57. 
43 Jackson (n 21); Basak Cali, Anne Koch and Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of the European Court of Human 
Rights: The view from the ground (UCL 2010); Brauch (n 11).  
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those judgments. Also, this book dates from 2004 and so predates much of the 
jurisprudence discussed in this thesis.  
Another author whose publications somewhat relate to this thesis is Ida Elisabeth Koch, 
particularly her book Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-economic 
Demands under the European Convention on Human Rights. This book consists of some 
general remarks on how the Court started including protection of economic and social 
rights under the Convention. She includes the right to housing and the right to health in 
her analysis, but there is no mention of the right to a healthy environment or of the 
rights to satisfactory detention conditions or healthcare in detention. Moreover, she 
does not question or analyse the consequences of the Court reading in rights with socio-
economic elements within the Convention, nor does she think that such a development 
might not be a good idea. Furthermore, like Mowbray, she does not consider or 
question the legitimacy of this development.  
Dimitris Xenos has also written a book on the positive obligations of states entitled The 
Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights.44 Xenos takes a 
different approach from Mowbray in his book on positive obligations and is much more 
critical; however, his approach is also rather different from that of this thesis. He does 
not focus on the difference between economic and social rights and civil and political 
rights as this thesis does, nor does he discusses other human rights instruments within 
the CoE that might be better suited for the protection of certain categories of rights. 
Also, his approach is more theoretical with no focus on the practical problems arising 
out of imposing positive obligations on states and without an exhaustive overview of 
the Court’s judgments, particularly those with socio-economic elements. Finally, there is 
no discussion, at least not as detailed as in this thesis, of the Court’s interpretative 
methods and of the legitimacy issues related thereto.  
Dragoljub Popović, a judge of the European Court of Human Rights, in his book, The 
Emergence of the European Human Rights Law, An Essay on Judicial Creativity,45 gives an 
exhaustive overview of the Court's creativity and its interpretative methods, both the 
activist and the self-restraint ones. However, this book does not give special attention to 
judgments with significant socio-economic elements that are given the greatest attention 
                                                 
44 Dimitris Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights (Routledge 
2011). 
45 Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12). 
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in this thesis nor does it question the legitimacy of the Court's work. 
Finally, none of the authors mentioned in this section look into the possible alternatives 
within the CoE for the protection of rights, nor do they look at what happens after the 
judgment becomes final and gets to the execution stage. Therefore, the work of the 
CoM when supervising the execution of judgments or the other instruments within 
Europe envisaged for human rights protection that might be better placed for 
protection of rights with socio-economic elements are not analysed or questioned in any 
of the literature that deals with issues similar to this thesis.  
 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
To sum up: this thesis looks at those traditional civil and political rights that have been 
interpreted by the Court in such a manner that they now include significant socio-
economic elements. After analysing and questioning the interpretation by the Court of 
the rights concerned and presenting possible alternatives for their protection in chapters 
IV-VII, it will be argued in the following chapters that this development in 
interpretation by the Court has produced excessive uncertainty and inconsistency and 
has imposed obligations on states that they never accepted when ratifying the 
Convention, and that consequently this has undermined the Court’s legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER II 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS- INDIVISIBLE OR SEPARABLE? 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyse the differences between economic and social rights and civil 
and political rights. It will be argued that, despite the indivisibility between the two 
categories of rights being nowadays so often stressed, the fact is that in practice they are 
still far from being indivisible. Later on through the thesis, in chapters IV-VII, the 
Court’s reading significant socio-economic elements into various Convention rights will 
be analysed. There are several reasons for this approach by the Court being inadvisable, 
and one of these reasons is the fact that economic and social rights and civil and 
political rights are still separated, particularly when it comes to states’ acceptance of their 
justiciability. Although numerous proclamations of their indivisibility and 
interdependence have been made, only one regional human rights document, namely 
the African Charter, makes no distinction between rights.46  States often oppose giving 
economic and social rights the same level of protection as to civil and political rights. 
Securing these entitlements is likely to require either increased government expenditures 
or increased governmental regulation of the economy.47 
Traditionally, human rights have been divided into three categories or generations of 
rights. According to this, civil and political rights were considered to be ‘first generation’ 
rights, economic and social ‘second generation’ rights, whereas the ‘third generation’ 
                                                 
46 On the international level the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN General Assembly, Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1577, p. 3), the 
Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination against Women (UN General 
Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 December 
1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13), and the Convention on Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 660, p. 195) are examples of 
instruments where both sets of rights are found side by side. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (2000/C 364/01) also makes no distinction between civil and political and economic 
and social rights. 
47 Philip Harvey, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and Social Rights 
Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 364, 368. 
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rights were rights of solidarity.48 This was due to the fact that at the beginning of the 
human rights era there existed in legal theory a well-established view that civil and 
political rights were duties of restraint, preventing the state from interfering with 
individual freedom rather than casting positive duties on the state to act. As such, they 
were thought to be more appropriate for judicial resolution than economic and social 
rights. Protection by the state against want or need was to be assigned to the realm of 
policy, and economic and social rights to the realms of aspiration. However, nowadays, 
in theory, there is the recognition of the unity of civil and political rights with economic 
and social rights. Nevertheless, this recognition of their unity is more theoretical then 
practical. Although numerous authors keep stressing their interconnection, indivisibility 
and interdependence,49 in reality the situation is different and the conclusion that these 
two groups of rights are no longer separable is rather premature.50  
Nevertheless, the classic distinction between civil and political rights as negative and 
determinate rights that have no budgetary implications and are appropriate for 
immediate implementation, while economic and social rights as positive and vague 
rights that are financially demanding and can be only achieved progressively, is no 
longer acceptable.51 In this chapter the current debate over the distinction between civil 
and political rights and economic and social rights will be presented. First, the way in 
which the two categories of rights are given effect to in regional and global instruments 
will be analysed. This will be followed by an exploration of the more theoretical debates 
over the nature of the two sets of rights. It will be shown that although they might be 
indivisible in theory, they are still rather separate in practice.  
 
2.2 CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
RIGHTS IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
One of the most explicit proclamations of indivisibility of civil and political and 
economic and social rights is contained in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action from 1993 which states: “Human Rights are (…) indivisible, interdependent and 
                                                 
48 The proposal for three generations of rights can be found in Karel Vasek, ‘A 30-Year Struggle: The 
Sustained Efforts to give Force of Law to the UDHR’ (1977) 30(11) UNESCO Courier 29. 
49 Van Boven (n 16) 173-188; An-Na’im (n 16); and Fredman, Human Rights Transformed… (n 37) 66-91. 
50 Khaliq and Churchill, ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular Challenge? (n 29). 
51 See Eide, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ (n 17).  
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interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and 
equal manner, on the same footing and with the same emphasis (…).”52  This viewpoint 
dates back to the 1948 United Nations (UN) resolution when UN Declaration of 
Human Rights was adopted. What is interesting is that this line of thinking was stated 
even when the UN General Assembly in the Separation Resolution decided to separate 
the rights and bring two covenants, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), 1966.  However, both of these documents declare in their preambles 
that the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights is a prerequisite for all human 
rights. Later on, this viewpoint has been restated in the Proclamation of Teheran, 
adopted as the final act of the first international conference on human rights: “Since 
human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and 
political rights without the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights is 
impossible. The achievement of lasting progress in the implementation of human rights 
is dependent upon sound and effective national and international policies of economic 
and social development.”53   
The next proclamation was the above quoted proclamation from the Vienna world 
conference and the Final Document from the 2005 World Summit reaffirmed this 
statement.54 Again, in 2006 the UN General Assembly Resolution, when establishing the 
Human Rights Council, stated in the preamble “that all human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and that all human 
rights must be treated in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the 
same emphasis.”55 Despite all these proclamations, civil and political rights are still most 
often placed under a different document than economic and social rights and their 
compliance mechanism is almost never the same. 
On the international level, the ICCPR has been ratified by all the major states except 
China showing that protection of civil and political rights is widely accepted 
worldwide.56 It has a monitoring body, the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a body of 
                                                 
52 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action from 1993 (n 18) [5]. 
53 Proclamation of Teheran (n 18) [13]. 
54 2005 World Summit Outcome (n 18) [121]. 
55 Human Rights Council: resolution (n 18), preamble [3]. 
56 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171. See more on the webpage of the ICCPR: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 13 July 2012; and in Sarah Joseph, Jenny 
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independent experts that monitors implementation of the ICCPR by its State parties. All 
States parties are obliged to submit regular reports to the HRC on how the rights are 
being implemented. States must report initially one year after acceding to the ICCPR 
and then whenever the HRC requests (usually every four years). The HRC examines 
each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the State party in the 
form of “concluding observations”.  
In addition to the Reporting procedure, Article 41 of the ICCPR provides for the HRC 
to consider inter-state complaints. The system of inter-state complaints operates on the 
basis of reciprocity. Furthermore, the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR57 gives the 
HRC competence to examine individual complaints with regard to alleged violations of 
the ICCPR by States parties to the Protocol. 
On the other hand, the ICESR protects economic, social and cultural rights.58 It is 
important to point out that the ICESCR has not been ratified by the United States of 
America (USA). There is a great reluctance of the USA towards giving economic and 
social rights legal status since it considers civil and political rights as the only “real” 
rights.59 This approach is sometimes visible even with the states that have ratified the 
ICESCR, like the United Kingdom, on which the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its Observations in 1997, 2002 and 2009 stated that the 
Covenant has still not been incorporated into the domestic legal order and cannot be 
directly invoked before the courts. The CESCR also pointed out its regrets regarding the 
statement made by the UK’s delegation that economic, social and cultural rights are 
mere principles and values and that most of the rights contained in the ICESCR are not 
                                                                                                                                          
Schultz and Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (2nd ed, OUP 2004). 
57 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 
21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force on 
March 23, 1976. 
58 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3. See more on the webpage of the ICESCR: 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm> accessed 13 July 2012. 
59 Manisuli Ssenyonjo, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 2009), 15; 
“Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are at best goals and not guarantees or entitlements, and the 
working of the free market is the best and fastest way to achieve these development goals.” The US 
spokesperson in the Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to Development Report of the Open-Ended 
Working Group on the Right to Development 20 March 2001, UN Doc E/CN4/2001/26, p.46 [8]. See more in 
Philip Alston, ‘Putting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights back on the Agenda of the United States’ in 
William F. Schulz (ed), The Future of Human Rights, U.S. Policy for a New Era (University of Pennsylvania 
Press 2009). 
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justiciable.60 Unlike the USA, the UK has accepted economic and social rights as actual 
rights and not only goals, however, it is argued by the UK government that they differ 
in nature form civil and political rights.61 
The ICESCR, unlike the ICCPR, does not require states to take immediate steps 
regarding the full realisation of the rights contained in it, but it urges contracting parties 
to “take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”62  Therefore, unlike in the ICCPR, the realization of the rights enshrined in it 
is not immediate, but progressive. Despite this provision the CESCR has in its General 
Comments declared certain rights to be of immediate effect and in relation to other 
rights certain steps to begin to realise the right must be taken within a reasonable time 
of a state becoming a party to the ICESCR (see infra section 2.3.). As a monitoring body 
the IESCR has the CESCR which is a body of independent experts that monitors the 
implementation by its States parties. All States parties are obliged to submit regular 
reports to the CESCR on how the rights are being implemented. States must report 
initially within two years of accepting the ICESCR and thereafter every five years. The 
CESCR examines each report and addresses its concerns and recommendations to the 
State party in the form of “concluding observations”.  
In June 2008 the UN Human Rights Council adopted the Optional Protocol to the 
ICESCR63 which provides for the CESCR to receive communications from individuals 
or groups claiming to be victims of any rights in the ICESCR. The Optional Protocol is 
not in force yet as it needs ten ratifications and so far it has obtained eight.64 
                                                 
60 CESCR, Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, May 2009, 
E/C.12/GBR/CO/5 [12] and [13]; CESCR, Report on the twenty-eight and twenty-ninth session, 
CESCR E/2003/22 [214]; CESCR, Report on the sixteen and seventeen sessions, CESCR E/1998/22 
[293].    
61 The same approach is expressed by the Polish government. See CESCR, Fifth Periodic Report of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc E/C.12/GBR/5 [71]- [75];  CESCR, 
Fifth Periodic Report of Poland, UN Doc E/C.12/POL/5; and CESCR, Concluding Observations: 
Poland, E/C.12/POL/CO/5, 2 December 2009 [8]. 
62 ICESCR, Article 2(1). 
63 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted by 
the Resolution A/RES/63/117, on 10 December 2008. 
64 Spain, Slovakia, Mongolia, El-Salvador, Ecuador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bolivia and Argentina (on 
May 2012). 
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Therefore, the UN system has, in its main human rights instruments- the ICESCR and 
the ICCPR, strictly separated economic and social from civil and political rights, by 
protecting them within two different instruments and with two different monitoring 
bodies. The form of monitoring is the same, or at least it will be when the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR enters into force. Thus the crucial difference remains that 
rights in the ICCPR are of immediate application, whereas those in the ICESCR are 
progressive. It also needs to be pointed out that the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women contain both civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights. 
However, these examples do not undermine the dominant pattern of separation existent 
in the main UN human rights instruments, the ICCPR and the ICESCR.  
Within the CoE system, civil and political rights are also separated from economic and 
social rights. The ECHR, a document on civil and political rights, consists of all 47 
Member States of the CoE and all those states are now under the jurisdiction of the 
Court that can deliver binding judgments concerning those states. With economic and 
social rights the situation is somewhat different. Forty three Member States of the CoE 
have ratified either the Original or the Revised ESC. Ratification of the ESC does not 
oblige them to accept the jurisdiction of the ECSR in Collective Complaints procedure, 
as the ratification of the ECHR does for the jurisdiction of the Court. Ratification of the 
ESC only obliges states to make reports to the ECSR on their implementation of the 
accepted provisions of the ESC. It is left for the states to decide whether they accept the 
Collective Complaint procedure that authorises the ECSR to adopt decisions, which 
although not judicial, do have a quasi-judicial character. Unfortunately, up until October 
2012 only 15 State parties to the ESC have accepted the Collective Complaints 
Protocol.65 Furthermore, the ESC permits its State parties not to accept all the rights it 
contains. More details on both the ECHR and the ESC will be given in the following 
chapter, but what one can see is that the acceptance of regional supervision of civil and 
political rights is widely accepted, while the same cannot be said for economic and social 
rights. Both the ESC and the ECHR and their mechanisms for human rights protection 
will be further elaborated in the thesis.  
                                                 
65 Those are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden. It is interesting that the United Kingdom has not 
accepted the Collective Complaints Procedure which also shows its attitude towards the legal status of 
economic and social rights.  
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The Inter-American and the African regional systems will now be briefly presented. 
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights66 is governed by three 
legal instruments: the Charter of the Organization of American States (the OAS 
Charter), the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American 
Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR) (with its additional Protocols). 67 In the human 
rights area the most important legal document, the one that constitutes a directly 
binding treaty, is the AmCHR. 
The AmCHR was adopted in 1969 and it entered into force almost ten years later, in 
1978. The same year when the AmCHR was adopted it was decided to establish the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (I-ACtHR), but the Court also came into effect 
in 1978 and began to operate when its Statute was established in the year 1980.68 The 
AmCHR divides the protected rights into two categories under separate chapters, where 
chapter II declares civil and political rights and chapter III economic, social and cultural 
rights.69 However, the AmCHR actually consists of mainly civil and political rights, since 
twenty three of the AmCHR’s twenty four protected rights fall under the civil and 
political rights chapter. The AmCHR contains only reference to economic, social and 
cultural rights in Article 26. Furthermore, the structure of this Article clearly shows it is 
                                                 
66 For more on the Inter-American system and particularly on the protection of economic and social 
rights see Elizabeth Strenio, The Inter-American Human Rights System (Human Rights Education Association 
2003); Ariel Dulitzky, ‘The Inter-American System Fifty Years Later: Time for Changes’ (2011) (special 
edition) Quebec Journal of International Law 127; Lax Lucas Lixinski, ‘Treaty interpretation by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: expansion at the service of the unity of international law’ (2010) 21(3) 
E.J.I.L 585; Veronica Gomez, 'Economic, Social and Cultural Right in the Inter-American System' in 
Baderin and McCorquodale (eds) (n 4); Tara Melish, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-
American System: A Manual on Presenting Claims (Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights, 
Yale Law School and Centro de Derechos Economicos y Sociales, Ecuador 2002); and Monica Feria 
Tinta, 'Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System of Protection 
of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and Notions' (2007) 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 433. 
67 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador”, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), entered into force 
November 16, 1999, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 67 (1992) and the Protocol to the American Convention on 
Human Rights Relative to the Abolition of Death Penalty (1990) O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 73 (1990), not 
in force yet. 
68 See more on the web page of the Inter-American Human Rights System at 
<http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413> accessed 13 July 2012. Also see Melish (n 66), 10-14; 
Ramirez Cleves, G.A., ‘The Interamerican system for the protection of human rights and a reflection of 
the Colombian situation’, at: 
<http://www.eplo.eu/alfaII/docs/The%20Interamerican%20System%20for%20the%20Protection%20o
f%20Human%20Rights,%20and%20a%20Reflection%20of%20the%20Colombian%20Situation.pdf> 
accessed 13 July 2012, pp. 3-4; David Marcus, ‘The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights 
through Supranational Adjudication’ (2006) 42 StanJIntL 53, 80-84. 
69 American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into 
force on 18 July 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American 
System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992). 
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not intended for protection on the same level as civil and political rights since it urges 
states “to adopt measures…with a view of achieving progressively… the full realization 
of the rights.”70  
The primary organs of the Inter-American human rights system are the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (I-AComHR) and the I-ACtHR.  
The Additional Protocol in the Matter of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Protocol of San Salvador) has been adopted and its aim is to fill in the gap from the 
AmCHR regarding economic and social rights. The Protocol has been ratified by only 
15 of the 24 parties to the AmCHR. It was designed to change the situation with 
economic, social and cultural rights within the AmCHR system. However, under Article 
19(6) of the Protocol the only right to organize trade unions (as set out under Article 
8(1)(a)) and the right to education (as set out under Article 13) are subject to the 
contentious jurisdiction of the I-ACtHR and the I-AComHR. The judicial protection of 
economic and social rights is still largely underdeveloped and the Inter-American 
judicial protection of economic and social rights has not generally involved express 
reliance upon, and enforcement of, economic and social rights under the AmCHR, its 
Protocols and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.71  
The African human rights system is the newest regional system and it is considerably less 
developed than the American and the European systems. It is based on the AfCHPR (or 
Banjul Charter),72 which entered into force in October 1986. Today, the AfCHPR has been 
ratified by all fifty-three members of the Organisation of African Union (OAU).73 In June 
1998, the OAU adopted the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
                                                 
70 Article 26 of the AmCHR. 
71 For the opportunities on judicial and other types of protection of socio-economic rights within the 
Inter-American system see: Melish (n 66), 41-52. Also in its case-law on the rights indigenous people the 
I-ACtHR has interpreted various civil and political rights (like the right to life) to give protection to a 
range of socio-economic rights and interests (like the right to food, the right to education and the right to 
health care). See Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment of 24 August 2010, Series C No. 
214. 
72 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5 (1981). 
73 The African Charter was adopted in 1981 by the 18th Assembly of Heads of State and Government of 
the OAU, the official body of the African states. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was 
established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, on signature of the OAU Charter by representatives of 32 
governments.  
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Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights.74 The 
OAU was transformed in 2002 into the African Union (AU).75  
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) has specific characteristics 
that distinguish it from the AmCHR and ECHR in order to satisfy the specific needs of 
Africa. First of all, the AfCHPR reflects the wish of Member States of the OAU to 
maintain their distance from both the East and the West in their conception of the 
ideological function of human rights. Furthermore, the AfCHPR adopts a dialectic 
approach by correlating rights with corresponding duties.  Also, according to the AfCHPR, 
the realization of individual rights can find its fullest expression and fulfilment only within 
the context of the community. And finally, the AfCHPR adopted an integrated approach 
to human rights, placing the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights on the 
same footing as civil and political rights.76  
The institutional framework concerning human rights of the AU consists of the assembly 
of Heads of State and Government which is the supreme organ of the AU. Furthermore, 
there are the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfComHR) and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCtHPR).  
The AfCtHPR has the competence to take final and binding decisions on human rights 
violations. Currently there are twenty six AU Member States that have ratified the 
Protocol establishing the Court.77 Despite the AfCtHPR, the AfComHPR still remains 
important in the individual complaints process since it has the role of taking the case to 
the AfCtHPR (only the AfComHPR and the States have automatic locus standi before the 
AfCtHPR). The AfComHPR has, through its work, even read certain economic and 
social rights into the AfCHPR, like the right to adequate housing and the right to 
                                                 
74 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African 
Court on Human and  Peoples' Rights, Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the  Organization 
of African Unity, Ougadougou, Burkina Faso, June  1998, OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.(1) Rev.2. 
75 Constitutive Act of the African Union, CAB/LEB/23.15 (26 May 2001). 
76 B. Obinna Okere ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and American System’ (1984) 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 
141, 145. See more in Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle The African Human Rights System, Its Laws, Practice, and 
Institutions (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001); Cristof Heyns ‘The African Regional Human Rights 
System: The African Charter’ (2003-2004) 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 679; and Makau W. Mutua ‘The African 
Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 342. 
77 AfCtHPR <http://www.african-court.org/en/> accessed 13 July 2012. 
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health.78 On the other hand, up until May 2012 there have not been many judgments of 
the AfCtHPR, and in most of them it found it has no jurisdiction to hear the case.79  
Therefore, although the interconnection and indivisibility of all human rights has been 
stressed from the very beginning of human rights discussion, in practice they have, at 
least so far, not been equally protected. As expressed by Antonio Cassese, “this 
convenient catch-phrase serves to dampen the debate while leaving everything the way it 
was.”80 Despite the proclamations of their indivisibility, they are far from being 
indivisible on a regional or on a global level. 
 
2.3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS - ARE THERE ANY? 
It is evident from the previous section that generally civil and political rights enjoy 
better legal protection and are more accepted within states as being justiciable. 
Nevertheless, although differences between economic and social and civil and political 
rights still exist, they are not nearly as sharp and clear as they were believed to be at the 
beginning of the international human rights era. 
The first idea of traditionalists in separating economic and social from civil and political 
rights arose from the thought of civil and political rights as negative in their nature while 
of economic and social rights as positive. The negative character of rights means that 
they do impose negative obligations on states, and negative obligations require Member 
States to refrain from action, while positive to take some action. The division on civil 
and political rights as imposing only negative obligations and economic and social rights 
as imposing only positive, is nowadays completely abandoned. Most civil and political 
rights, in order to be effective, also require some positive state action and fifty years of 
                                                 
78 See SERAC & CESR v Nigeria, Com. No. 155/96 (2001) [60]; African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (November 2010) [77] on the right to 
housing; and Purohit and Moore v the Gambia, Com. No. 241/2001 (2003) AHRLR 96 (where the 
AfComHR stated that the Gambia did not satisfy Articles 16 and 18(4) of the AfCHPR and that 
enjoyment of the right to health is crucial to the realisation of other fundamental rights and freedoms and 
includes the right of all to health facilities, as well as access to goods and services, without discrimination 
of any kind).  
79 Judgments and Orders of the Court are available on the AfCtHPR website (n 77). 
80 Antonio Cassese, ‘Are Human Rights Truly Universal?’ in Obrad Savić (ed) The Politics of Human Rights 
(Verso 1999), 159. 
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jurisprudence of the ECtHR clearly confirms this. Just a superficial look at the rights 
contained in the ECHR as protected by the Court shows that most civil and political 
rights entail some positive obligation on the states.81 Even the rights that are construed 
negatively, like the right not to be subjected to torture, require numerous positive 
actions from the states, like to protect vulnerable persons from ill-treatment by others82 
or to provide healthcare in detention83. While admittedly economic and social rights 
often require relatively greater state action84 for their realisation than do civil and 
political rights, this difference separates the two sets of rights more in terms of degree 
than in kind.85  
With the above stated division came another often made distinction; that civil and 
political rights are resource free, whereas economic and social rights or their 
implementation is resource dependent. However, whether or not a right is cost-free will 
depend on the obligation in question, rather than the classification of the right imposing 
that obligation as either civil and political or economic and social in nature.86 It is true 
that economic and social rights are often more financially demanding than civil and 
political rights (but not always, e.g. requiring the private sector to provide equal pay for 
equal work), but we can in no way say that civil and political rights are resource free.87 
                                                 
81 For example see Airey v Ireland (n 3) concerning Article 6(1) of the Convention, access to a court where 
the Court found a violation of this rights because of the state's failure to provide Mrs Airey with legal aid ; 
Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 447 regarding official recognition of transsexuals 
where the Court found that a state has an obligation to provide effective legal recognition of the new-
identities of post-operative transsexuals; Dougoz v Greece (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 61 regarding unsatisfactory 
detention conditions the Court found a violation of Article 3 due to the state's failure to provide for 
satisfactory conditions of detention; Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 513 regarding failure of the 
authorities to adequately protect the applicant's home and family life from gases emitted by a waste 
treatment plant, the Court found a violation of Article 8; Marckx v Belgium (1979-1980) 2 E.H.R.R. 330 
regarding the duty upon states to provide for the legal recognition of the relationship between a parent 
and her (illegitimate) child and the parent's family where the Court found a violation of Article 8; Osman v 
United Kingdom (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 245 where the Court did not find a violation of Article 2 but 
emphasized positive obligations states have in order to provide persons with suitable measures of 
protection against threats to their lives from third persons; and numerous other cases, some of which will 
be presented in the thesis. Also see Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations… (n 23). 
82 Z. v United Kingdom (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 3.  
83 Keenan v United Kingdom, (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 38. 
84 Although, some economic and social rights are purely negative, like the right to belong to a trade union 
and for a trade union to carry out its activities. (ICESCR, Article 8). 
85 Philip Alston and Gerard Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 156, 
183-4. 
86 Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 30), 8. 
87 For example, even the quintessential civil and political rights, the right to a fair trial, has budgetary 
implications: Airey v Ireland (n 3) [26] (where the Court said Ireland must either provide legal aid or 
simplify court proceedings) or Article 6(3)(e) of the Convention guaranteeing the right to a free assistance 
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The third division is that economic and social rights are to be achieved progressively, 
while civil and political rights are subject to immediate implementation. This viewpoint 
is confirmed in the in Article 2(1) of the IECSR.88 
However, despite this provision the CESCR has in its General Comments declared 
certain rights to be of immediate effect. For example, in General Comments No. 3 and 
9 it has stated that it considers many of the provisions in the Covenant to be capable of 
immediate implementation89 and in General Comments No. 3 it has, regarding all the 
ICESR rights, stated that regardless of the state of development of any country, there 
are certain steps which must be taken immediately.90 
The idea that economic and social rights may be of immediate effect was also accepted 
and affirmed in 1986 by the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the 
International Covenant on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:  
“The obligation ‘to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights’ requires States parties to move 
as expeditiously as possible towards the realization of the rights. Under no circumstances shall this be 
interpreted as implying for States the right to defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realization. On the 
contrary all States parties have the obligation to begin immediately to take steps to fulfil their obligations 
under the Covenant.”91  
As to the ESC, the rights found there are in general not progressive in nature, but are of 
immediate effect. The ECSR has taken the approach under which it requires states to 
take immediate steps in order to implement its decisions in respect of collective 
complaints and conclusions regarding national reports. For example, in its Conclusion 
2003-1 on France on reducing homelessness the ECSR stated that it requires “the 
                                                                                                                                          
of an interpreter if a person charged with a criminal offence cannot understand or speak the language 
used in court. 
88 See n 62. 
89 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990) E/1991/23: “Article 2 is of particular importance to a full 
understanding of the Covenant and must be seen as having a dynamic relationship with all of the other 
provisions of the Covenant...Thus while the full realization of the relevant rights may be achieved 
progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably short time after the Covenant’s 
entry into force for the States concerned.”[1]-[2]; CESCR, General Comment No. 9 (1998) 
E/C.12/1998/24 “The Committee has already made clear that it considers many of the provisions in the 
Covenant to be capable of immediate implementation. Thus, in General Comment No. 3 it cited, by way 
of example, articles 3; 7, paragraph (a) (i); 8; 10, paragraph 3; 13, paragraph 2 (a); 13, paragraph 3; 13, 
paragraph 4; and 15, paragraph 3.” [10] 
90 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 89) [2] and [9]. 
91 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, UN Commission on Human Rights, Note verbale dated 86/12/05 from the Permanent Mission 
of the Netherlands to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights ("Limburg 
Principles"), 8 January 1987, E/CN.4/1987/17, [21]. 
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introduction of measures, such as provision of immediate shelter and care for the 
homeless and measures to help such people overcome their difficulties and prevent a 
return to homelessness.”92 The same was restated in the Decision on the merits 
regarding Collective Complaint No. 39/2006.93 
However, the ESCR has on certain occasions accepted the progressive nature of 
economic and social rights and made clear it holds that the realisation of certain 
fundamental economic and social rights recognised by the ESC is guided by the 
principle of progressiveness.94 
The I-AComHR has also emphasized the duty to take immediate steps towards the 
realisation of economic and social rights, stating that: 
“The principle that economic, social and cultural rights are to be achieved progressively does not mean that 
governments do not have the immediate obligation to make efforts to attain the full realization of these rights. 
The rationale behind the principle of progressive rights is that governments are under the obligation to ensure 
conditions that, according to the state's material resources, will advance gradually and consistently toward the 
fullest achievement of these rights... 
It therefore follows that the obligation of member states to observe and defend the human rights of 
individuals within their jurisdictions, as set forth in both the American Declaration and the American 
Convention, obligates them, regardless of the level of economic development, to guarantee a minimum 
threshold of these rights.”95 
Although we might agree with the statement that on most occasion’s civil and political 
rights can be achieved within the stricter time limit than economic and social rights, the 
fact is that both groups of rights can sometimes be realised immediately or at least 
impose obligations on states to start immediately with their realisation.  
                                                 
92 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2003 Volume 1 (Bulgaria, France, Italy) (CoE Publishing 2003), 226. 
93 European Federation of National Organisations Working with Homeless (FEANTSA) v France (39/2006), (2008) 
47 E.H.R.R. SE15, [103]. 
94 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy (58/2009), (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. SE6 [26]; 
International Association Autism-Europe v France (13/2002), (2004) 11 I.H.R.R. 843 [53]. See also General 
Federation of employees of the national electric power corporation (GENOP-DEI) and Confederation of Greek Civil 
Servants’ Trade Unions (ADEDY) v Greece (66/2011), decision on the merits of 23 May 2012 where the 
ESCR recognised the economic crisis which the Greece is facing, but still emphasized that measures 
introduced to consolidate public finances should not undermine the core framework of a national social 
security system [47]. Therefore, the economic crises will not be sufficient argument for non-compliance 
with the obligations under the ECSR. 
95 Inter-Am.Comm.H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 1993, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc.9 rev (11 February 1994), Chapter VII ‘The 
principle of progressive realisation’. 
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The fourth often used argument is that economic and social rights are too vague for 
judicial enforcement, while civil and political rights are determinate. Linked to this 
argument is the argument of justiciability of economic and social rights. An interesting 
view on this issue has been given by D. Marcus who wrote that the perception of non-
justiciability and the normative underdevelopment of economic and social rights act as 
co-dependent parts of a negative feedback mechanism: “States oppose adjudication 
because the rules of decision are vague and imprecise, and these characteristics prevent 
the application of the "judicial craft" to clarify and develop their content.”96   
It is true that many of the rights contained in the ICESCR are formulated quite broadly, 
like the right to social security that only says: “The State parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance”97 or the 
right to work as guaranteed under Article 6 (1).98 However, not all rights under the 
ICESCR are formulated so vaguely and broadly, like the right to primary education as 
guaranteed under Article 13(2)(a).99 Also, the fact that rights are formulated vaguely does 
not automatically mean that they cannot be defined so that the states know what their 
obligations are. Regarding ICESCR the main guidance are General Comments adopted 
by the CESCR,100 which although not legally binding are not without legal significance. 
Some of them can even be considered as interpretations of the ICESCR.101 
As to the ESC, many of its provisions are drafted in sufficiently precise terms to be 
judicially enforceable.102 Furthermore, the ECSR has through its decisions on collective 
complaints103 and conclusions104 on national reports very clearly stated the obligations of 
the states regarding certain provisions of the ESC.  
                                                 
96 Marcus (n 68), 55. 
97 IECSR, Article 9. 
98 IECSR Article 6(1): ‘The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which 
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or 
accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right’. 
99 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization 
of this right: (a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all.” 
100 See CECSR, General Comment No. 18 (2005) E/C.12/GC/18 on the Right to work. 
101 Khaliq and Churchill, ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular Challenge?’ (n 29), 
5. 
102 Khaliq and Churchill, 'The European Committee of Social Rights: putting flesh…’ (n 29), 430. See 
Article 8(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised ESC on the right of employed women to protection of maternity. 
103 See Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece (30/2005), (2007) 45 E.H.R.R. SE11, on 
the obligation of the State to adequately prevent the impact for the environment or to develop an 
appropriate strategy in order to prevent and respond to the health hazards for the population; or European 
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria (31/2005), (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. SE10 on the obligation of the state to 
provide adequate housing for Roma people. 
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As we will also see through this thesis, most civil and political rights in the ECHR are 
also in no way determinate and conclusive, but through numerous interpretative 
methods the ECtHR has given meaning to these rights. On the other hand, the ECSR 
members are also entitled to use (and they often do) the same interpretative methods as 
the Court and thereby determine the meaning of rights contained in the ESC. “There 
are strong arguments in favour of open-textured framing of all human rights, so that 
courts are able to respond adequately to individual circumstances and historical 
developments in concretising their meaning over time.”105 
Finally, the issue of justiciability of economic and social rights has been debated a lot 
during the last 15 years, and most authors will nowadays agree that judicial protection of 
economic and social rights is possible.106 Part of the concern was that adjudicating 
economic and social rights issues is beyond the institutional capacity of the courts. In 
the paper The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An Updated Appraisal A. Nolan, B. 
Palmer and M. Langford broke this assertion into four primary claims: (i) that the courts 
lack the information required to deal with social and economic rights; (ii) that the 
judiciary lacks the necessary expertise, qualification or experience to deal with social and 
economic rights issues; (iii) that the courts are incapable of dealing successfully with 
‘polycentric’ tasks, such as those entailed by adjudication involving social and economic 
rights; and (iv) that the courts lack the necessary tools and remedies to deal effectively 
with social and economic rights. Further on in the text they have elaborated arguments 
against this assertion, claiming that the courts do have the necessary capacity to 
adjudicate economic and social rights.107 
Acceptance of the justiciability of economic and social rights on the international plane 
is shown by a number of developments. The CESCR has asserted the justiciability of 
rights contained in the ICESCR both in its General Comments108 and in some of its 
                                                                                                                                          
104 See ESC, ECSR Conclusions XVII- 2, Volume 1 (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland) (CoE Publishing 2005); and ESC (Revised), ECSR 
Conclusions 2007- Volume 1 (Albania, Armenia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France) 
(CoE Publishing 2007). 
105 Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 30), 11. 
106 Melish (n 66), 33-40; Marcus (n 68); Ellen Wiley, ‘Aspirational Principles of Enforceable Rights? The 
Future for Socio-economic Rights in National Law’ (2006-2007) 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 35; Mashood A. 
Baderin and Robert McCorquodale, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights: Forty Years of Development’ in Baderin and McCorquodale (eds) (n 4) 12.   
107 See Nolan, Porter and Langford (n 30), 15-18. 
108 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (n 89) [5] and General Comment No. 9 (n 89) [10]. 
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Statements.109 Also, as already mentioned in June 2008 UN Human Rights Council 
adopted the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,110 which provides for the CESCR to 
receive communications from individuals or groups claiming to be victims of any rights 
in the ICESCR.  
The ECSR has established a quasi-judicial procedure under the Collective Complaints 
Protocol. Although under this Protocol the ECSR does not have the power to deliver 
binding judgments, it has through a number of decisions (some of which will be 
presented later) clearly shown that economic and social rights are capable of legal 
enforcement. The I-AComHR and the I-ACtHR have also confirmed the justiciability, 
albeit limited, of Article 26 of the AmCHR guaranteeing economic and social rights.111 
Finally, as already stated, the African system, at least in theory, makes no difference in 
justiciability of civil and political and economic and social rights.112 
 
2.4 TRIPARTITE TYPOLOGY OF OBLIGATIONS 
The classical division on civil and political rights as negative rights that impose on the 
state only the duty to avoid depriving, and occasionally to protect from deprivation, and 
on economic and social rights as the ones that impose duties to protect from 
deprivation and to aid the deprived is nowadays rather abandoned. Today mostly 
accepted is the H. Shue’s idea that for every basic right there are three types of 
correlative duties.113 After H. Shue, A. Eide, as the Rappourteur to the UN Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities divided all 
human rights as to whether they impose obligations to respect, protect or fulfil. He 
described them where the obligation to respect requires states to abstain from violating a 
right; the obligation to protect requires states to prevent third parties from violating that 
                                                 
109 Statement to the Convention to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
<www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/EU.doc> accessed 13 July 2012.  
110 Optional Protocol to the ICESCR (n 63). 
111 Ivanildo Amaro da Silva et al. v Brazil, Case 1198-05, Report No. 38-101, Inter-Am.C.H.R., 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 5, rev. 1 (2010) [26], [41]; Acevedo Buendia et al v. Peru (I-ACtHR), 1 July 2009, 
[92]-[107].   
112 See Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples Rights (n 78).  
113 Shue (n 17), 52. Shue does not believe there are distinctions between rights, but only distinction 
between duties. For him, the complete fulfilment of each kind of right involves the performance of 
multiple kinds of duties, that is- for every basic right there are three types of duties. Therefore, Shue 
rejected the notion that rights can be divided into negative and positive ones.  
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right; and the obligation to fulfil requires the state to take measures to ensure that the 
right is enjoyed by those within the state’s jurisdiction.114   
Therefore, both Eide and Shue made no distinction among rights, but among duties. 
This tripartite typology of obligations has also been applied by the CESCR in General 
Comments115 and the AfComHPR in its decision Social and Economic Action Centre 
(SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2000)116 and in African Commission Principles and 
Guidelines on the Implementation on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, as well as in Maastricht Guidelines on 
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.117 
 
The obligation to respect requires from the state not to interfere with the enjoyment of 
the guaranteed human right. This obligation applies to all human rights, civil and 
political and economic and social. Fulfilment of the obligation to respect usually does 
not include large financial burden on states, and judgments concerning violations of 
these obligations should be suitable for immediate implementation. It is considered that 
more often civil and political rights will place this obligation on states, since most of 
civil and political rights are construed in a way that they primarily place an obligation on 
the state not to interfere. One example may be Article 3 of the ECHR stating ‘No one 
shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment’. The same goes for 
Article 2 that prohibits states to intentionally deprive someone of their life or Article 8 
that guarantees everyone the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence which are construed in a way that they primarily impose 
obligations to respect.  
However, not only civil and political rights place obligations on the state to respect but 
economic and social rights also require non-interference by the state. For example, 
states are under the obligation to respect the right to health by refraining from denying 
or limiting equal access for all persons, including prisoners or detainees, minorities, 
                                                 
114 Eide, The Right to Adequate Food… (n 17), 23-24.  
115 CESCR, General Comment No. 21 (2009) E/C.12/GC/21, [48]; General Comment No. 19 (2008) 
E/C.12/GC/19, [43]-[51]; General Comment No. 18 (n 100), [22]-[28]; General Comment No. 17 (2005) 
E/C.12/GC/17, [28]-[34]; General Comment No. 16 (2005) E/C.12/2005/4, [17]-[22]; General 
Comment No. 15 (2005) E/C.12/2002/11, [20]-[29]; General Comment No. 14 (2000) E/C.12/2000/4, 
[33]-[38]; General Comment No. 13 (1999) E/C.12/1999/10, [46]-[48]. 
116 Social and Economic Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 23 (ACHPR 1995) [44]. 
117 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, 22-26 
January 1997, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> accessed 13 
August 2012.  
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asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, to preventive, curative and palliative health 
services; abstaining from enforcing discriminatory practices as a state policy; and 
abstaining from imposing discriminatory practices relating to women’s health status and 
needs.118 
The obligation to protect imposes some positive obligations on states, since the state 
not only has to refrain from acting, but is also required to protect individuals from 
having their rights interfered with by third (i.e. non-state) parties.119 Although an 
obligation to protect has within classical theoretical divisions been more attributed to 
economic and social rights, the HRC, the Court and the I-ACtHR have through their 
interpretation also imposed the obligation to protect on civil and political rights.  
The HRC in its General Comment No. 20 concerning the prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment stated:  
“It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary against the acts prohibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official 
capacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity. The prohibition in article 7 is 
complemented by the positive requirements of article 10, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, which stipulates 
that "All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person.”120  
As to the Court, numerous cases where the Court interpreted the ECHR as to give rise 
to obligations to protect will be presented in the following chapters. To give here just 
few examples, under Article 8 of the ECHR, the Court has on numerous occasions gone 
beyond the notion to respect requiring the states to protect individuals’ rights 
guaranteed under Article 8. Here, the states have had to protect persons under their 
jurisdiction by changing legislation,121 to protect the applicants’ private life from 
environmental hazards,122 or they have had an obligation to protect the right to home by 
                                                 
118 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 115), [34]. 
119 See Nolan ‘Addressing economic and social rights violations…’ (n 31). 
120 HRC, General Comment No. 20: Replaces general comment 7 concerning prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment (Article 7), Forty-fourth session, 1992, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 
30 (1994) [2].  
121 X and Y v Netherlands (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 235. 
122 Lopez Ostra v Spain (n 81). 
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preventing evictions without sufficient (procedural) safeguards, all in relation to acts by 
private parties.123 
With the I-ACtHR this approach is visible in Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras where the I-
ACtHR stated that the State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human 
rights violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation 
of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose 
the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim adequate compensation. It also 
emphasized that an illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not 
directly imputable to a State can lead to international responsibility of the State, not 
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation 
or to respond to it as required by the AmCHR.124  
Regarding economic and social rights, in General Comment No. 18, concerning the 
obligation to protect the right to work, the CESCR stated that it includes, inter alia, the 
duties of States parties to adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal 
access to work and training and to ensure that privatization measures do not undermine 
workers’ rights.125 
On a regional level, the ECSR has also emphasized an obligation of the state to protect, 
both in its conclusions and in its decisions. For example, in its Conclusions XIV- 2 
(1998) on Malta it emphasized that it has found no information on specific measures 
(prohibition, protective equipment, permissible maximum exposure levels, etc.) taken to 
protect workers against dangers associated with hazardous biological agents, 
carcinogenic agents, ionising radiation or asbestos.126 In its decision on the merits in 
Collective Complaint 30/2005 the ECSR pointed out that with a view of ensuring the 
effective exercise of the right to a healthy environment within the right to health, Article 
11 of the ECSR requires States parties to protect public health against air pollution 
resulting from the actions of private enterprises. 127  
                                                 
123 McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 40; Yakovenko v Ukraine App no 15825/06 (ECtHR, 25 
January 2008). 
124 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras Inter-AmCtHR (Series C) No 4 (1988) [166]-[176]. 
125 CESCR General Comment No. 18 (n 100), [25]. 
126 ESC, Committee of Independent Experts Conclusions XIV-2 Volume 2 (Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom) (CoE Publishing 1998), 505. 
127 Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v Greece (n 103), [93]; See also International Commission of Jurists v 
Portugal (1/1998), decision on the merits of 10 September 1999, where the ECSR concluded that the 
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Finally, the obligation to fulfil requires states to adopt measures to ensure the goal of 
the full realisation of rights to those who cannot secure rights themselves.128 The 
obligation to fulfil is attributed mainly to economic and social rights, it is financially 
demanding, and usually the obligation itself is vague and unclear.129 As will be shown, 
regarding the imposition of the obligation to fulfil, the reluctance of the judiciary to 
decide on these matters is most apparent. The CECSR has adopted a three-fold 
classification and divided the obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural into the 
obligation to facilitate, promote and provide. The obligation to facilitate requires states, 
inter alia, to take positive measures that enable and assist individuals and communities to 
enjoy rights while the obligation to promote requires states to undertake actions that 
create, maintain and restore the realisation of all rights. Finally, the obligation to provide 
rights arises when individuals or groups are unable, on grounds reasonably to be beyond 
their control, to realise these rights themselves, with the means at their disposal. 130  
The ECSR has on numerous occasions stressed the obligation of State parties to 
promote, facilitate and to provide. In its Conclusion 2010 on Sweden regarding Article 
26 it asked that the next report contains a short description of the active measures taken 
by the government alone or in co-operation with employers and workers’ organisations 
to promote awareness, information and prevention of moral harassment in the 
workplace.131 In Collective Complaint No. 52/2008 the ECSR recalled that in order to 
satisfy Article 16 of the ESC, states must promote the provision of an adequate supply 
of housing for families, take the needs of families into account in housing policies and 
ensure that existing housing be of an adequate standard and size considering the 
                                                                                                                                          
satisfactory application of Article 7 cannot be ensured solely by the operation of legislation if this is not 
effectively applied and  rigorously supervised. [32]. 
128 Ssenyonjo (n 59), p 25.  
129 Van Hoof talks about two obligations, instead of the obligation to fulfil and those are: obligation to 
ensure and the obligation to promote. They differ in the sense that the obligation to ensure encompasses 
an obligation for the state to create conditions aimed at the achievement of certain results, while an 
obligation to promote is also designed to achieve a certain result, but it concerns more or less vaguely 
formulated goals. G.J.H. van Hoof, ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views’ in Phillip Alston and Katarina Tomaševski (eds), The right to food 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984), 106. 
130 CESCR, General Comment No. 14 (n 115) [37]; General Comment No. 15 (n 115) [25]; General 
Comment No. 17 (n 115) [34]; General Comment No. 18 (n 100), [26]-[28]; General Comment No. 19 (n 
115), [47]-[50]; General Comment No. 21 (n 115), [51]-[54]. See also Ssenyonjo (n 59), 25. 
131 ESC (Revised), ECSR, Conclusions 2010- Volume 2 (Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine) (CoE Publishing 2011), 585. 
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composition of the family in question, and include essential services, meaning that the 
state has an obligation to provide for those means.132  
Instruments on civil on political rights generally do not place obligations on states to 
fulfil nor do their monitoring bodies interpret the provisions contained in them in such 
way. 133 However, the Court judges have entered this sphere, for example by placing an 
obligation on states to provide for detention centres of certain standards134 or to provide 
for medical treatment.135  
It might be true that both civil and political rights and economic and social rights entail 
all three obligations for the state and that all three types of obligations have budgetary 
implications but the fact is that the obligation to fulfil tends to be the “most resource 
demanding, and often also the one that raises most questions as regards a precise 
description of the obligation”136 and most attributable to economic and social rights.  
 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the theoretical approaches to civil and political rights and economic and 
social rights have been analysed together with their placement in the main regional and 
global human rights instruments. The conclusion that can be reached is that nowadays 
the classic division between civil and political rights as negative, subject to immediate 
implementation, justiciable and resource free, and economic, social and cultural rights as 
positive, progressive, non-justiciable and financially demanding, is not sustainable. With 
all the developments in human rights protection, particularly on the global and regional 
level, we can say that both civil and political and economic and social rights can place 
                                                 
132 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Croatia (52/2008), (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. SE8, [65]. 
133 Although it is not always easy to discern the dividing line between the obligation to protect and 
obligation to fulfil. See Lopez Ostra v Spain (n 81) discussed in chapter V, Section 5.2. 
134 Kehayov v Bulgaria App no 41035/98 (ECtHR, 18 January 2005); Orchowski v Poland App no 17885/04 
(ECtHR, 22 October 2009); Kalashnikov v Russia (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 34. 
135 D. v United Kingdom (1997) 24 E.H.R.R. 423. D. is not directly about providing medical treatment, but 
by preventing D., from being expulsed from the UK, the Court impliedly placed an obligation to the UK 
to provide him with the medical treatment. Also, there are numerous examples where the state was under 
an obligation to provide for the medical treatment of prisoners (see chapter IV, Section 4.6.).  
136 Ida Elisabeth Koch, ‘The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 3, 12. 
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both negative and positive obligations on states and financial burdens, as well as being 
justiciable. Furthermore, both civil and political rights and economic and social rights 
can give rise to three different types of obligations: to respect, to protect and to fulfil. 
However, the implementation and execution of these two groups of rights is still under 
most human rights instruments somewhat different and separate.  
The fact is that a black-white distinction between economic and social and civil and 
political rights is not possible. However, there still are certain differences among those 
two categories of rights that cannot be ignored. Those differences do not mean that 
economic and social rights do not deserve legal protection. Whether the protection 
attributed to economic and social rights in a certain regional (or in the global) system 
will be judicial or quasi-judicial should be left to the system itself to determine. 
However, in Europe a decision has been made to have separate mechanisms. 
Within the CoE a proposal to add a Protocol to the European Convention on economic 
and social rights was rejected by the CoE bodies,137 showing that there is still a desire for 
separate protection of economic and social rights in Europe. In his Opinion regarding 
the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning 
fundamental social rights, Mr Erik Jurgens pointed out: 
 “However, recognising the indivisibility of human rights does not — for a number of reasons — mean 
that we should seek to make a single institution (namely the European Court of Human Rights) 
responsible for guaranteeing them all. On the one hand, imposing a further burden on the European 
Court of Human Rights at a time when it is just beginning to function and has many new members who 
need to familiarise themselves with new procedures and working methods could threaten its very 
existence. 
On the other hand, there is the question of how to make social rights enforceable in law. Before that can 
happen they must be secured in national legislation in such a way that they are enforceable in courts. 
Therefore, the first step is to ask the member states to make appropriate provision in their domestic law. 
                                                 
137 The CLAHR has been asked for an opinion on the Social, Health and Family Affairs Committee draft 
recommendation for a protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights establishing a number of 
social rights.  See Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 8357 (March 1999), Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights, Report of the Social Health and 
Family Affairs Committee; Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 8433 (1999), Opinion of the Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights on Additional protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights 
concerning fundamental social rights; and Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1415 (1999), 
Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights.  
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At Council of Europe level, we must once again insist on the need to apply the Social Charter and use the 
new collective complaints procedure, which, as we have seen, was deemed an appropriate means of 
guaranteeing social rights.”138 
As we can see, the Rapporteur of the CLAHR rejected the idea of protecting economic 
and social rights through the existing Court. 
Another reason for the Court not to enter the economic and social rights area is that 
there is no consensus on the acceptance of economic and social rights on the global and 
regional level among Member States of the CoE. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Slovakia and Spain have all ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR,139 whilst none 
of these states have ratified the Collective Complaints Protocol. On the other side, 
Poland and the UK have ratified neither the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, nor the 
Collective Complaints Protocol,140 while several other CoE Member States oppose to 
the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, like Norway and Sweden, although they are 
parties to the Collective Complaints Protocol.  
Finally, as M.J. Dennis and D.P. Stewart wrote:  
“The decision to put the two sets of rights in different treaties with different supervisory mechanisms was 
well considered, and the underlying reasons for those distinctions and decisions appear to remain valid 
today. Their different treatment in no way disqualified economic, social and cultural rights as rights or 
relegated them to a lower hierarchical rung. It did reflect an assessment of the practical difficulties that 
states would face in implementing generalized norms requiring substantial time and resources.”141 
Although they are referring to the UN human rights documents, this thesis contends 
that the same applies to the European level.142  
Let me now briefly present the ECHR and the ESC, before turning to the main issue of 
this thesis, the problem of the Court entering the socio-economic sphere of human 
rights protection. 
                                                 
138 Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 8433 (n 137), [31]-[33]. 
139 Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 January 2012, Slovakia on 7 March 2012, and Spain on 23 September 
2010. 
140 See n 60 and n 61. 
141 Michael J. Dennis and Dennis P. Stewart, ‘Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: Should 
there be an international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the right to food, water, housing and 
health?’ (2004) 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 462, 465.  
142 Of course, not everyone agrees with this opinion. See Malcolm Langford, ‘Closing the Gap- An 
Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’ (2009) 27(1) Nordisk Tidsskrift For Menneskerettigheter 1. 
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CHAPTER III 
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this thesis will be the ECHR and the work of the Court when 
deciding whether a violation of the ECHR occurred. More specifically, the issue will be 
the Court’s reading in positive obligations with significant socio-economic elements into 
the ECHR provisions through its case-law. Therefore, before starting writing on this 
topic, it is important to address some of the main features of the ECHR system. 
Furthermore, the ESC, as the ECHR’s counterpart in economic and social rights will 
also be presented in this chapter, before looking at its specific provisions in the 
following chapters. For both the ECHR and the ESC the supervising body that 
monitors compliance with the judgments and decisions is the CoM. For that reason, its 
work will be elaborated further in the thesis, and in this chapter its main responsibilities 
and activities will be presented.  
 
3.2. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
In Europe, the idea of a regional human rights system was born after the World War II 
and in 1949 the CoE was founded by 10 countries.143  The CoE is based in Strasbourg 
(France) and now covers virtually the entire European continent, with its 47 member 
countries.144 It seeks to develop throughout Europe common and democratic principles 
based on the ECHR and other reference texts on the protection of individuals.145 
                                                 
143 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25) 1. See also Leach, Taking a case to the European Court of Human 
Rights (n 24); Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights (n 23); White and 
Ovey (n 27); Janis, Kay and Bradley (n 26); Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights… (n 28); Karen 
Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 
2008); and Peter van Dijk et al. (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed, 
Intersentia 2006). 
144 These are Albania, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, 
Montenegro, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, 
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The ECHR was adopted in 1950 within the CoE. It entered into force in 1953 and has 
been ratified by all forty-seven Member States of the CoE. Today, it is an obligation of 
all states wishing to become a member of the CoE to ratify the ECHR. There have been 
numerous Protocols to the ECHR, where the substantive guarantees have been 
supplemented by the addition of further rights namely by the First146, Fourth147, Sixth148, 
Seventh149, Twelfth150 and Thirteenth151 Protocol that are binding on all states that have 
ratified them. Also, there have been Protocols that have amended the enforcement 
machinery of the ECHR: the Eleventh Protocol152 and the Fourteenth Protocol153 that 
replaced the Eleventh Protocol and introduced fundamental reforms to the 
enforcement machinery of the ECHR. 
The ECHR consist of a number of fundamental rights and freedoms, all of which are civil 
and political in their character (the right to life, prohibition of torture, prohibition of 
slavery and forced labour, right to liberty and security, right to a fair trial, no 
punishment without law, right to respect for private and family life, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, 
right to marry, right to an effective remedy, prohibition of discrimination). More rights 
are granted by additional protocols to the ECHR.154 The ECHR generally represents a 
                                                                                                                                          
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYRM), Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. 
145 Statute of the Council of Europe 1949, 87 UNTS 103; ETS 1. 
146 213 UNTS 262; ETS 9. Adopted in 1952 and in force since 1954. All Convention State parties are 
parties to it except Monaco and Switzerland.  
147 1469 UNTS 263; ETS 46. Adopted in 1963 and in force since 1968. All Convention State parties are 
parties to it except Andorra, Greece, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.  
148 ETS 114. Adopted in 1983 and in force since 1985. All Convention State parties are parties to it except 
Russia. 
149 ETS 117. Adopted in 1984 and in force since 1988. All Convention State parties are parties to it except 
Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom.  
150 ETS 177; 8 IHRR 884 (2002). Adopted in 2002 and in force since 2003. Seventeen State parties are 
parties to it:  Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, 
Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Spain, FYRM and Ukraine. 
151 ETS 187; 9 IHRR 884 (2002). Adopted in 2002 and in force since 2003. All Convention State parties 
are parties to it except Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia and Spain. 
152 ETS 155, 1-3 IHRR 206 (1994). Adopted in 1994 and in force since 1998. It was ratified by all State 
parties.  
153 ETS 194; 9 IHRR 884 (2002). Adopted in 2004 and in force since 2010. It was ratified by all State 
parties. 
154 The right to a peaceful enjoyment of possessions, the right to education and the right to free elections 
and a right to vote (First Protocol); Prohibition of imprisonment for debt, Freedom of movement, 
Prohibition of expulsion of national, Prohibition of collective expulsion of nationals (Fourth Protocol);  
Abolition of death penalty in time of peace and the Abolition of death penalty in all circumstances (Sixth 
and Thirteenth Protocol); Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, Right of appeal in criminal 
matters, Compensation for wrongful conviction, Right not to be tried or punished twice and Equality 
between spouses (Seventh Protocol) and; General prohibition of discrimination (Twelfth Protocol).  
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European counterpart to the ICCPR although it does not protect certain rights 
protected under the ICCPR.155  
 
3.3 THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
The ECHR, compared to most other regional and global human rights treaties has very 
strong enforcement mechanisms. The European Court on Human Rights was set up in 
1959. The original structure of the Court and mechanism for handling cases provided 
for a two-tier system of rights protection, which included the European Commission of 
Human Rights (EComHR, Commission) as well as the Court itself. When the caseload 
started to grow the idea of merging the Commission and the Court was born. On 1 
November 1998, Protocol 11 came into force, eliminating the Commission and 
establishing a new full-time Court that replaced the former system. 
The Court can receive both individual and inter-state complaints. There are today 800 
million possible applicants, since all the people living under jurisdiction of State parties 
have direct access to the Court in order to complain violations of their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
Approximately 151,600 applications were pending before a judicial formation on 1 
January 2012. Barely ten years after the Protocol 11 reform of the Convention system 
the Court delivered its 10,000th judgment. Its output is such that more than 91% of the 
Court’s judgments since its creation in 1959 have been delivered between 1998 and 
2011. In 2011, the Court delivered 1,157 judgments concerning 1,511 applications. A 
total of 52,188 applications were decided in 2011.156 
One way of dealing with the large number of applications was the introduction of the 
Fourteenth Protocol that made important changes to the Convention system. It took six 
years to come into force after its adoption because of Russia’s refusal to ratify it.  
                                                 
155 Like the right to recognition as a person (Article 16 of the ICCPR) or prohibition of propaganda for 
war or any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence (Article 20 of the ICCPR). 
156 The European Court of Human Rights in facts and figures 2011, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C99DDB86-EB23-4E12-BCDA-
D19B63A935AD/0/FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2012_VERSION_WEB.pdf>, accessed 20 July 2012, 
5 and 8.  
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The first important change brought by Protocol 14 was the introduction of a single 
judge.157 The second major change introduced was the expansion of the powers of three-
judge Committees.158 These changes represent an attempt to increase the efficiency of the 
Court at a time when it is facing a case overload. The third major change was the most 
controversial one since it introduces a new admissibility criterion for individual 
applications.159 Because of this provisions controversy, for the two years following the 
Protocol’s entry into force single-judge and the three-judge Committees will be prevented 
from applying this criterion.160  
Section II of the Convention governs the operation and the Procedure of the Court. 
The Court consists of a number of judges equal to the number of the High Contracting 
Parties and they must be of high moral character sitting in their own capacity.161 They 
are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly by a majority of votes cast from a list of three 
candidates nominated by each High Contracting Party.162 The judges of the Court’s term 
of office is now a single period of nine years (it was a period of six years prior to Protocol 
14) and they will not be eligible for re-election, as they were prior to Protocol 14.163 
The administrative and judicial work of the Court takes place in various formations. To 
consider cases brought before it, the Court sits in a single-judge formation, in Committees 
of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber of seventeen 
judges. In accordance with the changes introduced under Protocol 14 a single judge can 
decide on the admissibility of the application, while the three and seven judges 
committees and the Grand Chamber can decide both on the admissibility and on the 
merits of the case.  
The admissibility criteria are set out in Article 35 of the Convention. Besides the new 
admissibility criterion introduced under Protocol 14, the Court shall not deal with any 
application submitted that is anonymous or is substantially the same as a matter that has 
already been examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another procedure 
                                                 
157 ECHR, Article 26. 
158 Ibid, Article 28. 
159 Ibid, Article 35 (3)(b) (“The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
under Article 34 if it considers that: b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage…”). 
160 This criterion has been applied by the Court for the first time already on the same day on which the 
Protocol 14 entered into force. See Adrian Mihai Ioanescu v Romania App no 36659/04 (ECtHR Decision, 1 
June 2010). 
161 ECHR, Articles 20 and 21. 
162 Ibid, Article 22. 
163 Ibid, Article 23(2). 
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of international investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information.164 
Furthermore, the Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
that is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or its Protocols, manifestly ill-
founded, or is an abuse of the right of individual application.165 Any High Contracting 
Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the provisions of the Convention and 
its Protocols by another High Contracting Party. With the individual applications any 
person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim 
of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the Protocols may refer an alleged breach to the Court. Finally, the Court 
may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according 
to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months 
from the date on which the final decision was taken. There are specific situations where 
the individual does not have to be a victim (such as where a violation of the right to life is 
alleged and close relatives of the dead person can submit application) or where the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies is inapplicable or in situations of continuing violations 
where a six month rule also does not apply, but they will not be discussed here.  
The Court, after finding an application admissible, shall examine the case together with 
the representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the 
effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all 
necessary facilities. After looking at all the facts of the case and after holding a hearing 
(that shall be held in public unless there are some exceptional circumstances) the Court 
shall either reach a friendly settlement or deliver a judgment.  
At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may place itself at the disposal of the parties 
concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement. If a friendly settlement is effected, 
the Court shall strike the case out of its list by means of a decision.166 
As to the judgments of the Court, its content is set out under Article 74 of the Rules of 
the Court. Any judgment must contain, inter alia, the facts of the case, a summary of the 
parties’ submissions, the reasons on points of law and the Court’s decision. Any judge 
who has taken part in the consideration of the case shall be entitled to annex to the 
                                                 
164 Ibid, Article 35(2)(a) and (b). 
165 Ibid, Article 35 (3)(a). 
166 Ibid, Article 39. 
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judgment either a separate, concurring or dissenting opinion, or a bare statement of 
dissent.167   
Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any party 
to the case may request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. A panel of five 
judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case raises a serious question 
affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention or its Protocols, or a serious 
issue of general importance.168 The case may be referred to the Grand Chamber before 
the judgment is made where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question 
affecting the interpretation of the Convention or its Protocols, or where the resolution of 
a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment 
previously delivered by the Court. At any time before it has rendered its judgment, the 
Chamber may relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, unless one of the 
parties to the case objects.169 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber is final. The judgment of the Chamber becomes 
final when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to the 
Grand Chamber; or three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case 
to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; or when the panel of the Grand Chamber 
rejects the request to refer under Article 43. 
Finally, the Court may, at the request of the CoM, give advisory opinions on legal 
questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and its Protocols.170 So far, it 
has never done so in practice.  
A finding by the Court that a violation of the Convention or its Protocol has been made 
places an obligation on the respondent state to abide by the judgment.  The final 
judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the CoM, which supervises its execution. If 
the Court finds a violation of the Convention it does not have the authority to alter 
national law nor will it instruct the State on how a change in law ought to be made, since 
the Courts judgments are generally declaratory.171 As to the remedies, the Court has no 
power to reopen domestic proceedings, annul a wrongful conviction, or ensure that the 
                                                 
167 ECtHR, Rules of the Court, Registry of the Court (July 2009) Article 74. 
168 ECHR, Article 43. 
169 Ibid, Article 47. 
170 Ibid, Articles 47-49.  
171 Marckx v Belgium (n 81) “It is for the respondent State, and the respondent State alone, to take the 
measures it considers appropriate to assure that its domestic law is coherent and consistent.” [20]. 
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reforms instituted benefit the individual that brought the case in the first place.172 If it 
finds it necessary, the Court shall afford just satisfaction to the injured party.173 Generally, 
awards of just satisfaction can be made under three heads: pecuniary loss, non-pecuniary 
loss, and costs and expenses. The most frequent award of just satisfaction (beyond the 
declaration of finding a violation) is the award of cost and expenses.174 
Most of the Court’s judgments only declare the violations established, leaving it to states 
to define the required execution measures. These measures depend on the 
circumstances of each case.  However, in a certain number of recent judgments, in 
particular those concerned by the pilot judgment procedure,175 the Court has started to 
make recommendations with respect to execution.176  
 
3.3.1 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION 
As a human rights treaty where numerous provisions have been drafted with a lack of 
precision the Convention is subject to interpretation that is done by the Court.177 The 
judges have to interpret and define law in concrete situations, and not just apply it.  
From the perspective of public international law, since the Convention is a multilateral 
international treaty its interpretation should be governed by the Vienna Convention on 
                                                 
172 Dinah Shelton, ‘The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisprudence in Europe’ (2003) 13 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int'l L. 95, 147-148. 
173 ECHR Article 41. 
174 White and Ovey (n 27), 44. 
175 The Court uses pilot judgments to identify a ‘systemic or a structural’ problem that affects a large 
number of similar applications before the Court. In pilot judgments, unlike in judgments, the Court sets 
out a framework for general measures in the final operative part of the judgment. These measures provide 
for specific instructions. Basak Cali and Nicola Bruch, Monitoring the Implementation of Judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights, A handbook for non-governmental organisations, 2011, 
<http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/fms/MRSite/Research/HRSJ/EHRAC/Handbook%20for%20NGOs%
20on%20monitoring%20imp%20ECHR%20judg.pdf> accessed 13 August 2012, 8. 
176 Broniowski v Poland (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 21 or Gluhaković v Croatia App No 21188/09 (ECtHR, 12 April 
2011). 
177 During the drafting of the Convention there were numerous suggestions for more precision in 
provisions, however, at the end, an approach that all the experts, members of the preparatory committee 
agreed upon was accepted. For example, on Article 3 there has been a long discussion on its content, 
where M. Cock from the UK proposed a comprehensive provision stating it “should proclaim to the 
world in the most absolute and direct fashion, its condemnation of the terrible wave of barbarism and 
bestialism which has broken over our world during the last 30 years.” Library of the European Court of 
Human Rights, “Travaux preparatoires” of the Convention, Article 3, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART3-DH%2856%295-
EN1674940.pdf> accessed 13 August 2012, 2 
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the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT),178 as it is part of the customary international law.179 
The VCLT contains written rules of interpretation that, although were not in force at 
the time when the Convention was adopted, nowadays apply to international treaties.180 
The Court applies them, most of the time without referring to those rules explicitly and 
sometimes inconsistently.181 Although, during the early years of its work the Court 
seemed willing to endorse the use of the VCLT Principles,182 very soon it became clear 
that the Court will seldom invoke them. However, “though its decisions have been very 
much influenced by certain characteristics of the European Convention, the Court’s 
approach to interpretation has its basis in the Vienna Convention.”183 The basic rule and 
the main guideline for interpretation is Article 31 of the VCLT that states that a treaty 
“shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”184 
The important feature of the Convention’s rights is that most of them were drafted in a 
way such as to allow a wide interpretation of the guarantees it contains.185 The 
indeterminacy of language itself has as a consequence lack of precise meaning or 
determinate range of application.186 To date, the Court has developed numerous 
methods of interpretation of the Convention. The interpretative methods of the Court 
can be divided in two groups, related to the direction in which the judicial creativity led. 
The first group represents judicial self-restraint methods of interpretation where the 
judges used one of the four following methods: intentionalism, textualism, margin of 
appreciation or the doctrine of fourth instance.187 Judicial self-restraint as an ideology 
                                                 
178 Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980. United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, 331 The VCLT is not strictly speaking applicable to the ECHR because it is not 
retrospective (see Article 4). So what is applied is custom, which the Court takes to be the same as the 
VCLT (see e.g., Golder v United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 524, [33-34]. 
179 Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (n 23), 56.  
180 Karl Zemanek on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations Audiovisual Library of 
International Law <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/vclt/vclt-e.pdf> accessed 13 August 2012, 
(when quoting the International Court of Justice in the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 that stated: 
“…(a)rticles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties…may in many respects be 
considered as a codification of existing customary international law…” (I.C.J. Reports 1991, 69-70 [48]). 
181 VCLT (n 178), Articles 31-33. 
182 For example, see Golder v United Kingdom (n 178) [33] and [34]. 
183 J.G. Merrills, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester 
University Press 1993), 69.  
184 VCLT (n 178), Article 31(1). 
185 For the Convention’s preparatory work see:  
<http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/50/50_Preparatory_Works> accessed 13 July 2012. 
186 Mahoney, ‘Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint…’ (n 42), 60. 
187 Regarding the right to a fair trial the Court has often invoked the doctrine of fourth instance but it is 
not often used regarding other Convention provisions and is usually not mentioned as a tool of 
interpretation by the authors that write on the Court’s interpretative methods. Dragoljub Popović wrote 
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takes as its premise the proposition that the judge’s job is to apply the law and not to 
make it. The ideology of judicial activism takes an opposite position and it encourages 
the judges to develop the law. Law-making is a never-ending process and judges are and 
should be involved in the law-making process as legislators and executives are.188 The 
judicial activist methods of interpretation, as used by the judges’ of the Court are the 
living instrument doctrine or evolutive interpretation, the doctrine of effectiveness or 
innovative interpretation, and the doctrine of an autonomous concept.  
 
3.3.1.1 JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 
The first self-restraint method of interpretation that can be mentioned is intentionalism. 
Intentionalism places an emphasis on the parties’ intentions at the time when 
Convention has been drafted. Although it is rarely used, to date, whenever the judges 
feel that it is necessary or appropriate, they look at the preparatory work, but always as a 
supplementary method, as Article 32 of the VCLT directs and is not an independent 
basis for interpretation.189   
The interpretation in accordance with the textualist approach is looking for a meaning 
of the provision as it had at the time when it was drafted or enacted and the ordinary 
meaning of its terms. The Court itself has used an ordinary meaning of the Convention 
provisions by referring to the ordinary meaning of the right.190 When invoking ordinary 
meaning the Court most frequently also invokes article 31(1) of the VCLT that requires 
the judges to interpret the provisions of an international treaty in accordance with their 
ordinary meaning together with the interpretation in the light of its object and purpose.  
                                                                                                                                          
on this doctrine, while the other authors only mentioned it in the introduction to the chapter on the right 
to a fair trial. See Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12), 135-137; Harris, 
O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25), 202; White and Ovey (n 27), 140. 
188 Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12), 209; Clovis C. Morrison, The 
Dynamics of Development in the European Human Rights Convention System (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981), 5. 
For more on judicial activism see Popović, ‘Prevailing of Judicial Activism…’ (n 12); Mahoney, ‘Judicial 
activism and judicial self restraint…’ (n 42); Craig Green, ‘An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism’ 
August 2008, available at 
<http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=roger_craig_green> (accessed 
28 November 2012); Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986), Paul O. Carrese, The 
Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Rise of Judicial Activism (The University of Chicago Press 
2003); and Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication  (Harvard University Press 1997). 
189 James and Others v United Kingdom (1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 123; Nolan and K. v Russia (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 29. 
190 Johnston and Others v Ireland (1987) 9 E.H.R.R. 203. 
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The two interpretative methods presented above are not very often used, so they will 
not be given more attention in the thesis, but it would be an understatement to say that 
they are completely abandoned.191 They are still used among the judges of the Court, but 
not as often since the interpretation needed and used in the current times is more often 
related to the use of the activist doctrines.  
The most common restraining method of interpretation used nowadays by the Court is 
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.192 Margins of appreciation represent the 
“outer limits of schemes of protection, which are acceptable to the Convention.”193 This 
doctrine has been developed in order to allow states the space for manoeuvre that the 
Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities, in fulfilling their obligations 
under the Convention.194 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation cannot be found in 
the text of the Convention195 but was developed by the Strasbourg organs themselves in 
order to stress the Court’s subsidiary role.  
The margin of appreciation doctrine has been used by the Court regarding numerous 
issues. It has been used in jurisprudence of Article 15,196 of Articles 8-11,197 and of 
                                                 
191 See Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation… (n 39), 68-72. 
192 Description of a margin of appreciation as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint can be seen in judgment 
Cossey v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 622 where Judge Martens, in his dissenting opinion stated that 
“States do not enjoy a margin of appreciation as a matter of right, but as a matter of judicial self-restraint. 
Saying that the Court will leave a certain margin of appreciation to the States is another way of saying that 
the Court - conscious that its position as an international tribunal having to develop the law in a sensitive 
area calls for caution - will not fully exercise its power to verify whether States have observed their 
engagements under the Convention, but will find a violation only if it cannot reasonably be doubted that 
the acts or omissions of the State in question are incompatible with those engagements.” [3.6.3]. See also 
Paul Mahoney, ‘The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention on Human 
Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice’ (1998) (19)1 Hum.Rts.L.J. 1; Brauch (n 11); 
and Ronald St.J. Macdonald, ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in Ronald St.J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher 
and Herbert Petzold (eds), The European System for Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1994). 
193 White and Ovey (n 27) 80. 
194 Greer, The Margin of Appreciation… (n 28) 5. 
195 However, in the Brighton Declaration, adopted on 20 April 2012 at the High Level Conference on the 
Future of the European Court of Human Rights it is stated that the Conference: “a) Welcomes the 
development by the Court in its case law of principles such as subsidiarity and the margin of appreciation, 
and encourages the Court to give great prominence to and apply consistently these principles in its 
judgments; b) Concludes that, for reasons of transparency and accessibility, a reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as developed in the Court’s case law should be 
included in the Preamble to the Convention and invites the CoM to adopt the necessary amending 
instrument by the end of 2013, while recalling the States Parties’ commitment to give full effect to their 
obligation to secure the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention;” [12] (a) and (b). 
196 Lawless v Ireland (No.3) (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 15; Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 25. 
197 Sahin v Turkey (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 5; Otto-Preminger Institut v Austria  (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 34; Muller v 
Switzerland (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 212; Open Door and Dublin Well Women v Ireland (1993) 15 E.H.R.R. 244; 
Chapman v United Kingdom  (n 11); and Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (n 81). 
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Article 2 of Protocol 1.198 It has also been used in the jurisprudence of Article 14,199 
Article 1 of Protocol 1,200 Article 6,201 and Article 3 of Protocol 1.202 The rights protected 
under Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Convention have been considered as rights generating 
absolute obligations for the Member States and banning any incomplete application.203 
It is commonly used by the Court as a method of judicial self-restraint, allowing states a 
certain amount of discretion. The width of the margin of appreciation allowed to states 
varies in degrees of discretion, depending on the context. However, the margin of 
appreciation can sometimes be narrow and then states will be granted little discretion. 
No strict conclusion can be drawn as to when the Court will use wide and when it will 
use a narrow approach. Even when it comes to the same case, it was sometimes decided 
differently by the Grand Chamber then it was by the Chamber.204 Nevertheless, it can be 
said that more often the Court uses this doctrine to stress the Convention’s subsidiary 
role and thereby as a self-restraint method.  
The margin of appreciation doctrine has often been criticised on two different levels, 
either in general as a doctrine205 or its use in certain circumstances.206 Harris, O’Boyle 
and Warbrick wrote that “when it is applied widely, so as to appear to give a state a 
blanq cheque or to tolerate questionable practices or decisions, it may be argued that the 
Court has abdicated its responsibilities.”207 According to the other scholars the Court 
nowadays uses the margin of appreciation as a substitute for coherent legal analysis of 
the issues at stake, as well as to avoid very controversial judgments.208 However, scholars 
                                                 
198 Lautsi and Others v Italy App no 30814/06 (GC judgment, 18 March 2011) and (ECtHR, 3 November 
2009); Folgero and Others v Norway (2008) 46 E.H.R.R. 47; Oršuš and Others v Croatia (2011) 52 E.H.R.R. 7; 
D.H. and Others v Czech Republic (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 3. 
199 Belgian Linguistic case (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 252; Abdulazis, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom (1985) 
7 E.H.R.R. 471; Frette v France (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 21. 
200 Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 E.H.R.R. 35; James and Others v United Kingdom (n 189).  
201 Golder v United Kingdom (n 178); Ruiz Torija v Spain (1995) 19 E.H.R.R. 553. 
202 Krasnov and Skuratov v Russia (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 46; Hirst v United Kingdom (No.2) (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 
41; Campagnano v Italy (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. 43. 
203 CoE, The Margin of Appreciation, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/Paper2_en.asp> accessed 1 
June 2012. 
204 See Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (2003) 37 E.H.R.R. 28 (GC judgment) and (2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 1; 
Lautsi and Others v Italy (n 198). 
205 Brauch (n 11).  
206 See Judge Loucaides (former Judge of the Court) in reflections on his experience as a judge of the 
Court. He particularly criticizes the jurisprudence showing certain reluctance of the Court (ERRC 
webpage 26 May 2010) <http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?page=8&cikk=3613> (accessed 1 June 2012); or 
Macdonald ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ (n 192), 83-124. 
207 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25) 13.  
208 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 1998 73, 75. 
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generally agree that the margin of appreciation doctrine can be justified, but that the 
problem lies in knowing when and how to apply it to the facts of particular case.209 
 
3.3.1.2 JUDICIAL ACTIVIST METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 
More important methods of interpretation in terms of this thesis are the judicial activist 
ones, the living instrument doctrine, the autonomous concept and the doctrine of 
effectiveness. The doctrine of effectiveness and the living instrument doctrine were 
mainly used when interpreting provisions of the Convention to introduce some socio-
economic elements therein.  
The autonomous concept represents a specific method of interpretation closely 
connected to interpreting the Convention in accordance with its object and purpose i.e. 
purposive interpretation, but also with all other activist interpretative methods. This 
concept means that on certain occasions the Court will give an autonomous meaning to 
a Convention term, regardless of its meaning on a national level. Its goal is to 
accomplish the primary goal of the Convention, which is the protection of individual 
rights from being violated by the Member States. P. Mahoney defined autonomous 
concepts as “technical terms that are employed in national legal sources and are invested 
with special, non-ordinary, meaning.”210 The purpose of autonomous concept is to 
prevent provisions of the Convention from being “subordinated to the interpretation of a 
term or principle in domestic law of the contracting parties.”211 The emergence of 
autonomous concepts began in 1971 with the Engels v the Nerherlands212 judgment and it has 
been used widely by the Court since in order to interpret a number of concepts from the 
Convention.213 
                                                 
209 Ibid, 14. See also Paolo G. Carozza, ‘Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human 
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1998) 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217, 1220; and Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25), 13.  
210 Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation… (n 39) 48. 
211 Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals, Key concepts of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(CoE September 2009), 5. 
212 Engel and Others v Netherlands (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 647.   
213 Paulić v Croatia App no 3572/06 (ECtHR, 22 October 2009) (concept of home); Konig v Germany (1979-
80) 2 E.H.R.R. 170 (civil rights and obligations); Stec and Others v United Kingdom (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 47, 
(possessions); Intersplav v Ukraine (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. 4 (both for ‘possessions’ and ‘civil rights and 
obligations’); Iatridis v Greece (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 97  (possessions); Siliadin v France, (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 
16 (victim); Pellegrin v France (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 26 (civil servant); Frydlender v France  (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 
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The living instrument doctrine is “one of the best known principles of Strasbourg case-
law. It expresses the principle that the Convention is interpreted “in the light of present 
day conditions”, that it evolves through the interpretation of the Court.”214 The first 
time the Court used the wording living instrument was already in 1978 in the Tyrer 
judgment. Here, the question was whether the corporal punishment of a juvenile on the 
Isle of Man amounted to a degrading treatment under Article 3. In deciding this 
question the Court stated that it “…(m)ust also recall that the Convention is a living 
instrument which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but be influenced by 
the developments and commonly accepted standards in the penal policy of the Member 
States of the Council of Europe in this field.”215  
A. Mowbray stressed that critics of judicial activism might contend that the Court in 
Tyrer provided little justification for or elaboration of the living instrument216 and this is 
true. There was no reference to Member States’ criminal law, no comparative study on 
corporal punishment and no attempt to establish common standards of Member States 
in abolishing corporal punishment.217 Nowhere in the judgment can one see why the 
Court started using the living instrument doctrine and what is the Court justification 
doing so. Maybe, if the Court at the beginning of its use of this doctrine explained when 
and how it will be used i.e. theoretically justified it, nowadays we wouldn’t be faced with 
discrepancies which will be seen later in the thesis. However, despite not providing 
reasons or justification for adopting this doctrine, the Court started regularly using it 
when interpreting certain Convention right. The living instrument doctrine is now 
widely used and accepted,218 not only by the Court but in interpretation of various 
provisions in international human rights law, and as will be seen, the ECSR is using it.219  
                                                                                                                                          
52; Eriksen v Norway (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. 328 (lawful detention); Chassagnou and others v France (2000) 29 
E.H.R.R. 615 (association). 
214 Luzius Wildhaber, ‘The European Court of Human Rights in Action’ (2004) 21 Ritsumeikan Law 
Review 83, 84. 
215Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 1 [31]. 
216 Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (n 23), 61. 
217 Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation… (n 39), 76. 
218Selmouni v France (n 10) [102]; Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (GC judgment) (n 204), Joined 
dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Turmen, Zupančič and Steiner [2]; Soering v United Kingdom 
(1989) 11 E.H.R.R. 439 [102]; Henaf v France (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 44 [55]; Sandra Janković v Croatia App no 
38478/05 (ECtHR, 14 September 2009) [47]; Beganović v Croatia App no 46423/06 (ECtHR, 25 September 
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219 It has been used in Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece (n 103) [194] that will be 
discussed in detail in chapter V, but also, for example, in International Federation of Human Rights League 
(FIDH) v France (14/2003), decision on the merits of 3 November 2004 [26]-[29] and numerous others.  
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In the context of this thesis, the use of the living instrument doctrine is mostly visible in 
the interpretation of Article 3 as to guarantee the right to have satisfactory detention 
conditions and healthcare of certain standard in prisons. The Court has from 2001 
started imposing those obligations on states under Article 3. In Dougoz v Greece,220 the 
first judgment where the Court found a violation of Article 3 based on poor detention 
conditions,221 it did not directly refer to the living instrument doctrine. However, it can 
be concluded that the Court did find a violation of Article 3 by using the living 
instrument doctrine, without referring to it explicitly and without providing justification 
for such reasoning. If we bear in mind that the Court was reluctant in finding a violation 
of Article 3 based on poor detention conditions and unsatisfactory healthcare in prisons 
prior to 2001, we can conclude that it was the use of living instrument doctrine that led 
to these developments, so that detention conditions that did not satisfy the minimum 
level of severity as to represent a violation of Article 3 in the past, nowadays will. 
Whether or not the Court explicitly invoked it, it is clear that it was the use of this 
doctrine that allowed the Court to extend the scope of Article 3’s protections.  
When it comes to other issues relevant for this thesis, the living instrument doctrine has 
also been invoked by the Court in the Hatton case regarding the right to a healthy 
environment, both in the Chamber judgment and in the Grand Chamber judgment.222   
The doctrine of effectiveness, together with the living instrument doctrine, is the most 
important doctrine for this thesis, since it is the use of these interpretative methods that 
enabled the Court to deliver judgments with significant socio-economic elements. By 
introducing and using the doctrine of effectiveness, the Court is giving provisions of the 
Convention the “fullest weight and effect consistent with the language used and with 
the rest of the text and in such a way that every part of it can be given meaning.”223 The 
essence of this approach is that states cannot be in compliance with the Convention 
simply by prohibiting conduct that contravenes the Convention, but they might have to 
take positive action to protect its rights.224 Therefore, the general idea under this 
                                                 
220 Dougoz v Greece (n 81). 
221 Besides the Greek case (1969) 12 YB 170 EComHR. 
222 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (n 204) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Greve and Hatton and 
Others v United Kingdom (GC judgment) (n 204) Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, Ress, Turmen, 
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223 Merrills (n 183), 89. 
224 Donald McRae, ‘Approaches to the Interpretation of Treaties: The European Court of Human Rights 
and the WTO Appellate Body’ in Stephan Breintenmoser, Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al (eds), Human Rights, 
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approach is to impose positive obligations on the Contracting states. The principle of 
effectiveness is used by the Court either when it decides whether a provision is 
applicable or whether a clearly applicable provision has been violated.  
The first judgment where the doctrine of effectiveness was used is Golder225 and already 
here the use of this doctrine was controversial, since in a way, the Court introduced a 
new right under the Convention. The question was whether the right of access to a 
court is guaranteed under Article 6 since the text of Article 6 provides only rights to 
individuals who are already before the Court. The Court decided to ignore the intention 
of the drafters and said:  
“Taking all the preceding considerations together, it follows that the right of access constitutes an element 
which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1. This is not an extensive interpretation forcing 
new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the first sentence of Article 6 
para. 1 read in its context and having regard to the object and purpose of the Convention, a lawmaking 
treaty (see the Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, p. 23, para. 8), and to general 
principles of law.”226  
The issue of effective access to a court has been invoked before the Court on numerous 
other occasions, for example in Airey v Ireland,227 P, C and S v United Kingdom228 and Artico 
v Italy.229 
Just like any other method of interpretation, the method of effectiveness is not limitless. 
The Convention is not intended for the protection of all human rights and the Court 
cannot extend its scope without limits. The problem is that, in order to protect rights of 
individuals, even the ones not implicitly or explicitly guaranteed under the Convention, 
the Court can almost always extend the scope of the right by using the doctrine of 
effectiveness.  
Regarding the case-law that will be discussed in the thesis, it was the doctrine of 
effectiveness that enabled such broad interpretation of the Convention’s provisions as 
                                                                                                                                          
Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007), 1411-
1412. 
225 Golder v United Kingdom (n 178). 
226 Ibid [36].  
227 Airey v Ireland (n 3). 
228 P, C and S v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 31.   
229 Artico v Italy (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 1.  
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to introduce the right to a healthy environment,230 the right to healthcare,231 and the 
right to adequate housing.232 Although the Court very rarely explicitly invoked the 
doctrine of effectiveness, just like with the living instrument doctrine, it did so implicitly. 
By requiring states to take positive and effective measures to secure the Convention 
rights, even the ones not included in the Convention, the Court used the doctrine of 
effectiveness.  
What interpretative method will prevail to a large degree depends on the composition of 
the judges sitting in the Chamber that adopts a judgment (or in some cases the Grand 
Chamber). It cannot be said that some judges always take an activist approach or that 
some always take a self-restraint approach. In the 1970’s the distinction was much 
clearer. For example, Judge Fitzmaurice was the strongest supporter of the self-restraint 
approach, which is visible from his dissenting opinions elaborated in his judgments.233 
However, as Judge Wildhaber, a former president of the Court stated:  
“One of the judges may move ahead and when the composition of the Chamber is favourable, the 
majority may do something very activist. If you then follow precedent, you are bound to follow the 
outcome of judicial activism. As a result, you can be on the side of judicial self-restraint and at the same 
time you want to change precedent. Because of the complexities of our Court it is not a simple 
continuum. Are you to the same extent a judicial activist when it concerns your own country? You know 
your own system, you know it works and you think it hasn’t led to many abuses. Even as a very objective 
observer you may be more lenient towards your own country.”234 
As will be seen in chapter VIII when discussing the Court’s inconsistency, today it is not 
clear when and why the Court resorts to certain interpretative methods. Although on 
most occasions the Court points out the need for effective and practical protection of 
rights in accordance with the current day conditions, thereby using the living instrument 
and the doctrine of effectiveness, it occasionally returns to the judicial self-restraint 
methods of interpretation.  
Now, the CoM as the body charged with the task of supervising the execution of the 
Court’s judgments will be briefly discussed. 
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 58 
 
3.4. THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS 
The CoM is the CoE’s decision-making body. It comprises the Foreign Affairs Ministers 
of all the Member States, or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg.235 
Under Article 14 of the Statute of the Council of Europe each Member State shall be 
entitled to one representative on the CoM, and each representative shall be entitled to 
one vote. The work and activities of the CoM include political dialogue, interacting with 
the Parliamentary Assembly, interacting with the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities of the CoE, admitting new Member States, monitoring respect of 
commitments by Member States, concluding Conventions and agreements, adopting 
recommendations to Member States, adopting the budget, adopting and monitoring the 
Programme of Activities, implementing cooperation and assistance programmes and 
supervising the execution of judgments of the Court.236 Here, I will not look at all the 
activities of the CoM, but only the ones relevant for the thesis.  
Currently the main tasks of the CoM relating to the Court are the supervision of the 
execution of judgements of the Court, receiving and forwarding the lists of candidates 
for the election of judges to the Parliamentary Assembly, requesting advisory opinions 
of the Court and setting the Court’s annual budget. The CoM, when supervising the 
execution of judgments, operates under Rules of Procedure adopted in May 2006.237The 
CoM meets in four three-day sessions each year. Because of the increasing number of 
judgements delivered by the Court the CoM has adopted a series of guidelines (at a 
meeting in April 2004), as to when the case will be proposed for debate. A case will be 
proposed for debate if: the applicant’s situation warrants special supervision because of 
the violation; it marks a new departure in case-law by the Court; it discloses a potential 
systemic problem which could give rise to similar cases in future; there is a difference of 
appreciation between the Secretariat and the respondent state concerning the measures 
                                                 
235 Statute of the Council of Europe (n 145).   
236 Committee of Ministers, About the Committee of Ministers, 
 <http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM_en.asp> accessed 1 July 2012. 
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to be taken; there is a delay in execution with reference to the timetable; or a 
Government delegation or the Secretariat requests it.238 
When the Court has decided that there has been a violation of the Convention (or its 
Protocols) and has awarded just satisfaction to the injured party, the CoM shall invite 
the High Contracting Party concerned to inform it of the measures which it has taken or 
intends to take in consequence of the judgment, having regard to its obligation to abide 
by it.239  
Furthermore, 
“When supervising the execution of a judgment by the High Contracting Party concerned, pursuant to 
Article 46, paragraph 2, of the Convention, the Committee of Ministers shall examine:  
a. whether any just satisfaction awarded by the Court has been paid, including as the case may be, default 
interest; and  
b. if required, and taking into account the discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned to choose 
the means necessary to comply with the judgment, whether:  
i. individual measures have been taken to ensure that the violation has ceased and that the 
injured party is put, as far as possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the 
violation of the Convention;  
ii. general measures have been adopted, preventing new violations similar to that or those found 
or putting an end to continuing violations.”240  
Therefore, the obligation to abide by the judgments encompasses three main elements.  
As to the just satisfaction, the CoM only has the task of examining whether just 
satisfaction awarded has been paid.  
As far as the applicant’s individual situation is concerned, the main obligation is to 
ensure that individual measures are taken. This obligation is, as in international law in 
general, to achieve, as far as possible, restitutio in integrum for the applicant, as the 
provision itself states. The most commonly used individual measure required for restitutio 
in integrum is the reopening of domestic legal procedures, mainly in criminal matters and 
the erasure of a conviction from the criminal records. It is only where restitutio in integrum 
                                                 
238 See more in Human rights working methods—Improved effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers’ supervision of 
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proves to be legally or physically impossible that it will be replaced by compensation, 
which, moreover, the victim often prefers. 241 
On a more general level, the obligation also includes the prevention of violations similar 
to those found by the Court and that is the primary aim of the general measures. 
General measures which may be necessary include constitutional changes or legislative 
amendments, changes in the case-law of the national courts, as well as practical 
measures, such as improving prison conditions. The efficiency of domestic remedies is 
an important element of general measures and these are recommended by the CoM to 
review, following the Court’s judgments which point to structural or general deficiencies 
in national law or practice, the effectiveness of the existing remedies and, where 
necessary, set up effective ones, in order to avoid repetitive cases being brought before 
the Court. 242  
Where the CoM considers that all execution measures required have been adopted, it 
closes its examination of the case by adopting a final resolution (pending the adoption 
of such a resolution, cases are listed under a special appendix to the agenda). 
Although according to the Convention the supervision of the execution of the 
judgments is a matter for the CoM alone, in reality the Court and the Parliamentary 
Assembly have come to play a greater role in the process of the execution of judgments. 
As already mentioned, through the ‘pilot case’ procedures, the Court often specifies the 
general measures to be adopted. Also, in some newer cases the Court has started 
indicating, or even ordering, states which individual or general measures they should 
take.243  
The role of the Parliamentary Assembly in the supervision of the execution of 
judgments is that it is now included on the agenda of one of the CoM four meetings 
each year.244 Also, its members can ask questions in writing to members of the CoM to 
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obtain explanations concerning the failure to execute certain judgment. The 
Parliamentary Assembly also envisages asking the Minister of Justice of the state 
concerned to give an explanation in person to its members. Finally, the Parliamentary 
Assembly has secured a promise from the CoM that there will be formal consultations 
between their committees.245 Although the role of the Parliamentary Assembly is purely 
consultative, its importance lies in the public nature of its questions and criticisms.  
It is important to mention the sanctions available in order to force states to comply with 
their legal obligations as set out under the Court’s judgments. The CoM has several ways 
of pressuring states to comply with the judgment. The least invasive one is to pressure 
the government representative at the CoM’s meeting or more formally, for the 
Chairman of the CoM to send bilateral letters to notify the government concerned of 
the CoM’s views on any particular matter.246 Furthermore, the CoM can issue an interim 
resolution directly calling upon the competent state authority to resolve the problems it 
is encountering in enforcing of judgments.247 Interim resolutions can take various forms. 
The first type consists of taking note that no measures have been adopted and in 
inviting states to comply with the judgment. The second type provides the CoM with 
the opportunity to note certain progress and to encourage states to adopt measures in 
the future. This is the most common type of resolution. Finally, a third type of interim 
resolution, which is used only exceptionally, is designed to threaten the state with more 
serious measures.248 Interim resolutions are set out in Rule 16 of the CoM Rules stating 
that in the course of its supervision of the execution of a judgment or of the terms of a 
friendly settlement, the CoM may adopt interim resolutions, notably in order to provide 
information on the state of progress of the execution or, where appropriate, to express 
concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the execution. 
Finally, according to Article 3 of the Statute of the CoE: “Every member of the Council 
of Europe must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all 
persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council as 
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specified in chapter I”249 and Article 8 goes on by saying “Any member of the Council 
of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its rights of 
representation and requested by the CoM to withdraw under Article 7. If such member 
does not comply with this request, the Committee may decide that it has ceased to be a 
member of the Council as from such date as the Committee may determine.”250 The 
CoM is very reluctant when it comes to suspending a country from its rights of 
representation. For example, Russia escaped suspension in 2000 when the Parliamentary 
Assembly called upon the CoM to suspend Russia unless it immediately halted human 
rights abuses in Chechnya. Even then, after a meeting in Strasbourg, the CoM 
welcomed Russia’s efforts to respond to Western criticism of its conduct and made no 
mention of any possible sanctions.  
Protocol 14 also seeks to improve the effectiveness of the execution of the Court’s 
judgments and to that end added three more paragraphs to Article 46 of the Convention. 
The new Article 46(3) empowers the CoM to request an interpretation from the Court 
of a final judgment, for the purpose of facilitating the supervision of its execution. 
Secondly, new paragraph 46(4) allows the CoM to refer to the Court the question of 
whether the Member State had failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 1 to abide 
by the judgment. This can be done only after it has served a formal notice on that State 
party and adopted a decision by a majority vote of two-thirds representatives of the CoM. 
If the Court finds a violation of Article 46(1), it refers the case back to the CoM for 
consideration of the measures to be taken, pursuant to Article 46(5). In case the Court 
does not find a violation, it will also refer the case to the CoM which shall close its 
examination of the case.251 However, no express sanction (apart from those already 
mentioned above) will be available if the Court finds that a state has indeed failed to 
fulfil its obligations under Article 46(1).  
Although these improved working methods of the CoM in supervising the execution of 
judgements are to be welcomed, they have received numerous criticisms regarding their 
actual effectiveness. First of all, the CoM Rules are not prescriptive of states. If the 
Court finds a violation of the Convention, the respondent state is invited to inform the 
CoM ‘‘of the measures which the High Contracting Party has taken or intends to take in 
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consequence of the judgment’’.252 The CoM is only obliged to consider individual or 
general measures if required, and also taking into account the discretion of the High 
Contracting Party concerned to choose the means necessary to comply with the 
judgment. The Rules make no reference to the timing of the state’s response. The 
supervision process can also be criticised for its inaccessibility. The CoM Rules require a 
certain level of public access. The agenda of human rights meetings must be made 
public and the practice is for the CoM to publish general information about the progress 
of the execution of judgments after each human rights meeting. Furthermore, 
information provided by states (and indeed by the injured party and civil society 
organisations) should also be accessible to the public. However, it is the practical 
inaccessibility of information which remains a serious problem since little information is 
actually available to the public while most of the information remains unavailable.  
One of the biggest criticisms is whether CoM exerts enough pressure on the state in 
order for it to execute the judgements. As the Venice Commission has recalled, the 
supervisory function of the CoM is a ‘‘collective responsibility’’. As a result, ‘‘the 
execution of a particular judgment is not only the legal obligation of the State 
concerned, but a common concern.”253 Criticism was made of the rigour of the process 
in terms of its success in preventing further similar Convention breaches. There is an 
overwhelming case for making the implementation process in respect of systemic 
violation cases more frequent and more rigorous.254 An amendment to the CoM Rules 
made in May 2006 acknowledged this argument by introducing an obligation on the 
CoM to give priority to systemic cases while the Venice Commission also pointed to 
insufficient and unsatisfactory co-operation from the states. Finally, in his paper 
‘Protocol 14 and the Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ S. Greer has 
pointed out that the implementation of the judgements is the “Achilles heel of the entire 
Convention system,’’ because of the Council of Europe’s powerlessness to deal with 
persistently non-compliant states.”255  
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Up to today, states have on most occasions abided by the final judgments, either in their 
entirety or at least, in part.256 It seems as if it is not only the possibility of sanctions that 
urge the states to comply with the judgments but their political interests and their belief 
in the legitimacy of the Court. However, recently delays in executing the Court’s 
judgments are noticeable. Besides the greater number of applications and thereby of 
judgments, other reasons include the fact that the Court is reading more rights into the 
Convention and the imposition of judgments that contain obligations with significant 
socio-economic elements. Those are exactly the problems that will be discussed further 
in the thesis together with possible solutions for those problems.  
Before that, the role of the CoM under the ESC system will be presented, within the 
following section on the ESC. 
 
3.5 THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 
As pointed out in the previous chapter, within the CoE a deliberate decision was made 
to have two different human rights instruments, one on civil and political rights and the 
other one on economic and social rights. The ECHR came into force in 1953 and eight 
years later, the ESC was adopted.  
The ESC sets out economic and social rights and freedoms and establishes a supervisory 
mechanism guaranteeing their respect by the States parties. Following its revision, the 
1996 Revised ESC, which came into force in 1999, is gradually replacing the initial 1961 
treaty. By September 2012, all the CoE states had signed either the Revised ESC or the 
1961 ESC, while 43 states had ratified one or both versions of the ESC.257 
The ESC makes a distinction between ‘core’ and ‘non-core’ rights. In the original ESC 
there are seven ‘core’ rights258 while the Revised ESC adds two further core rights- the 
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right of children to protection and the right to equal opportunities and treatment in 
employment. The second category of rights comprises ‘non-core’ rights.259 The ESC is 
unique among human rights treaties since it permits its parties not to accept all the 
rights it contains.260 The probable reason for that are the considerable differences in the 
level of economic and social progress among members of the CoE.261 The consequence 
is that it is unlikely that many members to the CoE are subject to the same set of 
obligations under the ESC.262 Although allowing states not to accept all the ESC 
provision can be justified by economic and social differences among Member States of 
the CoE, this fact by itself shows that the CoE is not ready to equalise the protection of 
economic and social rights with the protection of civil and political rights.  
As to the compliance mechanism under the ESC, there are two forms of machinery 
seeking to ensure that parties comply with obligations under the ESC.263 The first is the 
system of Reporting which has been in existence since 1961 and is obligatory for all the 
State parties to the ESC. As to the second mechanism, the system of Collective 
Complaints, it was introduced in 1995 and has been in force since 1998. So far only 15 
Member States have ratified it.264  
The ESCR ascertains whether states have honoured the undertakings set out in the 
ESC. The CoM elects fifteen independent, impartial members for a period of six years, 
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renewable once. The ECSR determines whether or not national law and practice in 
states parties are in conformity with the ESC.265 
When it comes to the Reporting procedure, every year State parties submit a report 
indicating how they implement the ESC in law and in practice. Each report concerns 
some of the accepted provisions of the ESC. The provisions are divided into four 
thematic groups and each provision of the ESC will be reported on once every four 
years. The ECSR examines the reports and decides whether or not the situations in the 
countries concerned are in conformity with the ESC. Its decisions, known as 
‘conclusions’, are published every year.  
The CoM intervenes in the last stage of the supervisory process in the procedure based 
on national reports. The CoM’s work is prepared by a Governmental Committee 
comprising representatives of the governments of the State parties to the ESC, assisted 
by observers representing European employers’ organisations and trade unions.266 After 
receiving the report the CoM adopts a resolution closing each supervision cycle and 
addresses individual recommendations to Contracting Parties where necessary.267 
However, the CoM rarely issues recommendations; so far it has only issued thirty-seven 
of them.268 It also needs to be mentioned that the CoM recommendations regarding 
national reports are usually not detailed nor do they give clear guidance to the state on 
the measures it needs to take.269  
 
3.6 THE COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS SYSTEM 
According to the preamble to the 1995 Protocol providing for a system of Collective 
Complaints, the Member States have “Resolved to take new measures to improve the 
effective enforcement of the social rights guaranteed by the Charter; Considering that 
this aim could be achieved in particular by the establishment of a Collective Complaints 
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procedure, which, inter alia, would strengthen the participation of management and 
labour and of non-governmental organisations.”270 Under this Protocol, which came 
into force in 1998, complaints of violations of the ESC may be lodged with the ECSR.271 
Complaints of non-compliance may be made by four types of organisations, never by an 
individual applicant. Those organisations are: - the European Trade Union 
Confederation, BUSINESSEUROPE and International Organisation of Employers; - 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with participative status to the Council of 
Europe which are on a list drawn up for this purpose by the Governmental Committee; 
-Employers’ organisations and trade unions in the country concerned and – National 
NGOs (in the case of states which have agreed to this).272 
The ECSR examines the complaint and, if the formal requirements have been met, 
declares it admissible. Unlike the Convention, the Collective Complaints system does 
not have a victim requirement, or a requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, nor is 
there a time limit to bring a complaint. Once the complaint has been declared 
admissible, a written procedure is set in motion, with an exchange of memorials 
between the parties. The ECSR then takes a decision on the merits of the case, by 
drawing up a report with its conclusions. The ECSR forwards its decision to the parties 
concerned and the CoM in a report, which is made public within four months of its 
being forwarded. As w can see, unlike in the Reporting procedure, under the Collective 
Complaints procedure the ECSR sends its decition directly to the CoM without going 
through the Governmental Committee. If the ECSR finds that the ESC has been 
complied with, the CoM is to adopt a resolution to this effect by a simple majority. 
However, if it concludes that the ESC has not been complied with, the CoM shall adopt 
by a two-thirds majority a recommendation addressed to the defendant state. 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that most of the complaints have led to at least some 
findings of non-compliance, the CoM has only made a recommendation to the state 
once.273  
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There have been several criticisms to the Collective Complaints system, particularly its 
procedural aspects, the lack of remedial powers and the significant role played by the 
CoM.274  The ECSR has no power to order remedies; it can only deliver declaratory 
decisions. Despite the criticism that can all be considered valid, it still might be said that 
the Collective Complaints system can be regarded as a quasi-judicial process specifically 
for economic and social rights because of the jurisprudence developed by the ECSR. 
Since 1998, 82 complaints have been registered.275  
As to the second criticism, regarding the significant role of the CoM (which is a political 
body), the ECSR itself made a strong assertion of its authority in Confederation française de 
l’Encaderment (CFE-CGC) v France:  
“The Committee cannot subscribe to the Government's view that when they considered Complaint No. 
9/2000 CFE-CGC v. France, the Ministers' Deputies found that there had been no violation of the 
Revised Charter. It is clear from the wording of the Protocol providing for a system of collective 
complaints that only the European Committee of Social Rights can determine whether or not a situation 
is in conformity with the Charter. This applies to any treaty establishing a judicial or quasi-judicial body to 
assess contracting parties' compliance with that treaty. The explanatory report to the Protocol explicitly 
states that the Committee of Ministers cannot reverse the legal assessment made by the Committee of 
independent experts, but may only decide whether or not to additionally make a recommendation to the 
state concerned. Admittedly the Committee of Ministers, when it decides to use this power may take 
account of any social and economic policy considerations in its reasoning, but it may not question the 
legal assessment.”276  
This statement was made by the ECSR to emphasize its exclusive competence in 
making determinations about compliance with the obligations under the ESC and the 
lack of CoM’s power to reverse ECSR decisions. The Collective Complaints system has 
enabled the ECSR to make new interpretations of the ESC rights, even on the issues 
that have never been addressed through states reports.277  
However, the fact is that the CoM reacts quite mildly after the ECSR finds a violation of 
the ESC. Maybe the best examples are the two collective complaints concerning Italy 
where the ECSR found violations of the ESC based on the same facts of the case, 
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meaning that the CoM did not manage to urge Italy into remedying the situation.278 
These complaints will be presented in detail in chapter VII but it is relevant to mention 
here that following the decision of the ECSR in Complaint No. 27/2004 the CoM 
delivered a Resolution in 2006 where it had a rather mild reaction to violations of the 
Charter’s Articles 31(1), 31(2) and E found by the ECSR.279 
The CoM was equally weak in its resolution on Complaint 58/2009,280 especially as in its 
decision on the merits of this complaint the ECSR had said that Italy had failed to 
comply with the ECSR’s findings in Complaint 27/2004 and that that amounted to an 
aggravated violation of the ESC.281 The other problematic issues under both the 
Reporting and the Collective Complaints system will be discussed further in the 
following chapters when discussing the ESC substantive provisions. 
 
3.7 INTERPRETATIVE METHODS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTTEE 
ON SOCIAL RIGHTS 
Just like the ECHR, the ESC has numerous provisions that are quite general and 
abstract in terms, and thereby in need of interpretation. The ECSR started interpreting 
the ESC already through the Reporting procedure, but the main interpretative methods 
were articulated through the Collective Complaints system. For that reason, the ECSR 
interpretative methods as used while deciding on the collective complaints will be 
presented. 
The general approach of the ESCR has been most clearly and fully spelt out in the 
International Federation of Human Rights League (FIDH) v France.282 In this decision, the 
ESCR stated that the ESC, as a treaty, is to be interpreted on the basis of the VCLT “in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
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treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”283 In the same decision 
the ECSR noted some other interpretative methods that will be used when interpreting 
the ESC: 
“The Charter was envisaged as a human rights instrument to complement the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It is a living instrument dedicated to certain values which inspired it: dignity, autonomy, 
equality and solidarity. The rights guaranteed are not ends in themselves but they complete the rights 
enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights… Thus, the Charter must be interpreted so as 
to give life and meaning to fundamental social rights. It follows inter alia that restrictions on rights are to 
be read restrictively, i. e. understood in such a manner as to preserve intact the essence of the right and to 
achieve the overall purpose of the Charter.”284 
As we can see, the ECSR invoked a living instrument approach and emphasized the 
complementary role of the ESC to the ECHR, thereby signalling its intention to use 
similar interpretative methods. In its conclusion the ECSR stated that “legislation or 
practice which denies entitlement to medical assistance to foreign nationals, within the 
territory of a State party, even if they are there illegally, is contrary to the Charter.”285 It 
reached this conclusion even though the Revised ESC guarantees the right to nationals 
of other states only if they are lawfully in the State party.286 Thereby, it extended the 
scope of the ESC through its interpretation, not only by interpreting the Charter as a 
living instrument, but also by using the doctrine of effectiveness.  
Before turning to the doctrine of effectiveness, it must be emphasized that the ECSR 
also used the living instrument doctrine in its later cases.287 It is particularly interesting to 
point out that in the Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece the 
ECSR used the living instrument doctrine as a justification, in the light of current 
conditions, for interpreting the guarantee of the right to health in Article 11 of the 
Charter as including the right to a healthy environment.288 The ECSR again invoked not 
only the living instrument doctrine but also the doctrine of effectiveness. It has been 
pointed out, in Marangopoulos and in other decisions, that the purpose of the ESC is to 
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protect the rights not only theoretically, but also in fact.289 This statement can be 
understood as the intention of the ESCR to guarantee the ESC rights so as to make 
them practical and effective. 
The effective guarantee of rights has also been invoked in the housing cases, but in a 
somewhat different wording. In the housing cases, the ECSR emphasized positive 
interventions by states needed in order to ensure the effective guarantee of rights.290 
This means that, for example, even when the state introduced legislation it might not be 
sufficient, but it also needs to implement existing legislation properly.291 This is not 
surprising, since the idea that economic and social rights impose positive obligations has 
been always stressed as one of the main characteristics of the ESC.  
Positive obligations imposed on states by the ECSR mostly involve considerable public 
expenditure. It might have been expected that for that reason the ECSR will use a 
language suggesting that a state may claim lack of financial resources as a reason for not 
taking particular action, but this has proven not to be true. On most occasions, claiming 
a lack of financial resources by the state will not be accepted as a justification. In the 
text of the ESC, unlike in the text of the ICESCR (Article 2(1)), there is no article 
drafted in a way that limits an obligation to the availability of resources. The ESC 
requires states to secure the rights by taking appropriate or necessary measures, but no 
reference to ‘available resources’ is made. However, recourse to the lack of available 
resources may be unavoidable in certain cases, “when the achievement of one of the 
rights in question is exceptionally complex and particularly expensive to resolve.”292 In 
such cases the ECSR has stated that “a State Party must take measures that allow it to 
achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress 
and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources.”293 Resources 
were also relevant in Marangopoulos case where the respondent Government argued that 
it was following a coherent progressive emissions reduction strategy. While examining 
their plan for emission reductions, the ESCR concluded that “they do not offer real 
evidence of Greece’s commitment to improving the situation within a reasonable time 
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or making such an outcome plausible.”294 Therefore, even bearing in mind that the 
ECSR will sometimes allow the lack of available resources to be invoked or it will even 
invoke them itself, most of the time it will not relieve the state of its responsibility under 
the ESC due to the lack of available resources. 
Therefore, the ECSR has often invoked both the living instrument and the doctrine of 
effectiveness to point out that the Charter rights will not be interpreted restrictively and 
that it will not allow states to invoke lack of resources to avail themselves of refusing 
economic and social rights to certain groups within its territory.  
On the other hand, the ESC permits restrictions upon all ESC rights using the same 
formula as found under Articles 8 - 11 of the Convention.295 Article G of the Revised 
ESC reads as follows: 
“1. The rights and principles set forth in Part I when effectively realised, and their effective exercise as 
provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any restrictions or limitations not specified in those parts, 
except such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of public interest, national security, public health, or 
morals.  
2. The restrictions permitted under this Charter to the rights and obligations set forth herein shall not be 
applied for any purpose other than that for which they have been prescribed.” 
The ESC thus allows the same use of the proportionality test as the Convention does, 
under strict conditions and requiring from the states to fulfil all the necessary 
requirements.296  
Since the decisions of the ECSR under Collective Complaints procedure are not binding 
on states like the judgments of the Court are and the protection of the economic and 
social, as ‘weaker’ rights, is at stake, one might assume that the ECSR will allow states a 
wide margin of appreciation. However, that is not the case.297Although the ECSR has 
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made reference to the margin of appreciation frequently, it has rarely accepted it as to 
justify the state’s behaviour. One example is the Syndicat des Agrégés de l’Enseignement 
Supérieur (SAGES) v France298 where it stated “The Committee holds that where States 
Parties establish various consultation bodies that are not directly concerned with the 
essential trade union prerogatives such as collective bargaining they have a wide margin 
of appreciation in determining the composition of the bodies in question.”299 
On most occasions the ECSR, when deciding whether states have a wide or narrow 
margin of appreciation, decided that the margin of appreciation attributed to states is 
narrow. Therefore, when balancing respect for state discretion and protection of the 
ESC rights, the ECSR decided in favour of the ESC rights. For example, in Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Croatia the ECSR acknowledged that states do 
enjoy a certain margin of discretion in making decisions on their social policy or in 
determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Charter.300 Yet, it found 
that this margin of discretion was not wide and that it was the state’s obligation to 
secure the rights concerned in each case, finding a violation of the rights in question. It 
is also interesting to note that, in COHRE v Italy the ECSR stated “if discretion must be 
left to the competent national authorities, the margin will tend to be narrower where the 
right at stake is crucial to the individual's effective enjoyment of intimate or key rights 
(see, mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights, Connors v the United Kingdom, 
judgment of 27 May 2004, § 82). Where a particularly important facet of an individual's 
existence or identity is at stake, the discretion allowed to the State will be restricted (see, 
mutatis mutandis, European Court of Human Rights, Evans v the United Kingdom [GC], 
judgment of 10 April 2007, § 77).”301  
As we can see, the ECSR has used largely the same interpretative methods as the Court. 
On numerous occasions it has invoked the jurisprudence of the Court in support of its 
interpretation of the ESC. Also, where there is an ESC right that has an equivalent in 
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the Convention, the ECSR interprets the Charter so as to be in harmony with the 
Convention.302 
Let me now turn to the issue of the Court’s extensive interpretation of the Convention’s 
rights where they consist of significant socio-economic elements and the possible 
solutions to those problems. By reading into the Convention the right to have 
satisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, the right to a healthy 
environment, the right to healthcare in general and the right to adequate housing, the 
Court is creating numerous difficulties for the states. It reads in rights to which the 
states have not agreed when signing the Convention, rights already guaranteed under the 
ECPT and the ESC, and the execution of judgments concerning those rights is often 
surrounded with numerous difficulties. It will be argued that the protection of these 
rights is better left for the machineries of protection established under the ECPT and 
the ESC.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RIGHT TO SATISFACTORY DETENTION CONDITIONS 
AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN PRISONS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Article 3 of the Convention prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment under the Convention. It is one of the most important articles within the 
Convention and one of the rare articles that contain an absolute prohibition of any 
limitations on the rights it protects. What I will show through this chapter is that 
nowadays the nature of Article 3 as a fundamental right has been seriously 
compromised through the Court’s interpretation of Article 3 as guaranteeing satisfactory 
detention conditions and healthcare of a certain standard in prisons. It will be 
questioned whether it is really necessary for the Court to deal with detention conditions 
and healthcare in prisons under Article 3 or whether there are not other means within 
the CoE for dealing with those rights.  
In the first section of this chapter some general remarks on Article 3 will be given, 
followed by an introduction to the Court’s case-law finding violations of Article 3 based 
solely on poor detention conditions and unsatisfactory healthcare in prisons. Next, the 
chapter will introduce the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (the 
CPT), which is a non-judicial body established under the ECPT that deals exclusively 
with detention conditions and healthcare in prisons. Since the majority of the Court’s 
judgements concerning detention conditions and the healthcare in prisons, as well as the 
CoM supervision process, are very much influenced and supported by findings of the 
CPT as set out in its reports, the important aspects of the CPT and its work will be 
presented.  
Thereafter, the Court’s jurisprudence on unsatisfactory detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons will be analysed. This jurisprudence has significant socio-economic 
elements, particularly in their execution. Providing satisfactory detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons of a certain standard usually concerns a large group of detainees 
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and can be only achieved progressively through the involvement of large financial 
resources. For this reason it takes years for a state to execute a judgment of the Court in 
its entirety. Because of this problem, the supervision of the execution of judgments, 
which is the responsibility of the CoM, will also be analysed together with the CoM’s 
reports on the current state of execution of those judgments. 
Furthermore, the CPT has developed numerous standards concerning healthcare in 
prisons and detention conditions which it takes into account when examining whether 
they are being respected by the state and they will be briefly discussed. The CPT has 
been shown to be an effective body in supervising whether the states are improving 
their detention conditions and healthcare in prisons and states have shown willingness 
to co-operate with the CPT and follow its recommendations. In the final part of the 
chapter it will be argued not only that guaranteeing healthcare of a certain standard in 
prisons and adequate detention conditions would not be threatened if the Court left 
those matters for the CPT, but also that it would be desirable for the CPT to deal 
exclusively with those issues.  
 
4.2 ARTICLE 3- PROHIBITION OF TORTURE, INHUMAN OR 
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 
Article 3 of the Convention prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and, as already stated, it contains an absolute prohibition of any limitations 
on the rights (principles) it protects.303 There is no second paragraph of this Article (as 
with Articles 8-11) which would allow exceptions and the rights contained in it cannot 
be limited in a way that most other articles can. Also, it is not subject to derogation 
under Article 15 (2) of the Convention. The Court has never permitted any ill-treatment 
that would fall within the scope of Article 3, even for the most pressing reasons of 
public interest and irrespective of the victim’s conduct.304 The unconditional wording of 
Article 3 renders the motivation for the alleged treatment irrelevant: the ends can never 
justify the means. This strict approach is mitigated by the severity threshold that must 
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be satisfied under Article 3. When the Court is determining whether there is a violation 
of Article 3, it will never apply the principle of proportionality (as it does with Articles 
8-11). Introducing a proportionality test would threaten to undermine the absolute 
nature of the Article 3 protection as it would permit justifications for ill-treatment.305 
Torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment are not defined in the 
Convention so it has been up to the Court to define those terms. It did so in one of the 
first cases where Article 3 was in question, Ireland v United Kingdom.306 The Court defined 
the terms as follows: torture: “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and 
cruel suffering”; inhuman treatment or punishment: “the infliction of intense physical 
and mental suffering”; and degrading treatment: “ill-treatment designed to arouse in 
victims feelings of fear, anguish, and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing 
them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance.”307 
When deciding whether a violation of Article 3 occurred and whether it represents 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the Court takes into account 
all the circumstances of every case individually. The Court itself stated that the 
assessment of the minimum level of severity is, in the nature of things, relative; it 
depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its 
physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the 
victim.308 
What is relevant for this chapter is the Court’s dynamic interpretation of Article 3 and 
its application of the living instrument doctrine. In as early as 1978 in the Tyrer 
judgement the Court’s judges stated that Convention is a ‘living instrument’ that must 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions rather than what the drafters 
thought back in 1950.309 That also means that the notion of what constitutes torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment has changed over time within the Court’s 
jurisprudence. It is important to read the Convention in terms of current expectations, 
heightened standards may now more readily lead to the conclusion that certain ill-
treatment that might have been labelled as inhuman treatment now justifies the 
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application of the label torture,310 or even that the treatment of prisoners or detention 
conditions that used to be labelled only as unsatisfactory might now be regarded as 
violation of Article 3. 
Also, the Court pointed out that the circumstances which may give rise to a breach of 
Article 3 are not limited. In Pretty v United Kingdom, a case concerned with voluntary 
euthanasia, the Court commented that: ‘‘In light of the fundamental importance of 
Article 3, the Court has reserved to itself sufficient flexibility to address the application 
of that Article in other situations that might arise.’’311 This might be an explanation for 
why the Court over time started interpreting Article 3 so as to include unsatisfactory 
detention conditions and poor medical treatment in detention.312 Before presenting the 
most relevant cases under Article 3 concerning detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons, a short presentation of the CPT will be given since numerous Court’s 
judgments that will be discussed have very much been influenced by the CPT findings.  
 
4.3 THE CPT IN GENERAL AND ITS IMPACT ON THE WORK OF THE 
COURT 
The CPT has been established under the ECPT which has been ratified by all Member 
States of the CoE.313 The work of CPT is designed to be an integral part of the CoE 
system for the protection of human rights, as a proactive non-judicial mechanism.314 
Under the ECPT, the CPT is set up to conduct periodic and ad hoc visits in any places 
under the jurisdiction of a contracting state where persons are deprived of liberty to see 
how they are treated and, if necessary, to recommend improvements. The CPT 
produces two categories of documents: the annual general reports that describe its 
work during the past year and may also contain some substantive issues and general 
standards, and individual country reports arising out of the CPT’s programme of visits. 
The essential features of the ECPT are principles of co-operation and confidentiality 
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between the CPT and State parties. Each State party must permit visits and no 
reservations are allowed in respect to any of the provision of the ECPT. When carrying 
out visits the CPT enjoys extensive power under the ECPT: access to the territory of the 
state and the right to travel without restrictions, full information on places where 
persons deprived of their liberty are being held, unlimited access to any place where 
persons are deprived of their liberty, including the right to move inside those places 
without restrictions and access to all information available to the states which is 
necessary for the CPT to carry out its task.315 During its visit the CPT is likely to focus 
on two issues: whether there are indications suggesting that violence or unnecessary 
force have been used against detainees, and whether detention conditions and treatment 
regimes are adequate. Since it is not the role the of the CPT to establish whether there 
has been a breach of Article 3, the CPT has not found it necessary to provide a clear 
definition of the terms “torture” or “inhuman” or “degrading” treatment. However, the 
CPT has developed a set of standards which it employs during its visits and which apply 
to all persons in all places of detention. These CPT standards are promulgated in its 
annual/general reports and in country reports.316  
The Explanatory Report to the ECPT indicated that the CPT itself was not to “seek to 
interfere in the interpretation and application of Article 3.”317 However, in reality there is 
a two way relationship between the Court and the CPT. Decisions made under the 
Court guide the CPT, and the findings of the CPT may both stimulate petitions and 
even directly influence the application of Article 3.318 When challenging detention 
conditions as incompatible with Article 3 requirements, applicants have sought to rely 
upon CPT findings in two situations: in establishing the factual background to 
conditions of detention and in an attempt to persuade the Court to condemn the 
treatment of the applicant through finding a violation of Article 3.319  
As already mentioned, the majority of the Court’s judgements concerning detention 
conditions are very much supported by the CPT findings stated in their reports, both 
                                                 
315 ECPT, Article 8(2). 
316 See more in Section 4.8. 
317 ECPT, Explanatory Report (CPT: Reference Documents CPT/Inf/C (89) 1 [EN] (Part 2), Strasbourg, 
26.XI.1987), [27]. 
318 Rod Morgan and Malcom Evans, Combating torture in Europe: the work and standards of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) (CoE Publishing 2001), 59. 
319 Jim Murdoch, The Treatment of Prisoners: European Standards (CoE Publishing 2008), 47. 
 80 
the general ones and reports regarding a specific country.320 What is also important to 
mention is that not only does the Court rely on CPT findings when it finds that 
detention conditions are not in conformity with Article 3, but the Court has also been 
persuaded when the CPT has labelled conditions of detention as acceptable.321 Even if 
the CPT delegation has not visited the actual detention centre where the applicant has 
been held, the Court can use the findings made by the CPT on its visit to a facility 
similar to the one where the applicant is being held.322 All of this suggests that the work 
of the CPT makes a significant and crucial contribution in the area of treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty and that the Court now has the opportunity of 
understanding the long-term impact of poor detention conditions upon individuals. The 
CPT’s cooperation with state authorities and with non-governmental organisations, its 
unrestricted access to all of a state’s detention facilities and all detainees and the high 
impact the CPT has on the Court’s judgements have made the CPT an important 
contributor to the protection of prisoners in Europe.  
 
4.4 VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 BASED SOLELY ON POOR 
DETENTION CONDITIONS AS A RESULT OF DYNAMIC AND 
EVOLUTIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION 
Conditions of detention refer to the general environment in which persons are detained, 
to the prison regime and specific conditions in which inmates are kept, and to the 
specific circumstances of the prisoner.323 At first the judges were very reluctant to find 
violations of Article 3 based solely on poor prison conditions. This is an area where 
there has been a continuous evolution in the basic standards, since, as already 
mentioned, in earlier case-law the Court and the former Commission seemed reluctant 
to conclude that conditions of detention violated Article 3 (except in the Greek case).324 
Already in the 1980s, in Kröcher and Möller v Switzerland325 violations of international 
standards of detention were acknowledged, but no violation of Article 3 was found. The 
applicants were locked up separately in two non-adjacent cells. The cells on their floor 
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and above and below theirs had been evacuated. Both applicants were soon placed 
under surveillance by closed-circuit television with a 60-watt lamp continuously kept on 
in their cells. During weekends the applicants could not leave their cells at all and had 
no newspapers, magazines, radio or television. Their watches and diaries had been taken 
away from them. They were deprived of any contact with each other as well as with 
other prisoners and could not be visited by their lawyers and kept in conditions of 
solitary confinement in the full sense of the term. The Commission considered that the 
special conditions imposed on the applicants could not be construed as inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3. However, there were already 
members of the Commission that expressed a dissenting opinion. They considered that 
there was a violation of Article 3 in this case and according to them, the majority’s case 
appeared to rest on the fact that the conditions of detention imposed on the applicants 
were particularly severe during the first month but that conditions were subsequently 
relaxed one by one. According to the dissenting members, closer attention should have 
been paid to the situation imposed on the applicants during the first month of their 
detention and this considered in the light of Article 3. The fact that a situation 
prohibited by Article 3 was gradually released did not mean that that situation could be 
justified retroactively in regard to that provision.326  
The first clear indication that poor physical conditions of detention can constitute 
degrading treatment even though there is no intention to humiliate detainees appeared 
in 2001 in Dougoz v Greece. A convicted foreign drugs offender was held for 10 months in 
Drapetsona detention centre and for eight months in Alexandras Avenue police 
headquarters. Both of these locations were severely overcrowded and there were no 
beds, mattresses or blankets. The Court unanimously decided that:  
“…conditions of detention may sometimes amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. In the “Greek 
case” (applications nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67, Commission’s report of 5 November 
1969, Yearbook 12) the Commission reached this conclusion regarding overcrowding and inadequate 
facilities for heating, sanitation, sleeping arrangements, food, recreation and contact with the outside 
world. When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these 
conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant… In the light of the above, Court 
considers that the conditions of detention of the applicant at the Alexandras police headquarters and the 
Drapetsona detention centre, in particular the serious overcrowding and absence of sleeping facilities, 
                                                 
326 Ibid, Dissenting Opinions of Judges Messers, Tenekides, Melchior, Sampaio and Weitzel. 
 82 
combined with the inordinate length of the period during which he was detained in such conditions, 
amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3.”327  
In classifying Dougoz’s conditions of detention as representing degrading treatment, the 
Court was very much influenced by the findings and the criticism of the CPT regarding 
Alexandras police headquarters and the Drapetsona detention centre.328  
Shortly after the Dougoz case the Court found another breach of Article 3 in Peers v 
Greece.329 The applicant was a British drug addict who was detained in the segregation 
unit for two months while he underwent drug withdrawal treatment. The Court 
determined:  
“The Court takes into account, in particular, that, for at least two months, the applicant had to spend a 
considerable part of each 24-hour period practically confined to his bed in a cell with no ventilation and 
no window, which would at times become unbearably hot. He also had to use the toilet in the presence of 
another inmate and be present while the toilet was being used by his cell-mate. The Court is not 
convinced by the Government’s allegation that these conditions did not affect the applicant in a manner 
incompatible with Article 3. On the contrary, the Court is of the opinion that the prison conditions 
complained of diminished the applicant’s human dignity and aroused in him feelings of anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him and possibly breaking his physical or moral resistance. 
In sum, the Court considers that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the segregation unit of the 
Delta wing of Koridallos Prison amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention.”330 
What the Court also took into account was whether the competent authorities took any 
steps to improve the objectively unacceptable conditions of the detention. Since in this 
case, no steps were taken, that kind of omission showed a lack of respect for the 
applicant. This kind of reasoning might lead us to the conclusion that the Court will put 
great importance on whether there was an effort on the part of the state to improve 
detention conditions when deciding if a violation occurred. Nevertheless, it has turned 
out that the greatest relevance will be given to the objective conditions of the detention. 
Also, already here the Court has expressed its opinion that even when the suffering has 
been endured for a relatively short period of time a violation of Article 3 might occur. 
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Furthermore, unlike in Krocher and Muller, in Price v United Kingdom331 the Court stated that 
even a few days of detention in unacceptable conditions might be enough to constitute 
an Article 3 violation. The applicant, a four-limb-deficient thalidomide victim with 
numerous health problems, including defective kidneys, committed contempt of the 
court in the course of civil proceedings and was ordered by a judge to be detained for 
seven days (although, as a result of the rules on remission of sentences, she was in fact 
detained for three nights and four days). During her first night of detention the 
applicant was kept in a cell in a local police station because it was too late in the day to 
take her to prison. The custody record showed that she was complaining of the cold 
every half hour – a serious problem for the applicant who suffered from recurring 
kidney problems and who, because of her disability, could not move around to keep 
warm. Finally, a doctor was called, who noted that the applicant could not use the bed 
and had to sleep in her wheelchair, that the facilities were not adapted to the needs of a 
disabled person and that the cell was too cold. The Court noted that, despite the 
doctor’s findings, no action was taken by the police officers responsible for the 
applicant’s custody to ensure that she was removed to a more suitable place of 
detention, or released. Instead, the applicant had to remain in the cell all night, although 
the doctor did wrap her in a spare blanket and gave her some painkillers. There was no 
evidence in this case of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant. 
However, the Court considered that to detain a severely disabled person in conditions 
where she was dangerously cold, risked developing sores because her bed was too hard 
or unreachable, and was unable to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of 
difficulty, constituted degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention.332  
Dougoz, Peers, and Price were some of the first cases regarding poor detention conditions 
that showed the Court’s willingness to find violations of Article 3 based solely on 
unacceptable living conditions. A whole new arena of possible applications that might 
come before the Court was created, and soon after these judgments, numerous 
applications, particularly from the applicants under the jurisdiction of states that 
generally have poor detention facilities, came before the Court. 
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One of the most important cases regarding poor detention conditions is Kalashnikov v 
Russia.333 It was one of the first Russian cases before the Court concerning detention 
conditions and after it, a large number of applications concerning unacceptable 
detention conditions in Russian prisons came before the Court. The conditions in most 
Russian detention facilities are below all standards established by the CPT or by the 
Court. In this particular case Mr Kalashnikov, a bank manager who had been charged 
with embezzlement and placed in detention on remand in June 1995, complained that 
the conditions and duration of his detention were in breach of Article 3. Mr 
Kalashnikov was convicted in August 1999 and sentenced to five years and six months’ 
imprisonment, running from June 1995, but in March 2000 he was acquitted of a new 
charge of misappropriation of property and three months later he was released from 
prison following an amnesty. The Court upheld his complaint and held that the duration 
of Mr. Kalashnikov’s detention, taken with the cramped and unsanitary conditions in 
which he had been held, violated Article 3 as they amounted to degrading treatment. He 
had been forced to endure overcrowding and poor sleeping conditions, and as a result 
he had contracted skin diseases and fungal infections over a period of four years and 10 
months. Even the Government in its response to the allegations, confirmed that “It 
was acknowledged that, for economic reasons, conditions of detention in Russia were 
very unsatisfactory and fell below the requirements set for penitentiary establishments 
in other Member States of the Council of Europe.”334 The Court noted the 
Government’s acknowledgement but it did not find economic problems a sufficient 
reason to lower its standards regarding detention conditions. The Court declared that 
due to “severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment and its detrimental effect on 
the applicant's health and well-being, combined with the length of the period during 
which the applicant was detained in such conditions,”335 the applicant’s conditions of 
detention amounted to degrading treatment.  
After the Kalashnikov case, numerous Russian cases came before the Court, such as 
Guliyev v Russia;336 Kantyrev v Russia;337 Igor Ivanov v Russia;338 Andrey Frolov v Russia;339 
Labzov v Russia;340 Babushkin v Russia;341 and Trepashkin v Russia.342 
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Regarding poor detention conditions, the Court has shown its determination in not 
creating two sets of standards within Council of Europe, that is, in not taking into 
account the economic situation in the country. As in Kalashnikov case, in Poltoratskiy v 
Ukraine the Court noted that Ukraine was encountering serious economic problems. 
However, again it observed that lack of resources could not in principle justify prison 
conditions which were so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 
3. The economic problems faced by Ukraine could not in any event explain or excuse 
the particular conditions of detention which the Court found to be unacceptable in that 
case.343  
Furthermore, numerous cases concerning poor detention conditions came from 
Bulgaria, which was also encountering economic problems, for example Kehayov v 
Bulgaria,344 Dobrev v Bulgaria,345 and Stoyan Dimitrov v Bulgaria.346 These cases concerned 
poor conditions of the applicants’ detention between 1996 and 2000, amounting to 
degrading treatment, in different detention facilities of the Investigation Service and 
prisons. For example, in the Kehayov case between 25 December 1997 and 16 June 1998 
the applicant was kept in a lock-up at the Regional Investigation Office in Plovdiv. 
According to the applicant, the cell, where he was detained together with three other 
people, measured 3 x 3.5m (a surface area of 10.5 m²). Since there were no beds, the 
detainees slept on mattresses on the floor. Also, the blankets were not washed regularly. 
The cell did not have access to daylight and was equipped with a 100W electric lamp. 
There was a ventilation system, but according to the applicant the ventilation system 
was only installed in 1998. He also submitted that in winter the temperature in his cell 
did not rise above 10-12 Co. The Government disputed these allegations.347 The CPT 
reports on its visit to Bulgaria were used in the Court’s assessment.348 The Court 
considered that the fact that the applicant had to spend practically 24 hours per day 
during nearly six months in an overcrowded cell without exposure to natural light and 
without any possibility for physical and other out-of-cell activities must have been 
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detrimental to his health and must have caused intense suffering. The Court did not 
accept the applicant’s contention that the detention conditions were intended to degrade 
or humiliate him, however, there was little doubt that certain aspects of the stringent 
regime could be seen as humiliating. In conclusion, the Court stressed that “While the 
Court does not underestimate the financial difficulties invoked by the Government 
before the CPT, it observes that a number of improvements recommended by the CPT 
did not require significant resources but were not implemented... Having regard to the 
cumulative effects of the unjustified stringent regime to which the applicant was 
subjected, the material conditions in the cell and the time spent therein, the Court 
considers that the hardship he endured exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in 
detention and finds that the resulting suffering went beyond the threshold of severity 
under Article 3 of the Convention. It follows that there has been a violation of that 
provision.”349 As can be seen, the Court again relied on the CPT reports on its visits to 
Bulgaria when deciding whether the detention conditions were in conformity with the 
Article 3 demands or they violated that provision.  
Finally, one of the recent cases concerning poor detention conditions which show the 
extent of this systematic problem will be analysed. In Orchowski v Poland350 the applicant 
was detained at various times in eight different detention facilities involving frequent 
transfers back and forth between institutions from the date he lodged his application 
(2004) until the date of the Court's judgement (2009). All of his complaints were 
rejected as manifestly ill-founded by the Polish courts. The applicant submitted that his 
cell during his first detention measured 17 m² and was shared by ten detainees, including 
the applicant,351 and in other cells it was also less than 3m2 per person. He also 
complained that he had been allowed to spend a very limited amount of time outside 
the cell and that the sanitary conditions in the detention facilities in question were 
inadequate. He stressed that the problem of overcrowding in Polish prisons was 
systemic and that it was widespread and persistent.352 The Court found a violation of 
Article 3 and it pointed out that approximately 160 applications were at that time raising 
an issue under Article 3 of the Convention with respect to overcrowding and 
consequential inadequate living and sanitary conditions only in Poland. The Court 
concluded that from 2000 until at least mid-2008 overcrowding in Polish prisons and 
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remand centres revealed a structural problem consisting of a practice that was 
incompatible with the Convention. It stressed that:  
“In this connection, it is to be reiterated that, where the Court finds a violation, the respondent State has 
a legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded 
by way of just satisfaction under Article 41, but also to select, subject to supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal 
order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects…The 
respondent State remains free, subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, to choose the means 
by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the Convention, provided that such 
means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court's judgment.”353 
The Court emphasized that it was aware of the fact that solving a systemic problem of 
overcrowding in Poland might necessitate the mobilisation of significant financial 
resources. However, again it pointed out that lack of resources could not in principle 
justify prison conditions which were so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment 
contrary to Article 3 and that it was incumbent on the respondent Government to 
organise its penitentiary system in such a way that ensured respect for the dignity of 
detainees, regardless of financial or logistical difficulties.354 
This and similar cases strengthen the position of other potential claimants who 
complain of the conditions of their detention. They also reflect the changing scope of 
the Convention, so that conditions which might not have been considered so bad as to 
constitute a violation some years ago will now constitute a breach in light of the 
prevailing standards and expectations of the day. The Court is reading more and more 
into Article 3 rights. It not only requires a state to refrain from treating people under its 
jurisdiction in a way that constitutes torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment but is placing numerous positive obligations on states. Some of these 
obligations are to have detention conditions of a certain standard as well as healthcare in 
detention centres. In a large way, the work of the CPT has contributed to creating these 
standards.  
The question now is what is the practical value of delivering judgements on poor 
detention conditions when it comes to the execution of judgements? The process of the 
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execution of judgments concerning poor detention conditions will therefore now be 
examined, followed by the cases concerning healthcare in detention. 
 
4.5 EXECUTION OF THE JUDGEMENTS CONCERNING POOR 
DETENTION CONDITIONS 
In Poltoratskiy v Ukraine the Court stated:  
“However, the Court observes that lack of resources cannot in principle justify prison conditions which 
are so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Art.3 of the Convention. Moreover, the 
economic problems faced by Ukraine cannot in any event explain or excuse the particular conditions of 
detention which it has found in paragraph 145 to be unacceptable in the present case.”355 
As we can see, the Court has not accepted lack of resources as an excuse for 
unacceptable detention conditions. However, when it comes to the execution of 
judgements the lack of resources and the economic difficulties that the Ukraine is going 
through are of relevance. The same goes for Russia and Bulgaria and their prisons, as 
will be shown here.  
Some of the judgments presented above are up to 10 years old. Now, years later, they 
are still on the list of pending cases and the CoM is reporting on their current state of 
execution. The situation in prisons and other detention centres is gradually improving. 
However, this gradual improvement does not represent what civil and political rights 
protection was to be about. One of the major distinctions between economic and social 
and civil and political rights is that obligations in relation to the former are usually 
limited to the steps that can be taken within ‘available resources’.356 And this is exactly 
what is happening now with the Convention rights. 
First, the Poltoratskiy group of cases including Poltoratskiy as well as several other 
Ukrainian cases: Aliev;357 Kuznetsov;358 Dankevich;359 Khokhlich;360 and Nazarenko361 will be 
briefly looked at. These cases concern poor conditions of the applicants’ detention 
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between 1996 and 2000 on “death row” in four different prisons in Ukraine, found by 
the Court to amount to degrading treatment due in particular to their prolonged 
confinement in a very restricted living space without natural light and the virtual 
impossibility of any activity or human contact (violations of Article 3). Although the 
detention conditions of the applicants were unsatisfactory and violated Article 3, the 
CoM in its examination of these cases concluded that since the applicants were no 
longer awaiting execution of capital sentence no measures were necessary.362  
However, to contextualise the situation in Ukraine regarding implementation of general 
measures in cases where detention conditions are unsatisfactory (together with the lack 
of medical assistance) we will later in the chapter have a look at the CoM report on the 
Nevmerzhitsky group of cases.363  
As to the CoM report on the Kehayev v Bulgaria which is being supervised together with 
several other Bulgarian cases that concern violation of Article 3 due to the poor 
detention conditions (together with various other violations), the CoM noted that on 
15/05/2012 the authorities submitted two action reports, one concerning this whole 
group of cases, one concerning the Kashavelov case and the specific issues it raises. As to 
the individual measures in light of the information provided by the authorities in their 
revised action report, no further individual measures appear necessary in several cases 
while other cases are still under examination in this group. Regarding general measures 
the CoM noted that the revised action report of 15/05/2012 in the Kehayov group 
describes the measures taken and envisaged for the execution of these judgments 
regarding poor conditions of detention. As we can see, the CoM only noted the 
information provided by the authorities and these judgments are still on the list of 
pending cases waiting to be executed.364  
Regarding the so called Kalashnikov group of cases (besides the Kalashnikov case, it 
includes Benediktov,365 Andrey Frolov,366 Labzov,367 Mayzit,368 Novoselov369 and 25 other cases) 
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the CoM stated that these cases concern the poor conditions under which the applicants 
were detained in remand prisons (SIZOs) between 1995 and 2008 which were found by 
the Court to amount to degrading treatment, due in particular to severe overcrowding 
and an unsanitary environment (violations of Article 3).370 
As to the general measures, the CoM stated that the measures taken by the Russian 
authorities are summarised in Interim Resolution ResDH(2003)123 and that since then 
the authorities have regularly provided information on the measures adopted and 
envisaged.371 In its Resolution the CoM called upon the Russian authorities to continue 
to enhance the ongoing reforms with a view to aligning the conditions of all pre-trial 
detention on the requirements of the Convention, particularly as set out in the 
Kalashnikov judgment, so as to effectively prevent new, similar violations and invited the 
authorities to continue to keep the CoM informed of the concrete improvement of the 
situation, in particular by providing relevant statistics relating to the overcrowding and 
sanitary and health conditions in pre-trial detention facilities. This Resolution was 
adopted in 2003 and since then the CoM has not recommended any particular measures 
or pressured Russia to speed up the execution of these judgments. Just like with the 
Kehayev group of cases, there is still a lot of work left for the authorities in order for 
them to have detention conditions in conformity with the requirements set out under 
Article 3 and it does not seem that the CoM is ready to place political or other pressure 
on states or issue new resolutions.  
In relation the even older cases, to be accurate the first cases regarding detention 
conditions (Dougoz v Greece and Peers v Greece), in its declassified Introductory 
Memorandum on the Implementation of judgments of the European Court on Human 
Rights the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights (CLAHR) from May 2008, 
the CoM stated: 
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“3. A number of important measures have been implemented in order to prevent prison overpopulation. 
A new transfer centre for detainees opened in Athens and one of its wings, with a capacity of 208 men, 
150 women and 20 minors, for the exclusive use of detainees pending deportation...  
4. Despite the above-mentioned positive measures, further major improvements of detention conditions 
in prisons are necessary especially, in the light of the concerns expressed in the 2005 report of European 
Committee against Torture (CPT/Inf(2006)41) and in the Council of Europe Human Rights 
Commissioner’s follow-up Report on Greece (CommDH(2006)13).”372  
The Final Resolutions on the Dougoz and Peers cases have been finally adopted. In its 
Appendix to the Resolution on the Information about the measures to comply with the 
judgment in cases Peers and Dougoz the CoM presented all the measures that were 
introduced in order for these judgments to be executed.373 These included all the 
necessary reparations that were made on the prisons and other detention conditions, 
refurbishments, appropriate medical staff, construction of new prisons, special measures 
introduced for preventing prison overpopulation, training of prison staff, continuing 
improvement of prison conditions and numerous other measures. It took years to 
introduce all those measures, including great financial expenses.  
It is apparent from these reports how complex and financially demanding the execution 
of judgments concerning detention conditions are. What is also visible is the lack of 
pressure coming from the CoM. These reports also show us a certain degree of state 
willingness to respect the judgments and progress in improving detention conditions. 
Therefore, we cannot put the fault for the non-execution of the Court’s judgment 
entirely on states. 
Later in the chapter my arguments in favour of providing the CPT with the full 
authority to deal exclusively with the detention conditions and issues of provision of 
medical service in detention will be presented. What will be discussed now is the case-
law concerning the issue of providing a healthcare of a certain standard in detention.  
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4.6 THE CASE-LAW ON PROVIDING SATISFACTORY HEALTHCARE IN 
DETENTION 
The situation with the cases concerning healthcare in prisons is quite similar to the one 
described in the first part of the chapter on unsatisfactory detention conditions. Of 
course, an individual approach must be taken to cases concerning issues and violations 
of Article 3 rights that affect one particular individual and do not apply to prison 
healthcare in general. However, in cases where the issue is mainly concerning the 
general conditions of medical services in prisons, that are most of the time 
interconnected with the detention conditions in general, again I think the CPT experts 
are capable of dealing with the issue better than the Court together with the CoM. 
As with the general detention conditions, the Court has very much relied on the CPT 
reports when dealing with applications concerning healthcare in prisons.374 At the same 
time, the principles governing the healthcare in prisons in terms of the Convention 
share much in common with the standards introduced by the CPT. Although the 
Convention does not guarantee the right to healthcare or the right to prisoners’ 
healthcare, the Court (and formerly the Commission) have introduced certain standards 
through their jurisprudence. Even more importantly, since the CPT has included this 
section in its documents the Court started to rely on its standards on a regular basis.375 
According to the Court’s (and formerly the Commission’s) standards, prison authorities 
are under a positive obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of their liberty, 
and the lack of appropriate medical care may amount to treatment contrary to Article 
3.376 Also, delay of providing medical help may constitute a violation of Article 3.377 
However, the practical impact of this kind of opinion used to be limited. In Kudla v 
Poland the applicant claimed that he has not been given adequate psychiatric treatment 
despite a report indicating that his continued imprisonment posed the likelihood that he 
would attempt suicide. The Court did not find a violation of Article 3 since it concluded 
that the applicant received frequent psychiatric assistance.378 On the other hand, the 
Court stated: “…(U)nder this provision the State must ensure that a person is detained 
in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity…and that, given 
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the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured 
by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance...”379 
Securing health and well-being has become one of the Court’s principles when deciding 
about a violation of Article 3 regarding healthcare in prisons and nowadays the state’s 
responsibility to ensure the health and well-being of all the prisoners is being considered 
with much greater care than it was in the past.380  
In Melnik v Ukraine the Court emphasized three particular elements to be considered in 
relation to the compatibility of the applicant's health with his stay in detention: “(a) the 
medical condition of the prisoner, (b) the adequacy of the medical assistance and care 
provided in detention and (c) the advisability of maintaining the detention measure in 
view of the state of health of the applicant.”381 In Yakovenko v Ukraine the applicant 
complained that he had not received adequate medical assistance for his HIV and 
tuberculosis. The Court stated: “In the Court’s view, the failure to provide timely and 
appropriate medical assistance to the applicant in respect of his HIV and tuberculosis 
infections amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 
3 of the Convention”.382 In both Yakovenko and Melnik cases the Court, when 
considering the conditions of detention as well as the healthcare issues and when 
finding a violation of Article 3, very much relied on the CPT’s reports on their visit to 
Ukraine. Several other Ukrainian cases concern conditions of detention together with 
the provision of medical care (for example, cases Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine383 and Koval v 
Ukraine384).  
A case where the issue was the provision of special care to prisoners with special needs 
is McGlinchey v United Kingdom. In McGlinchey the applicants complained their mother had 
suffered inhuman and degrading treatment prior to her death in prison. She was 
suffering from severe withdrawal symptoms when she was first imprisoned. There was 
known to be a discrepancy in the weighing scales used on admission and those used in 
the health centre and consequently, the prison doctor relied on his clinical impressions 
rather than on the applicant’s mother apparent weight loss in assessing her condition. 
Over several days Mrs McGlinchey suffered from uncontrolled vomiting symptoms and 
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was unable to eat or hold down fluids. Evidence showed that her consequent weight 
loss could have been as high as 10 kilograms. During the weekends, the prison doctor 
was not present although a locum doctor visited the prison on a Saturday morning. The 
nursing staff was expected to call out a doctor or arrange a transfer to a hospital if so 
required over the rest of the weekend period. Although her condition continued to 
deteriorate during the weekend, she was not visited by the locum doctor and the nursing 
staff did not call out a doctor or arrange for a hospital transfer during the remainder of 
the weekend. On the Monday morning Mrs McGlinchey collapsed and was transferred 
to hospital where she later died. The Court held, upholding the complaint, that a failure 
of authorities to provide Mrs McGlinchey with appropriate medication for her heroin 
withdrawal symptoms, preventing her from suffering or a worsening of her condition, 
the gap in the monitoring of her condition by a doctor together with a failure to take 
more effective steps to treat her condition, contravened the prohibition against inhuman 
or degrading treatment contained in Article 3.385 The Court treated heroin addiction as a 
special vulnerability which increases a state’s obligations under Article 3. 
Although the McGlinchey case seems very much like individual rather than systemic 
failure (unlike the detention conditions cases), at the execution stage it is treated as an 
instance of systemic failure. The execution stage of other cases discussed here treats lack 
of medical care as an aspect of poor prison conditions; however, it can be separated 
from the previous detention conditions cases since it focuses on healthcare and not only 
the accommodation and accommodation related issues. 
 
4.7. EXECUTION OF THE JUDGMENTS CONCERNING HEALTHCARE 
IN DETENTION 
To date the CoM has adopted a final resolution in the McGlinchey case. In its 2007 
Report on the Supervision of the execution of judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights the CoM concluded regarding the McGlinchey case (Judgment final on 
29/07/2003, Final resolution (2007)133):386  
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“General measures: Inhuman and degrading treatment: a programme, completed in 2006, was set up to 
improve prison health policy in relation to the handling of substance abusers and addicts. These 
developments were accompanied by a £40m increase in resources. This figure was expected to increase to 
£60m in 2007 with funding continuing thereafter. The purpose of this funding was to enhance clinical 
and psychological management of drug dependence in prisons to meet national and international 
standards of good practice. It is also to be noted that at the beginning of 2005 there were drug 
rehabilitation programmes in 103 establishments. In 2004/2005 an innovative, short-duration drug 
treatment programme, which can be carried out in around 4 months, was also introduced at 32 
establishments, aimed at “short-term” prisoners. Data have shown a significant increase of prisoners who 
now benefit from these health services. Finally, research has demonstrated that drug treatment delivered 
in prison is effective in helping offenders stay drug-free and in reducing levels of re-offending.”387 
The execution of this judgement did not concern any individual measures beyond the 
payment of just satisfaction, it concerned mainly general measures intended to prevent 
similar violations. And those general measures were successfully executed because of 
both state willingness and the availability of financial resources. Even after the general 
measures had been complied with and the final resolution had been adopted by the 
CoM, there remains a lot of work and financial expenses for the state to take in order to 
have all the detention conditions satisfactory. This is visible from the CPT’s report from 
2008, since the work of CPT is continuous and so far it has visited places of detention 
in the UK and Northern Ireland thirteen times. In its visit (carried out from 
18/11/2008-1/12/2009) the CPT pointed out all the problems in the UK detention 
system, such as the overcrowding, lack of activities for prisoners, need for the prisoners 
to be fully medically screened upon their arrival, staff training, and numerous others.388 
The UK Government provided the CPT with its report from which its willingness to 
co-operate with the CPT and the continuous progress of its detention system can be 
seen.389 
The McGlinchey case might seem more ‘individualistic’ than other detention conditions 
cases that have been discussed. However, even this case, in its execution stage, required 
significant measures to be made by the UK, in order for it to prevent similar violations 
and new applications to the Court. It took several years for those measures to be 
introduced and for the situations in UK prisons to be in conformity with the Article 3 
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standards. Most importantly, the CoM again relied on the work of the CPT and 
particularly regarding the situation in the future where it expressed its belief that the 
efforts by the UK authorities to improve the conditions of treatment of prisoners will 
continue. 
Cases like McGlinchey are a minority since most of the ‘new’ CoE states do not have 
financial resources comparable to the UK. Also, the situation where the detention 
conditions and the medical services in prisons are in non-conformity with Article 3 of 
the Convention occur more rarely in the United Kingdom than in numerous other ‘new’ 
CoE states.  
Unlike the situation in the UK, there are numerous cases and judgments against ‘new’ 
CoE states concerning the availability of medical services in connection with the 
detention conditions that are still not executed, mainly because of the state’s lack of 
financial resources. In the Nevmerzhitskiy group of cases390 the CoM in its last report on 
the execution of judgements pointed out that it follows from the Court’s judgments and 
the reports of the CPT referred to in these judgments that the problems arising from 
the material conditions of detention and the lack of proper medical treatment in all 
three types of deprivation of liberty are of a structural nature and require comprehensive 
measures.391 The CoM furthermore “recalled that the first judgment examined in these 
groups of cases was delivered by the Court in 2005; invited the Ukrainian authorities to 
provide urgently a comprehensive action plan aimed at responding to the structural 
problems highlighted by the Court in respect of conditions of detention and medical 
care, as well as aimed at setting up effective remedies in respect thereof; noted that this 
action plan should also address the other problems identified in the judgments of the 
Court; invited further the Ukrainian authorities to provide also their assessment on the 
impact of the measures adopted so far and the results achieved by these measures; noted 
further that information is also awaited on the outstanding individual measures.”392 
When it comes to the big problem of transmittable diseases in prisons, this issue has 
also been dealt both by the Court and the CoM on one side and the CPT on the other. 
                                                 
390 Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine (n 383); Dvoynykh v Ukraine App no 72277/01(ECtHR, 12 October 2006); Koval 
v Ukraine (n 384) and three others. 
391 Current state of execution, Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine (lead), 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber
=&StateCode=UKR&SectionCode=> accessed 1 July 2012. 
392 Ibid. 
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For this issue we shall look at a Croatian group of cases393 where the Court found 
violations of Article 3 in all the cases regarding poor prison conditions and/or the 
medical treatment of detainees. 
“The Croatian authorities renovated or constructed a number of prison facilities and increased their 
capacity in order to improve the conditions of detention in prisons, including in Lepoglava and Požega. 
They also took a number of measures aimed at improving medical treatment of prisoners, such as 
diagnosing prisoners infected with hepatitis and HIV or providing targeted therapies and medical 
counselling to prisoners infected with hepatitis. Information is awaited, however, on measures taken to 
improve the conditions of detentions in Lepoglava Prison and in Gospic Prison, in particular in Unit 2. 
The most recent CPT report on Croatia (CPT/Inf(2008)29) also noted the outstanding issues concerning 
the overcrowding and medical care in Lepoglava Prison and conditions of detention in Gospic Prison, in 
particular in Unit 2.”394 
As we can see, the CoM itself mentioned the CPT and its conclusions and 
recommendations as an important factor in assessing the scope of measures adopted by 
the Croatian Government. During its visit, the CPT visited most of the Croatian 
detention facilities and made a detailed report on which the Croatian Government gave 
a progress report a year after the visit.395 Therefore, the issue of healthcare is very much 
interconnected to the issue of providing satisfactory detention conditions, and both of 
these issues are now being examined under the aegis of Article 3 of the Convention. 
Based on the discussion so far, we might with definite certainty say that that Court has 
been reading more and more into the Article 3 rights. It does not require only from a 
state to refrain from treating people under its jurisdiction in a way that will represent 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment but it has placed numerous positive obligations 
upon the state. Some of these obligations are to have satisfactory detention conditions 
as well as the medical care of a certain standard. In a large way, the work of the CPT has 
contributed in creating those standards. As stated, the question is what is the practical 
value of delivering judgements on poor prison conditions when it comes to the 
execution of judgements? Another question that can be asked is has the Court 
compromised the importance of Article 3 by delivering judgements based only on poor 
                                                 
393 Cenbauer v Croatia (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 49; Pilčić v Croatia App no 33138/06 (ECtHR, 17 January 2008); 
Stitić v Croatia App no 29660/03 (ECtHR, 08 November 2007); Testa v Croatia (2008) 47 E.H.R.R. 29.   
394 Current state of execution, Cenbauer v Croatia, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?CaseTitleOrNumber
=&StateCode=CRO&SectionCode=> accessed 1 July 2012. 
395Report to the Croatian Government on the visit to Croatia carried out by the CPT from 4 to 14 May 
2007, CPT/Inf (2008) 29; and Response of the Croatian Government to the Report of the CPT on its 
visit to Croatia from 4 to 14 May 2007 CPT/Inf (2008) 30. 
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detention conditions which cannot be executed within the short period of time and for 
which there is no effective way of forcing states to comply with them immediately?  
In a paper on Article 3 of the ECHR and proportionality S. Palmer wrote: “The 
consequences flowing from the finding of a negative or positive obligation should not 
be different. If State responsibility is engaged, it is irrelevant whether it is through a 
positive or negative obligation.”396 In my opinion that is indeed relevant when it comes 
to Article 3 and here arises the substantial difference among positive obligations with 
significant socio-economic elements, and negative obligations: the ability of the state to 
abide by the judgement and the possibility of it to do so within a reasonable time frame. 
I am not trying to say that there generally should be a division on positive and negative 
obligations as such, since in order to effectively protect human rights there must be an 
existence of both negative and positive obligations. What I want to ask is whether it is 
really necessary to read so many positive obligations with socio-economic elements into 
Article 3, obligations to have detention conditions and healthcare of certain standard, to 
be precise. No one can say that this kind of progress in the human rights area is not to 
be welcomed; however, it might be also said that it compromises the importance of 
Article 3. This is not because providing acceptable detention conditions and healthcare 
in prisons is something less important than protection from being actively subjected to 
ill-treatment. It is because even when the state is willing to comply with the judgement 
and execute it, most of the time introducing measures in order to comply with those 
judgements will be a long and extremely expensive process. Standards regarding 
detention conditions and healthcare in prisons are necessary, but are they necessary in 
the context of Article 3 which consists of absolute rights and protects the most 
fundamental human rights values? They can be very well protected through other 
mechanisms such as the CPT, as will be argued below. 
 
 
 
                                                 
396 Stephanie Palmer, ‘Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and the Proportionality’ (2006) 65(2) C.L.J. 358, 
452. 
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4.8 THE CPT ON THE RIGHT TO HAVE SATISFACTORY DETENTION 
CONDITIONS AND ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN PRISONS 
The CPT has given a lot of attention to the issue of detention conditions and healthcare 
in prisons. Some of the standards that the CPT has developed are on living 
accommodation and basic needs;397 staffing selection, training and management;398 
provision of an adequate regime of activities;399 and provision of healthcare in prisons.400 
Regarding living accommodation and basic needs the CPT stated: 
“Police cells should be clean, of a reasonable size for the number of people they are used to 
accommodate, and have adequate lighting (i.e. sufficient to read by, sleeping periods excluded) and 
ventilation; preferably, cells should enjoy natural light. Further, cells should be equipped with a means of 
rest (for example, a chair or bench) and persons obliged to stay overnight in custody should be provided 
with a clean mattress and clean blankets. 
Persons in custody should be allowed to comply with the needs of nature when necessary, in clean and 
decent conditions, and be offered adequate washing facilities. They should have ready access to drinking 
water and be given food at appropriate times, including at least one full meal (i.e. something more 
substantial than a sandwich) every day. Those detained for extended periods (twenty-four hours or more) 
should, where possible, be allowed to take outdoor exercise.”401 
Furthermore, in its 2nd, 7th and 11th General Reports the CPT paid particular attention to 
the problem of prison overcrowding.402  
In its 3rd General Report the CPT included a section on Health care services in 
prisons.403 For the CPT “prisoners are entitled to the same level of medical care as 
persons living in the community at large”404 and “an inadequate level of healthcare can 
lead rapidly to situations falling within the scope of the term inhuman and degrading 
treatment.”405 Subsequent country reports also have referred to particular aspects of 
                                                 
397 Report to the Polish Government on the visit to Poland carried out by the CPT from 30 June to 20 
July 1996 CPT/Inf (98) 13, [70]; 2nd General Report on the CPT Activities (1991) CPT/Inf (92) 3, [49]-
[50]. 
398 2nd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 397), [59]-[60] 
399 Ibid [47]-[48]. 
400 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 373), [30]-[77]. 
401 CPT Report to the Polish Government (n 397), [25]. 
402 2nd General Report (n 397) [46]; 7th General Report on the CPT Activities (1996) CPT/Inf (97) 10, 
[12]-[15]; and 11th General Report on the The CPT Activities (2000) CPT /Inf (2001) 16, [28]-[30]. 
403 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 375), [30]-[77]. 
404 Ibid [31]. 
405 Ibid [30]. 
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healthcare.406 Further on, in its 3rd General Report the CPT has emphasized numerous 
healthcare provisions that must be respected by the state. For example, newly arrived 
prisoners should be interviewed and examined by a medical doctor and they should be 
entitled to medical examination upon request.407 As regards emergency care, there 
should always be a competent first aider and a doctor available on call.408 Also, 
equivalence of care covers not only general health provision (appropriate medical, 
nursing, pharmacy and technical staff) but also psychiatric care services.409 Mentally-ill 
prisoners should be kept and cared for in adequately-equipped and staffed hospital 
facility.410 In respect of suicide prevention, the prison’s healthcare should ensure both 
general awareness of this issue as well as the implementation of appropriate 
procedures.411 Furthermore, healthcare should be directed not only at treatment but also 
at prevention of disease or ill-health. Special attention should be given to particular 
categories of detainees, like pregnant mothers, adolescents, or prisoners with personality 
disorders or who otherwise are unsuited for continued detention on account of age or 
severe disability.412 
Transmittable diseases were given special attention in the 11th General Report. Here the 
CPT pointed out its awareness of the economic difficulties states might be facing; 
however, it stated:  
“…Regardless of the difficulties faced at any given time, the act of depriving a person of his liberty always 
entails a duty of care which calls for effective methods of prevention, screening, and treatment. 
Compliance with this duty by public authorities is all the more important when it is a question of care 
required to treat life-threatening diseases.”413 
As we can see, the CPT has developed numerous standards on detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons that it employs during its visits to the states and states in its 
reports. The question is now, could the detention conditions be dealt exclusively 
through the work of the CPT? 
                                                 
406 Report to the Finnish Government on the visit to Finland carried out by the CPT from 10 to 20 May 
1992, CPT/Inf (93) 8, [37]; Report to the Government of the United Kingdom on the visit to the United 
Kingdom carried out by the CPT from 14 to 19 March 2004, CPT/Inf (2005) 10 [98]. 
407 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 375), [33]. 
408 Ibid [35]. 
409 Murdoch (n 319), 224. 
410 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 375), [43]. 
411 Ibid [57]. 
412 Ibid [64]-[70]. 
413 11th General Report on the CPT Activities (n 402), [31]. 
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4.9 COULD THE DETENTION CONDITIONS BE DEALT WITH 
EXCLUSIVELY THROUGH THE WORK OF THE CPT? 
In January 2012 the Court delivered a pilot judgment concerning detention conditions in 
Russia, Ananayev and Others v Russia.414 The Court, when deciding whether a violation of 
Article 3 occurred, again relied heavily on the CPT’s Reports, namely on its 2nd, 7th and 
11th General Reports.415 It found a violation of Article 3 and went on to say that it noted 
that inadequate conditions of detention appeared to constitute a recurrent problem in 
Russia which has led it to finding violations of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention in 
more than eighty judgments that have been adopted since the first such finding in the 
Kalashnikov case in 2002.416  It also emphasized another important aim of the pilot-
judgment procedure, to induce the respondent State to resolve large numbers of 
individual cases arising from the same structural problem at the domestic level, thus 
implementing the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Court, as a follow-up to this pilot judgment, decided not to adjourn the 
examination of similar applications pending before it. However, if the respondent State 
fails to adopt such measures following a pilot judgment and continues to violate the 
Convention, the Court will resume examination of all similar applications pending 
before it and proceed to judgment so as to ensure effective observance of the 
Convention. 
Delivering pilot judgments in cases concerning detention conditions shows the Court’s 
awareness of the systemic problem, and it might be a good step towards minimising the 
number of applications concerning poor detention conditions. Nevertheless, the CoM 
will need to supervise the execution of this and similar judgments and if the respondent 
state fails to adopt measures following a pilot judgment and continues to violate the 
Convention, the Court will resume examination of all similar applications pending 
before it. Therefore, delivering a pilot judgment might reduce the Court’s workload but 
there is still a lot of work left for the CoM in supervising the judgment. 
I argue that the issue of general detention conditions should be left to the CPT to deal 
with. As we have seen, most of the judgments concerning detention conditions are very 
                                                 
414 Ananayev and Others v Russia App nos 42525/07 and 60800/08 (ECtHR, 10 January 2012). 
415 Ibid [56]-[57]. 
416 Ibid [179]. 
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much influenced by the CPT reports on its visits to states. Through its political pressure 
the CPT can and does prompt states into making positive steps regarding their 
detention conditions. It has proven so far to be the most effective body in monitoring 
detention facilities and in co-operating with states regarding these conditions. Also, the 
CPT is the only body within the CoE that deals exclusively with places of detention. 
Large parts of the Court’s judgments regarding detention conditions (both when finding 
a violation and when deciding that no violation of Article 3 occurred) and the CoM 
reports on monitoring the execution of judgments are based on the CPT reports. The 
biggest ‘disadvantage’ of protecting the rights only by the CPT is that it is not a judicial 
body that has the authority to deliver binding judgements. However, despite this 
objectively big difference in mechanisms of enforcement, if we take a closer look at the 
sanctions for non-compliance with the Court’s judgements or non-compliance with the 
reports and recommendations of the CPT we can notice that in all of these situations 
the sanctions are only of a political character. They do not (and cannot) have the 
characteristics like that national systems do, since this is a regional arena when states are 
always on one side of the dispute and only monetary compensation or suspension of the 
state’s membership (or some other type of political sanctions) can be introduced. 
However, the CoE bodies are very reluctant when it comes to suspending a country 
from its rights of representation.417  
There is a difference between the ‘detention conditions’ cases and the situations that 
might raise the issue of suspension from the CoE. The fact is that in most of the 
‘detention conditions’ cases states show their willingness to execute the judgements, but 
the process is progressive and very long and requires great financial expense. Also, the 
CoE bodies are very reluctant when it comes to suspending a state from CoE 
membership so it is not likely that the Parliamentary Assembly will call upon the CoM 
to suspend a state for non-compliance with the detention conditions judgment. As is the 
case with most situations of non-compliance with the judgements, the only means 
available to the CoM is to pressure the states to speed up their improvement of the 
detention conditions through interim resolutions. Interim resolutions may be adopted 
with various objectives: to urge the domestic authorities to conclude on-going reforms; 
to express concern about the negligence and/or delay in execution and urge further 
                                                 
417 See Section 3.4. 
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action; or to provide indications as to the execution measures expected.418 However, 
these interim measures represent only political pressure to states urging them to speed 
up the execution of judgments. 
Now, let us look at the CPT working methods and why I think that the unacceptable 
detention conditions might also be dealt through the CPT’s work. The CPT visits places 
of detention to see how persons deprived of their liberty are treated and, if necessary, to 
recommend improvements to states. Unlike the CoM, the CPT will not only monitor 
the situation in the place of detention which is the concern of a particular judgement, 
but it will visit all places that it appointed in its annual visiting programme (periodic 
visits) and it may also organise additional ad hoc visits if necessary. States are obliged to 
co-operate with the CPT and allow its members access to all places of detention. When 
a state refuses to co-operate the sanction available to the CPT is the power to make a 
public statement on a state’s continuing failure to take steps to address CPT concerns. 
Only six such public statements have been made to this date; two of them were in 
respect of Turkey, three were concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian 
Federation and the last one was concerning Greece.419 These public statements are 
intended to put political pressure on the states and to force them to cooperate with the 
CPT. The CPT’s public statements have a lot in common with the CoM interim 
resolutions. Public statements consist of the CPT’s concerns regarding the situation 
with ill-treatment of prisoners or their detention conditions; its call for dialogue with the 
state and co-operation; and of facts found during its visit. Only the third type of interim 
resolutions is not available to the CPT; however, this type of resolution is used only 
exceptionally and from a sanction point of view they are not different from other 
interim resolutions. Therefore, we can see that both under the ECPT and under the 
Convention the only means available in order to urge states into improving their 
detention conditions is political pressure. 
                                                 
418 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Suggestions on solutions in the event of slowness in 
the execution of judgment, DH-PR (2005)001 (26 April 2005) [26]. 
419 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 375), appendix. 4: Public statement concerning on Turkey; The 
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appendix. 7: Public statement concerning the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation; 17th General Report on 
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 104 
As already mentioned, the CPT has developed a set of standards and these standards are 
promulgated in its annual/general reports and in country reports.420 The annual general 
reports describe the CPT’s work during the past year and may also contain some 
substantive issues and general standards, and individual country reports arising out of 
CPT’s programme of visits. Up to July 2012, the CPT had carried out 323 visits (195 
periodic visits + 128 ad hoc visits) and 271 CPT reports were published.421 It is not 
likely that the Court would deliver as many judgements as it did on Article 3 violations 
based solely on prison conditions if it was not for the CPT and its work which also 
shows us its importance in the detention conditions context. 
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
To conclude, one way to deal with unacceptable detention conditions might be through 
the CPT’s work which would allow the Court to deal with more serious and 
individualistic cases of Article 3 violations and the CoM to focus on the execution of 
judgements that objectively can be executed immediately or at least within a reasonable 
time frame. Furthermore, the CPT delegates regularly visit places of detention and after 
the visit they expect the state to continuously inform them on the improvements made. 
Therefore, it does not seem as if there would be increase (at least not significant) in the 
CPT workload. Giving the CPT exclusive jurisdiction over detention conditions issues, 
as was the case prior to 2001, would also help to reduce the Court’s and the CoM's 
workload without endangering the Article 3 protection. From all that has been written 
above, one can see that judgments concerning detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons have significant socio-economic elements when it comes to their execution. 
They place large financial burdens on states and it takes years for states to bring 
detention centres in conformity with required standards. Also, they usually concern the 
whole, or a large proportion, of a prison population thereby being more collective than 
individual in their nature. The fact that many other people are similarly affected does 
not by itself diminish the fact of a violation in relation to the individual. If a large prison 
population is being subjected to ill-treatment in breach of Article 3, the number of 
people affected does not mean that the Court should not deal with the issue. However, 
                                                 
420 The CPT Report to the Polish Government (n 396), [70]; 2nd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 
396) [47]-[50], [59] and [60]; 3rd General Report on the CPT Activities (n 375) [30]-[77]. 
421 About the CPT <http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm> accessed 1 August 2012. 
 105 
when it comes to the detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, this is an issue not 
originally guaranteed under Article 3 and it can effectively be protected by a non-judicial 
body, while the same cannot be said for other cases concerning Article 3 violations. As 
stated, whether the Court finds a violation or the CPT delivers a report concerning 
detention conditions, the reaction of the state can only be progressive implementation 
of the necessary measures. Despite the moral and symbolic effect of the Court finding a 
violation of rights, rather than just the CPT noting the need for improvement, the fact is 
that if there is no response from the state regarding the Court’s judgment or if the 
response to it and its execution is very slow, this actually undermines the importance of 
the Court’s judgments and threatens to diminish the relevance of the Court’s judgments 
concerning rights of individuals.  
Numerous applications, especially from ‘new’ CoE states are coming before the Court, a 
lot of them regarding the same detention centres. Although the Court has started 
delivering pilot judgments, there is still a substantial amount of work left for the CoM in 
supervising the execution of these judgments.  Furthermore, if the respondent state fails 
to adopt measures following a pilot judgment, the Court will resume examination of all 
similar applications pending before it and again deal with the same issue. 
On the other side, the CPT co-operates with the states very successfully and states have 
shown great willingness in improving their detention conditions in order for them to 
comply with the CPT standards. General measures required from states by the CoM are 
mostly based on the CPT reports and I do not see how the protection of prisoners 
would be compromised if the CoE bodies cede the management of detention 
conditions to the CPT.  One way of doing that is if the Court, upon receiving an 
application concerning general detention conditions, makes a practice statement that it 
is an issue for the CPT to deal with it and forwards the application to the CPT. Of 
course, the CPT would not examine the application in the same manner as the Court 
but receiving such an application should urge it to conduct an ad hoc visit to a detention 
centre in question and issue a report on the visit consisting of measures necessary to 
improve detention conditions. Regarding applications that also concern claims of 
violation of Article 3 of one particular individual (not only of unsatisfactory detention 
conditions), the Court should deliver a judgment but when finding a violation it should 
point out that only supervision of individual measures should be left for the CoM while 
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leaving the supervision of the general measures necessary to the CPT again urging it to 
pay particular attention to the detention centre concerned. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The ECHR does not contain a guaranteed right to a healthy environment, nor does the 
ESC. However, through the Courts’ jurisprudence and the ESCR decisions and reports 
many aspects of the right to a healthy environment are now very much included in the 
CoE system for the protection of human rights. Some scholars consider the right to a 
healthy environment as a third generation right.422 Nevertheless, it is now implicitly 
included in the ESC (as will be discussed here) and explicitly in the Inter-American 
Protocol on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (San Salvador Protocol- Article 11) as 
well as in the AfCHPR (Article 24). Thus, it is generally treated as a second-generation 
right. According to A. Boyle environmental rights do not fit into any category of human 
rights and they can be seen from at least three different perspectives, straddling all the 
various categories of human rights.423 It is not my intention here to question whether 
the right to a healthy environment is a second or a third generation right (or even a first 
generation right). My intention is to look at the existing machineries for human rights 
protection in Europe and to propose a solution for the effective protection of the right 
to a healthy environment. What can be seen from the global and regional practice is that 
environmental rights are considered to be more appropriate for protection under the 
                                                 
422 Stephen P. Marks, ‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’ (1980-1981) 33 
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Studies 521; Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, Principles Emerging from the case-law of the European 
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economic and social instruments and are nowadays included in the mainstream of 
human rights. 
Within the Convention system, alleged violations of the right to a healthy environment 
have been considered by the Court under Articles 2 and 8. Both Article 2 and Article 8 
of the Convention consist of two paragraphs. In the first paragraph the rights are 
expressed and in the second paragraph permissible interferences with those rights are 
elaborated. Article 8 places the obligations on states to respect a wide range of personal 
interests. Generally, there are four main interests protected: private life, family life, 
home and correspondence and all of those interests have ‘autonomous’ meaning. In its 
application of Article 8, the Court has taken a flexible approach to the definition of the 
individual interests protected, with the result that the provision continues to broaden in 
scope. What will be one of the interests for this chapter is the inclusion of the right to a 
healthy environment under Article 8. The cases where the Court has been willing to 
require the protection of persons from serious environmental pollution under the aegis 
of Article 8 will be examined. Furthermore, when dangerous and hazardous activities 
have had detrimental effects on the health of the applicant or resulted in death, they 
resulted in claims for violation of Article 2 of the Convention. Those cases will also be 
elaborated upon in this chapter.  
After discussing the most relevant case-law regarding violations of Articles 8 and 2 due 
to the environmental pollution, the current state of the execution of judgments 
concerning that case-law will be presented. What will be argued is that, as with the 
detention conditions cases, the execution of general measures required from states in 
environmental cases is a long and financially demanding process. My question here will 
be whether it is really necessary, or I might even say wise, to consider the issue of the 
right to a healthy environment under the Convention. In relation to that question, the 
discussion that was had within the CoE in relation to making an Additional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Right to a Healthy Environment will be presented. This question 
was raised both in 2003 and 2009 and on both occasions the opinion of the Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (CLAHR) of the Parliamentary Assembly was that it 
did not believe that extending the Convention through the proposed additional protocol 
was the correct solution.  
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After presenting that discussion, I will look at the ESC system. Both in the Collective 
Complaints and in the Reporting system the ECSR has read a right to a healthy 
environment into the right to health in Article 11 of the Charter. Sections 5.8-5.10. look 
at this development. The reason for doing so is to show that nowadays, considering all 
the problems which the Convention system is facing (particularly the extensive caseload, 
the long time it takes to produce a judgment and even longer time it takes to enforce it), 
this is one of the issues that might be better dealt with through the ESC system of 
Collective Complaints and through the Reporting system for those states that have not 
(yet) accepted the system of Collective Complaints. In my opinion, the right to a healthy 
environment is still too vague and has too many socio-economic elements to be 
guaranteed under the Convention, despite the non-absolute nature of Articles 2 and 8. 
Moreover, I see no reason why this right should not be secured through the ESC 
without lessening in any way its relevance.  
 
5.2 ARTICLE 8 OF THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT  
Article 8 states: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as 
is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.  
In its application of Article 8, the Court, taking the judicial activist approach to the 
Convention, has taken a flexible approach to the definition of the individual interests 
protected, with the result that the provision continues to broaden in scope in line with 
social and technical developments. Issues falling within Article 8 now include even 
search and seizure, secret surveillance, immigration law, paternity and identity rights, 
child and family law, assisted reproduction, suicide, prisoners’ rights, inheritance, 
tenants’ rights, and environmental protection.424 What will be of the interest for this 
                                                 
424 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25), 361. 
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thesis is environmental protection. The Court has made it clear that there are positive 
obligations inherent in Article 8(1), including both those requiring states to take steps to 
provide rights or privileges for individuals and those which require states to protect 
persons against the activities of other private individuals which prevent the effective 
enjoyment of their rights.425 In most of the cases regarding Article 8, its application 
requires a two-stage test. In the first stage comes the question of whether the complaint 
falls within the scope of Article 8(1). If it does, the second stage entails an examination 
of whether the state’s interference is consistent with the requirements of Article 8 (2).  
The determination whether or not a positive obligation exists under Article 8 cannot be 
precisely defined. The Court has stated: “In determining whether or not a positive 
obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between 
the general interest of the community and the interests of the individual, the search for 
which balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention.”426 In Johnston and Others v 
Ireland it concluded: “…Especially as far as those positive obligations are concerned, the 
notion of ‘respect’ is not clear-cut: having regard to the diversity of the practices 
followed and the situations obtaining in the contracting states, the notion’s requirement 
will vary considerably from case to case. Accordingly, this is an area in which the 
Contracting Parties enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be 
taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with due regard to the needs and 
resources of the community and of the individuals.”427  
The Court has held that a state’s positive obligations include an obligation to take action 
to deal with severe environmental pollution affecting an applicant’s home. 
Environmental degradation does not necessarily involve a violation of Article 8, but will 
do if the adverse effects attain a certain minimum level. As with the Article 3 violations, 
the assessment of that minimum will depend on all the circumstances of the case, such 
as the intensity and duration of the nuisance and its physical and mental effects, as well 
as on the general environmental context.428 The Court has even found a state in breach 
for its failure to notify affected residents of the risks associated with the operation of a 
fertiliser plant, emitting toxic substances and inflammable gases.429 
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The Guerra judgment indicated that states may be found in breach of their positive 
obligations under Article 8 if they fail to provide crucial safety and environmental 
information to local residents facing serious risks of severe pollution. Later, in McGinley 
and Egan v United Kingdom the Court held that: “…(w)here a Government engages in 
hazardous activities, such as those in issue in the present case, which might have hidden 
adverse consequences on the health of those involved in such activities, respect for 
private and family life under Article 8 requires that an effective and accessible procedure 
be established which enables such persons to seek all relevant and appropriate 
information.”430 
These cases consider the issue of providing information on dangerous activities to the 
people that may be affected. What will be looked at now are cases where the Court 
examined the issue of protecting persons from serious environmental pollution under 
the aegis of Article 8. As stated by one of the most eminent experts in the area of the 
European system for human rights protection: “That type of protection can involve 
considerable public expenditure and may be characterised as a newer generation right 
that the civil and political rights underpinning most of the Convention’s substantive 
guarantees.”431 
One of the first environmental cases, Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom,432 was regarding 
noise pollution, where the applicants claimed that noise from Heathrow Airport gave 
rise to a violation of Article 8. The Court agreed with the applicants that the “scope for 
enjoying the amenities of his home have been adversely affected’ and that Article 8 is a 
‘material provision’.”433 It concluded, however, that in the light of the public need for 
the airport and the efforts that had been made to limit the noise, no violation of Article 
8 had been made out. The first applicant lived under a flight departure route several 
miles from Heathrow airport, whilst the second applicant lived directly under flight 
paths just over one mile from the airport’s northern runway. The Court held that Article 
8 applied to both applicants as the quality of their private lives and their ability to enjoy 
the amenities of their homes had been adversely affected, to different degrees, by noise 
from aircraft using Heathrow. This airport had been privatised in 1986; therefore the 
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government submitted that their only obligations under Article 8 in regard to the 
applicants’ homes were positive ones. In the Court’s opinion:  
“Whether the present case be analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to secure the applicants’ rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8 or in terms of an 
‘interference by a public authority’ to be justified in accordance with paragraph 2, the applicable principles 
are broadly similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between 
the competing interests of the individual and of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State 
enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
Convention. Furthermore, even in relation to the positive obligations flowing from the first paragraph of 
Article 8, ‘in striking [the required] balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph may be of certain 
relevance.”434 
The Court noted the uncontested data produced by the government demonstrating the 
economic importance of Heathrow and that many measures, including restriction on 
night flights, aircraft noise monitoring, a £19 million scheme for the sound insolation of 
16,000 homes and the purchase of homes very close to the runways, had been 
undertaken to reduce the noise pollution from Heathrow. Consequently, the Court 
determined that “there is no serious ground for maintaining that either the policy 
approach to the problem or the content of the particular regulatory measures adopted 
by the United Kingdom authorities gives rise to violation of Article 8, whether under its 
positive or negative head.”435 Strictly speaking, this case was not decided under Article 8, 
but under Article 13, which involved the Court having to determine whether the 
applicants had an arguable case under Article 8. However, it is important to consider it 
in the context of including the right to a healthy environment under the aegis of Article 
8.  
Another significant environmental case concerning Heathrow airport is Hatton and Others 
v United Kingdom.436 Here, unlike in Powell and Rayner the Chamber majority found the 
regime governing night flights from Heathrow to be in breach of Article 8. The 
applicants complained that the Government’s policy on night flights at Heathrow 
airport in London violated their rights under Article 8. The Chamber, by five votes to 
two, distinguished the current case from the earlier Heathrow case by reference to the 
different factual circumstances, since the present action was concerned with night flights 
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under the post 1993 regime. The majority held that mere reference to the economic 
well-being of the country is not sufficient to outweigh the rights of others. It considered 
that states are required to minimise, as far as possible, the interference with these rights, 
by trying to find alternative solutions and by generally seeking to achieve their aims in 
the least onerous way as regards human rights. In order to do that, a proper and 
complete investigation and study with the aim of finding the best possible solution 
which will, in reality, strike the right balance should precede the relevant project.437  
Judge Greve in her partly dissenting opinion stated that she did not believe there had 
been a breach of Article 8. She believed that the majority had impermissibly narrowed 
the margin of appreciation accorded to states in environmental matters by the 
established case-law and gave the following interesting statement:  
“In modern society, environmental problems are not discreet and only of concern to those who may 
invoke Article 8, given their proximity to the source of the given problem. One of the functions of 
planning is, to the extent possible, to protect people against the negative impact on the environment of, 
for instance, and as in casu, the transport infrastructure; another function is to ensure that no group of 
people is disproportionately affected by what is considered necessary to meet the needs of modern urban 
society. The amount and complexity of the factual information needed to strike a fair balance in these 
respects is more often than not of such a nature that the European Court will be at a marked disadvantage 
compared to the national authorities in terms of acquiring the necessary level of understanding for 
appropriate decision-making. Moreover, environmental rights represent a new generation of human 
rights. How the balance is to be struck will therefore affect the rights not only of those close enough to 
the source of the environmental problem to invoke Article 8, but also the rights of those members of the 
wider public affected by the problem and who must be considered to have a stake in the balancing 
exercise. Furthermore, the general principle concerning the assessment of facts argues in favour of a wide 
margin of appreciation in these cases.”438 
This case was later referred to the Grand Chamber which found no violation of the 
same Article. It explained that in cases involving state decisions affecting environmental 
issues there are two aspects to the Court’s inquiry: the first is to assess the substantive 
merits of the government’s decision to ensure that it is compatible with Article 8 and 
the second is to scrutinize the decision-making process to ensure that due weight has 
been accorded to the interest of the individual.439 Significantly, with respect to the 
former, the Grand Chamber avoided identifying which approach to the application of 
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Article 8 was applicable in this case viewing the central issue as simply whether a fair 
balance has been struck down between the relevant interests. It remarked that economic 
interests were specifically enumerated as a legitimate aim under Article 8(2) and that 
accordingly it was appropriate for the state to take them into account in policy-
making.440 It suggested that the essential question is the breadth of the state’s margin of 
appreciation.441 The Grand Chamber did not find that the authorities overstepped their 
margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of the 
individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and home and 
the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a whole, nor did it find that 
there have been fundamental procedural flaws in the preparation of the 1993 regulations 
on limitations for night flights. Therefore, it found no violation of Article 8.  
However, five judges issued a joint dissenting opinion which advocated a stronger role 
for the Court in responding to complaints concerning environmental pollution.442 They 
stated that while it is true that the original text of the Convention does not disclose an 
awareness of the need for the protection of environmental human rights, in the 1950s 
the universal need for environmental protection was not yet apparent.443 They also 
emphasized that the Grand Chamber’s judgment in the present case, in so far as it 
concludes, contrary to the Chamber’s judgment of 2 October 2001, that there was no 
violation of Article 8, seems to deviate from the developments in the case-law and even 
takes a step backwards. According to them, it gives precedence to economic 
considerations over basic health conditions in qualifying the applicants' sensitivity to 
noise as that of a small minority of people.444 The dissenters considered that in the 
context of constant disturbance of persons sleep at night by aircraft noise there was a 
positive obligation upon States to ensure as far as possible that ordinary people enjoy 
normal sleeping conditions.445 Consequently, the margin of appreciation of the state is 
narrowed because of the fundamental nature of the right to sleep, which may be 
outweighed only by the real, pressing (if not urgent) needs of the state.446 
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In Hatton the judges were not unanimous in their approach regarding the protection of 
the right to a healthy environment under Article 8 of the Convention. The Chamber 
found that there has been a violation thereby narrowing the state’s margin of 
appreciation whereas the Grand Chamber found that economic interests prevailed over 
the applicant’s right not to be subjected to noise from the airport. I would mostly agree 
with judge Greve and her dissenting opinion on the Chamber judgment, since the right 
to a healthy environment is not a right that is appropriate for protection under the 
Convention, due to the fact that environmental problems are not discreet and only of 
concern to those who may invoke Article 8, given their proximity to the source of the 
given problem.447 
The first case where an environmental complaint was upheld was in 1994 in Lopez Ostra 
v Spain.448 The applicant complained that the fumes and noise from a waste treatment 
plant situated near her home made her family’s living conditions unbearable. After 
having had to bear the nuisance caused by the plant for more than three years, the 
family moved when it became clear that the nuisance could go on indefinitely and when 
the applicants’ daughter’s paediatrician recommended them that they do so. While 
recognising that the noise and smells had a negative effect on the applicant’s quality of 
life, the national authorities argued that they did not constitute a grave health risk and 
that they did not reach a level of severity whereby the applicant’s fundamental rights 
were breached. The Court balanced the ‘town’s economic well-being’ against the 
applicant’s interest in home and private and family life when deciding whether there had 
been a breach of Article 8. Whilst the plant was necessary for the economic well-being 
of the town and its leather industry, the judges were united in concluding that a fair 
balance had not been struck by the authorities in seeking to protect the applicant from 
the effects of severe pollution. The Court found that severe environmental pollution 
may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a 
way as to affect adversely their private and family life, even though it does not seriously 
endanger their health. In this case, the Court found a violation of Article 8. This 
decision gave an indication that it will not be sufficient for states to simply create 
pollution control regimes, rather they must also take adequate steps to enforce those 
rules.  
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Are we talking here of the negative or the positive obligation on the part of the state? 
Again, the Court has not made this clear but it stated that in both contexts regard must 
be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the 
individual and of the community as a whole, and in any case the state enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation.449 
A similar case where the Court also found a violation of Article 8 due to noise that 
interfered with the applicants Article 8 rights is Moreno Gomez v Spain.450 The applicant 
complained that persistent noise coming from nightclubs near her home disturbed her 
sleep for a long time. The Court reiterated what it said in Lopez Ostra451and found that 
the applicant suffered a serious infringement of her right to respect for her home as a 
result of the authorities' failure to take action to deal with the night-time disturbances.452 
It is interesting to notice that in this case the Court reiterated that the Convention is 
“intended to guarantee rights that are ““practical and effective”, not “theoretical or 
illusory.””453 
Another relevant case regarding healthy environment in the context of industrial 
pollution is Fadeyeva v Russia.454 Here, the applicant lived in the vicinity of a steel plant, 
an important steel producing centre in the respondent State. From 1982 the applicant 
and her family were living less than 500 metres from the large steel plant. In order to 
limit the impact of pollution from the plant, a 5,000 metre wide ‘sanitary security zone’ 
existed. The zone was supposed to separate the plant from residential areas although, in 
practice, several thousand people, including the applicant and her family, lived in the 
zone. In 1996 the Government noted that the plant was responsible for 96 per cent of 
all emissions in the area and that the overlap between industrial and residential areas was 
plainly harmful to health. The pollution was found to be responsible for the huge 
increase in the number of children with respiratory and skin diseases and the increased 
number of adult cancer deaths. The Court observed that in order to fall under Article 8, 
complaints relating to environmental nuisances have to show that there has been an 
actual interference with the individual’s “private sphere” and that these nuisances have 
reached a certain level of severity. In the case in question, the Court found that over a 
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significant period of time the concentration of various toxic elements in the air near the 
applicant’s house seriously exceeded safe levels and that the applicant’s health had 
deteriorated as a result of the prolonged exposure to the industrial emissions from the 
steel plant. Therefore, the Court accepted that the actual detriment to the applicant’s 
health and well-being reached a level sufficient to bring it within the scope of Article 8. 
Finally, it concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8.  
Furthermore, in Giacomelli v Italy455 the applicant had lived since 1950 in a house in the 
outskirts of Brescia, 30 metres away from a plant for storage and treatment of ‘special 
waste’. An operating licence for the plant had been granted for the storage and 
treatment of hazardous and non-hazardous waste. The regional council subsequently 
authorised the treatment of harmful and toxic industrial waste by a detoxification 
process involving significant risks to the environment and human health. The applicant 
brought judicial review proceedings, and the national court held that the renewal of the 
operating licence had been unlawful and ordered the suspension of operations pending 
an environmental impact assessment which the regional council had previously ordered. 
The assessment was carried out and revealed that the operation of the plant was 
incompatible with environmental regulations, but would be allowed to continue 
provided that it complied with requirements laid down by the regional council. The 
respondent Government submitted that the interference with the applicants’ right to 
respect for her home was justified as being in accordance with the law and in pursuit of 
the legitimate aims of protecting the public health and preserving the region's economic 
well-being. The Court upheld the applicants’ complaint and found a violation of Article 
8 of the Convention. It stated that the respondent Government had not succeeded in 
striking a fair balance between the interest of the community in having a plant for the 
treatment of toxic industrial waste and the applicant's effective enjoyment of her right to 
respect for her home and her private and family life. Also, neither the decision to grant 
the plant an operating licence for the plant, nor the decision to authorise it to treat 
industrial waste by means of detoxification, had been preceded by an appropriate 
investigation or study. 
One of the most recent cases concerning hazardous industrial processes and their 
impact on the local population is Tatar v Romania.456 In this particular case the applicants 
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lived in Baia Mare. The company S.C. Aurul S.A., obtained in 1998 a licence to exploit 
the Baia Mare gold mine. The company’s extraction process involved the use of sodium 
cyanide and part of its activity was located in the vicinity of the applicants’ home. On 30 
January 2000 an environmental accident occurred at the site. A UN study reported that 
a dam had breached, releasing about 100,000 m3 of cyanide-contaminated tailings water 
into the environment. The report stated that S.C. Aurul S.A. had not halted its 
operations. The applicants complained under Article 2 that the activities carried out by 
the company put their lives in danger, and that the authorities had failed to take any 
action. In its admissibility decision of July 2007 the Court ruled that the applicants’ 
complaints should be examined under Article 8. When it comes to the medical 
condition of the first applicant the Court noted that the applicant had failed to prove 
the existence of a causal link between exposure to sodium cyanide and asthma. 
Nevertheless, despite the lack of a causal link, the existence of a serious and material risk 
for the applicants’ health and well-being entailed a duty on the part of the State, under 
Article 8, to assess the risks, both at the time it granted the operating permit and 
subsequent to the accident, and to take the appropriate measures. The Court noted that 
even after the accident from January 2000 the company was allowed to continue its 
industrial operations, in breach of the precautionary principle, according to which the 
absence of certainty with regard to current scientific and technical knowledge could not 
justify any delay on the part of the state in adopting effective and proportionate 
measures. The Court also stressed the authorities’ duty to inform the public and 
guarantee the right of its members to participate in the decision-making process 
concerning environmental issues.457 Finally, the Court concluded that the Romanian 
authorities had failed in their duty to assess the risks entailed by the activity, and had 
failed to take suitable measures to protect the applicants’ rights under Article 8 and 
more generally their right to a healthy environment.458  
All these judgments demonstrate the Court’s willingness to accept that complaints 
concerning environmental pollution can be brought within the ambit of Article 8. 
Furthermore, states could be liable if they failed to take adequate measures, such as 
through enacting and enforcing appropriate regulatory regimes or ameliorating the 
effects of significant forms of pollution caused by private sector business that affected 
persons’ enjoyment of their homes. Acknowledging the necessity of many possible 
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sources of pollution in modern developed societies, the Court also accorded states a 
margin of appreciation in their task of balancing the conflicting interests of society as a 
whole and the needs of residents near unavoidable sources of pollution.459 Where 
decisions of public authorities affect the environment to the extent that there is an 
interference with the right to respect for private and family life or the home, they must 
accord with the conditions set out in Article 8 (2),460 meaning that such decisions must 
be provided for by law, follow a legitimate aim and must be proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. As already mentioned, this basically means that a fair balance 
must be struck between the individual and the interests of a community as a whole. 
Therefore, in certain situations, interference by public authorities may be acceptable 
under the Convention- but it has to be justified. These cases also show that on certain 
occasions protecting civil rights, such as the right to private and family life, and to 
respect for the home, enters the sphere of socio-economic protection, such as 
protection of the right to a healthy environment. The socio-economic elements of the 
rights to a healthy environment are particularly visible when it comes to the execution of 
judgments concerning this right.  
 
5.3 EXECUTION OF THE ARTICLE 8 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL JUDGMENTS’ 
As with all the Court’s judgements, the CoM is the body responsible for monitoring the 
execution of judgements. First, the execution of Lopez Ostra v Spain and Moreno Gomez v 
Spain will be looked at. In both of those cases the CoM adopted Final Resolutions. In 
Lopez Ostra the CoM adopted a Resolution a year after the Court delivered a judgment461 
stating that the Government of Spain paid the applicant the sum provided for in the 
judgment and therefore it has exercised its functions under Article 54 of the Convention 
in this case. Therefore, in this case only individual measures were necessary. In Moreno 
Gomez v Spain the Resolution was adopted in 2008, almost four years after the Court 
delivered its judgment.462 The CoM took note of the individual measures taken by Spain 
but also of general measures preventing similar violations. It found that both Spanish 
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national and regional legislation now provide protection against noise pollution and that 
Spanish courts have been very active in this field and therefore decided to close the 
examination of the case. 
Now, the latest CoM report on the execution of judgments of the last three cases 
described here, the most recent ones, viewed in June 2012 will be presented.  In Tatar v 
Romania the authorities provided information on the execution of this judgment on 5 
March 2010. Bilateral contracts are underway to secure the additional information 
necessary to present an action plan/action report to the CoM.463 
In Giacomelli v Italy, in relation to the individual measures, information is awaited on the 
implementation of the environmental requirements of the Decree of the Ministry of the 
Environment of 2004, which were issued five years after the judgment. As to the general 
measures, the CoM is awaiting the confirmation of dissemination of the judgment to the 
Ministry of the Environment authorities so that they may take the Court's findings into 
account and be aware of their obligations under the Convention.464 
When it comes to the Fadeyeva case, the CoM report points out that all information 
provided by authorities so far regarding the execution of the judgment, as well as the 
outstanding issues are summarised in the Memorandum CM/Inf/DH(2007)7.465 The 
CoM report on the execution of judgments concerns not only Fadeyeva case but also 
Ledyayeva, Dobrokhotova, Zolotareva and Romashina cases.466 The Memorandum has been 
prepared to assist the CoM in its supervision of the judgement in the case Fadeyeva and is 
being updated on the basis of the information provided by the applicants.467  
“The memorandum sums up the information provided by the Russian authorities to the Committee of 
Ministers and notes the positive environmental dynamic around Severstal plant since the facts at issue in 
the judgment. It further points out a number of outstanding issues arising in the light of the Court’s 
findings. These issues concern in particular:  
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- the general legislative and regulatory framework governing the decision-making process 
leading to the setting up of sanitary zones around polluting enterprises; 
- the public scrutiny of this decision-making process and domestic remedies available to the 
population; 
- close supervision of polluting enterprises’ compliance with the domestic environmental 
rules and the action to be taken to ensure compliance.”468  
The information is provided by the authorities regarding the measures they are taking to 
improve the situation. However, regarding all the information provided by the Russian 
authorities, the CoM Secretariat in its assessment wrote:  “The statistics provided by the 
Russian authorities are encouraging as they show a positive general dynamic as regards 
the decrease of the level of air pollution in the region. However, it remains to be 
demonstrated whether the level of air pollution all along the new border of the sanitary 
zone is below the MPLs provided for by Russian legislation.”469 As to the long-term 
programmes to improve the situation, the Secretariat pointed out that the authorities 
indicated in the framework of the proceedings before the Court that the new deadline 
for bringing the plant’s emissions below the dangerous level is now 2015. The Court 
considered that the overall improvement of the environmental situation would appear to 
be very slow and that the authorities failed to show clearly what their policy was in order 
to accelerate the compliance of the plant with the standards. The authorities have 
mentioned in their action plan certain environmental programmes under way without 
specifying what kind of measures have been taken by the local authorities or by the 
plant itself. Therefore, the CoM requested more details about these programmes.470  
As with the Article 3 detention conditions, most cases concerning violations of the right 
to a healthy environment concern not only the applicants, but also the population that 
might be (or is) affected. Also, the judgments concerning the right to a healthy 
environment cannot be executed immediately but they require an action plan from the 
states and furthermore, enforcement of that action plan. This is mostly visible from the 
Fadeyeva case where the CoM prepared a Memorandum consisting of the required 
measures. The Russian authorities have shown that they have taken certain measures to 
improve the situation regarding the industrial pollution together with the resettlement of 
the applicants in an ecologically safe area. However, despite the applicants’ resettlement 
and the measures taken the situation is still not satisfactory. It will take years for the 
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situation in the area to be in conformity with the healthy environment requirements, 
which is in connection with the great financial expenditure needed by the Russian 
government. This all shows the significant socio-economic elements inherent in 
execution of the healthy environment judgments and the challenges for both the CoM, 
when supervising the execution of judgments, and for states, when trying to bring the 
situation in conformity with the healthy environment requirements.  
In the following section the environmental cases decided under aegis of Article 2 of the 
Convention will be discussed. 
 
5.4 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL CASES’ DECIDED UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
CONVENTION 
When it comes to Article 2 and environmental issues the Court has not considered them 
in as many cases as it did under Article 8. Furthermore, Article 2 is likely to be 
applicable only in the case of environmental disasters where there is loss of life, and 
more routine instances of violations of a claimed right to a healthy environment will fall 
under Article 8. However, judgments decided under Article 2 are also worth mentioning 
and analysing here, since again the execution of these judgments requires numerous 
general measures. Although Article 2 is primarily of a negative character, since its 
purpose is to prevent the state from deliberately taking life, as with all the other 
Convention articles, it was impossible to keep this right absolutely negative in its nature, 
since the living instrument and the dynamic and evolutive interpretation doctrines have 
stimulated the development of positive obligations for the state.  
It was the L.C.B. case471 where the Court recognized for the first time that obligations 
from Article 2 require the State not only to refrain from the intentional or unlawful 
taking of life, but also to take all the appropriate steps to safeguard lives of those within 
their jurisdiction.472 Here, the applicant’s father had been exposed to radiation whilst 
serving in the armed forces on Christmas Island in 1957 and 1958 when a number of 
nuclear tests were carried out by the UK. The applicant was born in 1966 and in 1970 
she was diagnosed as having leukaemia which she attributed to her father's exposure to 
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radiation. In 1993 she applied to the Commission, which referred her case to the Court. 
She contended that the UK’s failure to warn her father of the possible risks to health 
and its failure to monitor the dose of radiation which he received amounted to breaches 
of the Convention’s Articles 2 and 3. The Court considered that the UK would only 
have been required to act on its own motion to advise her parents and monitor her 
health if it had appeared likely that exposure of her father to radiation might have 
caused a real risk to her health. In the instant case, the Court considered that the 
applicant had not established a causal link between the exposure of her father to 
radiation and her leukaemia. Therefore, the UK’s failure to take any measures regarding 
the risk to L.C.B.'s health between 1966 and the date of diagnosis in 1970 did not 
constitute a breach of Articles 2 or 3. Nevertheless, it was the first case where 
environmental hazards and issues had been raised before of the Court. 
The next significant and much more complex case concerning environmental issues was 
Oneryildiz v Turkey.473 This case was considered before the Chamber and before the 
Grand Chamber and here only the Grand Chamber’s decision will be presented. The 
applicant complained that the failure of the Turkish authorities to take appropriate steps 
to prevent the accidental death of nine of his relatives and the destruction of his 
property breached Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol 1. The 
applicant had lived with his family in a slum bordering on a municipal refuse tip. A 
methane explosion at the tip caused a landslide which engulfed his house, killing thirty 
nine people, of whom nine were his relatives. Responsibility was attributed to a number 
of public authorities. The applicant commenced administrative proceedings against the 
authorities responsible for the tip and claimed compensation for the loss of his relatives 
and destruction of his possessions. In its assessment of the case the Court found a 
direct causal link between the accident and the contributory negligence of the 
authorities. As to the possible violation of Article 2, the applicant argued that the death 
of his relatives and the flaws in the ensuing proceedings violated the Article 2 right to 
life. The Grand Chamber found a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2. In its 
assessment of the general principles applicable in this case the judges stated that the 
positive obligation to take all appropriate steps to safeguard life for the purposes of 
Article 2 entails above all a primary duty on the state to put in place a legislative and 
administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the 
                                                 
473 Onerylidiz v Turkey (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 20.   
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right to life.474 Although this has previously been applied in the context of law 
enforcement, the significance of the Öneryıldız judgment is that the judges stated that 
this also applies in the context of dangerous activities. The judges said that regulation of 
such activities should make it compulsory for all those concerned to take practical 
measures to protect people whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks. That 
obligation had to be construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public 
or not, where the right to life might be at stake, and a fortiori in the case of industrial 
activities which by their very nature were dangerous..475 Information had been available 
to the authorities to the effect that inhabitants of the slum were in danger on account of 
the shortcomings of the tip. However the authorities failed to take the necessary 
measures to protect those inhabitants.  
Furthermore, where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the 
responsibility of the state, that provision entails a duty for the state to ensure, by all 
means at its disposal, an adequate response, judicial or otherwise. This response by the 
state includes the duty promptly to initiate an investigation. In the Öneryıldız v Turkey, 
where lives had been lost, the Grand Chamber held that the authorities should of their 
own motion launch investigations into the accident which led to these deaths. 
Therefore, the Grand Chamber found both violations of substantive and procedural 
aspects of Article 2 showing that a state can and will be responsible for the loss of lives 
caused by dangerous industrial activities.  
The next relevant case in terms of right to a healthy and safe environment that was 
examined under Article 2 is Budayeva and Others v Russia476 where the Court extended the 
state’s positive obligation even to situations involving natural disasters. Here the Court 
had directly addressed questions concerning recourse to the Convention in 
circumstances of allegedly ineffective regulatory performance on the part of the state. 
The applicants lived in an area which over several decades had suffered from regular, 
annual mudslides, and these culminated (in 2000) in a week-long series of mudslide 
events. Consequences included eight deaths, numerous serious injuries, and other health 
effects, together with the destruction of homes and other property. Although the 
authorities had responded by providing replacement housing and lump-sum emergency 
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476 Budayeva and Others v Russia App nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02 
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allowances, the disaster appeared to be regarded officially as accidental, and no public 
investigation, criminal or otherwise, had been activated thereafter. Meanwhile, civil 
proceedings taken out against the authorities had been dismissed on the basis that local 
residents had been informed of the risk, and that all reasonable mitigating measures had 
been taken by the authorities. The applicants alleged violations of Articles 2, 8 and 13 of 
the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.  
As to the alleged violation of Article 2, the applicants complained that the authorities 
had failed to comply with their positive obligations to take appropriate measures to 
mitigate the risks to their lives against the natural hazards. The first applicant 
complained that the domestic authorities were responsible for the death of her husband 
in the mudslide of July 2000. She and the other applicants also complained that the 
domestic authorities were responsible for putting their lives at risk, as they had failed to 
discharge the state’s positive obligations and had been negligent in the maintenance of 
the dam, in monitoring the hazardous area and in providing an emergency warning or 
taking other reasonable measures to mitigate the risk and the effects of the natural 
disaster. The Court in its assessment reiterated that Article 2 lays down a positive 
obligation on states to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their 
jurisdiction.477 The Court applied the general principles mentioned in the L.C.B. and 
Onedryildiz cases to the alleged failure to maintain defence and warning infrastructures (a 
substantive aspect of Article 2) and to the judicial response required in the event of 
alleged infringements of the right to life (a procedural aspect of Article 2). As to the 
substantive aspect, the Court concluded that there was no justification for the 
authorities’ omissions in implementing the land-planning and emergency relief policies 
in the hazardous area given the foreseeable exposure of residents, including all 
applicants, to mortal risk. It found that there was a causal link between the serious 
administrative flaws that impeded their implementation and the death of Mr Budayev 
and the injuries sustained by the first and the second applicants and the members of 
their family. The authorities had thus failed to discharge the positive obligation to 
establish a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective 
deterrence against threats to the right to life as required by Article 2. Accordingly, the 
Court found a violation of Article 2 in its substantive aspect.478 As to the procedural 
aspect, having found that the question of state responsibility for the accident in Tyrnauz 
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had never as such been investigated or examined by any judicial or administrative 
authority, the Court concluded that there has also been a violation of Article 2 in its 
procedural aspect.479 
It is clear from Budayeva that factors crucial to determining whether interference with 
Convention rights is justified will encompass circumstances such as anticipated levels of 
risk, past events, and imminence and seriousness of future threats. 
 
5.5 EXECUTION OF ARTICLE 2 ‘ENVIRONMENTAL JUDGMENTS’ 
Let us now take a look at the execution of the Onedryildiz and Budayeva cases where the 
Court found a violation of Article 2 caused by the environmental related hazards and 
accidents. 
In the Onedryildiz case the damage caused by the violations including the unpaid sums 
awarded by domestic courts has been covered by the just satisfaction awarded by the 
Court. However, of the interest here again are the general measures. The CoM noted 
that the Turkish authorities submitted numerous pieces of information regarding a plan 
of action for the execution of this judgment. The Ümraniye tip has been covered with 
earth following a decision of the local council which also installed air ducts on it. 
Furthermore, a rehabilitation project has been put into force by the Istanbul 
Metropolitan Municipality, which has planted trees on the area of the former site of the 
tip and has had a sports ground laid down. The new Criminal Code has been brought 
into force and the strategic plan for solid waste management in Istanbul, guided by the 
environmental regulations of the European Union, was prepared and put into practice. 
However, despite all the measures, the judgment has still not executed in its entirety and 
the information from Turkish authorities is still awaited.480  
In Budayeva v Russia regarding individual measures only just satisfaction for the non-
pecuniary damage had to be paid. However, as for the general measures, the CoM 
reported: 
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“Information provided by the Russian authorities (1059th meeting, June 2009): On 6/01/2006 the government of 
the Russian Federation adopted a Federal Programme aimed at lowering the risks and reducing the 
consequences of emergencies of natural and industrial origins covering the period until the end of 2010. 
To implement it, a regional programme for the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (RKB), was adopted by 
the Parliament of the RKB. The regional programme focuses not least on setting up an adequate 
legislative and administrative framework, improving monitoring and forecasting systems and developing 
the warning infrastructure.  
• This information is being assessed.”481  
The CoM decided to resume consideration of this item, in the light of information to be 
provided on general measures. 
What can be concluded is that the Onedryildiz and Budayeva cases are particularly 
important for establishing the principle of positive obligations under Article 2 of the 
Convention and the protection of life, however from the perspective of protecting the 
right to a healthy environment their contribution is not of such significance. 
Furthermore, the governments are not keen on executing these judgments speedily, and 
as we will see they are reporting on the same issues to the ECSR through the Reporting 
and the Collective Complaints procedure. Therefore, it does not seem that these 
judgments will have any significance in terms of protecting the right to a healthy 
environment as such. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL CASES DECIDED UNDER 
THE ECHR 
We can draw certain conclusions from all these cases, both the ones that concern Article 
8 and Article 2 violations regarding the environmental issues. First of all, “states have a 
positive duty to take appropriate measures to prevent industrial pollution or other forms 
of environmental nuisance from seriously interfering with health or the enjoyment of 
private life or property.”482 Its extent will depend on the harmfulness of the activity and 
the foreseeability of the risk. Secondly, although the Court refers to the need to balance 
the rights of the individual with the needs of the community as a whole, in some cases 
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the states’ failure to apply or enforce their own environmental laws left no room for 
such a defence.483 States cannot expect to persuade the Court that the needs of the 
community can best be met in such cases by not enforcing the law. Thirdly, the 
beneficiaries of this duty to regulate and control sources of environmental harm are not 
the community at large, still less the environment per se, but only those individuals 
whose rights will be affected by any failure to act. The duty is not one of protecting the 
environment, but of protecting humans from significantly harmful environmental 
impacts.484  
Regarding the third point mentioned, in Kyrtatos v Greece485 the Court used an 
opportunity to clarify the scope of Article 8 with regard to environmental issues. It 
noted first: 
“Severe environmental pollution may affect individuals' well-being and prevent them from enjoying their 
homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously 
endangering their health. The crucial element in determining whether pollution has adversely affected one 
of the rights safeguarded by Art.8(1) is a harmful effect on a person’s private or family sphere, not simply 
the general deterioration of the environment. Neither Art.8 nor any of the Convention's other Articles 
provide general protection of the environment.”486   
And secondly,  
“Even if the environment has been severely damaged by urban development, the applicants have not 
shown that the alleged damage to the birds and other protected species living in the swamp directly 
affected their own rights under Art.8(1). It might have been otherwise if the environmental deterioration 
complained of had consisted in the destruction of a forest area in the vicinity of the applicants' house, a 
situation which could have affected their own well-being more directly. As it is, however, the interference 
with the conditions of animal life in the swamp does not constitute an attack on the applicants' private or 
family life.”487  
In this case the Court found no violation of Article 8, since the disturbances caused by 
the urban development of the area had not reached a sufficient degree of seriousness to 
be taken into account for the purposes of Article 8. 
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Therefore, the application under the Convention can only be brought by the direct 
victims of the environmental hazards that can prove a causal link between their loss and 
the environmental disturbances. As we have seen, it cannot be always shown by the 
applicants there has been a causal link between their right to private life and 
environmental, and even more rarely with their right to life. What will also not be taken 
into account are potential violations of the Convention.488 Finally, while cases are 
brought by individuals, in many of those cases hundreds or thousands of other people 
are affected by the same harmful activity. Therefore, even when the Court delivers a 
judgment finding a violation such a judgment will have wide-ranging socio-economic 
elements since usually there will be numerous other people affected by the same 
environmental hazard and it will take years for the state to bring the situation into 
conformity with the healthy environment standards.  
The individual cases concerning environmental issues do not have much impact on the 
protection of the environment itself nor is the Convention system suitable for those 
issues. These judgments, particularly the ones where a violation of Article 8 has been 
found, only bring uncertainty regarding states obligations under the Convention and 
make the supervision of the execution extremely demanding and the point at which the 
judgment is actually enforced in its entirety uncertain.  
The appearance of the ‘environmental cases’ raised the idea of making an additional 
protocol to the Convention on the right to healthy environment. The discussion on 
adopting an additional protocol to the Convention will now be analysed before turning 
to the healthy environment as protected under the ESC system. As will be seen, the 
ESC system, both the Reporting and the Collective Complaint system, are much more 
suitable for cases involving environmental hazards, since there is no victim requirement, 
potential violations are taken into account and by its character it is more suitable for 
non-individual complaints. 
 
                                                 
488 Tauira and Eighteen Others v France, App no 28204/95 (EComHR Decision, 4 December 1995). See also 
similar cases where the environmental claims were rejected due to the inability to satisfy the ‘victim 
requirement’: Balmer- Schafroth v Switzerland (1998) 25 E.H.R.R. 598; Athanassoglou and Others v Switzerland 
(2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 13. 
 130 
5.7 DISCUSSION ON ADOPTING AN ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY 
ENVIRONMENT 
Because of new environmental cases that appeared before the Court, the Committee on 
the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional Affairs of the CoE’s 
Parliamentary Assembly in 2009 recommended that the CoM should draw up an 
additional protocol to the Convention, recognising the right to a healthy and viable 
environment.489  
However, already in June 2003, the Parliamentary Assembly’s CLAHR had rejected the 
idea of an additional protocol on the right to a healthy environment as being 
unjustifiable and potentially counterproductive.490 The new recommendation from 2009 
made by the Committee on the Environment, Agriculture and Local and Regional 
Affairs afforded the CLAHR the opportunity to re-examine its position, and the 
justifications and viability of such a Protocol.  
On 29 December 2009, the CLAHR published its opinion on the ‘Preparation on an 
additional protocol to The European Convention on Human Rights, on the right to a 
healthy environment’. At the beginning of its opinion, the CLAHR stated that although 
it recognises the importance of the healthy, viable and decent environment, it does not 
believe that extending the Convention through the proposed additional protocol is the 
correct solution.491  
In its explanatory memorandum the CLAHR considered the background history and 
existing case-law. It stressed that the Court had already identified in its case-law issues 
related to the environment which could affect the right to life (Article 2), the right to 
respect for private and family life as well as the home (Article 8), the right to a fair trial 
and access to a court (Article 6), the right to receive and impart information and ideas 
(Article 10), the right to an effective remedy (Article 13) and the right to the peaceful 
enjoyment of one’s possessions (Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).492 In answer to the 
question wheteher the environment is protected under the Convention it is stated that 
“The Convention is not designed to provide a general protection of the environment as 
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such and does not expressly guarantee a right to a sound, quiet and healthy 
environment. However, the Convention indirectly offers a certain degree of protection 
with regard to environmental matters as demonstrated by the evolving case law of the 
Court in this area.”493  
In the 2009 Opinion the CLAHR Rapporteur, Mr Chope, in his explanatory 
memorandum stated that to include a new protocol, which was so vague, would lead to 
uncertainty and be a recipe for a substantial increase in the Court’s case load. Mr Erik 
Jurgens in 2003 had expressed similar concerns and had said:  
“It must be remembered that, despite its enormous success in advancing the protection of a particular 
range of human rights in Europe, the Convention is not an instrument that is appropriate for all forms of 
rights. The Convention was intended to protect a narrow range of rights and its mechanisms designed 
specifically with those rights in mind; it is not structured for, nor capable of, the protection of all rights 
addressed by international instruments. Its past achievements are not a guarantee of limitless resilience: 
indeed, this very success can generate risks to its future integrity and to the capacity of the Court to work 
effectively in enforcing its provisions. These risks include the temptation to extend its jurisdiction to other 
forms of rights of uncertain content, scope and application. The inclusion of such ‘untested rights’ – 
which to a large extent could require primary elaboration not on national political and legal levels but 
through the case law of a pan- European judicial body – could not only undermine the standing of the 
Court but threaten it with an unmanageable burden of new applications (at a time when the level of 
applications is already a serious problem), to the detriment of protection of the rights currently 
included.”494  
In his opinion Mr Chope again quoted Mr Jurgens warning that “If we give citizens a 
broadly formulated, individual right to a healthy environment without being more 
specific as to the basis on which and against whom a citizen can in fact make a claim 
arising from that right, it becomes difficult for a judge to adjudicate.”495 
Mr Chope went on to emphasize that “introducing a right into the Convention that is 
impossible to enforce endangers the whole system.”496 In his concluding remarks before 
stating his belief that an additional protocol is not the correct solution, Mr Chope stated: 
“There is a significant difference between an environment that is healthy and one that 
merely supports life. In order for the Court not to be overwhelmed with ambitious and 
speculative applications, any additional protocol would need to clearly define which acts 
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or omissions constitute a human rights violation. It must be remembered that not every 
environmental problem can be perceived as a potential human rights violation.”497 
As we can see from both the opinions in 2003 and 2009, the experts agreed that it 
would not be advisable to make an additional protocol to the Convention on the right 
to a healthy environment. As the main obstacle, the Rapporteurs in both opinions 
mentioned the vagueness and uncertainty of the right to a healthy environment and its 
broadness as well as the danger that a huge amount of new applications might come 
before the Court.   
The Convention, despite being a living instrument, is intended to protect a narrow range 
of rights with mechanisms designed specifically with those rights in mind and it does 
not seem to be a good idea to include the right to a healthy environment under the 
Convention. However, the Convention is not the only human rights instrument in 
Europe. The following part of the chapter will be on the right to a healthy environment 
as interpreted by the ECSR under the ESC, and it will consider whether that would be a 
possible alternative to the Convention and Court as a means of guaranteeing a right to a 
healthy environment. 
 
5.8 THE ESC AND THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
Article 11 of the ESC guarantees the right to protection of health. The wording of 
Article 11 is the same under both versions of the Charter, with a difference in paragraph 
3 of the Revised Charter where it urges states to take appropriate measures to prevent as 
far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as well as accidents, while the 
original version of the Charter does not refer to accidents. Taking account of the 
complementarity with the Convention and the growing link that State parties to the 
Charter and other international bodies now make between the protection of health and 
a healthy environment, the ECSR has interpreted Article 11 as including the right to a 
healthy environment.498  
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In an information document on the right to health prepared by the secretariat of the 
ESC in March 2009 the ECSR emphasized, regarding the right to a healthy 
environment, that:  
“The ECSR acknowledges that overcoming pollution is an objective that can only be achieved gradually. 
States must nevertheless take measures to achieve this goal within a reasonable time, with measurable 
progress and making maximum use of available resources. The measures taken are assessed with reference 
to their national legislation and regulations and undertakings entered into with regard to the European 
Union and the United Nations, and in terms of how the relevant law is applied in practice.”499  
Furthermore, under the heading ‘air pollution’, the ECSR pointed out: 
 “In order to guarantee a healthy environment, states must therefore: 
– develop and regularly update sufficiently comprehensive legislation and regulations in the environmental 
field; 
– take specific steps (such as modifying equipment, introducing threshold values for emissions, measuring 
air quality, etc.) to prevent air pollution at local level and to help reduce it on a global scale…; 
– ensure that environmental standards and rules are properly applied, through appropriate supervisory 
machinery that is both effective and efficient, i.e. comprising measures which have been shown to be 
sufficiently dissuasive and have a direct effect on polluting emission levels; 
– assess, systematically if necessary, health risks through epidemiological monitoring of the groups 
concerned.”500 
The right to a healthy environment is not something that can be achieved and realised 
immediately. The ECSR stressed the economic and social nature of the right to a 
healthy environment, regardless of its obvious importance for the society and its 
individuals. This information document is based on the ECSR decisions and 
conclusions as the ECSR has been scrutinizing the situation in Member States regarding 
environmental issues for years. Despite the fact that states have only to report every 
four years, states are- through the Reporting system- informing the ECSR on the 
relevant matters regarding the environment. One might suspect that by stating how 
overcoming pollution is an objective that can only be achieved gradually the ECSR will 
be tolerant and open handed in its conclusions and decisions to states when assessing 
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the measures they introduced in order to secure the healthy environment. However, we 
will see from the collective complaint and reports that will be discussed that is not the 
case at all.  
 
5.9 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO A 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
Unfortunately, the ECSR case-law on the right to a healthy environment is not 
numerous, to be exact only two collective complaints on that issue have been lodged so 
far and regarding one of them ECSR has adopted a decision on the merits.501 
Nevertheless, this one decision gives us a very valuable overview of the ECSR’s 
standpoint on the issue of the right to a healthy environment. 
The Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights lodged a complaint on 4 April 2005 
in relation to Article 11 (right to protection of health), Article 2(4) (right to reduced 
working hours or additional holidays for workers in dangerous or unhealthy 
occupations), Article 3(1) (safety and health regulations at work) and Article 3(2) 
(provision for the enforcement of safety and health regulations by measures of 
supervision) of the ESC. In the complaint it was alleged that in the main areas where 
lignite is mined Greece had not adequately prevented the impact on the environment 
nor developed an appropriate strategy in order to prevent and respond to the health 
hazards for the population. It was also alleged that there is no legal framework 
guaranteeing the security and safety of persons working in lignite mines and that the 
later did not benefit from reduced working hours or additional holidays. Here, only on 
the complaint regarding Article 11 will be analysed.  
Greece is the second largest lignite producer in the EU and fifth in the world. Since the 
Greek Government acknowledged the polluting effects of lignite production, the 
questions before the ECSR were whether the pollution was attributable to Greece and 
whether it led to a violation of the right to health (as well as of the right to just 
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conditions of work and the right to safe and healthy working conditions). The 
Government claimed that the mining operations were undertaken by private entities for 
whose actions the state could not be held accountable. In response to that argument the 
ECSR concluded that regardless of the company’s legal status Greece was required to 
ensure compliance with its positive undertakings under the Charter. The ECSR’s 
jurisdiction ratione temporis also had to be considered since the Protocol establishing the 
Collective Complaint procedure came into force in Greece in August 1998. The Greek 
Government maintained that acts or omissions prior to that date could not be taken 
into consideration. On this issue (which had already been considered in the decision on 
admissibility) the ECSR relied on the notion of a ‘continuing violation’ developed by the 
Court,502 meaning that the Government will be held accountable for an event occurring 
before the entry into force of a treaty if it continues to produce effects after this. The 
ECSR found that there might be a breach of the duty of preventing damage arising from 
air pollution, for as long as the pollution continues. It also needs to be emphasized that, 
when deciding whether a violation of the Charter occurred the ECSR stressed that the 
ESC is a living instrument and that rights and freedoms set out in it are to be interpreted 
in the light of current conditions.503 
The ECSR acknowledged that the use of lignite and its mining serve legitimate 
objectives under the Charter (such as energy independence, access to electricity at a 
reasonable cost, and economic growth), but nonetheless, it identified several areas in 
which the state’s efforts fell short of Greece’s national and international undertakings to 
overcome pollution, which, in turn, had resulted in a failure to protect the health of the 
population. It found that, although the Greek Constitution makes protection of the 
environment an obligation of the state and, at the same time, an individual right, 
national environmental protection legislation and regulations were not applied and 
enforced in an effective manner, and that the environmental inspectorates were not 
sufficiently equipped.504 Based on these and other facts before it, the ECSR found no 
real evidence of Greece’s commitment to improving the situation within a reasonable 
time.505 The ECSR also concluded that, “even taking into consideration the margin of 
discretion granted to national authorities in such matters, Greece had not managed to 
strike a reasonable balance between the interests of persons living in the lignite mining 
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areas and the general interest”,506 and thus that there had been a violation of Greece’s 
obligations with respect to the right to protection of health under the Charter.  
In her paper M. Trilisch wrote that Marangopoulos v Greece is, “undoubtedly, one of the 
most important decisions the ECSR has taken so far. Not only does it provide some 
much-needed input on the social right to health, it also clarifies the ECSR jurisdiction 
ratione temporis when dealing with positive obligations under the Charter. Most 
importantly, however, it places the right to a healthy environment in the mainstream of 
human rights.”507 Furthermore, she emphasized the impact this decision has on the 
material content of the right involved as well as on the removal of the right to a healthy 
environment from the constrained realm of so-called third generation rights. She 
mentioned one of the first cases examined by the Court (Lopez Ostra v Spain) 
emphasizing that “the Court did not expressly rely on the right to a healthy environment 
as such. Therefore, the Committee’s decision can be understood as further advancing 
the progressive endorsement of environmental issues by the European human rights 
institutions.”508 This is something to be welcomed and encouraged. The ECSR has 
through this decision proven its willingness and ability to provide decisions on complex 
and demanding issues like environmental pollution.  
In its Resolution on the case,509 adopted on 16 January 2008, the CoM stated, regarding 
violation of Articles 11(1), 11(2) and 11(3) of the Charter: 
 “The Greek National Action Plan for 2005-2007 (NAP1) provides for greenhouse gas emissions for the 
whole country and all sectors combined to rise by no more than 39.2% until 2010, whereas Greece was 
committed, in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol, to an increase in these gases of no more than 25% 
in 2010.  When air quality measurements reveal that emission limit values have been exceeded, the 
penalties imposed are limited and have little dissuasive effect. Moreover, the initiatives taken by DEH (the 
public power corporation operating the Greek lignite mines) to adapt plant and mining equipment to the 
“best available techniques” have been slow. 
The Committee finds that Greek regulations satisfy all the requirements concerning information to the 
public about and their participation in the procedure for approving environmental criteria for projects and 
activities. However, the circumstances surrounding the granting and extension of several authorisations, 
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and the publication on the Internet of such a complex document as the NAP1 for just four days, show 
that in practice the Greek authorities do not apply the relevant legislation satisfactorily.  
The Committee considers that the government does not provide sufficiently precise information to 
amount to a valid education policy aimed at persons living in lignite mining areas. Finally, very little has so 
far been done to organise systematic epidemiological monitoring of those concerned and no morbidity 
studies have been carried out.”510 
Unfortunately, not only did it take two years for the CoM to adopt a Resolution but it 
seems rather mild only stating that it welcomes the measures already taken by the Greek 
authorities as well as further measures envisaged in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of the rights protected by the ESC. However, as will be seen, the ECRS 
is also through the Reporting procedure continuously supervising the situation in 
Greece concerning the environmental problems arising out of lignite mining. 
 
5.10 THE REPORTING SYSTEM UNDER THE ESC CONCERNING THE 
RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
There is an ongoing dialogue between states that send reports and the ECSR that adopts 
conclusions on those reports. Unlike the collective complaints where there are only two 
complaints concerning the right to a healthy environment, there are numerous reports 
and conclusions regarding Article 11(3) of the both the Original and the Revised 
Charter.  
Unfortunately, despite the fact that states are often taking years to bring their behaviour 
into conformity with the ESC rights, up to this date the CoM has not yet issued any 
Recommendation or Resolution regarding the rights protected under Article 11(3). 
When it comes to the Collective Complaints system, as discussed above, regarding the 
Marangopoulos decision the CoM adopted a quite bland Resolution two years after the 
ECSR adopted its decision on the merits in this case. 
First we will look at the conclusions related to the previously discussed decision on 
Maragngopoulos Foundation v Greece. After Greece sent its 19th Report to the ECSR on, 
                                                 
510 Ibid. 
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inter alia, Article 11, for the period 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2007,511 the ECSR adopted its 
Conclusions. In them it again concluded that Greece is in non-conformity with 
requirements set out under Article 11(3) of the Revised Charter. The ECSR noted 
progress in Greece’s policies on the prevention of avoidable risks-reduction of 
environmental and other issues examined under Article 11(3); however, in most of the 
issues it requested further information.512 Furthermore, the ECSR focused on the 
Marangopoulus Foundation for Human Rights complaint where the CoM found the measures 
taken by the authorities to improve the situation were insufficient. The ECSR took note 
of the information provided by the Greek Government in its latest report and noticed 
that it is quite similar to that provided in its submissions in the case. It concluded that 
the situation was still not in conformity with Article 11(3) on the ground that it had not 
been demonstrated that sufficient measures had been adopted during the reference 
period to improve the right to a healthy environment of persons living in lignite mining 
areas.513  
Obviously, putting the situation in conformity with the Article 11(3) requirements is a 
long process. The important thing is that both the ECSR and, we might say, the CoM 
are closely monitoring the situation and the fact that the case was decided and 
supervised under the ESC did not diminish its relevance. 
Now, the reports and conclusions on Turkey, Italy, Romania and United Kingdom, that 
were respondent states in the above analysed Court cases on the right to a healthy 
environment, will be looked at. In relation to Russia, there is currently no information. 
The Russian Federation signed the Revised ESC on 14 September 2000 and it ratified it 
on 16 October 2009. It has accepted 67 of the Revised Charter’s 98 paragraphs, 
including all three paragraphs of Article 11. The first report to be submitted by the 
Russian Federation on the implementation of the Revised Charter was due by 31 
October 2011 but it did not concern Article 11 on the right to health.  
In March 2009 Turkey submitted its 15th report on the Original Charter and 1st report 
on the Revised Charter on the accepted provisions of Thematic Group 2 “Health, social 
                                                 
511 19th report on the implementation of the European Social Charter and 5th report on the 
implementation of the 1998 Additional Protocol submitted by the Government of Greece (Articles 3, 12 
and 13 for the period of 01/01/2005-31/12/2007; Articles 11, 14 and Article 4 of the Additional 
Protocol for the period 01/01/2003-31/12/2007), Cycle 2009, RAP/Cha/GR/XIX(2009).  
512 ESC, ESCR Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (GREECE), Articles 3, 11, 12, 13, 14 and Article 4 of the 
Additional Protocol of the Charter (CoE Publishing 2010), 15-18. 
513 Ibid, 18. 
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security and social protection” (Articles 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23 and 30). Conclusions in 
respect of these provisions were published in January 2010. In its report Turkey 
presented in detail all the administrative and legislative work it is doing on the 
provisions mentioned above.514 In its Conclusion, in respect of Article 11(3), the ECSR 
stated that it took note of the information contained in the report submitted by Turkey. 
However, it also noted that much of the information needed to assess the situation was 
lacking. It considered that if the information requested later in its Conclusion is not 
provided in the next report there will be nothing to show that the situation in Turkey is 
in conformity with this provision of the Revised Charter. Since the information is 
lacking on all of the Article 11(3) aspects the ECSR decided to defer its conclusion 
pending receipt of the information requested.515 The same conclusion was adopted 
regarding Romania where again the ECSR could not reach a final conclusion regarding 
conformity or non-conformity due to lack of information, so it decided to defer its 
conclusion.516 
In the same 2009 Conclusions regarding Italy the ECSR stated that although some 
information is still awaited, the situation in Italy is in conformity with Article 11(3) of 
the Revised Charter.517 Finally, in the 2009 Conclusions on the UK on Article 11(3) of 
the Original Charter (the UK has not ratified the Revised Charter) the ECSR concluded 
that the situation in the UK is in conformity with Article 11(3) of the Charter. 518  
Therefore, states can be and some are in conformity with the Article 11(3) requirements 
and the ECSR Reporting system is dealing with all the environmental risks one country 
is facing. From the 2009 Conclusions on the Revised Charter one can see that out of 
twenty three states that have accepted Article 11(3) ten have been found to be in 
conformity, in relation to eight states the ECSR decided to defer its conclusion while 
                                                 
514 European Social Charter, 15th National Report on the Implementation of the European Social Charter 
and 1st National Report on the implementation of the European Social Charter (revised) submitted by the 
government of Turkey, Articles 11, 12, 13 & 14 for the period between January 1, 2003 to July 31, 2007 
(1961 Charter) and August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007 (Revised Charter) Articles 3, 23 & 30 for the 
period between August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007 (Revised Charter) Cycle 2009 
RAP/RCha/TU/I(2009), 18-20. 
515 Ibid. 
516 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2009 (Romania), Articles 3, 11, 12 and13 of the Revised Charter 
(CoE Publishing), 16-17. 
517 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2009 (Italy), Articles 3, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23 and 30 of the Revised 
Charter (CoE Publishing 2010), 17-18. 
518 ESC, ECSR Conclusions XIX- 2 (2009) (United Kingdom), Articles 3, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Charter 
(CoE Publishing 2010), 13-17. 
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five were found to be in non-conformity.519 In the Conclusions from the same year but 
on the Original Charter, the ECSR found eleven out of fifteen states to be in 
conformity with Article 11(3) while only two were found to be in non-conformity.520 
The number of states that are in conformity and the improvements states are making 
suggests that the Charter and the pressure of the Reporting procedure are (at least to 
some extent) the cause of this. Of course, this system is not ideal because of its non-
binding form and long time periods between the country reports. However, within the 
CoE it is the most detailed and the most regular way to supervise the countries methods 
of dealing with the environmental risks.  
 
5.11 CONCLUSION 
The ECSR has not developed nearly as significant or numerous case-law as the Court, 
since the Collective Complaints system has been in operation only since 1998 and only 
15 Member States to the CoE have so far accepted it. Another disadvantage of the 
Collective Complaints system is the absence of a judicial body, with only the ECSR 
which at most can be called a ‘quasi-judicial’ body. However, the number of complaints 
is increasing and the awareness of protection of economic and social rights through the 
system of Collective Complaints is growing. On the other hand, the Reporting system 
on Article 11(3), despite having the same disadvantages as the Collective Complaints 
system- a small number of states that have accepted Article 11(3) and the ESCR 
conclusions are of a non-binding character, shows that it is the most detailed 
supervising process of environmental hazards. The ECSR is looking at all the elements 
necessary for fulfilling the healthy environment conditions, which are numerous, and is 
placing pressure on states to bring the situation in conformity with Article 11(3).  
Furthermore, there are two other problematic issues under the ESC system that cannot 
be ignored. First, the more information the ECSR requires from State parties to provide 
                                                 
519 States that are found to be in conformity with Article 11(3) of the Revised Charter are: Estonia, 
Finland, France, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden. ESC (Revised), 
ECSR Conclusions 2009- Volume I (Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Ireland, Italy) (CoE Publishing 2010), 16. 
520 States that are found to be in conformity with Article 11(3) of the Original Charter are: Austria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Luxemburg, Poland, Spain and United 
Kingdom. ESC, ECSR Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, "the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia", United Kingdom) (CoE Publishing 2010), 16. 
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for it to be able to make a judgment about their compliance with the Article 11(3) 
obligations, the more difficult it becomes for the ECSR to make a definite judgment 
about such compliance.521 This is evident from all the ECSR conclusions where it 
decided to defer its conclusion, and, as we have seen in the previous Section, there are 
quite a few such conclusions. Another and even bigger disadvantage and problematic 
issue of both the ECS Reporting and Collective Complaints system is the ineffectiveness 
of the CoM and its unwillingness to issue Recommendations and Resolutions. 
Furthermore, even when it adopts them, they are rather vague and bland. Unfortunately, 
we have seen that the CoM is the same when supervising the execution of the Court’s 
judgments, and it places rather mild, if any, pressure on states. 
On the other hand, the ECHR system is seriously over-burdened now and it is not wise 
for the Court to extend its interpretation of Convention rights into the area of 
protecting the right to a healthy environment. Both the Court and the ECSR have 
admitted that healthy environment is something that cannot be achieved immediately 
but can only be achieved gradually. Although nowadays there is a tendency to abandon 
the distinction between economic and social and civil and political rights, the fact that 
they are guaranteed under two separate documents remains. After looking at the ESC 
Reporting and the Collective Complaints system with a special overview on the right to 
healthy environment, it is can be concluded that, although there are still problematic 
issues, the right to a healthy environment can be protected under the ESC system. 
Furthermore, it seems that the Court and the ECSR are starting to duplicate each 
other’s work, and in my opinion that is not a solution to be welcomed.  
The ESC system is developing, together with its machinery of protection. The ECSR 
and the CoE bodies should focus on improving the ESC system, including the 
protection of the right to a healthy environment. The right to a healthy environment 
should primarily be a collective right and not an individual right, since the effects of 
pollution or any other kind of environmental hazard will generally effect a large group 
of people, not just one individual. Since the Court deals only with individual complaints 
and the ECSR with collective ones the Court should not deal with the healthy 
environment issue, but only the ECSR. As stated by Margared DeMerieux: “Central to 
the idea of environmental rights and of the protection of the environment is that the 
                                                 
521 Khaliq and Churchill, ‘The European Committee of Social Rights: putting flesh…’ (n 29), 452. 
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interests of populations as a whole and indeed of unborn generations are crucial.”522 Also, 
environment disasters should be prevented rather than treated after they have happened 
which is only possible under the ESC system. And if the CoE bodies try to improve the 
ESC system and make the Reporting procedure together with the system of Collective 
Complaints as effective as possible, the environmental threats to people living in a 
particular territory might be much better protected then under the Convention. The 
CoE bodies should urge states to ratify the Collective Complaints Protocol523 as well as 
the CoM to start bringing recommendations to states, recommendations that are not 
mild and bland, both under the Collective Complaints and the Reporting procedure.  
The ECHR’s biggest contribution to the human rights protection in Europe is that it 
protects individuals against state actions and that it imposed positive obligations on the 
state to protect individuals from various types of human rights violations. When it 
comes to the right to healthy environment, it is not an issue that should be left for the 
Convention and the Court. The Court should not deliver judgments concerning the 
right to a healthy environment, since it has numerous socio-economic elements. 
Environmental hazards on most occasions affect hundreds or thousands of people and 
the execution of such judgment can only be achieved progressively with substantial 
financial expenditure. Instead of entering this sphere, when an application that concerns 
the right to live in a healthy, sound and viable environment comes before the Court, it 
should not deal with it. One way of doing so might be that the Court could announce in 
the next environmental case that all future environmental applications will be declared 
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto (based on Article 35(3)(a) of the Convention), and therefore inadmissible.524  
                                                 
522 DeMerieux (n 423), 534. 
523 See for example Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1795 (2007) ‘Monitoring of commitments 
concerning social rights’. Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Parliamentary 
Assembly, on 24 May 2007. “The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers: 
11.1. take the necessary measures to ensure that member states that have not already done so ratify the 
revised European Social Charter, the Protocol amending the European Social Charter and the Additional 
Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints and grant 
national NGOs the right to lodge complaints.” [11]. 
524 See Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria (CoE 2011), 44-45; White and Ovey (n 27), 33-34; Janis, Kay 
and Bradley (n 26), 47-49; Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25), 800-801; and case Pančeko v Latvia App 
No 40772/98 (ECtHR Decision, 28 October 1999). 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Convention contains no references to healthcare rights. The right to healthcare is a 
traditional socio-economic right; however, the issue of providing healthcare in general 
has also been raised before the Court, mainly in relation to Article 2 and Article 8.  
It has been shown through the previous chapters that the Court is now often using an 
integrated approach525 when interpreting the Convention rights. This approach is 
predicated on the indivisibility of all human rights and “recognizes that, on the one 
hand, the enjoyment of civil and political rights requires respect for and promotion of 
social rights and, on the other hand, that social rights are not second best to civil and 
political rights.”526 On that, one might say that the integrated approach has the 
advantage of opening the door to creative possibilities for litigation of social rights and 
re-conceptualizing of the contours of civil and political rights.527 What also might be 
said, and is also in a way expected, is that the Court’s use of integrated approach and 
dynamic interpretation will include the right to healthcare in general, at least to some 
degree, in the Convention, particularly after seeing in chapters IV and V how far the 
Court has gone in its dynamic interpretation of the right to satisfactory detention 
conditions and healthcare in prisons and the right to a healthy environment.  
However, it looks as if the right to healthcare is an area where the Court has decided to 
make a distinction between the two categories of rights. In this chapter the Court’s 
approach towards the right to healthcare will be analysed, together with my opinion on 
why the Court has not gone further and why that is a good thing. Jurisprudence on 
Articles 2 and 8, in relation to healthcare rights, will be discussed. Furthermore, cases 
concerning violation of Article 2 due to the lack of appropriate medical services in 
prisons which were not examined in chapter IV will be analysed. Later on, jurisprudence 
                                                 
525 White and Ovey (n 27), 75. 
526 Ibid.  
527 Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the Defense and Promotion 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human Rights Agenda’ (2005) 27 HUM. 
RTS. Q. 1200, 1219 (analyzing strategies for the realization of economic, social, and cultural rights based 
on the indivisibility of all human rights). 
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of the Convention’s organs on Article 8 regarding the right to healthcare will be 
presented followed by the deportation cases where the applicants invoked violation of 
Article 3 because of the lack of satisfactory (or any) healthcare in the countries where 
they were supposed to be deported, as connected with the right to healthcare. Finally, 
the right to health as protected under the ESC will be analysed. The collective 
complaints and the reports on Article 11 will be discussed. In my opinion, the ESC is a 
better instrument for healthcare issues, and the reasons for that line of thinking will be 
presented in sections 6.7.-6.9. of this chapter.  
 
6.2 THE ECHR AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE 
There have been several cases where the Court explored the possibility of protecting the 
right to health or/and the right to healthcare. Here, the issue is not the right to 
healthcare in detention but in society in general. The issue of providing healthcare in 
detention has been discussed in chapter IV. In that chapter the development of the 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding the right to have satisfactory detention conditions and 
the right to healthcare of the persons deprived of their liberty has been discussed. What 
I have tried to show is that these judgments have significant socio-economic elements 
since they are financially demanding, on numerous occasions affect the whole 
population in a detention centre and cannot be executed within a short time period and 
in my opinion, are compromising the importance of Article’s 3 absolute nature. Most 
importantly, the right to health is already guaranteed under the ESC.  
Here the right to health and the right to healthcare in general will be discussed and what 
will be shown is that these rights are not included in the Convention nearly as frequently 
as the right to a healthy environment and the right to satisfactory detention conditions 
and healthcare in detention. Moreover, most of the ‘healthcare cases’ have not even 
passed through the admissibility stage.  
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6.2.1 POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2 OF THE 
CONVENTION 
The issue of providing healthcare has mainly been raised before the Court in relation to 
Article 2. Article 2 of the Convention is formed as a negative right, i.e. it is cast as a 
negative obligation.528 However, as with numerous Convention provisions, through the 
Court’s jurisprudence Article 2 started imposing positive obligations on the states. In 
the first case before the Court involving Article 2, McCann and Others v the United 
Kingdom,529 the applicants contended that first paragraph of Article 2 imposed positive 
duty on states to protect life. However, the Court decided to examine this case under 
the notion of proportionality of Article 2(2), examining whether the control and 
organisation of that anti-terrorist operation complied with Article 2(2).530  
Nevertheless, later in its jurisprudence the Court held that Article 2 contains positive 
obligations, such as the obligation to investigate unexplained deaths of those in the 
custody of state officials,531 to take action to prevent persons from being killed by 
private individuals,532 and the obligation to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives 
of those within their jurisdiction.533 As will be discussed now, these positive obligations 
have been to some extent extended into the sphere of healthcare. 
 
6.3 ARTICLE 2 AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE IN GENERAL 
There is a developing jurisprudence of the Court where it considers Article 2 as being 
capable of encompassing obligations on states to provide medical facilities and 
                                                 
528 Article 2(1): Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which 
this penalty is provided by law. 
529 McCann and Others v United Kingdom (1996) 21 E.H.R.R. 97. 
530 Ibid. The Court found that although there was no premeditated plan to kill the suspects, there had 
been a breach of Article 2 of the Convention as the authorities had shown a lack of appropriate care and 
control in carrying out the operation by instructing their soldiers to act on their intelligence assessments 
which failed to account for a possible margin of error and which were, in the event, erroneous. 
531 For example in already mentioned case McCann and Others v United Kingdom (n 529) but also in 
numerous other cases like Ergi vTurkey (2001) 32 E.H.R.R. 18; Ilhan v Turkey (n 376); Akkoc v Turkey 
(2002) 34 E.H.R.R. 51; and Paul and Audrey Edwards v United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 19. 
532 Osman v United Kingdom (n 81). 
533 Budayeva and Others v Russia (n 476). 
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services.534 However, as will be shown through this chapter, the Court has shown great 
reluctance in dealing with the right to healthcare in general. 
The possibility of a duty to provide medical services was first explored by the Court in 
L.C.B. v United Kingdom (already partially analysed in chapter V). Here, the Court did not 
find it established that, given the information available to the State at the relevant time 
concerning the likelihood of the applicant’s father having been exposed to dangerous 
levels of radiation and of this having created a risk to her health, it could have been 
expected for the State to act of its own motion to notify her parents of these matters or 
to take any other special action in relation to her. It followed that there has been no 
violation of Article 2. However, the Court stressed that obligations under Article 2 
require from the state not only to refrain from the intentional or unlawful taking of life, 
but also to take all the appropriate steps to safeguard lives of those within their 
jurisdiction.535 
The next case where health-related issues were raised was Erikson v Italy536 which 
concerned alleged medical malpractice. The applicant complained that his mother’s right 
to life was violated on account of the failure of the Italian authorities to exercise their 
best efforts to identify those responsible for her death and invoked Article 2. The Court 
in its assessment of the case pointed out that:  
“In particular, the positive obligations a State has to protect life under Article 2 of the Convention include 
the requirement for hospitals to have regulations for the protection of their patients’ lives and also the 
obligation to establish an effective judicial system for establishing the cause of a death which occurs in 
hospital and any liability on the part of the medical practitioners concerned.”537 
Nevertheless, the Court found this case manifestly ill-founded and therefore 
inadmissible since it did not disclose any failure by the respondent State to comply with 
the positive obligations imposed by Article 2 of the Convention.  
                                                 
534 Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations… (n 23), 22. 
535 L.C.B.  v United Kingdom (n 471) [36]. See also Roche v United Kingdom (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. 30 where the 
applicant was suffering from health problems as a result of his exposure to toxic chemicals carried out on 
him while he was serving in the British army. He complained that he had been denied proper access to his 
service medical records in breach of Articles 6, 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No.1. As to Article 8, the 
Court found that Article 8 had been breached as there had been a failure to provide an effective and 
accessible procedure that would have allowed the applicant to access relevant and appropriate information 
so that he could then assess the risk caused by the exposure.  
536 Erikson v Italy (2000) 29 E.H.R.R. CD152. 
537 Ibid. 
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In another related case, Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy, the applicants alleged a violation of 
Articles 2 and 6(1) on the ground that owing to procedural delays a time-bar had arisen 
making it impossible to prosecute the doctor responsible for the delivery of their child, 
who had died shortly after birth.538 The Court found Article 2 applicable and repeated 
Article’s 2 principle which puts an obligation on the state to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard lives. Furthermore it, just like in Eriskon, stated the requirements and 
principles that apply in public sphere, namely in hospitals.539 Nevertheless, the Court 
found no violation of Article 2.  
Therefore, states are under an obligation to have regulations under which measures for 
the protection of patients’ lives will be adopted. However, in neither of these cases was 
the issue of providing healthcare in general mentioned by the Court.  
Later on, in Nitecki v Poland540 the applicant complained under Article 2 that the refusal 
to refund the full price of a life-saving drug violated his right to life. In that connection, 
he submitted that he had been making social security contributions for over thirty-seven 
years. The applicant could not afford to pay 30% of the price of the required drug and 
therefore could not follow the prescribed pharmaceutical treatment. Consequently, his 
medical condition deteriorated and his invalidity was assessed at the highest degree. 
Although he was one of only two amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) sufferers in 
Poland who had survived longer than four years, the fact was that inability to follow the 
prescribed pharmaceutical treatment would result in his untimely death. The Court 
referred to the aforementioned statements about the obligations of States parties with 
regard to healthcare measures.541 Although the Court did find this application manifestly 
ill-founded the important thing to mention here is that it attached importance to the fact 
that Poland did in fact refund 70% of the cost of the drug and concluded:  
“Bearing in mind the medical treatment and facilities provided to the applicant, including a refund of the 
greater part of the cost of the required drug, the Court considers that the respondent State cannot be said, 
in the special circumstances of the present case, to have failed to discharge its obligations under Article 2 
by not paying the remaining 30% of the drug price.”542  
                                                 
538 Calvelli and Ciglio v Italy App no 32967/96 (ECtHR, 17 January 2002). 
539 Ibid [49]. 
540 Nitecki v Poland App no 65653/01 (ECtHR Decision, 21 March 2002).  
541 See Erikson v Italy (n 536). 
542 Ibid. 
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Since the Court stressed special circumstances of the case, it could have taken into 
account that for the applicant the amount the state refunded did not make a difference 
since he could not afford even 30% and because of that he has been denied the right to 
healthcare which caused deterioration of his health. However, as it did not do so we can 
only speculate the Court’s judgment and reasoning if the state had not refunded 70 % of 
the drug price.  
Similar circumstances occurred in Pentiacova and Others v Moldova543 where almost all of 
the 49 applicants were suffering from chronic renal failure and consequently they 
needed haemodialysis. They were all disabled on account of their disease and receiving 
state disability allowances. The applicants submitted that before 1997 the expense of 
their haemodialysis was covered entirely by the hospital. Between 1997 and 2004 the 
hospital’s budget was reduced and only strictly necessary procedures and medication 
were provided free to them. From January 2004 the situation became more or less 
identical to that existing before 1997, with the exception of the frequency of 
haemodialysis session. In their application, they complained about the failure of the 
state to provide all the medication necessary for haemodialysis at public expense and 
about the poor state financing of the haemodialysis section of the Spitalul Clinic 
Republican. They also alleged that on account of the insufficient financing some of 
them were forced to have two instead of three haemodialysis sessions per week. 
Accordingly, the applicants argued that their right to life under Article 2 had been 
breached.  
The Court first examined this issue under Article 8 and found it manifestly ill-founded. 
As to the alleged violation of Article 2 it repeated the above expressed principles on the 
state’s duty to take appropriate steps to safeguard lives. The Court furthermore noted 
that the applicants had failed to adduce any evidence that their lives had been put at risk. 
It pointed out that chronic renal failure is a very serious progressive disease with a high 
rate of mortality, not only in Moldova but throughout the world. The fact that a person 
had died of this disease was not, therefore, in itself proof that the death was caused by 
shortcomings in the medical care system. The Court therefore found that the complaint 
under Article 2 was also manifestly ill-founded. However, the Court did not reject the 
idea that the state may be under an obligation to provide healthcare measures but 
                                                 
543 Pentiacova and 48 Others v Moldova (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. SE23. 
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emphasised that there needs to be a direct causal link between the applicants’ deaths and 
the shortcomings in the medical care system in order for a state to be under obligation. 
Another important statement was made by the Court in this case, as well as in the above 
discussed Nitecki case and in one of the rare inter-state cases, Cyprus v Turkey. The Court 
emphasized that:  
“Moreover, an issue may arise under Article 2 where it is shown that the authorities of a Contracting State 
put an individual’s life at risk through the denial of health care which they have undertaken to make 
available to the population generally.”544 
The facts of Cyprus v Turkey are complex and concern numerous claims of violations, 
but regarding healthcare issues it is important to note that the applicant Government 
claimed that the Greek-Cypriots living in the northern part of Cyprus were denied the 
right to avail themselves of medical services in the southern part of Cyprus and that the 
facilities in the north were inadequate. In relation to those allegations the Court took 
note of the fact:  
“..(T)hat the Commission was unable to establish on the evidence that the “TRNC” authorities 
deliberately withheld medical treatment from the population concerned or adopted a practice of delaying 
the processing of requests of patients to receive medical treatment in the south. It observes that during 
the period under consideration medical visits were indeed hampered on account of restrictions imposed 
by the “TRNC” authorities on the movement of the populations concerned and that in certain cases 
delays did occur. However, it has not been established that the lives of any patients were put in danger on 
account of delay in individual cases. It is also to be observed that neither the Greek-Cypriot nor Maronite 
populations were prevented from availing themselves of medical services including hospitals in the north. 
The applicant Government is critical of the level of health care available in the north. However, the Court 
does not consider it necessary to examine in this case the extent to which Article 2 of the Convention may 
impose an obligation on a Contracting State to make available a certain standard of health care”545 
A similar statement was made by the Commission in an admissibility decision from 
1998, Scialacqua v Italy, where the applicant requested a refund from Italian health service 
for his treatment at the herbalist which was helpful for his liver. It stated: 
“However, even assuming that Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention can be interpreted as imposing on 
States the obligation to cover the costs of certain medical treatments or medicines that are essential in 
                                                 
544 Pentiacova and 48 others v Moldova (n 543); Nitecki v Poland (n 540); and Cyprus v Turkey (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 
30 [219]. 
545 Cyprus v Turkey (n 544), [219]. 
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order to save lives, the Commission considers that this provision cannot be interpreted as requiring States 
to provide financial covering for medicines which are not listed as officially recognised medicines.”546 
Both the Court and the Commission leave the question about the minimum level of 
healthcare needed under the Convention open and they do not want to be drawn into 
making a framework or creating standards about a possible minimal level of healthcare. 
The Court strictly emphasized that it does not consider it necessary to examine the 
extent to which Article 2 of the Convention may impose an obligation on states to make 
available a certain standard of healthcare. 
Up to now there have not been any cases brought before the Court raising the issue of a 
necessary minimum of healthcare. According to L. Clements and A. Simmons the Court 
might find a violation of the Convention where there has been a failure to provide basic 
medical care which led to death or some kind of serious injury.547 As an example they 
used a Croatian case reported by the ERRC where a local hospital refused to send an 
emergency medical team to care for a pregnant woman living in a Roma settlement who 
had gone into labour. The child was stillborn when delivered.548 However, the fact is 
that this (or a similar case) never came before the Court so we can only speculate the 
Court’s ruling on the case. 
From the above survey of the case-law, there are some suggestions that the issue of 
providing healthcare may be of relevance, for example, in certain cases in which a state 
may/will be under an obligation to provide healthcare to preserve life under the 
Convention’s Article 2. Still, there is no clear evidence or a judgment which might allow 
us to say with certainty whether the Court is willing to protect the right to a healthcare 
in general under the aegis of Article 2 of the Convention.549 
 
                                                 
546 Scialacqua v Italy (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. CD164 (ECtHR Decision). 
547 Luke Clements and Alan Simmons ‘European Court of Human Rights, Sympathetic Unease’ in 
Langford (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence… (n 29), 418. 
548 Ibid. 
549 The HRC also emphasized the need for positive measures from states. It has pointed out much more 
clearly socio-economic aspect of the right to life than the Court did. “Moreover, the Committee has noted 
that the right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted. The expression "inherent right to life" 
cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States 
adopt positive measures. In this connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for States 
parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in 
adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.” HRC, General Comment No. 6 Article 6 
(Right to life), Sixteenth session, 1982. U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 6 (1994 [5]. 
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6.4 ARTICLE 2 AND THE ISSUE OF HEALTHCARE IN DETENTION 
We have seen in chapter IV that the Court has been willing to consider the right of 
prisoners to healthcare services. There are two further cases where the Court found a 
violation of Article 2 due to the lack of appropriate medical services which were not 
examined in chapter IV. The reason for this is that here the detention conditions or 
Article 3 rights were not an issue at all, therefore no general detention problems were 
raised but they concerned only these particular applicants.  
The first case is Velikova v Bulgaria550  where the applicant’s partner, Mr. Tsonchev, was 
taken into police custody on suspicion of cattle theft. He had consumed alcohol prior to 
his arrest but was in good physical health, with no ailments or visible injuries. Police 
testimony stated that Tsonchev said he was feeling unwell. The physician who was 
called to the station at that time testified that Tsonchev was too drunk to be examined. 
Police testimony then stated that, after vomiting in his cell, Tsonchev was left in the 
hallway where he fell on the floor. At 2 a.m. on the day after his arrival to police 
custody, the same physician arrived again at the station and found Tsonchev dead. A 
forensic expert carried out a post-mortem examination and found the cause of death to 
be an acute loss of blood resulting from large and deep haematomas on the upper limbs 
and the buttocks. Before the Court, the Government was not able to produce any 
documentary records concerning the medical care given to Mr Tonchev. The Court 
found: 
“That there is sufficient evidence on which it may be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that Mr 
Tsonchev died as a result of injuries inflicted while he was in the hands of the police. The responsibility of 
the respondent State is thus engaged. 
The Court also finds that there is no evidence of Mr Tsonchev having been examined with the care one 
would expect from a medical professional at any time while in custody, and suffering from severe 
injuries”551 
It therefore concluded that there has been a violation of Article 2 in respect of the death 
of Mr Tsonchev.  
                                                 
550 Velikova v Bulgaria App no 41488/98 (ECtHR 18 May 2000).  
551 Ibid [74]-[75]. 
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In a subsequent Bulgarian case, Anguelova v Bulgaria,552 the Court again found a breach of 
Article 2 due to the failure of the authorities to provide timely medical care to a 
seriously injured detainee. This case was lodged by the mother of 17-year-old 
Zabchekov. He had been arrested by the police on suspicion of theft and all the 
witnesses were unanimous that he had been in good health prior to the time of his 
arrest, with no visible injuries. No written order for his detention was issued. The 
sergeant on duty stated that he noticed a bruise on Zabchekov’s eyebrow. When the 
sergeant later returned to check on Zabchekov, he noticed that Zabchekov was sleeping 
and shivering, and decided to move him to a warmer office. He also noticed that 
Zabchekov was breathing heavily. A few hours later the officers present at the time of 
his arrest drove to the hospital and returned with a paediatrician, who until then had not 
been given any information regarding Zabchekov’s condition. Zabchekov was found to 
be dead by the time he arrived at the hospital. The Court observed that the officers 
delayed the provision of medical assistance to Mr Zabchekov and that that contributed 
in a decisive manner to the fatal outcome. The Court found that the behaviour of the 
police officers and the lack of any reaction by the authorities constituted a violation of 
the State’s obligation to protect the lives of persons in custody. Therefore, there had 
been a violation of Article 2 of the Convention.553  
In these cases the Court found a violation of Article 2 due to the fact that both the 
injuries and the non-providing of medical treatment were caused directly by a state 
authority. The respective applicants’ partner and son were under the full control of the 
state authority which led the Court to conclude that it was their obligation to provide an 
adequate, timely and satisfactory medical assistance. This maturation of the positive 
obligations remained only in the context of detention. The reason for that is the fact 
that when the persons are under the full control of the state authorities, the Court has 
higher expectations from the authorities regarding the protection of individuals. When it 
comes to providing medical assistance and healthcare for individuals deprived of their 
liberty, the Court has shown willingness in providing judicial protection for those 
individuals. The same principle may apply when people are in hospital which the Court 
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expressed in Erikson decision.554 However, for the individuals that are not deprived of 
their liberty the Court has been much more reluctant in finding a violation.  
 
6.5 ARTICLE 8 AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE 
There is jurisprudence from the Convention’s organs on Article 8 regarding the right to 
healthcare. They have kept the same restraint when deciding the healthcare issues under 
Article 8 as they have under Article 2, until 2011. However, in 2011 the Court delivered 
a judgment, Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania555 in which it, rather surprisingly, 
found a state to be in violation of Article 8 for not introducing general and preventive 
measures for protecting the applicant’s health. Besides this judgment there are two 
decisions, one adopted by the Court and another by the Commission, which are relevant 
for this thesis. 
The first one is an admissibility decision made by the Commission, Passannate v Italy.556 
Here, the applicant complained that she had to wait about five months in order merely 
to book a specialist’s visit in an Italian public hospital while she would have been able to 
see the same specialist in the same hospital within only four days if she had been able to 
pay 150,000 Italian lire. The Commission stated:  
“The Commission notes the Italian public health service is based on compulsory contributions which 
entitle those who pay them to certain services, among which medical examinations within public 
hospitals. 
Therefore, the Commission considers that, in such circumstances where the State has an obligation to 
provide medical care, an excessive delay of the public health service in providing a medical service to 
which the patient is entitled and the fact that such delay has, or is likely to have, a serious impact on the 
patient's health could raise an issue under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.”557 
However, in this case the applicant did not prove nor even allege that the above delay 
had a serious impact on her physical or psychological conditions and the Commission 
found the application manifestly ill-founded. Again, like as the Article 2 case Pentiacova 
and 48 Others v Moldova, the lack of causal link was the reason for dismissing the case. 
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In a later case, Sentges v Netherlands,558 the Court decided that positive duties under Article 
8 did not extend to the state's obligation to provide a severely disabled person with a 
robotic arm. The applicant, who was represented by his mother, suffered from 
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD), a disease characterised by progressive muscle 
degeneration, loss of the ability to walk and often the loss of lung or cardiac functions. 
There is currently no known cure for DMD and most affected people survive into their 
twenties. The applicant was unable to stand, walk or lift his arms, and his manual and 
digital functions were virtually absent. He had to use an electric wheelchair to move 
about, both outside the home and at school. On 20 July 1999 the applicant's parents 
requested their health insurance fund to provide him with a “MANUS Manipulator”, a 
robotic arm specifically designed to be mounted on electric wheelchairs in order to give 
disabled people more autonomy in handling objects in their environment. It was 
predicted that after being provided with the robotic arm, the applicant’s dependence on 
the constant presence of carers would be reduced by at least one to three hours a day. 
The health insurance fund rejected the request for the reason that the provision of a 
robotic arm was not covered by any social insurance scheme. The parents’ various 
appeals against this decision all failed. The applicant submitted that refusal of his request 
to be provided with a robotic arm infringed his right to respect for his private life, as 
guaranteed by Article 8. The Court rejected his complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It 
stated that:  
“Even assuming that in the present case such a special link indeed exists – as was accepted by the Central 
Appeals Tribunal –, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole and to the wide margin of appreciation 
enjoyed by States in this respect in determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
Convention (see Zehnalovà and Zehnal, cited above). 
This margin of appreciation is even wider when, as in the present case, the issues involve an assessment of 
the priorities in the context of the allocation of limited State resources (see, mutatis mutandis, Osman v. the 
United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports 1998-VIII, p. 3159, § 116, O’Reilly and Others v. 
Ireland (dec.), no. 54725/00, 28 February 2002, unreported). In view of their familiarity with the demands 
made on the health care system as well as with the funds available to meet those demands, the national 
authorities are in a better position to carry out this assessment than an international court. In addition, the 
Court should also be mindful of the fact that, while it will apply the Convention to the concrete facts of 
this particular case in accordance with Article 34, a decision issued in an individual case will nevertheless 
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at least to some extent establish a precedent (see Pretty, cited above, § 75), valid for all Contracting 
States.”559 
Here, unlike in Passannate the Court recognised the existence of a causal link, however it 
invoked the state’s margin of appreciation. The Court emphasized that the applicant had 
access to the primary, basic healthcare and every aspect of healthcare that goes beyond 
that basic standard was within the state’s margin of appreciation. It is also interesting to 
mention that the Court invoked the possibility of this case establishing a precedent 
which would, had the Court found a violation, extend the scope of Article 8 into 
healthcare rights. Again, limited state resources were, unlike in the detention conditions 
cases, of importance when deciding whether a violation occurred.  
Therefore, when it comes to Article 8 and the right to healthcare the Court largely relied 
on the state’s margin of appreciation when it came to every issue beyond the basic 
healthcare leaving to states to arrange their healthcare system in accordance with the 
available state resources. We can assume that it was exactly because of the scarcity of 
state resources. 
However, in the Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania case the Court narrowed the 
state’s margin of appreciation when it comes to preventive healthcare measures and 
invoked the doctrine of effectiveness. This case is conceptually different from the 
Passannate and Sentges cases since those two cases were concerned with the provision of 
healthcare, whereas in Stoicescu, the thrust of the complaint is that the state was the cause 
of the applicant’s medical condition. The case concerned the Bucharest authorities’ 
failure to protect a 71-year-old woman, who was left disabled after being attacked by a 
pack of stray dogs. At the relevant time, the large numbers of stray dogs in Romanian 
cities was already a public health and safety issue. Relying in particular on Article 8, Ms 
Stoicescu (who later during the proceedings died so her husband continued with the 
application) complained that she had been attacked by a pack of stray dogs because the 
local authorities had failed to take adequate measures to control stray dogs in Bucharest.  
The Court, in its assessment first invoked positive obligations inherent in Article 8.560 It 
went on by emphasizing that positive obligations to adopt appropriate measures must 
be interpreted in a way that does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden 
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on the authorities However, it stressed that the authorities had broad and detailed 
information on the large number of stray dogs in the city of Bucharest and the danger 
they represented to the physical integrity and health of the population. The Court agreed 
with the Romanian Government that responsibility for the general situation of stray 
dogs in Romania also lies with civil society and it was not for the Court to determine the 
best policy for dealing with such public safety problems. Nevertheless, the Court found 
that the lack of sufficient measures taken by the authorities in addressing the issue of 
stray dogs in the particular circumstances of the case, combined with their failure to 
provide appropriate redress to the applicant as a result of the injuries sustained, 
amounted to a breach of the state’s positive obligations under Article 8 to secure respect 
for the applicant’s private life. Therefore, there has been a violation of Article 8.  
This judgment was reached with only one dissenting opinion. Judge López Guerra 
emphasized one very important point: 
“In the present case it is obvious that the authorities had no knowledge of the existence of a real and 
immediate, individual risk to the applicant, but were aware of a general situation of risk that might affect 
citizens in general, rather than only (and specifically) this individual applicant. According to the Court’s 
case-law, it is certainly justified to require the member State authorities to take action to prevent probable 
and immediate risks with respect to rights guaranteed under the Convention that affect specific and 
identified persons. But I do not deem warranted the present extension of this principle to demand that 
authorities adopt all necessary measures to protect all people from all forms of danger in general. The 
public powers are required to meet practically unlimited needs with inevitably limited means. They must 
provide vital services such as clean water, sewer systems, waste disposal, health care, traffic safety and 
public safety, among many others. And the number of victims of the faulty delivery of those services may 
be considerable. But it is the competent authorities of each country and not this Court who must establish 
priorities and determine preferences when allocating efforts and resources.”561 
I agree with this viewpoint. This case is about the state’s obligation to take general and 
preventive measures that concern not only this applicant but the population in general. 
It concerns the issue of the protection of health since the Court found that the failure of 
the authorities to adopt general preventive measures concerning stray dogs violated the 
applicant’s right under Article 8. The Court entered into clearly economic issues, stating 
where the national authorities should allocate their resources. Furthermore, even though 
this judgment concerns one individual, from the judgment is visible that it also concerns 
the population in general since there was a lack of general, preventive state measures 
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that led to finding a violation. Also, in 2000 some 22,000 persons had received medical 
care following attacks by stray dogs and from the beginning of 2001 more than 6,000 
persons had been bitten by stray dogs.562 It is clear that this judgment has numerous 
socio-economic elements on the state. The CoM is currently waiting an action plan from 
Romanian authorities regarding the execution of judgment.  
As we can see, the Court has up until 2011 refrained from entering the healthcare 
sphere since it concerns allocation of national resources and left these with this issues 
wide margin of appreciation to states. However, with the Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu it 
went one step further, finding a state to be in violation of an individual right by not 
introducing preventive, general measures that include allocating national, already scarce, 
resources. 
 
6.6 ARTICLE 3 DEPORTATION CASES IN THE HEALTHCARE 
CONTEXT 
The deportation cases where the applicants invoked violation of Article 3 because of the 
lack of satisfactory (or any) healthcare in the countries where they were supposed to be 
deported are connected with the right to healthcare. What is interesting is that one of 
the first deportation cases regarding healthcare related issues suggested that the Court 
would be willing to deal with the health and healthcare rights.563 Although in this case 
the circumstances were special and dealt with the concept of inhuman and degrading 
treatment, this case is worth mentioning since it gave interesting indicators to the 
interpreters of the Convention. However, those indicators were later rejected by the 
Court. Moreover, following this judgment, a number of decisions of the Court sought to 
distinguish this case.  
The facts of D. v United Kingdom are as follows. D., a national of St Kitts, was found in 
possession of a substantial amount of cocaine upon his arrival in the UK and was 
convicted of illegally importing a controlled drug and sentenced to six years' 
imprisonment. By the time he was released, D. was in the advanced stages of AIDS and 
was provided with accommodation and care by a UK charity, as well as receiving 
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medical treatment for his condition. The immigration authorities ordered D.’s removal 
to St Kitts and his application for judicial review of that decision and subsequent appeal 
were dismissed. D. applied to the Court, contending that his removal would breach 
Article 3, as he would not receive adequate medical treatment and had no family in St 
Kitts who could care for him. The Court in its assessment of the situation concluded:  
“Aside from these situations and given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention 
system, the Court must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to address the application of that Article in 
other contexts which might arise. It is not therefore prevented from scrutinising an applicant’s claim 
under Article 3 where the source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving country stems from 
factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly the responsibility of the public authorities of that 
country, or which, taken alone, do not in themselves infringe the standards of that Article. To limit the 
application of Article 3 in this manner would be to undermine the absolute character of its protection.”564 
“Against this background the Court emphasises that aliens who have served their prison sentences and 
are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a 
Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance 
provided by the expelling State during their stay in prison. 
However, in the very exceptional circumstances of this case and given the compelling humanitarian 
considerations at stake, it must be concluded that the implementation of the decision to remove the 
applicant would be a violation of Article 3.”565 
Although the Court stressed that the notion of inhuman treatment had a specific 
meaning due to the very exceptional circumstances of the case and that entitlement to 
care and treatment could not in principle be invoked, to many future applicants (and 
interpreters of the Convention) this judgment looked as if it opened a space for 
invoking a right to a healthcare treatment under the Convention.566 However, in none of 
the later cases did the Court find the circumstances were so exceptional that the 
decision to remove the applicant would be a violation of Article 3. It is clear that the D. 
judgment has not established Article 3 as promoting a general right to medical care for 
individuals facing expulsion from the state. What D. v UK represents is a single case and 
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it did not establish a minimum core right to treatment of dying patients without anyone 
to take care of them, or even less a precedent,567 as one might have expected.  
For example, in a later case N. v the United Kingdom568 the applicant (N.), a HIV positive 
Ugandan national, complained, in particular, that if she were returned to Uganda she 
would not have access to the medical treatment she required. In this case N., following 
her entry into the UK, had been diagnosed as HIV positive. She had developed AIDS 
defining illnesses. Her condition stabilised upon receipt of medication and access to 
medical facilities in the UK. The secretary of state, after rejecting N.’s asylum claim, 
dismissed her claim under Article 3 on the basis that all major anti-viral drugs were 
available in Uganda at highly subsidised prices and that the treatment of AIDS in 
Uganda was comparable to any other African country. N. argued that, given her illness 
and the lack of freely available medical treatment, social support or nursing care in 
Uganda, her removal there would cause acute physical and mental suffering, followed by 
an early death, in breach of Article 3. As we can see, the facts are quite similar to D. v 
UK. However, the Court said: 
“The Court does not exclude that there may be other very exceptional cases where the humanitarian 
considerations are equally compelling. However, it considers that it should maintain the high threshold set 
in D. v United Kingdom and applied in its subsequent case law, which it regards as correct in principle, given 
that in such cases the alleged future harm would emanate not from the intentional acts or omissions of 
public authorities or non-state bodies, but instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of 
sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country.”569    
If the above statement is the principle, then even D. would not have succeeded. D. 
alleged the same harm as N. which would arise out of the lack of medical services in 
case of deportation to a home country. However, as we know, D. succeeded in his 
application, despite the principle proclaimed by the Court in N. v UK where it found no 
violation of Article 3. Another interesting issue was pointed out by the Court in this 
case:  
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 “Although many of the rights it contains have implications of a social or economic nature, the 
Convention is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political rights. Furthermore, inherent in 
the whole of the Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights. Advances in 
medical science, together with social and economic differences between countries, entail that the level of 
treatment available in the contracting state and the country of origin may vary considerably. While it is 
necessary, given the fundamental importance of Art.3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a 
degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases, Art.3 does not place an obligation on 
the contracting state to alleviate such disparities through the provision of free and unlimited health care to 
all aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding to the contrary would place too great a 
burden on the contracting states.” 
The Court stressed that there are significant social and economic differences between 
countries and that even though Article 3 is of fundamental importance, putting an 
obligation to the state to provide free and unlimited healthcare to all aliens would place 
too great burden on the states. The Court’s concern regarding the financial burden that 
will be placed on states is clearly expressed. This wording is coming from the same 
Court that considered detention conditions and Article 3, stating:  
“…when considering the material conditions in which the applicant was detained and the activities 
offered to him, that Ukraine encountered serious socio-economic problems in the course of its systemic 
transition and that prior to the summer of 1998 the prison authorities were both struggling under difficult 
economic conditions and occupied with the implementation of new national legislation and related 
regulations. However, the Court observes that lack of resources cannot in principle justify prison 
conditions which are so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention. Moreover, the economic problems faced by Ukraine cannot in any event explain or excuse 
the particular conditions of detention which it has found in paragraph 145 to be unacceptable in the 
present case.”570 
Both of the two quoted cases have strong economic and social elements and if the 
Court finds a violation of Article 3 it places a strong financial burden on the state. Even 
more, one might expect that there are and will be fewer aliens looking for protection of 
their health from the state than detainees requiring detention conditions and healthcare 
in prisons of a certain standard. So, why did the Court decide to continue in its findings 
of violation of Article 3 based on poor detention conditions but when it came to the 
right to healthcare of aliens it decided to stop after one judgment? One can only 
speculate. Maybe, with the right to healthcare for aliens the Court became worried about 
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the consequences of those judgments in terms of heightening expectations to provide 
the right to a healthcare in general, i.e. to the population in general. Maybe the fact that 
the victims in these cases are foreigners and not citizens of the respondent State also 
had influence on the Court. Also, with the detention conditions the Court was and still 
is very much influenced by the work of the CPT and the CPT findings are of great help 
to the Court when deciding whether a violation occurred. In the deportation cases there 
is also a difficulty in assessing standards of healthcare in non-European states which 
might be another reason for the Court’s reluctance. As said, one can only speculate.  
But, what we might conclude is that the doctrine of the indivisibility of civil and political 
and economic and social rights has been used by the Court on a somewhat discretionary 
basis. The Court has in the cases concerning detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons as well as in the cases concerning the right to a healthy environment decided to 
very much rely on the living instrument and the dynamic interpretation doctrines, while 
in the issue of healthcare in general it has been much more cautious and allowed to 
states a wide margin of appreciation which, together with the need to ration scarce 
resources, has been used as an explanation for its reluctance.  
Now, the right to protection of health as interpreted by the ESCR under the ESC will 
be presented. This is to show that despite the notion of indivisibility which is strongly 
supported in theory, the practice shows us that the protection of economic and social 
rights is still better when left to the ESC organs then to the ECHR ones.  
 
 
6.7 EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER AND THE RIGHT TO THE 
PROTECTION OF HEALTH 
Article 11 of the Revised ESC states: 
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to protection of health, the Parties undertake, 
either directly or in cooperation with public or private organisations, to take appropriate measures 
designed inter alia: 
1. to remove as far as possible the causes of ill-health; 
2. to provide advisory and educational facilities for the promotion of health and the 
encouragement of individual responsibility in matters of health; 
 162 
3. to prevent as far as possible epidemic, endemic and other diseases, as well as accidents.571  
In chapter V the Information document prepared by the secretariat of the ESC in 
March 2009 on health promotion and prevention regarding the right to a healthy 
environment was presented. In this document numerous issues relating to public health 
as protected under Article 11, such as food safety, vaccination programmes and 
alcoholism are also analysed. Also, it makes reference to the other ESC articles related 
to the right to health, namely, Article 3 which concerns health and safety at work; 
Articles 7 and 17 which concern the health and wellbeing of children and young 
persons; Articles 8 and 17 which concern the health of pregnant women and Article 23 
which deals with the health of elderly persons.572 
As to the healthcare issues the Information document states: 
“The system of health care must be accessible to the entire population. To that end, states should take as 
their main criterion for judging the success of health system reforms effective access to health care for all, 
without discrimination, as a basic human right. 
The right to access to health care implies: 
- that the cost of health care should be borne, at least in part, by the community as a whole; 
- that health costs should not place an excessive financial burden on individuals. Steps must therefore be 
taken to reduce the financial burden on patients from the most disadvantaged sections of the population; 
- that arrangements for such access must not lead to unnecessary delays in its provision. Access to 
treatment should notably be based on transparent criteria, agreed at national level, that address the risk of 
deterioration both in clinical and quality of life terms; 
– the number of health care professionals and equipment must be adequate (the criterion is 3 beds per 
thousand population).”573 
The document itself is intended to be used as guidance for State parties as it points out 
what is expected from states under the Charter provisions that deal with the right to 
healthcare. The Information document is based on the conclusions adopted by the 
ECSR through its Reporting system over the years and it might be said to represent a 
summary of the ECSR conclusions in the healthcare issues.  
                                                 
571 In the Original ESC there is no mention of accidents. 
572 The right to health and the European Social Charter (n 499).  
573 Ibid, 10-11. 
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The ECSR interpreted and made observations regarding Article 11 not only in its 
conclusions but also through its decisions in the Collective Complaints procedure. Both 
the ECSR conclusions and decisions concerning the right to health will now be 
discussed.  
 
6.8 THE REPORTING PROCEDURE AND ARTICLE 11 OF THE ESC 
Under the Reporting procedure every year States parties submit a report indicating how 
they implement the Charter in law and in practice. Each report concerns some of the 
accepted provisions of the Charter. The provisions are divided into four thematic 
groups and each provision of the Charter is reported on once every four years. As to the 
Article 11 of the ESC it is a ‘non-core’ right, but all the states that have accepted it are 
under the ECSR authority regarding obligations as set out under Article 11. Some 
conclusions adopted by the ECSR regarding the right to health will now be presented.  
In the introduction to its Conclusions XVII- 2 from 2005 (Volume 1) the ECSR made 
the following general observation regarding Article 11 of the (Original) Charter: 
“The Committee notes that the right to protection of health guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter 
complements Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights - as interpreted by the 
European Court of Human Rights - by imposing a range of positive obligations designed to secure its 
effective exercise. This normative partnership between the two instruments is underscored by the 
Committee’s emphasis on human dignity. In Collective Complaint FIDH v. France (No. 14/2003) it 
stated that "human dignity is the fundamental value and indeed the core of positive European human 
rights law – whether under the European Social Charter or under the European Convention of Human 
Rights and [that] health care is a prerequisite for the preservation of human dignity. 
In assessing whether the right to protection of health can be effectively exercised, the Committee pays 
particular attention to the situation of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. Hence, it considers that any 
restrictions on this right must not be interpreted in such a way as to impede the effective exercise by these 
groups of the right to protection of health. 
… 
The Committee notes that this approach calls for an exacting interpretation of the way the personal scope 
of the Charter is applied in conjunction with Article 11 on the right to protection of health, particularly 
with its first paragraph on access to health care. In this respect, it recalls that it clarified the application of 
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the Charter's personal scope in its general introduction to Conclusions XVII-1 and 2004 (pp. 9-10; see 
also the general introduction to Conclusions XVI-1 and 2002). 
… 
Finally, the management of waiting lists and waiting times in health care, which the Committee examines 
by paying particular attention to the issues of discrimination and emergency situations and in the light of 
the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R (99) 21 on criteria for the 
management for waiting lists and waiting times in health care, and health education in schools are crucial 
for assessing the conformity of national situations with Articles 11§1 and 11§2 respectively.”574 
As we have seen, the Court similarly made statements on the necessity of having a 
healthcare system available to everyone without discrimination; however, the ECSR 
expressed this obligation with additional explanations and more clarity.   
In assessing the state’s compliance with Article 11(1) in Conclusions from 2009 
concerning Articles 3 and 11 of the Revised Charter in respect of Albania, the ECSR 
found Albania to be in non-conformity. The ECSR pointed out regarding general 
indicators of the state of health of the population: “To comply with Article 11(1), the 
main indicators of a country’s state of health must reflect an improvement and not be 
too significantly below the average for all European countries.”575 It also paid close 
attention to life expectancy and the principal causes of death, infant and maternal 
mortality and the healthcare system (access to healthcare, healthcare professionals and 
facilities).576  
Regarding Article 11(2) the same ECSR Conclusions will be looked at, but on 
Belgium.577 The ECSR examined various spheres of Article 11(2) on advisory and 
educational facilities, such as encouraging individual responsibility through public 
information and awareness-raising, health education in schools; counselling and 
screening to the population in general and then specifically pregnant women, children 
and young people. On Belgium the ECSR decided to defer its conclusion until receiving 
the information requested on the above mentioned issues.  
We can look at two more conclusions on Hungary and Iceland. Conclusions XIX-2 on 
Article 11(1) concerning the situation in Hungary are on the right to protection of 
                                                 
574 ECSR Conclusions XVII- 2, Volume 1 (n 104), 10-11. 
575 ECSR Conclusions 2009- Volume 1 (n 519), 27. 
576 Ibid, 27-30. 
577 Ibid, 123-125. 
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health on the removal of the causes of ill-health. On the issue of life expectancy and 
principal causes of death the ECSR considered it has not been established that measures 
taken to reduce the mortality rate are adequate. Therefore it did not find the situation in 
Hungary in conformity with Article 11(1) of the Charter. On the issues of infant and 
maternal mortality as well as access to healthcare Hungary is placed among the average 
for European countries. Finally, on healthcare professional and facilities the ECSR 
concluded that the situation in Hungary is not in conformity with Article 11(1) of the 
Charter because there is nothing in the report to show that sufficient measures have 
been taken to reduce the mortality rate.578 On the same issues and in the same 
Conclusions, Iceland was found to be in conformity with Article 11(1) since the life 
expectancy is above the European average,579 infant mortality dropped and maternal 
mortality was zero during the reference period. As for the issue of access to healthcare 
and healthcare professional and facilities the ECSR also found Iceland to be in 
conformity with the Charter.580  
Therefore, the ECSR has developed a general approach in assessing the compliance of 
states with the right to health as well as the particular interpretation of each paragraph 
of Article 11. It started its interpretation in its first cycle of conclusions on Article 11 
and up to July 2012 the ECSR has assessed numerous national reports and set out 
standards in providing the right to health as required under Article 11 of the Charter. In 
its 2009 Conclusions on Article 11(1) and 11(2) of the Revised Charter, the ECSR found 
ten out of twenty three states that have accepted Article 11(1) to be in conformity with 
it, while regarding Article 11(2) it found eleven out of twenty three states that have 
accepted it to be in conformity.581 In the 2009 Conclusions but on the Original Charter 
the ECSR found nine out of fifteen states that have accepted Article 11(1) to be in 
conformity with it, while regarding Article 11(2) it found eight out of fifteen states to be 
in conformity. 582 Generally, the conclusions are very detailed and the ECSR analyses 
                                                 
578 ECSR, Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (n 520), 247-249. 
579 In 2006 it was 79 years for males and 83 years for females compared to an EU average (2004) of 75.2 
years for males and 81.5 years for females. 
580 ECSR Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (n 520), 272-273. 
581 States that are found to be in conformity with Article 11(1) of the Revised ESC are: Belgium, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden.  States that are found to 
be in conformity with the Article 11(2) of the Revised ESC are: Andorra, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia and Sweden. See ECSR Conclusions 2009- Volume 
1 (n 518), 16. 
582 States that are found to be in conformity with Article 11(1) of the Original ESC are: Austria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Luxemburg, The Former Yugoslavian Republic of 
Macedonia and United Kingdom. States that are found to be in conformity with Article 11(2) of the 
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every aspect of the right to health in accordance with its interpretation of every 
paragraph. 
As with the reports on the right to a healthy environment, one of the problems in the 
Reporting system is the amount of information the ECSR requires from states in order 
for it to reach a conclusion whether the state is in conformity or in non-conformity with 
Article 11(1) and Article 11(2) requirements. For that reasons, it on several occasions 
decided to defer its conclusion, for example in 2009 Conclusions on the Revised 
Charter it decided to defer its conclusions on Article 11(1) regarding three states while 
on Article 11(2) regarding six states.583 As to the Original Charter’s Articles 11(1) in 
2009 it deferred its conclusions on Greece, Poland and Spain, while regarding Article 
11(2) it did so on Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Spain and “The former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia”.584  Again it is evident that the more information the ECSR requires State 
parties to provide for it to be able to make a judgment about their compliance, the more 
difficult it becomes for it to make a definite judgment about compliance. 
Unfortunately, again just like with Article 11(3) concerning the right to a healthy 
environment, the biggest defect within the Reporting system is the CoM follow up 
procedure, or the lack thereof. Despite very detailed ECSR conclusions on the 
healthcare rights, the CoM has to date only issued two recommendations, both 
concerning Turkey.585 Not only does the CoM rarely issue recommendations, but even 
the adopted recommendations are very mild and brief. It only stated that it recommends 
that the Government of Turkey takes account, in an appropriate manner, of the 
negative conclusions and requested information from Turkey in its next report on the 
measures it has taken to this effect.586 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Original ESC are: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Luxemburg, Poland and United 
Kingdom. See ECSR Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (n 520), 16. 
583 The ECSR decided to defer its conclusions on Article 11(1) of the Revised ESC on: Andorra, Cyprus 
and Ukraine whiled regarding Article 11(2) of the Revised ESC it decided to defer its conclusions on: 
Azerbaijan, Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Portugal and Ukraine. See ECSR Conclusions 2009- Volume 1 (n 
518), 16. 
584 ECSR Conclusions XIX-2 (2009) (n 520), 16. 
585 Recommendation no. R ChS (98) 4 on the application of the European Social Charter by Turkey (n 
266); and Recommendation no. R ChS (2002) 1 on the application of the European Social Charter by 
Turkey during the year 1995-1998 (15th supervision cycle, part II) on Article 11-1 of the Original ESC. 
586 Ibid. 
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6.9 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE 
The ECSR has up to May 2012 dealt with eight collective complaints and delivered four 
decisions on the merits.587 Since the Marangopoulos complaint was discussed in the 
previous chapter it will not be discussed again in this chapter. Giving an in-depth 
analysis of all collective complaints on the right to health is not relevant for this thesis, 
since the main point, to show how the ECSR operates and deals with the claims of 
violation, can be shown without discussing all the complaints. The complaint discussed 
here will be ERRC v Bulgaria588 as it consists of the best and most comprehensive 
presentation of the ECSR approach towards the right to health. But first two other 
cases will be discussed briefly.  
In the International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v 
Croatia589 INTERIGHTS alleged that Croatia is not in conformity with Articles 
11(2), and 16 taken alone and in the light of the non-discrimination clause in the 
Preamble; nor with Article 17 of the ESC, because Croatian schools do not provide 
comprehensive or adequate sexual and reproductive health education for children and 
young people. Since education materials used in Croatian school contained some 
discriminatory statements the ECSR held that such statements contained in educational 
material used in the ordinary curriculum constitutes a violation of Article 11(2) in light 
of the non-discrimination clause.590 
As to the complaint brought to the ECSR by the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) v 
France,  the CGT asked the ECSR to rule that the provisions of Act No. 2003-47 of 17 
January 2003 on wages, working time and employment development, referred to as 
“Fillon II”, and specifically those of Article 2 A. II, III and VIII and of Article 3, fail to 
comply with Articles 2(1) and (5), 3(1) and 11(1) and (3) of the Revised Charter. 
However, the ECSR in this case did not pay particular attention to Article 11 of the 
Charter since the CGT did not claim a sole violation of Article 11 but only in 
                                                 
587 Confédération générale du travail (CGT) v France (22/2003), (decision on the merits of 7 December 2004); 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) v Greece (n 103); International Centre for the Legal Protection 
of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v Croatia (45/2007), (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. SE13; ERRC v Bulgaria 
(46/2007), (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. SE2; Defence for Children International (DCI) v the Netherlands (47/2008), 
(2010) 51 E.H.R.R. SE14; Medecins du Monde- International v France (67/2011), decision on admissibility of 
13 September 2011; Defence for Children International (DCI) v Belgium (69/2011), decision on admissibility of 
7 December 2011; International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) v Greece (n 501). 
588 ERRC v Bulgaria (n 587). 
589 International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v Croatia (n 587). 
590 Ibid [43]-[66]. 
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conjunction with Article 2(1) and (5). The ECSR in its conclusions only found violation 
of Article 2(1).  
The ERRC v Bulgaria case concerns the rights of Roma to healthcare, health insurance, 
exemption of payment of healthcare contributions for persons receiving social 
assistance, the living environment of Roma, access of Roma to healthcare services and 
measures to address health problems of Roma in Bulgaria. In this case, the ERRC 
claimed violations of Article 11, Article 13 and of Article E on non-discrimination, while 
the Government considered that the relevant legislation guaranteed equal access to 
health insurance for all citizens and that it had taken sufficient positive measures for the 
improvement of the health status of the Roma.  
The right to healthcare in Bulgaria is based on a system of compulsory health insurance 
through the collection of healthcare contributions. Persons who perform their 
obligations related to the payment of health contributions have access to medical care 
and a whole range of medical services. There is, however, a patient participation fee for 
each visit to a physician or each day of hospital treatment. Coverage under the 
contributory healthcare scheme is possible on a “non-contributory” basis for certain 
categories of socially vulnerable persons, namely persons entitled to social assistance, 
targeted assistance for heating or unemployment benefits, who are exempted from 
paying healthcare contributions, and can also obtain an exemption or reduction of the 
patient participation fee. Finally, there is a health scheme funded by taxes which 
provides benefits in kind, other than those provided by the contributions funded 
scheme, to all residents irrespective of their health insurance status. This ensures 
medical aid in emergency cases and another range of minimum medical services.591  
In its assessment of the parties’ submissions regarding the alleged legal restrictions on 
access to health insurance and medical assistance for socially vulnerable individuals, the 
alleged systemic barriers for the effective exercise of the right to health protection and 
the alleged discrimination against Roma in the provision of medical services, the ECSR 
concluded as follows. In respect of ERRC’s complaint that healthcare legislation 
excludes Roma from access to healthcare, the ECSR considered that none of the 
relevant statutory provisions examined can be deemed to be discriminatory on the 
grounds of ethnicity. The ECSR considered that a health insurance system based on the 
                                                 
591 ERRC v Bulgaria (n 587) [18]. 
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collection of healthcare contributions, as is the case in Bulgaria, met the requirements of 
the Revised Charter, given that there also existed a subsidiary “non-contributory” 
system, open to persons who did not benefit from the contributory system and which 
ensured them sufficient coverage, not only in situations of emergency or a threat to 
life.592 Furthermore, the ECSR observed that exemption from paying healthcare 
contributions for persons receiving social assistance, targeted assistance for heating or 
unemployment benefits – who are entitled to state-subsidised health insurance - ensured 
that some of the most disadvantaged sections of the community had access to 
healthcare.593 However, regarding the situation of persons who did not qualify for social 
assistance or who had temporarily lost the right to social assistance, the ECSR noted 
that such persons were left without health coverage during the period that social 
assistance was interrupted, given that the Health Insurance Act links eligibility for “non-
contributory” state health coverage to being a recipient of social assistance benefits.  
The main issue was for the ECSR to assess what medical services were available to 
persons who had lost social insurance and who required medical care, namely the access 
of Roma to healthcare services.594 
The ECSR concluded: 
“The Committee recalls that Article 11 of the Charter imposes a range of positive obligations to ensure an 
effective exercise of the right to health, and the Committee assesses compliance with this provision paying 
particular attention to the situation of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups (Conclusions XVII-2 – 
General Introduction). 
… 
The Committee considers there is sufficient evidence which shows that Roma communities do not live in 
healthy environments. This situation can in part be attributed to the failure of prevention policies by the 
State, for instance the lack of protective measures to guarantee clean water in Romani neighbourhoods, as 
well as the inadequacy of measures to ensure public health standards in housing in such neighbourhoods 
(see European Roma Rights Centre v. Bulgaria, Complaint No. 31/2005, decision on the merits of 18 
October 2006)… In connection with the measures taken by the authorities as regards health education, 
health counselling and screening for the Roma population, the Committee notes that some programmes 
recently put in place – such as the establishment of health mediators - may have a positive impact on 
                                                 
592 Ibid [40] and [41]. 
593 Ibid [42]. 
594 Ibid [43]. 
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improving Roma access to health care. However, it considers that there has been a lack of systematic, 
long-term government measures to promote health awareness. 
The Committee also notes from various studies referred to by the ERRC in the complaint that the health 
status of Roma is inferior to that of the general population. The Government acknowledges in its 
submissions that the health condition of Roma is poor, and refers to the adoption of a “Health Strategy 
Concerning People in Disadvantaged Position Belonging to Ethnic Minorities” with a view to improving 
their health condition. The Committee nevertheless considers that the State has failed to meet its positive 
obligations to ensure that Roma enjoy an adequate access to health care, in particular by failing to take 
reasonable steps to address the specific problems faced by Roma communities stemming from their often 
unhealthy living conditions and difficult access to health services.  
… 
The Committee therefore holds that the failure of the authorities to take appropriate measures to address 
the exclusion, marginalisation and environmental hazards which Romani communities are exposed to in 
Bulgaria, as well as the problems encountered by many Roma in accessing health care services, constitute 
a breach of Article 11§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Revised Charter in conjunction with Article E.”595 
As we can see, the ECSR found a violation of all Article 11 paragraphs together with 
Article E of the ESC. It emphasized that Article 11 imposes a range of positive 
obligations and that regarding the Roma community in Bulgaria the national authorities 
had not complied with the requirements set out in Articles 11 and E of the ESC. The 
ECSR analysed the situation in detail together with all the particularities concerning the 
Roma population in comparison to the population in general.  
Following the ECSR’s decision, the CoM adopted a Resolution in which it, on the basis 
of information provided by the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria, it welcomed the 
measures already taken by the Bulgarian authorities to bring the situation into 
conformity with the standards of the Charter regarding the provision of healthcare to all 
persons who might need it, irrespective of their origin or social condition, and stated 
that it looks forward to Bulgaria reporting that, at the time of the submission of the next 
report concerning the relevant provisions of the ESC, the situation has been brought 
into full conformity.596 
                                                 
595 Ibid [45]-[51]. 
596 Resolution CM/ResChS(2010)1 on the Collective complaint No. 46/2007 by the European Roma 
Rights Centre (ERRC) against Bulgaria, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 March 2010 at the 
1081st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
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Therefore, the situation in Bulgaria has improved from December 2008, when the 
decision on the merits was adopted, to March 2010 when the CoM adopted its 
Resolution. If we compare this with the time it takes for the Court’s judgments to be 
executed it does not seem as if the ESC is a less effective mechanism for human rights 
protection then the ECHR. I am not trying here to reach a final conclusion based on 
one single collective complaint; however, through the years of the Reporting system and 
after looking at the Convention system in healthcare issues, it looks as if within the CoE 
healthcare issues should be left to the ESC mechanism and bodies to deal with, 
especially nowadays when the Collective Complaint system is gaining in importance and 
the number of collective complaints is increasing. 
Again, the CoM is rather bland in its Resolution and it took almost two years for it to 
adopt a Resolution. Unfortunately, the pressure it puts on states through the 
Convention system is also mild and with the same time distance. Therefore, the fact that 
the Court delivered a judgment will not make a difference in terms of the CoM political 
pressure on states.  
 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
The reason for giving an in-depth analysis of the ERRC v Bulgaria is that it provided us 
with the claims of violations of all aspects of the right to health as guaranteed under 
Article 11. By looking at this decision on the merits we can see the ECSR working 
methods when deciding whether a violation of Article 11 occurred within the Collective 
Complaints system. The way the ECSR deals with the heathcare complaints is, in my 
opinion, another argument against the Court’s involvement in protection of economic 
and social rights, that is, in rights with significant socio-economic elements.  Even more 
importantly, the execution of the ECSR decisions and of the Court judgments dealing 
with the rights with significant socio-economic elements is quite similar. Although the 
Court has not dealt with the right to health, at least not as much as with the right to a 
healthy environment and with the right to healthcare in detention, it gave indications it 
might start doing so in the future. But, what I have also tried to show is that although 
the Collective Complaints system is relatively new (especially in comparison to the 
Court’s judgment system) it is making important progress and the awareness of possible 
claimants of protection provided by the ESC system is rising. The standards of 
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healthcare required under Article 11 have been set by the ECSR under the Reporting 
procedure and now, with the Collective Complaints procedure, those standards have 
reached a more obligatory level, despite the non-binding character of the ECSR 
decisions. Also, the Court has shown inconsistency in deciding cases concerning the 
right to health in all its aspects with no clear guidelines and standards. On the other 
hand, the ECSR has made clear its expectations and state obligations regarding the right 
to health in its conclusions and is also stressing them through its collective complaints 
decisions.  
Again, the biggest deficiencies of the ESC system in general are the small number of 
states that have ratified the Collective Complaints Protocol and the lack of the CoM 
follow-up where it should address appropriate recommendations to states found by the 
ECSR to be in non-compliance. One must not ignore those problematic issues. 
However, instead of looking for a solution for those problems within the ECHR 
system, the CoE bodies should focus into improving the ESC system and urge states to 
ratify the Collective Complaints Protocol as well as pressure the CoM to issue proper 
and concrete recommendations. Therefore, the right to health and healthcare issues 
should be left for the ESC mechanisms of protection to deal with.  
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CHAPTER VII 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will look at the right to adequate housing, as interpreted and understood 
under the ECHR and ESC. Again, the main focus will be on whether the Convention 
system is suitable for dealing with rights that consist of numerous socio-economic 
elements, such as the right to adequate housing. Just as with the right to healthcare, we 
will see the Court’s reluctance in recognizing the right to adequate housing under the 
Convention. Nevertheless, again the Court has given some indications it might enter 
this sphere.  
In this chapter the right to adequate housing as protected under the Convention’s 
Article 8 will first be discussed. Therefore, the jurisprudence under Article 8 will be 
analysed to see the Court’s approach when it comes to guaranteeing the right to 
adequate housing. The Court’s jurisprudence will be divided in three groups of cases.597 
Within the first group, cases where state agents were directly involved in the destruction 
of and eviction from homes will be presented. Secondly, cases where actions of state 
bodies caused individuals to either lose or to move from their homes will be discussed. 
Finally, in the third group of cases, applications primarily concerned with the content of 
the state positive obligations regarding adequate housing will be analysed. As will be 
seen, when it comes to the first group of cases, the Court has been rather clear in setting 
out states’ obligations. As to the second group of cases, it has shown a certain 
inconsistency while it has shown most reluctance in placing positive obligations on 
states under the third group of cases.  
                                                 
597 For a similar, albeit not the same, division see Clements and Simmons (n 546). See also Padriac Kenna, 
‘Housing rights: positive duties and enforceable rights at the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 2 
E.H.R.L.R. 193; Koch, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights… (n 2) Chapter 6; David Hughes and Martin 
Davis, ‘Human rights and the triumph of property: the marginalisation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights in housing law’ (2006) Nov/Dec CONVPL 526; Ellie Palmer, ‘Beyond arbitrary 
interference: the right to a home? Developing socio-economic duties in the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2010) 61(3) N.I.L.Q. 225; Nic Madge, ‘Housing and human rights: lessons from 
Strasbourg: Part 4’ (2008) 11(3) J.H.L. 47; and Nic Madge, ‘Housing and human rights: lessons from 
Strasbourg: Part 5’ (2008) 11(5) J.H.L. 89. 
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Furthermore, the right to housing as guaranteed under the ESC will be analysed and it 
will be argued that it would provide a better alternative than seeking to protect the right 
to adequate housing through the ECHR. The right to housing is protected under three 
provisions of the ESC.598 All in all, those provisions guarantee: access to adequate and 
affordable housing; reduction of homelessness; housing policy targeted at all 
disadvantaged categories; procedures to limit forced eviction; equal access for non-
nationals to social housing and housing benefits; and housing construction and housing 
benefits related  to family needs.599 As will be detailed later in the chapter, there were 
numerous reports under the ESC on the right to housing. Even more importantly, there 
have also been numerous collective complaints, and most of them concerned a violation 
of Article 31, but there were also complaints regarding Article 16 and Article 23. 
Attention will be given to both the Reporting and to the Collective Complaints system 
to show that the ESC system is more suitable for protection of the right to adequate 
housing. 
 
7.2 THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING AND THE ECHR 
Within the ECHR there is no right to adequate housing as such. However, from the 
concept of a right to respect for the home and the right to private life under Article 8, 
the idea of the right to adequate housing, at least certain aspects of it, has begun to 
emerge.600 
In general, according to the Court, home (which is an autonomous concept within the 
meaning of Article 8(1)) “will usually be the place, the physically defined area, where 
private and family life develops.”601 The Court has also stated that home can include an 
intended place to live602 and that the notion of home can also cover business premises.603 
                                                 
598 Articles 31 and 23 of the Revised ESC and Article 16 of both Revised and Original ESC (n 5). 
599 CoE, European Social Charter, About the Charter, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/AboutCharter_en.asp> accessed 17 
July 2012.  
600 See Antoine Buyse, ‘Strings attached: the concept of “home” in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2006) 3 E.H.R.L.R  294. 
601 Giacomelli v Italy (n 455) [76]. 
602 Gillow v United Kingdom (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 5930 [46]. 
603 Niemietz v Germany (1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 97: “As regards the word ‘home’, appearing in the English text 
of Article 8, the Court observes that in certain Contracting States, notably Germany, it has been accepted 
as extending to business premises. Such an interpretation is, moreover, fully consonant with the French 
text, since the word 'domicile' has a broader connotation than the word ‘home’ and may extend, for 
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It is difficult to separate rights respecting the home in a physical sense from those 
associated with family life, since a protected private space is essential to the activities 
which constitute family life.604 After some premises have been established as home, then 
the first protection is of a right of access and occupation, and a right not to be expelled 
or evicted from them (Cyprus v Turkey).605 
The interference with respect for one’s home may come in the first instance from 
private parties, but the state’s responsibility will be engaged if the state fails to address a 
continuing interference. Despite the positive developments in the right to respect for 
the home under Article 8, the Court has stressed that there is no right to be provided 
with a home and how such claims fall outside the scope of Article 8.606 Consequently, 
there is no right to enjoy a home of particular standard. However, as will be seen later, 
in Marzari v Italy, where the applicant with severe disability was allocated in an 
inadequate apartment, the Court stated that although Article 8 does not guarantee the 
right to have one’s housing problem solved by the authorities, a refusal of the 
authorities to provide assistance in this respect to an individual suffering from a severe 
disease might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8.607  
As already stated, under the Convention home has an autonomous meaning and 
whether or not some habitation constitutes a home will depend on the actual 
circumstances of the case. For example, in the Connors case (that will be discussed later 
in the chapter), the Court emphasised that Article 8 “concerns rights of central 
importance to the individual's identity, self-determination, physical and moral integrity, 
maintenance of relationships and a settled and secure place in the community.”608 In one 
of the leading cases concerning the concept of home, Gillow v United Kingdom, the UK 
Government had first (before the Commission) argued that the applicants had been 
absent from their house for so long that it was no longer their home within the meaning 
                                                                                                                                          
example, to a professional person’s office. In this context also, it may not always be possible to draw 
precise distinctions, since activities which are related to a profession or business may well be conducted 
from a person’s private residence and activities which are not so related may well be carried on in an 
office or commercial premises. A narrow interpretation of the words ‘home’ and ‘domicile’ could therefore 
give rise to the same risk of inequality of treatment as a narrow interpretation of the notion of 'private 
life.'” [30]. 
604 Janis, Kay and Bradley (n 26) 403. 
605 Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick (n 25), 377; Cyprus v Turkey (n 544).   
606 Chapman v United Kingdom (n 11) [99]. 
607 Marzari v Italy (1999) 28 EHRR CD 175 [179]. 
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of Article 8(1).609 However, the Commission (and later the Court) decided that although 
the applicants had been absent from Guernsey for almost nineteen years, they had in the 
circumstances retained sufficient continuing links with Whiteknights for it to be 
considered their home, for the purposes of Article 8 and that, taking account of the 
applicants’ continuing connection with the property, their return to Whiteknights was a 
return to their home within the meaning of Article 8.610 Furthermore, the Court has 
emphasized that for the establishment of a home under Article 8 there is no 
requirement of legality. It noted that whether a property is to be classified as a home is a 
question of fact and does not depend on the lawfulness of the occupation under 
domestic law.611  
When it comes to adequate housing, many cases involving a claimed right to adequate 
housing will fall to be considered not only under the right to respect for the home, but 
also under the right to respect for private life of Article 8 as well as under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1 which guarantees the right to property. When it comes to private life under 
Article 8, it is a broad concept and the Court itself stated: 
“Private life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. The Court has already held that 
elements such as gender identification, name, sexual orientation and sexual life are important elements of 
the personal sphere protected by Article 8. That Article also protects a right to identity and personal 
development, and the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings and the 
outside world and it may include activities of a professional or business nature. There is, therefore, a zone 
of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of 
“private life”.”612 
Of course, some guidance regarding the scope and meaning of the right to private life 
can be found in the Court’s case-law, but it is exactly because of its broadness that the 
applicants in certain circumstances have invoked only the violation of their private life 
and not the violation of their right to respect for home when it came to housing issues. 
Even the applicants who were never in a possession of a home may therefore seek to 
claim the right to adequate housing before the Court and not only the applicants whose 
homes have been in some way interfered with. It is the cases where the right to adequate 
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housing has been invoked under the right to private life that are most challenging for 
the Court. 
The cases where Article 1 of Protocol 1 has been invoked without reference to Article 8 
will not be discussed here, since the interest of this chapter are not the property rights 
but the right to adequate housing within the context of private life, family life and home 
as a civil and political right. The main obligations under Article 8 are those of negative 
character, meaning that the state must not interfere with one’s right of access and 
occupation of a home as well as not to expel or evict a person from its home. However, 
besides those negative obligations, as with many of the Convention rights, certain 
positive duties have emerged through the years. 
As already stated, cases analysed here under the Article 8 right to adequate housing will 
be divided into three groups. The Court’s incoherent approach regarding the right to 
adequate housing and what obligations it imposes will be discussed now.  
 
7.3 CASE-LAW OF THE COURT ON THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE 
HOUSING 
 
7.3.1 THE FIRST GROUP OF CASES 
The first group consists of cases where the state agents were directly involved in the 
destruction of and eviction from the home. Here the Court was least reluctant in finding 
a violation of Article 8 and placing an obligation on the state to solve the applicants’ 
homelessness problems. One of the leading cases concerning this issue is the Moldovan 
and others v Romania (no.2)613 or so called Hadareni case. The case originally involved 25 
applicants, of whom 18 had agreed to a friendly settlement of their case (case Moldovan 
and others v Romania (no. 1), delivered on 5 July 2005). However, the facts of those cases 
are the same so here they will be presented jointly.  
In September 1993 a row broke out between three Roma men and a non-Roma villager 
in Hadareni that led to the villager’s son, who had tried to intervene, being stabbed in 
                                                 
613 Moldovan and others v Romania (no.2) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 16. 
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the chest by one of the Roma men. The three Roma men fled to a nearby house, but a 
crowd gathered outside, including the local police commander and several officers, and 
set the house on fire. Two Roma men managed to escape from the house, but were 
pursued by the crowd and beaten to death, while the third one was prevented from 
leaving the building and burnt to death. By the following day, 13 Roma houses had been 
completely destroyed including the homes of all the applicants. When they tried to 
return to their homes, they alleged that rocks were thrown at them and that they were 
beaten by police officers. The Roma residents of Hadareni lodged a criminal complaint 
against those allegedly responsible, including six police officers.  In September 1995, all 
charges against the police officers were dropped. The proceedings were first led in front 
of the domestic courts that concluded that “the Roma community has marginalised 
itself, shown aggressive behaviour and deliberately denied and violated the legal norms 
acknowledged by society. Most of the Roma have no occupation and earn their living by 
doing odd jobs, stealing and engaging in all kinds of illicit activities.”614 The punishments 
imposed on the villagers were extremely mild.  
The Romanian Government subsequently allocated funds for the reconstruction of the 
damaged or destroyed houses. Eight were reconstructed, though the applicants 
submitted photographs showing that those houses were uninhabitable, with large gaps 
between the windows and the walls and incomplete roofs. Other houses had either not 
yet been rebuilt or had been rebuilt, but remained unfinished. The applicants 
complained to the Court that, following the destruction of their houses, they could not 
live in their homes and had to live in very poor, cramped conditions. The Court found a 
violation of Articles 3, 6(1), 14 and 8. 
To the claims of an Article 8 violation the Court first stressed some general principles 
regarding the positive obligations of the state and that regard also must be given to the 
subsequent behaviour of the state.615 It went on to stress that its task is to determine 
whether the national authorities took adequate steps to put a stop to breaches of the 
applicants’ rights. In the Court’s view, all the elements taken together disclose a general 
attitude of the authorities – prosecutors, criminal and civil courts, Government and local 
authorities – which perpetuated the applicants’ feelings of insecurity after June 1994 and 
constituted in itself a hindrance of the applicants’ rights to respect for their private and 
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family life and their homes. An important aspect was also that most of the applicants 
had not to date returned to their village, and lived scattered throughout Romania and 
Europe. The Court concluded that the above hindrance and the repeated failure of the 
authorities to put a stop to breaches of the applicants’ rights amounted to a serious 
violation of Article 8 of a continuing nature.616 The Court also noted that the attacks 
were directed against the applicants because of their Roma origin and the applicants’ 
Roma ethnicity appeared to have been decisive for the length and the result of the 
domestic proceedings. The Court took note of the repeated discriminatory remarks 
made by the authorities throughout the case and concluded accordingly that there has 
been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8. 
The Court looked at all the circumstances of the case together and found the State 
responsible for the applicants’ homelessness. It also found that the State had caused the 
problems applicants were facing later on, particularly the ones related to the applicants 
not being able to return to their own homes.   
The CoM in its examination of the execution of the judgment regarding general 
measures stated that in the context of the friendly settlement and of the unilateral 
declarations in these cases, the Romanian authorities undertook, aside for the payment 
of various amounts to the applicants, to adopt a number of general measures. The 
Romanian authorities provided an action plan for the execution of these judgments on 
15 June 2011 and they are presented in the information document 
CM/Inf/DH(2011)37.617 Also, on 12 September 2011, the Romanian authorities 
presented a revised Action plan. On 16 February 2012, they provided additional 
information on the implementation of the general measures announced in the revised 
action plan as well as clarifications on a number of outstanding issues identified in the 
information document CM/Inf/DH(2011)37. A lot of helpful information was 
provided to the CoM by the ERRC in its Communication to the CoM on the 
implementation of the judgment. An outline of these communications and of the 
Romanian authorities’ responses thereto is presented in the information document 
CM/Inf/DH(2011)37.  
In the decision adopted at the 1144th meeting, the CoM noted that the revised Action 
plan provided clarifications on some of these questions, in particular as regards the 
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content of the measures taken in respect of the communities Plaiesii de Sus, Casinul 
Nou and Bolintin Deal. Furthermore, the CoM Deputies took note with interest of the 
revised Action plan presented on 24 May 2012 by the Romanian authorities. However, it 
noted that the new organisational and financial framework for the implementation of 
the remaining measures for the locality of Hadareni had still not been adopted. Finally, it 
decided to resume consideration of all the issues in the light of the additional 
information and the clarifications awaited from the Romanian authorities.618 
This judgment, that does not represent an abbreviation from the original Article 8 idea, 
also has visible socio-economic elements since it has been more than 15 years from the 
events in Hadareni took place and more than 5 years since the judgment has been made 
by the Court and still the situation is unsatisfactory.  
There are several other cases under the Convention where the state agents were directly 
involved in the destruction of and eviction from the home and caused the applicants’ 
homeless, the most significant being about the burning of houses by the Turkish 
security forces in southeast Turkey.619 In these cases the state agents deliberately burned 
the applicants’ homes and the Court found that there was no doubt that these acts 
constituted particularly grave and unjustified interferences with the applicant's right to 
respect for their private and family lives and homes. All of those cases were decided 
before the 2001 and they are still on the list of CoM pending cases.620  
In a really important inter-state case concerning forced evictions of Greek Cypriots 
from their homes and lands in northern Cyprus (following the occupation by the 
Turkish army in 1974), the Court found Turkey responsible, on the same principle, of 
forced evictions of these population and of refusing to guarantee them the right to 
return to the homes and villages.621 
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In all of these cases the Court found a state to be under an obligation to provide the 
applicants with the adequate housing, since the state agents were directly involved in the 
destruction of the applicants’ homes. However, even the execution of these judgments 
is surrounded with numerous obstacles, mainly because of their complexity, the 
impossibility in executing them within a short period of time and the fact that states 
need to incur substantial financial expenditure.  
 
7.3.2 THE SECOND GROUP OF CASES 
The Court has been more reluctant in finding a violation of Article 8 in situations where 
actions by state bodies had a disproportionate socio-economic impact on the individual 
or a group, which amounted to a form of indirect socio-economic discrimination.622  
The most notable cases are the ones concerning land development controls in the UK 
which led to lot of Roma people (Gypsies) being left technically homeless.623 These 
controls made it particularly difficult for Roma people to obtain permission for the 
stationing of a caravan, which is a form of accommodation favoured by the majority of 
UK Roma.624 In all of these cases the applicants accepted that there was a need for the 
regulation of land use, but they claimed that the state action that led to them being 
evicted had had a disproportionate socio-economic impact. Because of that, the 
applicants requested that either the scheme be reconfigured to enable them to 
accommodate themselves or that the State provide them with accommodation.625 
In the first case concerning Roma people, Buckley v United Kingdom,626 the applicant’s 
retrospective application for planning permission for the caravans was refused by the 
District Council, which issued an enforcement notice requiring the caravans to be 
removed within a month. She was left to apply for a pitch at an official site for Gypsies 
nearby which she claimed was unsuitable for a single woman with children. She alleged a 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention and/or of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 
14. The Court first declared that although the applicant had lived illegally on the caravan 
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site, the present case concerned her right to respect for her home.  
The Court, in its assessment recalled its previous practice to admit the national 
authorities’ wide margin of appreciation especially in spheres involving the application 
of economic or social policies, but nevertheless stressed that their decision remains 
subject to review for conformity with the requirements of the Convention. In the 
instant case the interests of the community were to be balanced against the applicant’s 
right to respect for her home, a right which is pertinent to her and her children's 
personal security and well-being. The importance of that right for the applicant and her 
family also had to be taken into account in determining the scope of the margin of 
appreciation allowed to the respondent State. The Court’s task was to determine 
whether the reasons relied on to justify the interference in question were relevant and 
sufficient under Article 8(2). It concluded it “is satisfied that the reasons relied on by the 
responsible planning authorities were relevant and sufficient, for the purposes of Article 
8, to justify the resultant interference with the exercise by the applicant of her right to 
respect for her home. In particular, the means employed to achieve the legitimate aims 
pursued cannot be regarded as disproportionate. In sum, the Court does not find that in 
the present case the national authorities exceeded their margin of appreciation.”627 
Therefore, no violation of Article 8 occurred and even though the Court stressed the 
importance of the right to have a caravan sited at that particular location to the applicant 
and her children, it decided that the state’s right to a wide margin of appreciation should 
prevail. 
In the next case, Chapman v United Kingdom,628 the Court again found no violation of 
Article 8.  The approach of the Court was in many ways similar to the approach in the 
Buckley case since the facts of the case were also quite similar. The Court stated “while it 
is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of 
legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, 
without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.” So, it did not. 
However, in the Chapman case the Court provided us with some interesting points of 
view. It observed that there might be a need for certain measures of so-called positive 
discrimination towards minorities, but it did not believe that there was a sufficiently 
concrete consensus among the Member States for the Court to  in any way impose such 
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measures. It also clearly stated that:  
“It is important to recall that Article 8 does not in terms give a right to be provided with a home. Nor 
does any of the jurisprudence of the Court acknowledge such a right. While it is clearly desirable that 
every human being has a place where he or she can live in dignity and which he or she can call home, 
there are unfortunately in the Contracting States many persons who have no home. Whether the State 
provides funds to enable everyone to have a home is a matter for political not judicial decision.”629 
Therefore, the Court rejected the idea of the state’s obligation to provide an individual, 
or even an individual who is a member of an endangered minority, with a home or any 
kind of help regarding their accommodation.  
What is also interesting to notice in this case is the opinion of the minority. The case 
was decided by the Grand Chamber and of the seventeen judges seven were of the 
opinion that a violation of Article 8 had actually occurred.630 They were of the opinion 
that the Court had a duty to review the approach adopted in the Buckley case in the light 
of current conditions and the parties’ arguments and, if necessary, adopt the approach 
to give practical effect to the rights guaranteed under the Convention. They considered 
that the Buckley judgment could not bind the Court, whose first task was to implement 
effectively the Convention system. Furthermore, they stressed that attention must be 
paid to the changing conditions in Contracting States and give recognition to any 
emerging consensus in Europe as to the standards to be achieved. According to them, 
although the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary 
action by public authorities, there might in addition be positive obligations inherent in 
an effective respect for private and family life and the home. Their principal 
disagreement with the majority lay in their assessment that the interferences were 
necessary in a democratic society. They claimed that the environmental arguments put 
forward by the Government did not disclose a pressing social need.  
It is clear there is no common position developed by the judges on the Roma people 
cases and state obligations towards their accommodation.  
The next case was Connors631 and here the Court actually did find that the applicant’s 
Article 8 right to respect for home has been violated. However, it did so because it 
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placed particular emphasis on the lack of procedural protection to Gypsies on local 
authority sites, not because it decided to extend the scope of positive obligations under 
Article 8.632 The facts of the case were quite similar to the Buckley and Chapman cases. In 
this case, Mr Connors complained that the eviction of his family from a local authority 
run gypsy site contravened Articles 6, 8, 13, 14 and Protocol 1 Article 1. Apart from one 
short absence, the family had lived on the site, which they had a licence to occupy, for 
14 years. However, they were evicted after being given a final written warning about 
anti-social behaviour and nuisance caused to other residents by their relatives and 
visitors to the site. The notice to quit was not accompanied by reasons for the decision 
and a possession order was granted by the county court when Mr Connors application 
for judicial review was refused.  The Court held, upholding the complaint under Article 
8, that the serious consequences of evicting the family required detailed reasons to be 
given. Security of tenure extended to gypsy sites and site management would not be 
affected by the requirement to give reasons for evicting long term residents. 
Furthermore, the failure to justify the eviction decision meant that the local authority 
had acted in breach of procedural safeguards in violation of Article 8. The Court made a 
great effort to distinguish this case from other Roma people cases by stressing the lack 
of procedural safeguards. It pointed out numerous times that the eviction of the 
applicant and his family was not attended by the requisite procedural safeguards, and 
cannot therefore be regarded as justified by a “pressing social need” or as proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued. 
Other Roma people cases, all decided on 18 January 2001 had the same outcome as 
Buckley and Chapman,633 meaning that the Court found no violation of Article 8.634 In all 
the cases the facts were similar, and as with the Chapman case judgments were delivered 
by the Grand Chamber where a minority of seven judges expressed their dissenting 
opinion invoking the same arguments as in Chapman. 
Only in the Connors and Kay cases did the Court find a violation by referring to the 
seriousness of interference combined with the lack of procedural safeguards. However, 
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one can assume that in all the other cases the Court could also have decided that there 
has been a violation of Article 8. It is not hard to imagine that the opinion of the 
minority could have turned into the opinion of the majority.635  
The Connors judgment is still under supervision by the CoM. Secondary legislation was 
required in England and Wales to bring section 318 of the Housing and Regeneration 
Act 2008 into effect, extending the protection contained in the Mobile Homes Act 1983 
to local authority Gypsy and Traveller sites. According to the latest information 
provided by the UK authorities to the CoM, this was laid before Parliament. Further 
information is awaited on the progress of the legislation.636 
In the most recent case concerning Roma people where at stake was the issue of their 
eviction from a settlement situated on municipal land in an area of Sofia, the Court 
decided to depart from its previous (UK) case-law and held that there would be a 
violation of Article 8 if the removal order were enforced.637 The applicants were 23 
Bulgarian nationals who live in a neighbourhood in the outskirt of Sofia, which housed 
about 250 other Roma. Most of them had lived in the area from the 1960s and 1970s 
and their homes were built without authorisation. They claimed that they could not 
apply for authorisation because they were poor and the relevant law did not make it 
possible for them to obtain ownership of their houses. Although the issue of their 
settlement was widely debated, until 2005 state authorities had never attempted to 
remove the applicants and their families. However, in 2005 the district mayor had 
ordered the applicants’ forcible removal and in 2006, the Sofia municipal council 
transferred ownership of land where the applicants lived to a private investor. In June 
2006, the municipal authorities announced their intention to evict the unlawful Roma 
residents, including the applicants, within a week and to demolish their homes. Due to 
political pressure (mainly from the European Parliament), the eviction did not take 
place. However, the mayor publicly stated that it was not possible to find alternative 
housing for the settlement’s inhabitants. In 2006 the application was lodged with the 
Court. Following another attempt to remove the applicants, in June 2008 the Court 
indicated to the Bulgarian Government under its rule on interim measures, that the 
applicants should not be evicted until such time as the authorities assured the Court of 
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the measures they had taken to secure housing for the children, elderly, disabled or 
otherwise vulnerable people. 
In its assessment of the case, the Court first observed that the houses where the 
applicants lived had become their homes within the meaning of Article 8.638 The Court 
was satisfied that the impugned removal order had a valid legal basis in domestic law 
and that that the impugned measure, if enforced, would have a legitimate aim under 
Article 8(2) of the Convention.  
As to the necessity in the democratic society the Court invoked the state’s margin of 
appreciation. However, it went to say that the municipal authorities did not give reasons 
other than that the applicants occupied land unlawfully and that before issuing the 
impugned order the authorities did not consider the risk of the applicants’ becoming 
homeless if removed. Furthermore, the Court stated that the authorities failed to 
recognise the applicants’ situation as an outcast community and one of the socially 
disadvantaged groups. It again emphasized there was no obligation under the 
Convention to provide housing to the applicants. However, an obligation to secure 
shelter to particularly vulnerable individuals might flow from Article 8 in exceptional 
cases.639 
The Court reached the conclusion that there would be a violation of Article 8 in the 
event of enforcement of the deficient order as it was based on legislation which did not 
require the examination of proportionality and was issued and reviewed under a 
decision-making procedure which not only did not offer safeguards against 
disproportionate interference but also involved a failure to consider the question of 
“necessity in a democratic society”.640 
It is clear that the judgment prohibiting the Bulgarian authorities from evicting Roma 
people has numerous financial and socio-economic implications on Bulgaria. The Court 
itself expressed the view that the general measures in execution of this judgment should 
include such amendments to the relevant domestic law and practice so as to ensure that 
orders to recover public land or buildings, where they may affect Convention protected 
                                                 
638 Ibid [103]. 
639 Ibid [130]. 
640 Ibid [144]. 
 187 
rights and freedoms, should, even in cases of unlawful occupation, identify clearly the 
aims pursued, the individuals affected and the measures to secure proportionality.641 
Therefore, we can see that the Court decided to change its approach regarding eviction 
of Roma people and to narrow the state’s margin of appreciation. It had a rather 
cautious approach in the UK cases where it invoked the special vulnerability of the 
Roma people,642 and yet it found that whether the state provides funds to enable 
everyone to have a home is a political not judicial decision.643 In this case it decided to 
depart from this view. Furthermore, in the UK cases it stated it is highly relevant 
whether or not the home was established unlawfully,644 which was clearly not the case in 
Yordanova. Finally, in the UK cases, the Court concluded by saying: “If the applicant's 
problem arises through lack of money, then she is in the same unfortunate position as 
many others who are not able to afford to continue to reside on sites or in houses 
attractive to them.”645 In Yordanova, the Court did not consider that the applicants are in 
the same unfortunate position as many others, but that they needed special assistance.  
The Court could have easily reached the same conclusions in Yordanova as it did in the 
UK Roma people cases and allowed the state a wide margin of appreciation. It decided 
to depart from the views expressed in UK cases, and although it invoked exceptional 
circumstances, it is clear it extended the states’ positive obligations under Article 8. It 
remains to be seen what approach the Court will adopt in future similar cases.  
Four more interesting cases, not involving Roma people, can also be mentioned under 
this second group of cases. In one of them, McCann v United Kingdom,646 the Court again 
invoked procedural safeguards and relied on them when finding a violation of Article 8. 
Here, a local authority summarily evicted a joint tenant by issuing a notice to quit 
instead of complying with the statutory procedure for the allocation of public housing, 
particularly the Housing Act 1985. The Court found that it had violated the tenant’s 
right to respect for his home, since there had been no possibility of having the 
proportionality of that measure determined by an independent tribunal.  
This case is still under CoM supervision and in relation as to the general measures the 
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CoM noted certain improvements in domestic law where the question of whether a local 
authority’s decision to repossess a home is proportionate within the meaning of Article 
8 must be considered by a court. There have been improvements within the UK legal 
system where the Supreme Court delivered a judgment consistent with the Court’s 
judgment (Pinnock v Manchester City Council).647 However, information is awaited on the 
response of the UK authorities following the Supreme Court’s conclusions in Pinnock.648 
In a Croatian case, Paulić v Croatia,649 the Court found a violation of Article 8 due to the 
possible eviction of the applicant from his home. However, as with the Connors and 
McCann cases, the Court placed greatest emphasis on the procedural issues, finding a 
violation not because it considered a loss of the applicant’s home to be a violation of 
Article 8 but because of the lack of procedural safeguards. Here the Court did not just 
refer to the principle of proportionality but also of reasonableness.650 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not explain the meaning of reasonableness so we cannot reach a conclusion 
on what influence it had on the Court when delivering its judgment. 
However, in another Croatian case, Blečić v Croatia,651 the Court has again shown its 
unwillingness to protect a person’s right to home unless well established, strong criteria 
have been satisfied and again invoked the state’s wide margin of appreciation.652 In Blečić 
the applicant was a Croatian national who in 1953 acquired a specially protected 
tenancy, which was at the time quite common in Croatia, on a flat in Zadar. On 26 July 
1991, she went to stay with her daughter in Rome planning to stay only during the 
summer. By the end of August the armed conflict in Croatia had escalated and from 
mid-September Zadar was exposed to constant shelling and the supply of water and 
electricity was disrupted. In October 1991, the applicant’s pension was stopped and she 
lost the right to medical insurance. Having no means of subsistence and no medical 
insurance, and being in poor health, she decided to stay in Rome. The following month, 
her flat was broken into and occupied by a family. She did not return to Zadar until May 
1992. However, before her return, on 12 February 1992, Zadar Municipality brought a 
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social justice and public benefit. In this area, the margin of appreciation available to the State in 
implementing social and economic policies is necessarily a wide one.” [65]. 
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civil action against the applicant for termination of her tenancy, on the ground that she 
had been absent from the flat for more than six months without justification. The 
applicant claimed that she had not been able to return to Zadar given the war in Croatia 
and because she had no money, no medical insurance and was in poor health. The 
Croatian courts ultimately terminated the applicant’s specially protected tenancy, finding 
that the reasons given by the applicant did not justify her absence.  
The applicant then lodged a complaint to the Court claiming a violation of Article 8 and 
Article 1 Protocol 1. When looking at the claim regarding Article 8, the Court first 
stressed that it was satisfied that the applicant did not intend to abandon the flat and 
that the flat in question could therefore reasonably be regarded as her home. 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the termination of her tenancy was in accordance 
with the national law. The legislation was intended to promote the economic well-being 
of the country and the protection of the rights of others.  The Court again observed that 
in the housing area the margin of appreciation to the state is a wide one and looked at 
whether the measure employed was manifestly disproportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued.  It concluded that the solution the Croatian courts reached in seeking a fair 
balance between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirement of protecting the applicant’s right to respect for her home was not 
manifestly disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court held, unanimously, 
that there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
This case was referred on appeal to the Grand Chamber653 and during the Grand 
Chamber proceedings the Croatian Government for the first time complained about the 
Court’s lack of temporal jurisdiction.654 The Grand Chamber, with a majority of 11 
votes to six, determined that it could not review Croatia’s termination of Ms Blečić 
occupancy/tenancy rights (OTR) because the case lay outside its temporal jurisdiction. 
In so doing, it reversed two prior decisions of the First Section Chamber; an 
admissibility decision issued in January 2003, and a decision on the merits of the case 
issued in July 2004, admitting the case for review.655  
                                                 
653 Blečić v Croatia (2006) 43 E.H.R.R. 48 (GC Decision).   
654 Croatia became subject to ECHR jurisdiction as of 5 November 1997. 
655 Blečić v Croatia (n 653). This decision is a controversial one, but not only for the reasons discussed in 
this chapter but also for the Court’s reasoning when deciding that this case falls outside of its temporal 
jurisdiction. For an interesting and (in my opinion) quite understandable critiques see dissenting opinion 
of Judge Zupančič joined by Judge Cabral Barreto. Also see the dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides 
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Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber decisions show the Court’s inconsistency 
and the judges’ discrepancy in dealing with difficult and controversial issues and it might 
be said that “the concept of the margin of appreciation has become as slippery and 
elusive as an eel. Again and again the Court now appears to use the margin of 
appreciation as a substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.”656 For these 
cases, it seems that the Court used the doctrine of a margin of appreciation on a 
somewhat discretionary basis, not setting out clear standards as to when it will narrow it 
and when it will allow the states a wide margin.   
However, in a subsequent Croatian case657 that also deals with the issue of special 
protected tenancy, the Court decided to depart from the view adopted in Blečić (by the 
Chamber, since the Grand Chamber did not even discuss the merits of the case). The 
facts of the Bjedov are quite similar to the ones in the Blećić. The applicant was a Croatian 
national who lived in a flat in Zadar from 1975 on which she and her husband were 
awarded special protected tenancy. In August 1991 she and her husband went to the 
village of Mokro Polje where in September her husband fell ill. They also found out that 
third persons had broken into and occupied their flat. In these circumstances they 
decided to stay in Mokro Polje. Her husband died in 1994 and Mrs Bjedov went to live 
with her daughter in Switzerland. She returned to Zadar in 1998 and lived in a friend’s 
flat until 2001, when third parties moved out of her flat. Meanwhile, in 1995 she made a 
request to buy her flat in Zadar. The national authorities, just like in the Blečić, found 
that her absence had been unjustified and therefore that she was not entitled to buy the 
flat and ordered her eviction. The applicant lodged a complaint to the Court, and unlike 
in Blečić, the Court actually did find a violation of Article 8. The Court accepted the 
Croatian allegations that the interference with the applicant’s right was prescribed by law 
and had a legitimate aim, but it found that her eviction was not ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’. Therefore, the Court acknowledged the state’s margin of 
appreciation in this regard but went on by saying: 
“While it is true that the applicant’s eviction had been temporarily adjourned on health grounds in the 
course of the enforcement proceedings, this in itself does not satisfy the requirement that the 
reasonableness and the proportionality of the eviction order as such has to be assessed by an independent 
                                                                                                                                          
joined by Judges Rozakis, Zupančič, Cabral Barreto, Pavlovschi and Davíd Thór Björgvinsson 
and dissenting opinion of Judge Cabral Barreto. Also see n 752 in Section 8.2.3.  
656 Lord Lester of Herne Hill (n 208), 75. 
657 Bjedov v Croatia App no 42150/09 (ECtHR, 29 May 2012). 
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tribunal. The enforcement proceedings – which are by their nature non-contentious and whose primary 
purpose is to secure the effective execution of the judgment debt – are, unlike regular civil proceedings, 
neither designated nor properly equipped with procedural tools and safeguards for the thorough and 
adversarial examination of such complex legal issues. Therefore, competence for carrying out the test of 
proportionality lies with a court conducting regular civil proceedings in which the civil claim lodged by the 
State and seeking the applicant’s eviction was determined (see Paulić v. Croatia, no. 3572/06, § 44, 22 
October 2009). 
There has, therefore, been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the instant case.”658 
The Court also pointed out the applicant’s age and poor health, while in Blečić case it did 
not give much relevance to Mrs Blečić age and health. Also, to Mrs Bjedov the local 
authorities offered to pay the amount necessary for her to be able to live in the Home 
for Elderly while nothing similar was offered to Mrs Blečić. 
The Bjedov and Blečić cases were based on similar factual situations: both applicants were 
elderly and vulnerable, and the national authorities based their decisions on the same 
Housing Act. Yet, in Bjedov case the Court decided to depart from approach adopted in 
Blečić. For that reason, today we have two cases with almost the same factual situation 
with two different decisions from the Court.  
Complaints raising similar issues to the ones discussed above also have come before the 
ESCR, and it will be seen that the ECSR has taken a different and more consistent 
approach in its decisions than the Court took in its judgments that raise controversial 
issues with significant socio-economic elements. 
 
7.3.3 THE THIRD GROUP OF CASES 
Even more socio-economic elements can be found in the following cases which belong 
to the final group of cases that will be examined here. It is in these cases, where the state 
or its agents were not the cause of the applicants’ situation that most clearly show when 
and if the Court is ready to impose positive obligations in relation to the right to 
adequate housing and to what content.  
                                                 
658 Ibid, [71] and [72]. 
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The first case where the state’s responsibility was invoked for not providing adequate 
accommodation for a (vulnerable) applicant is Burton v United Kingdom.659 Here the 
applicant was a Roma person by birth whose parents took the decision to move into 
settled accommodation having suffered repeated evictions from sites where they had 
stationed their caravan and in the absence of any provision of permanent caravan sites.  
The applicant was diagnosed with a serious cancer and after finding out that it was 
incurable she intensified her desire to live out her last days and die in a caravan, 
according to her Romany gypsy traditions. The Council attempted but was unable to 
provide a location on which the applicant’s family could station their caravan. A request 
to live in a mobile home owned by the council was refused, the Council considering the 
mobile home unsuitable for habitation.                    
The applicant invoked both Articles 3 and 8. Regarding Article 8 she claimed that 
because of the combined effect of legislation and Government planning policy she was 
unable to pursue her traditional way of life in a caravan that belonged to her family 
without the family being in breach of law. She claimed there was a disproportionate 
interference in her traditional way of life. When assessing her allegations, the 
Commission did actually invoke positive obligations inherent in Article 8. However, the 
Commission pointed out that it did not consider that Article 8 could be interpreted in 
such way as to extend a positive obligation to provide alternative accommodation of an 
applicant’s choosing. Therefore, the Commission in its findings stated there was no 
right to accommodation of an applicant’s choosing.  
In the next case concerning the right of a vulnerable individual to adequate 
accommodation, Marzari v Italy,660 the applicant was an Italian national, born in 1944, 
who started suffering from a rare and serious illness called metabolic myopathy in 1965. 
However, the applicant’s illness was not diagnosed until 1979. In 1980 the applicant was 
recognised as 100% disabled. From 1973 he had lived in a privately rented apartment 
which he had adapted, at his own expense, to his needs in view of his pathology. In 
1988 the Trentino Institute for Housing (ITEA) expropriated the building. ITEA 
intended to renovate the building, and tried to find another suitable accommodation for 
the applicant, who demanded the respect of certain criteria and technical characteristics. 
On 8 August 1991, the second apartment was allocated to the applicant by ITEA; and 
                                                 
659 Burton v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. CD134. 
660 Marzari v Italy (n 607). 
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the applicant moved into it, despite the fact that he considered it to be inadequate to his 
needs. During the next 7 years the applicant was in numerous disputes with the ITEA 
since in 1993 he had ceased the payment of the rent, demanding that certain works be 
carried out in the apartment with a view to making it fit for his needs. In 1994 ITEA 
instructed its lawyer to pursue the applicant’s eviction because of his outstanding debt 
to ITEA. On 28 January 1998 the applicant was evicted. He went to live in a camper 
van parked in the main square of Trento. On 9 March 1998 the provincial body on 
residential housing stated that it would not be possible to allocate another apartment to 
the applicant, on account of his insolvency. On 19 March 1998 the applicant was 
hospitalised in Trento; his condition had dramatically deteriorated on account of his 
living in an inadequate environment (camper van); however, a month before that he had 
been allocated a third apartment.   
In May 1997 he lodged a complaint to the Court complaining, among other things, 
about the local administrative authorities’ failure to provide him with accommodation 
adequate to his disability.  The Court found that the applicant’s eviction from his 
apartment interfered with his rights under Article 8(1).  The Court therefore had to 
examine whether the interference was justified under the terms of Article 8(2). First, the 
Court stated that the interference at issue was in accordance with the law and that it had 
a legitimate aim. As to the question whether the interference complained of was 
necessary in a democratic society, the Court underlined that the applicant’s medical 
condition was particularly relevant to the need of appropriate accommodation: the 
applicant had to be hospitalised as a consequence of his living in a camper van after his 
eviction. However, the applicant was never co-operative and did not use the venues 
which were available to him and which were even pointed out to him in order to avoid 
the eviction. In these circumstances, the Court did not find any appearance of a breach 
of Article 8 on account of the authorities’ decision to proceed with the applicant’s 
eviction from the second apartment. The Court considered that the local authorities 
could be considered to have discharged their positive obligations in respect of the 
applicant’s right to respect for his private life. 
Presumably the Court, unlike the applicant, thought that the second flat was adequate 
since the offer of the third flat came seven years after the applicant’s eviction from the 
first flat. Also, the applicant in this case was never co-operative and the authorities were 
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willing to help the applicant with his housing problems, so the Court found the 
application inadmissible because manifestly ill-founded.661  
Nevertheless, the Court did not rule out that the assessment might have been different 
had the applicant not been offered this apartment. It stressed that:  
“…although Article 8 does not guarantee the right to have one’s housing problem solved by the 
authorities, a refusal of the authorities to provide assistance in this respect to an individual suffering from 
a severe disease might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because 
of the impact of such refusal on the private life of the individual. The Court recalls in this respect that, 
while the essential object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities, this provision does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition 
to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private life. 
A State has obligations of this type where there is a direct and immediate link between the measures 
sought by an applicant and the latter’s private life.”662  
The next case where the state’s obligation of providing a vulnerable individual with 
adequate housing was under review is O’Rourke v United Kingdom.663 The applicant was an 
individual who upon coming out of prison was provided with temporary 
accommodation in a hotel room pending a local authority decision as to whether he was 
eligible for housing as a homeless person. The temporary accommodation was allocated 
to him due to his health problems. He was later evicted from temporary 
accommodation, following complaints about his behaviour there. The applicant was 
later on offered a tenancy, but he refused it as he believed that the majority of the 
surrounding tenants were aware of his past history and claimed that he had been 
threatened. He remained on the streets for 14 months, to the detriment of his health, 
since his eviction from the hotel. On 2 February 1994 (more than 2 years after his 
eviction) he was offered a secure tenancy, which he accepted subject to repairs and 
decorations being carried out. The applicant’s tenancy commenced on 28 February 
1994. 
In the meantime he complained to the Court that his eviction and failure to provide him 
with accommodation led to a violation of Articles 3 and 8. As to the claim of violation 
of his Article 8 right to respect for private life, the Court mainly repeated the wording 
from the above mentioned cases regarding how it considers that the scope of any 
                                                 
661 The Court discussed this case in terms of respect for private life rather than respect for the home. 
662 Marzari v Italy (n 607). 
663 O’Rourke v United Kingdom App no 39022/97 (ECtHR Decision, 26 June 2001).  
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positive obligation to respect the applicant’s private life must be limited. It concluded 
that even if the applicant’s hotel room might be considered as home it found that the 
eviction following complaints about the applicant’s conduct was in accordance with the 
law. The eviction was also proportionate in pursuit of the legitimate aims of preventing 
disorder or crime at the hotel and protecting the rights and freedoms of the proprietors, 
their staff and other guests. The Court eventually found the application regarding 
Article 8 to be manifestly ill-founded since the applicant himself for a long time 
obstructed his placement in suitable accommodation.  
Therefore, in these three applications the Court (and the former Commission) did find 
the applications inadmissible putting a great emphasis on the fact that vulnerable 
applicants had some sort of accommodation or that it was mainly their fault for losing 
the accommodation provided for them. Although we might argue that the Court should 
not have declared the applications inadmissible and rather should have discussed the 
merits and examined the applications more carefully, one might suspect that again the 
Court would not have found a violation of their rights. The cases where the applicants 
were vulnerable individuals to whom the state had not provided any accommodation 
have not been raised before the Court so we cannot say with any certainty whether the 
Court really accepted the idea of positive obligations in terms of respect for private life 
on part of the state to provide an accommodation to vulnerable individuals. 
In the first group of cases, where the states agents were directly involved in causing the 
applicants’ homelessness and where the Court found a violation of Article 8, the 
applicants problems are now, years after their housing problem occurred, still not 
solved. In the second group of cases, where actions by state bodies, legitimate under 
national law, caused individuals to lose or move from their home, the judges have 
shown a certain amount of inconsistency and the Court was, up until the Yordanova case, 
reluctant to find a violation for any circumstances other than lack of procedural 
safeguards. With the Yordanova case it decided to change its approach regarding the 
eviction of Roma people. This judgment was delivered in April 2012 so it is to be seen 
whether the judges will follow this approach in the future cases. And in the third group 
of cases, primarily concerned with positive obligations regarding adequate housing, the 
Court was not ready to find a violation or even consider the merits of the case and made 
a clear statement that Article 8 does not guarantee a right to have one’s housing 
problem solved by the authorities. The Court did make some interesting points 
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regarding the state’s obligations toward certain groups of people; nevertheless the 
circumstances under which state might be responsible to provide adequate housing for 
the applicants are still not clear.  
Finally, in all the groups of cases discussed above, the Court has shown ambiguity and 
reluctance in guaranteeing the right to adequate housing although it has made some 
interesting points that might lead us to the conclusion that in certain cases the state will 
be under obligation to provide housing for a person under its jurisdiction. However, it 
seems that, at least so far, the Court decided to refrain from imposing positive 
obligations on states regarding the right to adequate housing when the state agents or 
bodies are not the cause of the applicants’ situation, presumably having in mind the 
socio-economic elements of such decisions. 
 
7.3.4 THE CASE OF M.S.S. V GREECE AND BELGIUM 
Just as with the right to health, discussed in the previous chapter, where the Court 
actually recognized the state’s obligation to provide healthcare to a vulnerable applicant 
and declared that his expulsion would amount to a violation of Article 3,664 here we have 
a case where the Court delivered one specific judgment stating that not providing the 
applicant with satisfactory living conditions amounted to a violation of Article 3.665 
In this case, the applicant (originally from Afghanistan) left Kabul in 2008 and entered 
the European Union through Greece. In Greece, he was fingerprinted and detained for 
a week. He was then issued with an order to leave the country. He left Greece and 
entered Belgium, where he applied for asylum. The Belgian Aliens Office submitted a 
request for the Greek authorities to take charge of the asylum application. In late May 
2009, the Aliens Office ordered the applicant to leave the country for Greece, where he 
would be able to submit an application for asylum. The applicant lodged an appeal with 
the Aliens Appeals Board, arguing that he ran the risk of detention in Greece in 
appalling conditions, that there were deficiencies in the asylum system in Greece and 
that he feared ultimately being sent back to Afghanistan where he claimed he had 
                                                 
664 D. v United Kingdom (n 135).  
665 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 
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escaped a murder attempt by the Taliban in reprisal for his having worked as an 
interpreter for the air force troops stationed in Kabul.  
Regardless of his claims, the applicant was transferred to Greece on 15 June 2009. On 
arriving at Athens airport, he was immediately placed in detention in an adjacent 
building, where, according to his reports, he was locked up in a small space with 20 
other detainees. Following his release and the issue of an asylum seeker’s card on 18 
June 2009, he lived on the street, with no means of subsistence. Having subsequently 
attempted to leave Greece with a false identity card, he was arrested and again placed in 
the detention facility for one week, where he alleges he was beaten by the police. After 
his release, he continued to live in the street. 
Before the Grand Chamber M.S.S. alleged both Greece and Belgium had breached his 
human rights. Among other claims, he claimed that the state of extreme poverty in 
which he had lived since he arrived in Greece amounted to inhuman and degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3. With no means of subsistence, he, like many 
other Afghan asylum seekers, had lived in a park in the middle of Athens for many 
months. The Court first stressed that it considers it necessary to point out that Article 3 
cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone 
within their jurisdiction with a home. Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to 
give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living. 
However, in this case the Court was of the opinion that what was at issue was 
somewhat different from in the previous cases, mainly because the obligation to provide 
accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum seekers has 
now entered into positive law (Directive 2003/9 laying down minimum standards for 
the reception of asylum seekers in the Member States (“the Reception Directive”)).666 
Furthermore, the Court attached considerable importance to the applicant’s status as an 
asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable 
population group in need of special protection. The situation of which the applicant 
complained had lasted since his transfer to Greece in June 2009 and was linked to his 
status as an asylum seeker. Had the authorities examined his asylum request promptly, 
they could have substantially alleviated his suffering. It followed that through their fault 
he had found himself in a situation incompatible with Article 3 constituting degrading 
treatment. 
                                                 
666 Ibid [250]. 
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The Court on numerous occasions throughout this judgment stressed the specific 
circumstances of this case, barring and protecting itself from possible applications that 
might arise regarding the right to adequate housing or the state’s obligation to provide 
living conditions of a certain standard to every individual. Even more importantly, this 
case concerned an asylum seeker whose situation (while in detention) might be 
compared to that of persons deprived of their liberty. While living in the street he had 
no possibility of getting any means of subsistence because of the state denying him 
documents that would enable him to work or get any financial support.  This is one of 
the reasons why, at the beginning of the discussion of this case it was compared with D. 
v UK, a case where the applicant was not detained any more, but was still highly 
dependent on the state.    
As we can see, regarding the right to adequate housing the Court has not gone nearly as 
far as it did with providing satisfactory detention conditions and with a right to live in a 
healthy environment. It found violations in situations where the state agents were 
directly involved in the destruction of and eviction from the home. However, even 
though these cases do not represent Court’s wide use of interpretative powers and 
reading more into existing rights, the problems of execution have already arisen during 
the implementation of these judgments. It takes a long time for the states to execute the 
judgments and the progress is very slow. Furthermore, the Court’s jurisprudential limits 
of a judicial approach in the cases where the states have not directly caused the 
applicants’ homelessness or housing problems, shows that in these situations the Court 
on most occasions decided to reject the integrated approach and not place an economic 
burden on states by requiring the provision of adequate housing to certain, vulnerable 
groups or individually. It generally decided to accept the negative positive dichotomy of 
rights putting a stop to the broad interpretation of the right to adequate housing under 
Article 8.   
In my opinion the Court did not make a mistake by not entering into the socio-
economic sphere under Article 8 and by not imposing obligations on states to provide 
adequate housing. However, Yordanova, Bjedov and M.S.S. show certain developments in 
the Court’s attitude when it comes to housing issues of vulnerable individuals and 
groups. These two cases are the most recent ones so we might understand them as 
indications that the Court is extending the scope of obligations inherent in Article 8 
concerning adequate housing. However, the overall conclusion after seeing all the cases 
 199 
discussed above might be that the right to adequate housing is not appropriate to be 
guaranteed under the Convention. 
Now, as with the previous chapters the work of the ECSR will be analysed. The ECSR 
has dealt with housing issues much more unambiguously, particularly since the Revised 
ESC contains an explicit right to adequate housing and therefore, much more 
successfully than the Court.  
 
7.4 RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING UNDER THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL 
CHARTER 
The right to housing is guaranteed under three provisions of the ESC. Those are Article 
31 of the Revised Charter, the broadest and most comprehensive provision, Article 23 
of the Revised Charter and Article 16 of both the Original and the Revised Charter. 
Under Article 31 of the Revised ESC the parties undertake to take measures designed: 
to promote access to housing of an adequate standard; to prevent and reduce 
homelessness with a view to its gradual elimination: and to make the price of housing 
accessible to those without adequate resources.667 The Original ESC contains no 
equivalent provision. Under both the Original and the Revised Charter right to housing 
can also be found in Article 16 which states: “With a view to ensuring the necessary 
conditions for the full development of the family, which is a fundamental unit of 
society, the Parties undertake to promote the economic, legal and social protection of 
family life by such means as social and family benefits, fiscal arrangements, provision of 
family housing, benefits for the newly married and other appropriate means.”668 Article 
23 of the Revised ESC deals with the right of elderly people to social protection and it 
requires that states “…enable elderly persons to choose their life-style freely and to lead 
independent lives in their familiar surroundings for as long as they wish and are able, by 
means of: a provision of housing suited to their needs and their state of health or of 
adequate support for adapting their housing…”669 While Article 16 is a core right670 both 
Article 31 and Article 23 are non-core rights. 
                                                 
667 Revised ESC (n 5), Article 31. 
668 Revised and Original ESC (n 5), Article 16.  
669 Revised ESC (n 5), Article 23 (2)(a). 
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The analysis of the Reporting system and the Collective Complaints system will show us 
that the right to housing is well developed under the ESC; that there have been 
numerous reports but even more importantly, that there have been numerous collective 
complaints concerning the state’s failure to provide the right to adequate housing to 
certain groups. Just as before the Court, there were numerous complaints concerning 
Roma people, but there were also some other important complaints where the ECSR 
shown its readiness to deal with the housing issues.  
 
7.5 REPORTING PROCEDURE UNDER THE ESC AND THE RIGHT TO 
HOUSING 
Within the Reporting system under the ECS we will look now only at Article 31 reports 
since Article 31 is the most comprehensive and broadest provision on the right to 
housing and the expectations the ECSR has on the states is most visible through this 
provision.671 The ECSR has, through its reports, very clearly and in detail identified state 
obligations under all three Article 31 paragraphs. 
When it comes to Article 31(1) the ECSR pointed out that states must guarantee to 
everyone the right to adequate housing and should promote access to housing in 
particular to the different groups of vulnerable persons.672 The ECSR also stated that, 
                                                                                                                                          
670 The ECSR has in ERRC v Greece (15/2003) (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. SE14 and in International Centre for the 
Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v Greece (49/2008)) (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. SE4 shown that it 
is willing to interpret Article 16 broadly and read in within this provisions the right to housing as 
guaranteed under Article 31 of the Revised Charter. This kind of interpretation might be understood as 
placing obligations on Greece to which it has not agreed, particularly since it has not ratified the Revised 
Charter. However, the biggest problem was not the wide interpretation but the proper follow-up by 
Greece since both of these complaints are based on similar problems concerning the housing of Roma 
people.  
671 Conclusions 2011 on Andorra (31(1) and 31(2)), Finland (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), France (31(1), 31(2) 
and 31(3)), Italy (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Lithuania (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)) , Norway (31(1), 31(2) and 
31(3)), Netherlands (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Portugal (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Slovenia (31(1), 31(2) and 
31(3)), Sweden (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Turkey (31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), and Ukraine (31(1) and 31(2)); 
Conclusions 2007 on Finland (Vol. 1, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)) and Italy (Vol. 2, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)); 
Conclusions 2005 on France (Vol. 1, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Lithuania(Vol. 1, 31-1 and 31-2), Norway 
(Vol. 2, 31-1, 31-2 and 31-3), Slovenia (Vol. 2, 31-1, 31-2 and 31-3), and Sweden (Vol. 2, 31(1), 31(2) and 
31(3)); Conclusions 2003 on France (Vol. 1, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), Italy (Vol. 1, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), 
Slovenia (Vol. 2, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)), and Sweden (Vol. 2, 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3)) available at The 
European Social Charter database, Conclusions on Article 31, 
<http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/esc2008/query.asp?action=page&page=4&timestamp=41711.92> accessed 18 
July 2012. Also see Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (CoE 2008), 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a3f52482.html, accessed 6 August 2012, 169-175 
and 349-355. 
672 Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (n 671), Article 31-1, 170. 
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for the purpose of Article 31(1), the parties must define the notion of adequate housing 
in law. According to the ECSR “adequate housing” means a dwelling which is 
structurally secure, safe from a sanitary and health point of view and not overcrowded, 
with secure tenure supported by the law. The standards of adequate housing shall be 
applied not only to new constructions, but also gradually, in the case of renovation to 
the existing housing stock. They shall also be applied to housing available for rent as 
well as to owner-occupied housing.673  
As to Article 31(2), when dealing with the issue of homelessness, the ECSR pointed out 
that the parties shall take reactive and preventive measures. The ECSR considers as 
homeless those individuals not legally having at their disposal a dwelling or other forms 
of adequate shelter.674 The temporary supply of shelter, even adequate, cannot be held as 
satisfactory and the individuals living in such conditions and who wish so, should be 
provided with adequate housing within a reasonable period. Talking about the measures 
to reduce homelessness the ECSR stated that Article 31(2) obliges parties to gradually 
reduce homelessness with a view to its elimination. Reducing homelessness implies the 
introduction of measures such as provision of immediate shelter and care for the 
homeless and measures to help such people overcome their difficulties and prevent a 
return to homelessness.675 The ECSR furthermore defined forced eviction as the 
deprivation of housing which a person occupied due to insolvency or wrongful 
occupation. When an eviction is justified by the public interest, authorities must adopt 
measures to re-house or financially assist the persons concerned.676 In the Conclusions 
from 2005 and 2007 the ECSR focused more on the emergency and longer-term 
measures to reduce homelessness and forced evictions without the need for repeating 
the standards and definitions pointed out in the 2003 Conclusions.677 
                                                 
673 Ibid, 170; ECSR Conclusions 2003, Volume 1 (n 92), 221; and ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 
2003, Volume 2 (Romania, Slovenia, Sweden) (CoE Publishing 2003), 122. 
674 Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (n 671), p 171 and ECSR 
Conclusions 2003, Volume 1 (n 92), 345; ESCR Conclusions 2003, Volume 2 (n 673), 123. 
675 Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (n 671), p 172 and ECSR 
Conclusions 2003, Volume 1 (n 92), 345. 
676 ECSR Conclusions 2003, Volume 2 (n 673), 128-129; ECSR Conclusions 2003, Volume 1 (n 92), 136-
137. 
677 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2005, Volume 1 (Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Lithuania) (CoE Publishing 2006), 46-47; ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2005, Volume 2 (Moldova, 
Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden) (CoE Publishing 2006), 79-80; ECSR Conclusions 2007, Volume 1 
(n 100), 58-59; ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2007, Volume 2  (Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Norway, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden) (CoE Publishing 2007), 73-75. 
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As to the Article 31(3) in its Conclusions from 2003 the ECSR provided us with some 
general definitions and standards. It stated that, for the purpose of Article 31(3), parties 
shall ensure an adequate supply of affordable housing. The ECSR considers housing to 
be affordable when the household can afford to pay the initial costs, the current rent 
and/or other costs on a long-term basis and still be able to maintain a minimum 
standard of living, as defined by the society in which the household is located. The 
ECSR also considers that, under Article 31(3), parties are required, in order to increase 
the supply of social housing and make it financially accessible: to adopt appropriate 
measures for the construction of housing, in particular social housing, where their own 
direct involvement is complemented by that of other partners; to introduce housing 
benefits for the low-income and disadvantaged sectors of the population. Furthermore, 
in the 2003 Conclusions the ECSR looked at the information provided on assistance for 
construction, social housing and housing benefits.678 In its Conclusions from 2005 and 
2007 the ECSR focused only on social housing and housing benefits, again finding no 
need to repeat already established standards and definitions.679 
The ECSR has, through the Reporting system, broadly interpreted Article 31 and given 
it a real meaning. It did so by defining fundamental notions, such as adequate housing, 
homeless persons, forced eviction and housing affordability. It also in its conclusions 
established what action states are required to carry out to ensure the effectiveness of the 
right to housing.680 The conclusions of the ECSR in monitoring states obligations under 
Article 31 have demonstrated the application of a new set of benchmarks to national 
housing law and policy.681 
As emphasized by Michael Guet in the conference on Improving access to housing for Roma: 
good local practices, funding and legislation (held in Prague, 2-4 February 2011): 
                                                 
678 ECSR Conclusions 2003, Volume 2 (n 673), 129; ECSR Conclusions 2003, Volume 1 (n 92), 136-137. 
679 ECSR Conclusions 2005, Volume 1 (n 677), 48-50; ECSR Conclusions 2005, Volume 2 (n 677), 81-8; 
ECSR Conclusions 2007, Volume 1 (n 677), 59-60; Conclusions 2007, Volume 2 (n 677), 75-77. 
680 For example: “The Committee recalls that the effective right to adequate housing implies its legal 
protection. This means that tenants or occupiers are given access to affordable and impartial judicial 
remedies. The present report does not provide information on this issue, to the exception of a case in 
which the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman requested local authorities to improve the conditions of a 
residential home. Therefore the Committee asks how the right to adequate housing is legally protected, in 
particular, to what extent judicial and non-judicial remedies are available, also in case of excessive waiting-
time for access to housing. It also asks information on existing case law.” ECSR Conclusions 2007, 
Volume 1 (n 677), 57-58. 
681 Michael Guet, Support Team of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Roma Issues, 
‘Council of Europe Standards Regarding Roma Housing’,  
<http://www.romadecade.org/czech_housing_conference> accessed 11 July 2012. 
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“…For the situation to be in conformity with Article 31 of the Charter, States Parties must: 
 adopt the necessary legal, financial and operational means of ensuring steady progress towards 
achieving the goals laid down by the Charter; 
 maintain meaningful statistics on needs, resources and results; 
 undertake regular reviews of the impact of the strategies adopted; 
 establish a timetable and not defer indefinitely the deadline for achieving the objectives of each 
stage; 
 pay close attention to the impact of the policies adopted on each of the categories of persons 
concerned, particularly the most vulnerable.”682  
Through its conclusions on national reports the ECSR has established a strong and clear 
threshold on the right to housing as should be guaranteed by State parties of the 
Charter. These established standards are also of great help to the ECSR when adopting 
decisions on the collective complaints. Unfortunately, despite the established strong 
threshold, in practice the right to housing is not that effectively protected, mainly 
because of the small number of states that have accepted Article 31 of the Revised 
Charter. Out of thirty two states that have accepted the Revised Charter,683 only twelve 
of them have accepted one or more Article 31 provisions.684 Out of those twelve states 
nine have accepted all Article 31 provisions, while three have accepted Article 31(1) and 
Article 31(2).685  
In its latest Conclusions from 2011 on the states that have accepted two out of three 
Article 31 provisions (Andorra, Lithuania and Ukraine), the ECSR decided to defer its 
conclusions on Andorra regarding both Article 31(1) and 31(2),686 while it found that the 
situation in Lithuania and Ukraine is not in conformity with Article 31(1) and Article 
31(2).687 Regarding states that have accepted all of the Article 31 provisions, not even 
one state has a situation in full conformity with Article 31 requirements, and only 
                                                 
682 Ibid. 
683 Member States of the Council of Europe and the European Social Charter, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp> accessed 11 
August 2012 
684 The information on the ESC web page regarding accepted provisions has been updated in October 
2011, so no information is available on the accepted provisions of the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia that ratified the Revised ESC in January 2012. 
685 Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey have accepted all 
Article 31 provisions while Andorra, Lithuania and Ukraine have accepted Article 31(1) and 31(2). 
686 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Andorra), Articles 7, 8, 17, 19 and 31 of the Revised Charter 
(CoE Publishing 2012), 25-30. 
687 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Lithuania) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised 
Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 30-35; ECSR, Conclusions 2011 (Ukraine) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 
31 of the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 29-35. 
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Finland and Sweden are in conformity with two provisions (Finland with Article 31(1) 
and 31(2) and Sweden with Article 31(2) and 31(3)) while regarding one provision 
(Article 31(3) on Finland and Article 31(1) on Sweden) the ECSR decided to defer its 
conclusion.688 All the other states are in non-conformity with one or more provisions of 
the Article 31.689 Not only are a lot of states in non-conformity with Article 31 
requirements but on numerous occasions has the ECSR decided to defer its 
conclusions.690 
Therefore, although the large amount of information that is required from states 
regarding Article 31 provisions is to be welcomed it seems, just as with the right to 
health and with the right to a healthy environment, it is exactly this large amount of 
information that on numerous occasions makes it difficult for the ECSR to make a 
definite judgment about compliance.691  
Finally, and even more importantly, there is also a problem with the CoM unwillingness 
to address recommendations. Up until May 2012 there have not been any CoM 
recommendations concerning Article 31 provisions. Compliance with Article 31 has 
been supervised by the ECSR in 2003, 2005, 2007 and 2011 and, as we have seen, the 
ECSR has found states to be in non-conformity with one or more Article 31 provisions 
on numerous occasions. Nevertheless, the CoM had not once issued a recommendation 
requesting states to bring national practice into conformity with the Charter. 
 
 
                                                 
688 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Finland) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised 
Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 27-32; ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Sweden) Articles 7, 8, 16, 
17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 27-32. 
689 ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (France) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised 
Charter (CoE Publishing 2012),  38-49; ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Italy) Articles 7, 8, 16, 
17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 39-47; ESC (Revised), ECSR 
Conclusions 2011 (the Netherlands) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised Charter (CoE 
Publishing 2012), 31-39; ESC (Revised), 2011 (Norway) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised 
Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 28-32; ESC (Revised), ECSR Conclusions 2011 (Portugal) Articles 7, 8, 
16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 34-40; ESC (Revised), ECSR 
Conclusions 2011 (Slovenia) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 
2012), 30-38; and ESC (Revised), ECSR, Conclusions 2011 (Turkey) Articles 7, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27 and 31 of 
the Revised Charter (CoE Publishing 2012), 41-48. 
690 It deferred its conclusion regarding Andorra (Article 31(1) and 31(2)); Finland (Article 31(3); 
Netherlands (Article 31(1) and 31(3)); Portugal (Article 31(2) and 31(3)); Sweden (Article 31(1)); and 
Turkey (Article 31(3)). 
691 Khaliq and Churchill, ‘The European Convention of Social Rights: putting flesh…’ (n 29), 452.  
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7.6 COLLECTIVE COMPLAINTS ON THE RIGHT TO HOUSING 
There have been numerous complaints to date and through them one can also get a 
good overview of the ECSR’s work. More importantly, we can see that the ECSR is 
now a body whose work is extremely relevant (particularly for the 15 states that have 
accepted the Collective Complaints procedure) in the protection of economic and social 
rights in Europe. For the purpose of this chapter collective complaints regarding the 
right to housing will be divided in accordance with the affected groups. The biggest 
number of complaints concerned Roma people and Travellers.692 Although every 
complaint is different in its nature what most of them have common is the lack of 
adequate housing for Roma people and the interconnection between their housing 
problems and with the discrimination towards them.  
A complaint brought by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) against 
Italy will be discussed here, since it also represents a response to the fact that the 
authorities have not ensured a proper follow-up to the similar decision on the merits in 
respect of the ERRC v Italy.693 In the latter complaint the COHRE claimed a violation of 
Article E together with Articles 16, 19, 30 and 31. It claimed racial discrimination in the 
enjoyment of the right to housing by the Roma and Sinti and difficulties for these 
groups in having access to housing and family benefits; racial discrimination in the 
protection of family life with regard to census and identification procedure; xenophobic 
and racist propaganda aggravating social exclusion; and, difficulty in accessing 
identification documents and unlawful collective expulsion. For the purpose of this 
chapter only housing issues under Articles 16 and 31 (together with Article E) will be 
presented in detail.  
In the first part of the complaint the COHRE alleged violation of all three paragraphs 
of Article 31 in conjunction with Article E. When examining the complaint the ECSR 
stressed that in its decision on the merits in ERRC v Italy, the situation in Italy was held 
to be in breach of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 31(1), 31(2) and 31(3). 
                                                 
692 COHRE v Italy (n 94); Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France (63/2010), (2012) 54 
E.H.R.R. SE5; International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS) v Greece (n 670); 
ERRC v Bulgaria (n 103); ERRC v Italy (n 279); European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Greece (n 670); 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Portugal (61/2010), decision on the merits of 1 July 2010; European 
Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France (51/2008), (2010) 51 E.H.R.R. SE1; and European Roma and Travellers 
Forum (ERTF) v France (64/2011), decision on the merits of 1 February 2012. 
693 For that reason, only the later complaint against Italy will be presented COHRE v Italy (n 94) and not 
the Complaint ERRC v Italy (n 278).  
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Furthermore, the ECSR repeated its words expressed in its Reports on Article 31(1), 
31(2) and 31(3) and again paid great attention to all Article 31 paragraphs. Regarding 
Article 31(1), the ECSR stated that a growing number of Roma and Sinti live in socially 
excluded locations characterised by substandard conditions on the edges of towns, 
segregated from the rest of the population. Moreover, the ECSR stressed that Italy 
provided no evidence to demonstrate whether the numerous examples of substandard 
living conditions of Roma and Sinti have improved rather than deteriorated following 
the adoption of the “security measures” contested by Italy. As, on the one hand, the 
measures in question directly targeted these vulnerable groups and, on the other, no 
adequate steps were taken to take due and positive account of the differences of the 
population concerned, the ECSR found that situation amounts to stigmatisation which 
constitutes discriminatory treatment.694 Therefore, there was a violation of 31(1) 
together with Article E.  
As to the Article 31(2) the ECSR again found a violation, in conjunction with Article E. 
The ECSR stressed that evictions of Roma and Sinti continue to be carried out in Italy 
without respecting the dignity of the persons concerned and without alternative 
accommodation being made available. Also, the respondent Government has not 
provided credible evidence to refute the claims that Roma have suffered unjustified 
violence during such evictions and that raids in Roma and Sinti settlements, including by 
the police, have not systematically been denounced and those responsible for destroying 
the personal belongings of the inhabitants of the settlements have not always been 
investigated and, if identified, condemned for their acts.695 The ECSR not only found a 
violation, but an aggravated violation of Article 31(2) (in conjunction with Article E) 
since the criteria for a violation to be aggravated were met.696  
Regarding Article 31(3) (in conjunction with Article E) again a violation was found. 
According to the ECSR, and in connection with the situation already established in the 
complaint No. 27/2004 and in the Report on Article 31(3) concerning Italy from 2007, 
“..(t)here is no evidence to establish that Italy has taken sustained positive steps to 
                                                 
694 COHRE v Italy (n 94) [58]. 
695 Ibid [73]. 
696 “An aggravated violation is constituted when the following criteria are met: 
- on the one hand, measures violating human rights specifically targeting and affecting vulnerable groups 
are taken and; - on the other, public authorities not only are passive and do not take appropriate action 
against the perpetrators of these violations, but they also contribute to such violence.” Ibid [76].  
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improve the situation.”697 The ECSR stressed that, as to the difficulties in dealing with 
social housing coherently given the complex distribution of competences between the 
national level and the regions, ultimate responsibility for policy implementation, 
involving at a minimum oversight and regulation of local action, lies with the state.  
Furthermore, regarding the right to housing the COHRE claimed that Italy also violated 
Article 16 taken in conjunction with Article E. The ECSR stated that the finding of a 
violation under Article E taken in conjunction with Article 31 amounts to finding of a 
violation of Article E taken in conjunction with Article 16 in respect of the right to 
adequate housing.  
The ECSR made a comprehensive analysis of the claimed violations; it took into 
account its conclusions on the right to housing, its previous decision on the merits, and 
it also obtained some valuable information from other CoE bodies, like the Court, the 
CoE Commissioner for Human Rights and the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities. The monitoring of the Roma situation in Italy (and generally) is not a short 
term or one-shot process but it is a continuous one. The ECSR is itself aware that the 
achievement of these rights is a complex process and particularly expensive to resolve698 
and it emphasized that the State party must take measures that allows it to achieve the 
objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with measurable progress and to an 
extent consistent with the maximum use of available resources.699 Particularly with 
regard to the right to housing “implementation of the Charter requires State parties not 
merely to take legal action but also to make available the resources and introduce the 
operational procedures necessary to give full effect to the rights specified therein.”700 
By looking at COHRE v Italy it can be seen that the situation with the housing of Roma 
people is always complex, financially demanding and only possible to resolve 
progressively.  
Regarding both of the complaints against Italy concerning housing rights of Roma 
people the CoM adopted Resolutions. In Resolution ResChS(2006)4701 on Collective 
Complaint No. 27/2004 it presented information communicated by the Italian 
                                                 
697 Ibid [86]. 
698 Ibid [25]. 
699 Ibid. 
700 Ibid [26]. 
701 Resolution ResChS(2006)4 on the Collective complaint No. 27/2004 by the European Roma Rights 
Centre against Italy (n 278). 
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delegation during the 960th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies and in Resolution 
ResChS(2010)8702 on Collective Complaint No. 58/2009 it stated that it  looks forward 
to Italy reporting that, at the time of the submission of the next report concerning the 
relevant provisions of the Revised Charter, the situation is in full conformity with the 
Revised Charter. Unfortunately, the CoM is quite feeble in its assessment and 
recommendations, even though the ESCR found a violation of the ESC provisions, 
regarding the same factual situation, in two complaints. Even more, in COHRE v Italy, 
the ECSR has shown that it considers the situation regarding Roma people in Italy 
rather urgent and serious. This is visible from the fact that the ECSR gave its decision 
only a year after the complaint was registered and that it found an aggravated violation 
of Article 31(2). 703 For these reasons it is rather surprisingly that the CoM, even though 
it acted speedily and issued a Resolution on 21 October 2010 (4 months after the 
decision on the merits) was so lenient. Unfortunately, it does not seem likely that these 
weak recommendations on the part of the CoM will initiate action on the part of the 
Italian state. Furthermore, the CoM’s second Resolution adds nothing substantive to the 
language of the Resolution that it adopted in response to the Committee's findings in 
ERRC v Italy. This is despite the clear failure of Italy to address the violations 
determined by the ECSR.704 
As to the right to housing of groups other than the Roma, COHRE v Croatia will be 
analysed here.705 The situation complained of by the COHRE has numerous similarities 
with the Blečić case and unlike the Court, the ECSR found numerous shortcomings in 
the behaviour of Croatian authorities.  
The COHRE complaint concerns the problem of loss of special occupancy rights of 
ethnic Serbs and other minorities which occurred during 1991-1995 and after the war in 
Croatia. The conflict in the former Yugoslavia created a massive population 
displacement. During the war, on the basis of Article 99 of the Housing Act, 
proceedings for cancellation of occupancy rights were instituted against persons with 
specially-protected tenancies under the social ownership system who did not remain in 
                                                 
702 Resolution CM/ResChS(2010)8 on the Collective complaint No. 58/2009 by the Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) against Italy (n 278). 
703 The complaint was registered on 29 May 2009 and the Committee adopted its decision on the merits 
on 6 July 2010.  
704 Nolan, ‘”Aggravated violations”, Roma housing rights…’ (n 31), 359. 
705 COHRE v Croatia (n 132). This is not the only non-Roma housing case. Others include International 
Movement ATD Fourth World v France (33/2006), (2009) 48 E.H.R.R. SE6 and European Federation of National 
Organisations Working with Homeless (FEANTSA) v France (n 93). 
 209 
occupation of their flats, where such persons could not provide a suitable legal 
justification for their absence.706 In contrast, persons who remained in occupation of 
their socially owned flats during the conflict were granted the right in certain 
circumstances to acquire legal ownership of their flats. From 1991 until 2008 there have 
been numerous national and international provisions and agreements that dealt with the 
problem of displacement and possible return of the ethnic Serbs to Croatia.707  
First, it needs to be pointed out that the Government maintained that the issues raised 
by the complainant organisation fall outside of the temporal jurisdiction of the ECSR 
(just as it did in the Blečić case before the Grand Chamber), as they concern matters 
which took place before Croatia ratified the ESC on 1 March 2003.  
On the ratione temporis issue the ECSR referred to the judgments of the Grand Chamber 
of the ECHR in cases of Blečić and Šilih v Slovenia.708 However, unlike the Court’s Grand 
Chamber in Blečić case, the ECSR considered that the special nature of the rights at issue 
can be relevant in assessing whether a situation can be said to be on-going, as accepted 
by the Grand Chamber in Šilih.709 In this context, the nature of the protection conferred 
by Article 16 of the Charter is relevant, particularly its focus on securing effective and 
continuing protection of family life. Turning to the application of these principles to the 
issues at stake in the present complaint, the ECSR recalled that, in its decision on 
admissibility,710 it held that the heart of the complaint concerned alleged violations of 
the Charter which has continuing and persistent effects at the time it was lodged, which 
post-dated the ratification by Croatia of the Charter in 2003. Therefore, the ECSR 
found this complaint to be within its temporal jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, in the substantive part of the complaint, the COHRE alleged the breach 
of Article 16 in four respects. First, the COHRE argued that the requirement stating 
that to qualify for housing care the applicants had to express a desire to return to 
Croatia, constituted an unjustified limitation on the right of displaced families to obtain 
redress. Secondly, it stated that the housing and security of tenure provided to returning 
families by the Government under the housing care programmes could not be 
considered to constitute the full restitution and/or compensation to which displaced 
                                                 
706 As we have seen in the Blečić case (n 651). 
707 COHRE v Croatia (n 132) [7]-[22]. 
708 App no 71463/01 (ECtHR, 9 April 2009).  
709 Ibid, [147]. (Unlike in Blečić case (n 653). 
710 COHRE v Croatia (decision on admissibility from 30 March 2009) (n 132). 
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families should be entitled by right. Thirdly, the COHRE stated that the implementation 
of housing care programmes is not adequate, on the basis that housing provided under 
the programme is of inadequate standard, the processing of applications is subject to 
long delays, and considerable uncertainty exists as to when housing will be made 
available to displaced families. Fourthly, according to the COHRE, the implementation 
of the housing programme discriminates against ethnic Serbs, who constitute the bulk 
of the displaced families. 
As to the first issue invoked by the COHRE the ECSR considered that Article 16 of the 
Charter imposes obligations upon the Government of Croatia only in respect of those 
families who have expressed their clear wish to return to Croatia, or those for whom the 
lack of an effective and meaningful offer of housing and other forms of economic, legal 
or social protection has constituted an obstacle to return. Regarding the claim that the 
redress provided does not take the form of a legal entitlement of restitution or 
compensation, the ECSR found that COHRE’s allegation does not fall within the 
material scope of Article 16. 
Turning to the adequacy of the measures implemented by the Government under its 
housing programme for displaced persons, in respect of the adequacy of the housing 
and tenure provided to families who have returned or wish to return to Croatia, the 
ECSR held that the COHRE has not produced sufficient evidence to establish that the 
quality of housing provided under the housing programme does not fulfil Article 16 
requirements. 
Finally, on the basis of the information provided by the parties and the sources such as 
the European Commission, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Organisation 
for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) the ESCR assessed all the information 
and concluded that the housing programme has not been implemented by Croatian 
authorities within a reasonable timeframe. Therefore, the ECSR found a violation of 
Article 16 read in light of the non-discrimination clause on the basis of the failure to 
implement the housing programme within a reasonable timeframe and a violation of 
Article 16 read in light of the non-discrimination clause on account of the failure to take 
into account the heightened vulnerabilities of many displaced families, and of ethnic 
Serb families in particular.     
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As we can see, the ECSR paid particular attention to the fact that displaced families 
were vulnerable, which the Court in the Blečić case failed to do, as well as not 
considering this complaint to be outside its temporal jurisdiction although Croatia 
ratified the ESCR 6 years after its ratification of the Convention.  
The ECSR is, unlike the Court, not ambiguous in reaching its conclusions on the 
housing issues and is aware of the problematic issues that lie under the concept of 
housing rights. That is exactly the reason why again in the COHRE v Croatia decision it 
stressed that “when the achievement of one of the rights in question is exceptionally 
complex and particularly expensive to resolve, a State party must take measures that 
allows it to achieve the objectives of the Charter within a reasonable time, with 
measurable progress and to an extent consistent with the maximum use of available 
resources. States parties must be particularly mindful of the impact their choices will 
have for groups with heightened vulnerabilities.”711 
There are numerous other collective complaints on the right to housing, but for the 
purpose of analysing the working methods of the ECSR, an overview of the two above 
discussed decisions is sufficient. Another reason for looking at those complaints is that 
they have numerous similarities with the cases brought before the Court,712 particularly 
given that they concern the same vulnerable groups and their housing problems, and are 
part of the group of cases where the Court has shown greatest ambiguity and 
uncertainty in its reasoning and decision making.  
As to the supervision of the execution of the decision on COHRE v Croatia, the CoM 
on 5 May 2011 adopted a Resolution ResChS(2011)6.713 It noted the statement made by 
the Croatian government and the information that it had communicated on the follow-
up to the decision of the ECSR. The CoM welcomed the measures that the Croatian 
government had already taken and the authorities’ commitment to bring the situation 
into conformity with the Charter. Finally, it addressed its hope that Croatia will report in 
the future that the situation has been brought into full conformity. Unfortunately, just as 
                                                 
711 COHRE v Croatia (n 132) [65]. 
712 Regarding Roma people: Beard v United Kingdom (n 633); Lee v United Kingdom (n 634); Smith (Jane) v 
United Kingdom (n 634); Kay v United Kingdom (n 632); Buckley v United Kingdom (n 611); Chapman v United 
Kingdom (n 11); Connors v United Kingdom  (n 608); Coster v United Kingdom (n 623); and regarding special 
occupancy rights: Paulić v Croatia (n 213); Bjedov v Croatia (n 657) and Blečić v Croatia (n 651). 
713 Resolution CM/ResChS(2011)6 on the Collective complaint No. 52/2008 by the Centre on Housing 
Rights and Evictions (COHRE) against Croatia (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 5 May 2011, 
at the 1113th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). 
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with all the other CoM Resolutions presented in this thesis, the CoM was again not 
placing any pressure on Croatia, but it only welcomed the measures already taken.  
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
What we have seen in this chapter is that the right to adequate housing is an area in 
which the Court has shown great ambiguity, uncertainty and even inconsistency. 
However, we have also seen that this is clearly a right that can be placed under the 
traditional definition of economic and social rights, just as the ECSR has stressed on 
numerous occasions. Even more, under the ESC there are a number of provisions that 
directly or indirectly deal with the right to housing whereas under the Convention 
adequate housing as such can only be indirectly claimed and in most cases those 
applications will be unsuccessful. In my opinion, instead of broadening the scope of the 
Convention and looking for the ways to introduce the right to housing under the 
Convention, this right should be considered as a traditional economic and social right 
which is better left for the ECSR to deal with it. 
Despite the small number of states that have accepted the Collective Complaints 
procedure what is visible from the analysis so far is that the number of complaints 
regarding the violation of the right to housing is rather high. The CoE bodies, like the 
Parliamentary Assembly, should place more pressure on states to ratify the Collective 
Complaints Protocol if it aims for a better protection of economic and social rights as 
the right to adequate housing is. Unfortunately, another problem is that the CoM very 
rarely places pressure on states to comply with the ESCR decisions and reports. Even 
when it does so, that pressure is often pretty weak. The CoE bodies should also urge the 
CoM to make more recommendations. 
As to the Reporting procedure, we have seen there are also three particularly 
problematic issues, the small number of states that have accepted Article 31 of the 
Revised Charter, the number of information the ECSR requires from states making it 
difficult for it to reach a final conclusion on compliance, and the lack of CoM 
recommendations.  
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However, on most occasions states are making an effort to bring a situation in 
conformity with the ECSR decisions, but that is a long and demanding process that 
concerns a large number of people, it usually requires the state to change legislation, and 
introduce numerous general measures. Therefore, it is better placed for protection as a 
collective rather than as an individual right.714  
 
7.8 CONCLUSION ON THE CHAPTERS IV, V, VI AND VII OF THE 
THESIS 
We have seen through the last four chapters that on certain occasions the Court has 
entered the socio-economic sphere when protecting civil and political rights and that it 
has often shown ambiguity and inconsistency when it comes to adopting judgments that 
have significant socio-economic elements. Despite the theoretical idea that all rights are 
indivisible, interconnected and interrelated, in Europe the protection of economic and 
social rights is left for the ECSR that can adopt only non-binding decisions, while the 
protection of civil and political rights is left to the Court that can deliver binding 
judgments. As to the detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, those issues are 
successfully dealt by the CPT which requires states to bring the situation in their 
detention centres into conformity with established standards and, although it requires 
from states to take measures immediately, it is aware that full compliance can only be 
achieved progressively.  
Several groups of rights have been analysed under the previous chapters. What we have 
seen is that when it comes to detention conditions and the provision of healthcare in 
prisons the Court has mainly examined those issues under Article 3. Here, the Court has 
shown consistency and it found violations of Article 3 whenever the state failed to 
provide detention conditions and healthcare of certain, adequate standards. However, 
                                                 
714 For more on individiual and collective rights and differences among them see Yalim Eralp ‘Individual 
Rights versus Collective Rights’ (2010) 18 Global Political Trends Center 1; Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Group Rights <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-group/>  accessed 23 December 
2012; Douglas Sanders ‘Collective Rights’ (1991)13 Hum. Rts. Q. 368;  Robert A. Dubault ‘The ADA and 
the NLTRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights’  (1994-1995) 70 Ind. L.J. 1271 (1994-1995); 
Michael Hartney ‘Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights’ (1991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 293; 
Yoram Dinstein ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’ (1976) 25 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 102; 
Lesley A. Jacobs ‘Bridging the Gap Between Individual and Collective Rights With the Idea of Integrity’ 
(1991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 375; and Leslie Green ‘Two Views on Collective Rights’ (1991) 4 Can. 
J. L. & Jurisprudence 315.  
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this is not something originally intended to be granted under Article 3 of the 
Convention. The Court has started interpreting Article 3 in such manner within the last 
12 years and numerous applications regarding those issues have come before the Court. 
Numerous complaints, as we have seen, concern the same or similar detention centres, 
and after the Court finds a violation (mainly basing its decision on a CPT findings), the 
CoM supervises the execution for years. The idea I tried to elaborate through the 
chapter IV is that one way to deal with unacceptable detention conditions might be 
through the CPT’s work which would allow the Court to deal with more serious and 
individualistic cases of Article 3 violations and the CoM to focus on the execution of 
judgments that objectively can be executed within a more reasonable timeframe in order 
to secure individual human rights protection under Article 3. By doing so, the CPT’s 
workload would not increase, at least not significantly, since as has been shown, the 
CPT regularly visits places of detention in Member States of the CoE and continuously 
examines improvements of the detention conditions. On the other side, the workload of 
the Court and the CoM would significantly decrease without endangering the protection 
of rights of individuals under Article 3 of the Convention.  
Within the preceding three chapters the right to a healthy environment, the right to 
health and the right to housing have been presented. All these rights are, whether 
explicitly or implicitly, guaranteed under the ESC. When it comes to the right to a 
healthy environment, here again the Court has shown its willingness to enter this sphere 
of human rights protection and again, this has been shown not to be the best solution. 
The situation concerning the right to a healthy environment is not as clear-cut as the 
detention condition cases since the Court allowed certain margin of appreciation to 
states thereby creating even more uncertainty for states regarding their obligations under 
the Convention. As to the right to healthcare in general and the right to adequate 
housing the Court has shown much more reluctance when it came to guaranteeing these 
rights, however it gave clear indications it might enter this spheres of human rights 
protection. In my opinion, neither the right to a healthy environment, nor the right to 
adequate housing or to the healthcare in general should be protected under the 
Convention.  
Numerous problematic issues the ESC system is facing cannot be ignored, both under 
the Reporting and under the Collective Complaints procedure. There are a small 
number of states that have ratified the Collective Complaints Protocol, states are not 
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obliged to accept all the ESC provisions, and the great amount of information the 
ECSR requires from states under the Reporting procedure often makes it hard for the 
ECSR to make a judgment about states compliance with their obligations. Furthermore, 
another problem of the Reporting system is the fact that a single round of one report 
may take for almost a decade before a final conclusion had been reached. After the state 
report is considered by the ECSR its conclusions are then subjected to the scrutiny by 
the Governmental Committee which then sends its report to the CoM to finalise the 
process.715  
Further deficiency of the ESC system is the CoM supervision of both ECSR decisions 
and conclusions where it is quite often reluctant to address recommendations and even 
when it does, those recommendations are quite bland. 716 The role played by the CoM 
should either be decreased or it should be obliged to place more pressure on states 
when either the Court or the ECSR find there has been a violation of the Convention or 
of the ESCR. The CoE bodies should urge the CoM to issue recommendations every 
time after the ECSR finds the state to be in non-compliance with the ESC provisions 
and to make stronger resolutions. Issuing recommendations to states as well as clearer 
and stronger resolutions, after the ECSR has found that the state is not in compliance 
with certain ESC provision should become common practice of the CoM. As R. 
Churchill and U. Khaliq wrote regarding non-issuing of recommendations by the CoM 
under the Collective Complaints system: 
“If this trend continues, it will serve only to discredit the system and discourage complaints because 
complainants will feel that there is little point in utilizing the system if a finding of non-compliance by the 
ECSR will not be endorsed and a recommendation addressed to the defendant state by the Committee of 
Ministers. More fundamentally, it is undesirable that the Committee of Ministers, a political body, should 
have any role to play in what is, or at least ought to be, a quasi-judicial process.”717 
Unfortunately, the situation with the CoM is quite similar under the Convention 
system.718 Both under the Convention and under the Charter system the CoM rarely 
                                                 
715 For a detailed analysis of the timing and the role of all the Committees within the Reporting system, 
see Alston ‘Assessing the Strength and Weaknesses…’ (n 263). 
716 For further critiques of the ESC supervisory systems see also Alston ‘Assessing the Strength and 
Weaknesses…’ (n 263); Khaliq and Churchill, ‘The European Committee of Social Rights: putting 
flesh…’ (n 29); and Andrew Dremczewski ‘Fact-finding as Part of Effective Implementation: The 
Strasbourg Experience’ in Anne F. Bayefsky (ed) The U.N. Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century 
(Kluwer Law International 2000). 
717 Churchill and Khaliq, ‘The Collective Complaints System…’ (n 29). 
718 See chapter III (section 3.4.). 
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places any pressure on the states, instead it accepts the national reports, welcomes the 
measures taken and asks states to adopt more measures. Its findings are very brief, 
compressed and bland towards states.  
Despite the problematic issues under the ESC system it needs to be pointed out that the 
role of the Court is not to protect all human rights, but only the civil and political rights 
guaranteed under the Convention.719 If there is a goal within the CoE for giving 
economic and social rights better protection, the CoE bodies should focus more on 
improving the ESC system of protection and urge states to ratify the Collective 
Complaints Protocol and accept more ESC provisions. As to the detention conditions 
and a right to a healthcare in prisons, we have seen that the CPT can provide equally 
good protection of these rights although non-judicial. The solution for better protection 
of the rights discussed in chapters IV, V, VI and VII is not in reading in more rights 
under the Convention, because imposing new rights under the Convention can be 
counter-productive. Not only can it deteriorate the good situation there is at the 
moment regarding the states’ compliance with the judgments, but it can also bring into 
question the legitimacy of the Court. By deciding whether a violation of the above 
stated rights occurred on a case-by-case basis the Court is often also being inconsistent 
and creates uncertainty among states regarding their obligations under the Convention. 
For that reasons, in the following chapter the inconsistency in the Court’s decision-
making will be discussed. Emphasis will be on the Court’s jurisprudence as discussed in 
chapters IV, V, VI and VII. Finally, chapter IX will question and analyse another 
interrelated issue: the legitimacy of the Court and its work. The biggest problem that will 
be addressed is whether the Court’s legitimacy is threatened because of its reading in 
new rights, rights with significant socio-economic elements, particularly by doing that in 
an inconsistent manner. 
                                                 
719 Except from the Right to education (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1) and the Right to protection of 
property (Article 1 of Protocol No.1). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE INCONSISTENCY OF THE COURT’S JUDGMENTS 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have seen from the jurisprudence analysed in the previous chapters the practical 
problems that arise when judges of the Court deliver judgments with significant socio-
economic elements. Another problem of such judgments is the inconsistency in the 
decision-making. Inconsistency is one of the issues raised in the research hypothesis and 
it will be discussed here. The Court is not bound by its precedents as courts in a 
common law system are, but for reasons of legal certainty it is necessary for the Court to 
be consistent and follow its precedents, mainly for the states to be able to regulate their 
behaviour in accordance with the human rights standards developed by the Court.  
According to Judge Popović, the use of precedent in the Court’s practice represents the 
second pillar of development leading to the emergence of the European human rights 
law. The first pillar of the whole process is the Court’s creativity and that creativity 
would have been unbalanced without the role played by precedent.720 It is not easy to 
find out what the Court’s position towards the binding force of precedent really is. 
However, the absence of a properly formulated doctrine does not necessarily mean the 
absence of a corresponding practice of the Court.721 The Court’s principal position on 
the binding force of precedent can be distilled from its case-law.  
“The Court is not bound by its previous judgments. However, it usually follows and applies its own 
precedents, such a course being in the interests of legal certainty and the orderly development of the 
Convention case-law. Nevertheless, this would not prevent the Court from departing from an earlier 
decision if it was persuaded that there were cogent reasons for doing so.”722 
The Court generally denies the binding force of previous judgements, while at the same 
time it follows its own judgments for the sake of legal certainty. In Chapman v United 
                                                 
720 Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12), 62. See also Alastair Mowbray, ‘An 
examination of the European Court's approach to overruling its previous case-law’ (2009) 9(2) H.R.L.Rev. 
179. 
721 Ibid, 66. 
722 Cossey v United Kingdom (n 192), [35]. 
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Kingdom the Court invoked interests of legal certainty, foreseeability, and equality before 
the law as reasons for not departing (without good reasons) from precedents laid down 
in previous cases.723 
Three separate grounds of justification for overruling the Court’s previous case-law have 
been detected in the case-law: uncertainty in the existing jurisprudence, rapidly 
increasing numbers of complaints to the Court concerning a specific right guaranteed by 
the Convention, and the application of the living instrument doctrine to 
the interpretation of the Convention.724 The justification invoked most frequently by the 
Court is the duty to ensure that the Convention is interpreted in an evolutionary manner 
that reflects contemporary standards in accordance with the living instrument 
doctrine.725 Therefore, the Court will depart from its previous case-law if the heightened 
human rights standards require it to do so, and that will be the case if there is a 
consensus among states about those standards. However, the problem arises when the 
Court departs from its case-law without providing a good explanation, when there are 
no cogent reasons or consensus among states for doing so, or when it decides to take a 
step backward in human rights protection. I begin this chapter by looking briefly at the 
Court’s case-law in general, and then go on to consider the judgments with significant 
socio-economic elements discussed in the previous chapters.  
 
8.2 PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY 
A general example of the Court’s inconsistency is Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom,726 
where the issue of making changes in the registration of births and marriages and in 
British National Insurance systems to recognise the post-operative legal status of 
transsexuals was raised. The Court found that the respondent Government could no 
longer claim that the matter fell within their margin of appreciation. It concluded that 
the fair balance that was inherent in the Convention now tilted decisively in favour of 
the applicant and that there had been a failure to respect her right to private life in 
breach of Article 8. The Court simply changed the existing case-law under the aegis of 
Article 8 right respect for private life without even invoking European or international 
                                                 
723 Chapman v United Kingdom (n 11) [70]. 
724 Mowbray, ‘An examination of the European Court's approach…’ (n 720), 200-201. 
725 Ibid, 197-198. 
726 Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom (n 81). 
 219 
consensus but only an international trend.727 Furthermore, the Court invoked three 
principles of the rule of law: legal certainty, foreseeability, and equality, and yet in this 
case it did not apply any of those principles.728 It seems that the Court decided to depart 
from its previous case-law729 and expand the scope of the right to private life, and it did 
so without providing legal reasons for such behaviour and without looking for 
consensus among states.730  
Further cases can also be mentioned: such as Banković and Others v Belgium and Others,731 
where the Court used a restrictive interpretation of the Convention’s provisions after 
years of rejecting such approach, and Al-Skeini v United Kingdom,732 where it returned to 
the activist approach, both of which were decided without providing proper justification 
for such decision-making. Banković was a citizen of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
whose daughter was killed in a NATO air attack on a Serbian television station. He 
complained that the attack had breached several Convention provisions. The Belgian 
government, along with other NATO governments, contended that as Banković was 
not within any of their respective jurisdictions the complaint did not come within 
Article 1 of the Convention. The Grand Chamber held that there was no jurisdictional 
link between Banković and the NATO States. It stated that under Article 1 the 
Convention was subject to territorial limits in terms of jurisdiction and it was only in 
very exceptional cases that acts performed outside the territory of the contracting states, 
or taking effect beyond their territories, would amount to an exercise of jurisdiction for 
the purposes of Article 1; however, the Grand Chamber held this had not occurred in 
Banković case, and therefore the complaint did not fulfil the jurisdictional requirements 
of Article 1.733  
The next case that raised the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction was Al-Skeini. Here the 
judges again pointed out that a state’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 was 
primarily territorial: acts performed, or producing effects, outside their territories could 
constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional 
                                                 
727 Ibid [84]. 
728 Ibid [74]. 
729 Rees v United Kingdom (n 426); Cossey v United Kingdom (n 192). 
730 Also see Frette v France (n 199). 
731 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. SE5 (GC Decision). 
732 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 18. 
733 For more detailed analysis of Banković see Erik Roxtrom, Mark Gibney and Terje Einarse ‘The NATO 
bombing case (Bankovic et al. v Belgium et al.) and the limits of Western human rights protection’ (2005) 
23:55 Boston University International Law Journal 55 and Matthew Happold ‘Bankovic v Belgium and the 
territorial scope of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2003) 3 (1) H.R.L.R. 77. 
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cases. In the instant case, following the removal from power of the Ba’ath regime and 
until the accession of the interim government, the UK, together with the United States, 
had assumed the exercise of some of the public powers normally exercised by a 
sovereign government in Iraq. In those exceptional circumstances, the UK, through its 
soldiers engaged in security operations in Basrah, exercised authority and control over 
individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to establish a 
jurisdictional link between the deceased and the UK for the purposes of Article 1.  
The Al-Skeini judgment was welcomed among the scholars and human rights lawyers, 
although to some it raised certain questions related to the Court’s decision-making 
principles.734 The Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini did point out that the exceptional 
circumstances of the case unlike those in Banković, fulfilled the criteria necessary for the 
extraterritorial acts to be considered as under state’s jurisdiction as required by Article 1. 
However, these two cases represent inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning, especially 
Banković which represents a step backwards in the Court’s interpretation of the 
Convention particularly when looked at from the perspective of its earlier reasoning in 
Cyprus v Turkey and Loizidou v Turkey.735 Let me now turn to the problem of 
inconsistency in judgments with significant socio-economic elements.  
 
8.2.1 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING DETENTION CONDITIONS AND HEALTHCARE IN 
PRISONS, HEALTHCARE IN GENERAL, AND HEALTHCARE FOR 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 
First, judgments concerning detention conditions and healthcare in prisons where not 
much inconsistency can be found will be discussed. As already mentioned in chapter IV, 
the main problem with those judgments is that they usually require states to institute 
numerous general measures and their execution is a long and financially demanding 
process.  
                                                 
734 For further comments on Al-Skeini, see Max Schaefer ‘Al-Skeini and the elusive parameters of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction’ (2011) 5 E.H.R.L.R. 566; and Joanne Williams, ‘Al Skeini: A flawed 
interpretation of Bankovic’ (2005) 3(4) Wisconsin International Law Journal 687. 
735 Cyprus v Turkey (1982) 4 E.H.R.R. 482 and Loizidou v Turkey (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 99. 
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Despite the Court’s overall consistency there is one case that can be mentioned here, 
Stojanović v Serbia,736 where the Court, after years of applying strict criteria and standards 
when deciding whether a violation of Article 3 occurred due to unsatisfactory detention 
conditions or healthcare in prisons, delivered a rather unusual decision. In this particular 
case the applicant was examined by a prison dentist in 2004, who confirmed his 
complete toothlessness and proposed that the applicant should be provided with 
dentures. The applicant could not afford to pay the amount necessary unless he paid in 
instalments corresponding to his monthly prison salary. It took more than three years 
before he had been provided with the dentures during which time he could not eat any 
solid food. The Court struck out this part of the application, on the ground that the 
applicant had eventually been provided with the relevant and necessary medical care.737 
This reasoning is contrary to Court’s judgments concerning detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons.738 Judge Zagrebelsky dissented on this particular issue, claiming 
that a violation of Article 3 had occurred by stating: 
“The Court, to my knowledge, has never found the matter to have been resolved in a case under Article 3 
of the Convention such as the present one…  
I am unable to see how it can be said that the issue of the case has been resolved by the sole fact that a 
possible violation of Article 3 has finally ended and I am deeply worried by a judgment that sets such a 
precedent in the Court’s Article 3 case-law. Moreover one can easily conceive possible developments and 
applications of this new precedent, capable of spreading across a broader range of Convention violations 
such as serious violations of Article 3, or of Article 5 and so forth.”739 
However, in relation to detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, the Court has 
generally been consistent in finding violations of Article 3, and this judgment did not 
establish a precedent.  
As we can see, inconsistency is not common with regard to detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons. One of the reasons for this is the clear standards established by 
the CPT which the Court, as seen in chapter IV, is also applying in its decision-making. 
Furthermore, Article 3 does not allow any margin of appreciation to be attributed to 
states and there is no second paragraph of this article that would allow exceptions. 
Therefore, once the Court started guaranteeing satisfactory detention conditions and the 
                                                 
736 Stojanović v Serbia App no 34425/04 (ECtHR 19 May 2009). 
737 Ibid [76]-[81]. 
738 See Price v United Kingdom (n 331). 
739 Stojanović v Serbia (n 736), Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Zagrebelsky. 
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right to healthcare of a certain degree in detention, it could not depart from those 
established standards by using the margin of appreciation.  
Regarding the right to healthcare in general, as guaranteed by the Court, we have seen in 
chapter VI that this is an area where the Court decided to refrain from entering this 
socio-economic sphere of human rights protection, but left the issue of healthcare to 
the ECSR. When it is not providing healthcare of detainees, the Court generally adopts 
an approach of not dealing with providing healthcare in general under the Convention. 
However, in one of its most recent cases, Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania,740 the 
Court decided to depart from its previous case-law and found a state to be in violation 
of Article 8 for not introducing general and preventive healthcare measures.741 It will be 
interesting to see whether the Court will continue to declare how a state should allocate 
its national resources in the healthcare area. This is not advisable, since it is an area of 
human rights protection clearly not envisaged by the Convention but it is dealt with 
under the ESC. 
Furthermore, another pertinent issue for this section relates to cases concerning the 
issue of healthcare and deportation. In N. v United Kingdom, the Court acknowledged that 
financial issues were an important factor when matters of asylum were raised. In this 
judgment the Grand Chamber stated that in the absence of very exceptional 
circumstances, the deportation of an asylum seeker who was suffering from AIDS to 
Uganda, where access to medical treatment and facilities was problematic, would not 
breach Article 3 of the Convention.742 Unlike in N., in D. v United Kingdom743 the Court 
decided that deportation of the applicant to St. Kitts would have serious detrimental 
effects on his health, as he was also suffering from AIDS, and therefore the 
implementation of the national decision to remove the applicant to St Kitts would 
violate Article 3 of the Convention. The facts of these cases are not different on any 
important or significant level and yet the Court reached different conclusions.  
The two points of N. judgment are particularly interesting. First, the Court invoked 
financial burden this judgment might place on the state that is already in a difficult 
economic situation. If we look at the previous practice of the Court, where it 
                                                 
740 Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania (n 232). 
741 See chapter VI, Section 6.2.4. 
742 In some ways, this judgment looks similar to the Banković decision (n 731) where the Court also 
invoked exceptional reasons, thereby allowing itself discrepancies in decision-making. 
743 D. v United Kingdom (n 135). 
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emphasises the absolute nature of Article 3 and the irrelevance of the financial burden, 
we compare that with the Court’s decision in N. where it departed from this view. 
Secondly, the N. case also shows us that when the Court finds it appropriate, it stresses 
the difference between economic, social, civil and political rights;744 while on other 
occasions, it points out the interconnection between those two sets of rights and its 
integrated approach to human rights protection.745  
In conclusion, despite the small amount of inconsistency in the healthcare and detention 
condition cases, it is again apparent that whenever the Court does not have clearly 
defined standards, inconsistency can be found in its decisions.  
 
8.2.2 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 
As seen in chapter V, the Court has increasingly examined complaints in which 
individuals have argued that a breach of their Convention rights has resulted from 
adverse environmental factors. Due to the fact that a healthy environment per se is not 
protected under the Convention, the Court decided environmental cases on a case-by-
case basis, and it did not set out clear standards or guidelines, as to when and why the 
state’s margin of appreciation will be wide, and when on the other hand it will be 
narrow. 
The first case to which attention will be given is Hatton, a case that has been decided by 
both the Chamber and Grand Chamber, and where both chambers reached different 
conclusions. The Chamber held that the state did have a duty to take reasonable and 
appropriate steps to uphold the residents’ rights. According to the Chamber, the UK 
Government had failed to strike a balance between competing interests: the UK’s 
economic well-being, and the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their right to respect for 
their homes and their private and family lives. Despite the margin of appreciation left to 
the respondent State, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 8.746 
                                                 
744 N. v United Kingdom (n 568) [43] and [44]. 
745 Airey v Ireland (n 3) [26]. 
746 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (n 204). 
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However, this judgment was not reached unanimously and two judges disagreed with 
the majority’s finding that there had been a violation of Article 8.747 
Hatton was referred to the Grand Chamber, which held, dismissing the Article 8 claim, 
that although a person who was significantly affected by noise or pollution could bring a 
claim under Article 8, states had a margin of appreciation that required them to weigh all 
the competing interests involved. According to the Grand Chamber, no violation of 
Article 8 had occurred and in the instant case, and that the UK had acted within the 
scope of its margin of appreciation.  
This decision was criticised by Judges Costa, Ress, Türmen, Zupančič and Steiner, who 
issued a joint dissenting opinion where they invoked the current stage of development 
of the pertinent case-law regarding the guarantees of the right to live in a healthy 
environment under Article 8. They also emphasized that the Convention is a living 
instrument and therefore the Court adopts an evolutive interpretation of various 
Convention requirements that it has gradually extended in order to raise the level of 
protection afforded to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.748  
“The Grand Chamber’s judgment in the present case, in so far as it concludes, contrary to the Chamber's 
judgment of October 2, 2001, that there was no violation of Article 8, seems to us to deviate from the 
above developments in the case law and even to take a step backwards. It gives precedence to economic 
considerations over basic health conditions in qualifying the applicants' “sensitivity to noise” as that of a 
small minority of people.”749 
The differences in the opinions of the judges of both the Chamber and the Grand 
Chamber in this judgment are a clear sign of their uncertainty when delivering 
judgments where a claim relies upon a right not guaranteed under the Convention, and 
at the same time that right has strong economic implications for states. Interestingly, 
even the dissenting judges emphasized the Court’s inconsistency in this area.750  
Finding a violation of Article 8 due to environmental hazards is compatible with the use 
of both the living instrument doctrine and the doctrine of effectiveness where the Court 
wants to make sure that the protection of the Convention rights is not theoretical or 
                                                 
747 Ibid. Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Greve and dissenting opinion of Judge Brian Kerr. 
748 Hatton and Others v United Kingdom (GC judgment) (n 204), Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Costa, 
Ress, Türmen, Zupančič and Steiner [15]. 
749 Ibid [17]. 
750 Ibid [14]. 
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illusory, but practical and effective in accordance with the present day conditions. 
However, the use of these doctrines will also depend on the width of the margin of 
appreciation attributed to states and the consequences that a judgment will have on 
states, particularly on their finances. Finding a violation of Article 8 in the Lopez Ostra 
case had fewer consequences, particularly financial ones, for Spain than the decision in 
the Hatton case would have had for the UK.  
In the later cases, Fadeyeva v Russia,751 Giacomelli v Italy,752 and Tatar v Romania753 the Court 
found a violation of Article 8 due to the impact the state’s actions or inactions had on 
the applicants’ environment. Therefore, the Court, when striking a fair balance, decided 
to narrow the margin of appreciation afforded to states and found that it was their 
obligation to provide the applicants with a healthy environment. Nevertheless, the 
situation with the right to the healthy environment is still not clear, as the Court decides 
on a case-by-case basis, sometimes narrowing and sometimes widening the state’s 
margin of appreciation, all without clear standards and guidelines.  
As to the cases regarding a healthy environment in relation to Article 2, they are not 
numerous, nor are there inconsistencies, since the Court was determined in establishing 
Article 2 violations where the state failed to fulfil its positive obligations to protect lives 
from environmental hazards.  
 
8.2.3 THE COURT’S INCONSISTENCY AND JUDGMENTS 
CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING 
Finally, the inconsistency of the Court’s judgments in relation to the right to adequate 
housing will be discussed. In chapter VII, the housing cases were divided into three 
groups, the first group consisted of cases where state agents were directly involved in 
the destruction of and eviction from home. The second group of cases involved 
situations where actions of state bodies caused individuals to either lose or to move 
from their homes, while the third group of cases analysed was primarily concerned with 
the content of the state positive obligations regarding adequate housing. 
                                                 
751 (n 454). 
752 (n 455). 
753 (n 456). 
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Not much attention will be given to the first group of cases where the Court has been 
consistent in finding a state responsible for the alleged violations. 
One of the cases from the second group of cases that can be mentioned here is Blečić v 
Croatia. 754 It represents an interesting case for numerous reasons but mainly because 
here the Court showed its lack of consistency on several levels.  
First, the Chamber declared that no violation of the Article 8 right to respect for home 
arose and allowed the state a wide margin of appreciation. The judges found no 
violation of Article 8 since satisfying housing needs had to be balanced against Ms 
Blečić’s right to respect for her home. In the context of Article 8 rights, the Court 
stressed that domestic authorities enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in 
implementing social and economic policies necessary to secure social justice and public 
benefit. It is important to point out that in the Blečić case the applicant was actually the 
sole holder of a specially protected tenancy on a flat. The state terminated her tenancy 
on the ground that she had been absent for more than six months without justified 
reason, and the national courts had found that the war in Croatia did not justify her 
absence. The Chamber found the national decisions to be justified and necessary in a 
democratic society, justifying it by reference to the housing needs of other citizens. 
However, when the case was referred to the Grand Chamber it found the case to be 
inadmissible, and held that the Court had no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
case.755 
In the later and similar housing case, Paulić v Croatia756 the Court did find a violation of 
the applicant’s Article 8 right by stressing procedural safeguards as an important point 
when deciding on the state’s scope of margin of appreciation.757  
                                                 
754 Blečić v Croatia (n 651). 
755 Blečić v Croatia (n 653), [85]. The Grand Chamber said that the alleged interference was the termination 
of the applicant's tenancy and that act occurred when a judgment terminating the tenancy became res 
judicata, which was in February 1996 when the Supreme Court reversed the County Court's judgment. 
According to the majority, the subsequent Constitutional Court decision of November 1999 was simply 
the exercise of a domestic remedy and resulted in allowing the alleged interference to subsist. This 
reasoning and this kind of deduction is completely inconsistent with the Court's previous jurisprudence in 
relation to the application of the Convention ratione temporis. With this judgment the Court declared that 
the decision of the Constitutional Court is not relevant for the ratione temporis issue because this decision 
“only resulted in allowing the interference allegedly caused by that judgment – a definitive act which was 
by itself capable of violating the applicant’s rights – to subsist.” See Dissenting opinion of Judge Loucaides 
joined by Judges Rozakis, Zupančič, Cabral Baretto, Pavlovschi and David Thorn Björgvinsson and 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Zupančič joined by Judge Cabral Barreto. 
756 Paulić v Croatia (n 213). 
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Finally, in Bjedov v Croatia which is the most recent Croatian case concerning the issue of 
special protected tenancy the Court found a violation of Article 8.758 Just like Mrs Blečić, 
the applicant was elderly and of poor health and absent from her flat due to special war 
circumstances. However, unlike in Blečić, in the Bjedov case the Court found a violation of 
the applicant’s Article 8 right to respect for home claiming the failure of the state 
authorities to analyse the issue of proportionality and reasonableness of the applicant’s 
eviction. The Court reached this decision even though the applicant was offered 
alternative accommodation in a Home for Elderly, which was not the case for Mrs 
Blečić. The same criteria could have easily been applied by the Court in Blečić, but the 
Chamber in the Blečić case decided that satisfying housing needs prevailed over the 
applicant’s right to respect for her home (while Grand Chamber found the issue to be 
outside its temporal jurisdiction). Since the Bjedov case was decided in May 2012, and 
Croatia has numerous unresolved housing issues related to the persons that left their 
special protected tenancies during the war, it remains to be seen whether the Court will 
continue to follow its reasoning from Bjedov or from Blečić. 
A similar situation can be found in the following ‘UK Roma people cases’, where the 
Court showed the same lack of precision and consistency when deciding whether a 
violation of Article 8 occurred. In these cases the Court agreed that there was a 
common standard recognising the special needs of minorities, and yet it decided to 
ignore it. In Chapman the Grand Chamber found that the enforcement of planning 
restrictions pertaining to land owned and occupied by gypsies did not constitute a 
breach of the applicant’s right to respect for private and family life and thereby no 
violation of Article 8 had occurred.759 This judgment was not reached unanimously and 
7 judges considered that there had been a violation of Article 8. The majority of judges 
considered that since they found no violation in the previous Buckley judgment, for the 
reasons of legal certainty, foreseeability, and equality before the law, that it should not 
depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases. The majority 
also rejected the idea of state’s obligation to provide an individual, or even an individual 
who is a member of an endangered minority, with a home or any kind help regarding 
their accommodation. The minority, on the other hand, considered that a violation had 
                                                                                                                                          
757 Ibid [40]. 
758 Bjedov v Croatia (n 657). 
759 Chapman v United Kingdom (n 11). 
 228 
occurred.760 They claimed that the Court had a duty to review the approach adopted in 
the Buckley case in light of current conditions and the arguments put forward by the 
parties.  
In the next Roma people case concerning the right to adequate housing under Article 
8761 the Court actually did find that the applicant’s Article 8 right to home had been 
violated. Just like in Paulić, it did so because it placed particular emphasis on the lack of 
procedural protection.762  
Other UK Roma people cases, all decided on 18 January 2001, were decided in the same 
way as Buckley and Chapman,763 meaning that the Court found no violation of Article 8.764 
In all these cases the facts were quite similar, and as with the Chapman case the judgment 
was delivered by the Grand Chamber with a minority expressing a dissenting opinion, 
and invoking the same arguments as in Chapman. Only in the cases of Connors and Kay 
did the Court narrow the margin of appreciation by referring to the seriousness of 
interference combined with a lack of procedural safeguards.  
However, in the latest case involving Roma people and their eviction the Court decided 
to change its approach. In Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria  the Court did find a violation 
of Article 8, and it did so not by invoking procedural safeguards, but on the basis that 
the applicants were members of a disadvantaged group facing a risk of becoming 
homeless if removed. Here, just as in the UK cases, the applicants were illegally on the 
land and under national legislation the state could have evicted them. However, the 
Court decided to narrow the state’s margin of appreciation and although it again 
emphasized that the state is not under an obligation to provide housing, it is clear that 
with this case it placed new positive obligations on states under Article 8. It remains to 
be seen whether the Court will follow this approach in its future jurisprudence or 
whether it will represent an exceptional decision.  
                                                 
760 Ibid, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Tulkens, Stráznická, Lorenzen, 
Fischbach and Casadevall. 
761 Connors v United Kingdom (n 608). 
762 The Court also found a violation of Article 8 due to the lack of procedural safeguards in Kay v United 
Kingdom (n 632) (the procedural safeguards required by Article 8 for the assessment of the proportionality 
of the interference had not been observed in that the applicants had been dispossessed of their homes 
without the proportionality of the measure being determined by an independent tribunal, so that there 
had been a violation of Article 8. 
763 Except for the Kay case (n 631). 
764 Coster v United Kingdom (n 623); Beard v United Kingdom (n 634); Lee v United Kingdom (n 634); Smith (Jane) v 
United Kingdom (n 634). 
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In the third group of housing cases discussed under Section 7.3.3. the Court has, so far, 
decided to restrain itself from finding violations of Article 8. However, the Court 
pointed out that although not creating a right to a home per se, the positive duty in 
Article 8 to respect private and family life did not absolve the government of all 
responsibilities in respect of housing needs.765 By making this statement, the Court gave 
itself space for delivering judgments with different conclusions in the future. 
 
8.3 CONCLUSION 
The Court has shown greatest consistency in cases concerning detention conditions and 
healthcare in prisons. One can assume that the reason for this is the clear standards set 
out by the CPT that the Court is using when delivering judgments. When it comes to 
the right to a healthy environment, healthcare in general, and the right to adequate 
housing, the Court has shown quite a big amount of inconsistency. The probable 
reasons for such inconsistency are that these rights are not originally guaranteed under 
the Convention and that there is a lack of clear standards established for these cases. By 
creating a consistent group of judgments, as it did with the detention condition cases, 
the Court could possibly have created precedents for its later decision-making process. 
Instead, it created a great deal of uncertainty for states and the applicants by providing 
no defined standards as to when it will find a violation of a certain Convention right. In 
my opinion, it would be best for the Court if it had not entered this sphere at all and left 
the protection of the rights discussed in the thesis to the CPT and the ECSR. By doing 
so, it would have avoided the inconsistency and uncertainty that applicants and states 
are facing today.  
 
                                                 
765 Marzari v Italy (n 607). 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter attention will be given to the legitimacy of the Court in relation to the 
problems arising out of the Court’s wide use of its interpretative powers, often 
inconsistently, that have led to the judgments concerning issues not guaranteed under 
the Convention but under different European instruments. Before turning to some 
theoretical discussions, I would like to mention one recent and strong criticism of the 
work of the Court, where its legitimacy has been completely denied, that of Lord 
Hoffmann’s speech in 2009 “The Universality of Human Rights.”766  
Although in some respects Lord Hofmann is too critical,767 one part of his speech is 
rather interesting from the aspect of this thesis: 
“The proposition that the Convention is a “living instrument” is the banner under which the Strasbourg 
court has assumed power to legislate what they consider to be required by “European public order”. I 
would entirely accept that the practical expression of concepts employed in a treaty or constitutional 
document may change. To take a common example, the practical application of the concept of a cruel 
punishment may not be the same today as it was even 50 years ago. But that does not entitle a judicial 
body to introduce wholly new concepts, such as the protection of the environment, into an international 
treaty which makes no mention of them, simply because it would be more in accordance with the spirit of 
the times.”768 
At the conclusion of his speech Lord Hoffmann said “I have no difficulty about the text 
of the European Convention…The problem is the Court; and the right of individual 
                                                 
766 ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Speech by Lord Hoffmann at the Judicial Studies Board Annual 
Lecture 2009, <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2009/speech-lord-hoffman-19032009> 
accessed 11 July 2012.  
767 For example, when quoting Bentham and saying that the cases mentioned (O’Halloran and Francis v 
United Kingdom, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v United Kingdom and Hatton v United Kingdom) are examples of 
teaching grandmothers to suck eggs. Ibid [10] and [28]-[33]. 
768 Ibid [36]. 
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petition, which enables the Court to intervene in details and nuances of the domestic 
laws of Member States.”769  
The speech of Lord Hoffmann is very sceptical about the role played by the Court and 
he would rather see it as a forum for theoretical discussion without any real judicial 
powers than as a court with the power to deliver binding decisions on states.770 There 
were numerous criticisms of Lord Hoffmann’s speech.771 In my criticism of the Court, I 
would not go nearly as far as Lord Hoffmann did, but I do think that the Court should 
start imposing some boundaries on its interpretation of the Convention rights and try to 
remain consistent in its decision-making. 
Why am I now turning to the question of legitimacy of the European Court? The main 
reason is because it was one of the issues raised in the research hypothesis. 
Furthermore, according to scholars J. Gibson and G. Caldeira, legitimacy is the single 
most important attribute for legal institutions. “Legitimacy provides courts’ authority, it 
allows them the latitude necessary to make decisions to the perceived immediate 
interests of their constituents.”772 As a supranational regional human rights court, the 
Court does not have enforcement or sanctioning powers. Its main task is to judge the 
actions of exactly those state authorities upon whose support it relies to enforce its 
judgments. Thus, the Court relies on its legitimacy to gain respect and deference from 
domestic judges and politicians.773  
The definitions of legitimacy are numerous, but the most commonly used comes from 
T. Franck who wrote “Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rulemaking institution which 
itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively because those 
                                                 
769 Ibid [44]. 
770 For the recent criticism of the Court see an article published online in the Daily Telegraph (7th 
February 2011) ‘UK should withdraw from European Court of Human Rights’ as a response to Hirst 
(No.2) v UK where Lord Hoffmann was quoted: “'International institutions which are set up by everyone 
become in practice answerable to no one, and courts have an age-old tendency to try to enlarge their 
jurisdictions,”… “And so the Strasbourg court had taken upon itself an extraordinary power to 
micromanage the legal systems of the Member States of the Council of Europe (or at any rate those which 
pay attention to its decisions) culminating, for the moment, in its decision that the UK is not entitled to 
have a law that convicted prisoners lose, among other freedoms, the right to vote.”  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/8307782/UK-should-withdraw-from-
European-Court-of-Human-Rights.html> accessed 11 July 2012. 
771 See Michael O'Boyle ‘The Legitimacy of Strasbourg Review: Time for a Reality Check?’  in La conscience 
des droits : mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Paul Costa / [ouvrage coordonné par Patrick Titiun et réalisé avec 
l'assistance de Patricia Dumaine] (Paris : Dalloz 2011), 489-498. 
772 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, ‘The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: 
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice’ (1995) 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 459, 460. 
773 Cali, Koch and Bruch (n 43). 
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addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”774 Another widely 
accepted definition is given by I. Clark: “Legitimacy is international society's aggregate 
instrument for seeking an accommodation between competing norms, and is essentially 
a political condition grounded in degrees of consensus about what is considered 
acceptable.”775 Furthermore, it has been suggested that “[l]egitimacy is the missing link 
in solving the mystery of how the international system obligates without a coercive 
sovereign.”776 All these definitions show us the importance of legitimacy for every 
institution.  
According to T. Franck, and this division can also be found in other papers on 
legitimacy of the Court,777 there are three basic models of legitimacy. The first model is 
given by theorists led by M. Weber and H. Kelsen, who define legitimacy in terms of 
rather narrowly specific process. This model is also called an ‘input’ legitimacy defining 
it as an attribute which a norm or a decision of an institution possesses only if it was 
adopted or created in accordance with accepted procedure. The second group of 
theorists is interested not only in how a ruler, and a rule, was chosen but also “whether 
the rules made and commands given have been considered in the light of all relevant 
data, both objective and attitudinal.”778 The third group, which is composed primarily, 
but not exclusively of neo-Marxist philosophers, focuses primarily on the outcomes. In 
that view, “a system seeking to validate itself - and its commands - must be defensible in 
terms of the equality, fairness, justice and freedoms realised by those commands.”779 
 
9.2 THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
Founded on one or more of the above presented theories are five different models of 
legitimacy that, arguably, provide a foundational basis for the (Court’s) overall 
legitimacy. Those are: (1) Formal legitimacy; (2) Procedural legitimacy; (3) Social 
                                                 
774 Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (n 38), 19. 
775 Jackson (n 20), 793 (Quoting Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (OUP 2005)). 
776 Jose E. Alvarez ‘The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations by Thomas M Frank’ (1991) 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199, 206 (book review). 
777 See Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou ‘Does consensus matter? Legitimacy of European consensus in the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) Jul P.L. 534; and Jackson (n 21). 
778 Franck, ‘Why a Quest for Legitimacy?’ (n 38), 543. 
779 Ibid. 
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legitimacy; (4) Normative legitimacy; and (5) Legal legitimacy.780  The Court’s “overall” 
legitimacy is built upon the legitimacy it is afforded within each of the five models and 
the Court’s legitimacy depends upon the aggregate legitimacy of the five models.781  
The first model of legitimacy, formal legitimacy, is concerned “with the extent to which 
all the applicable legal requirements were satisfied when the entity in question was set 
up.”782 In other words, this model is concerned with a legal pedigree of an institution. 
There is not much need to question this dimension of legitimacy since the Convention 
has entered into force, and it became a valid treaty in 1953, after the necessary 
precondition, which was ratification by 10 Member States, had been satisfied. The 
Convention itself, under Article 19, provided for the creation of the Court, therefore, 
the Court can be considered to have formal legitimacy.  
The second model of legitimacy, as expressed by J.L. Jackson is procedural legitimacy, 
which in turns depends upon its function being perceived as “legalistic”: for a Court 
that means that its procedure entails “adjudicating and rendering decisions in 
accordance with the rule of law, as well as performing its functions in both a transparent 
and participatory manner.”783 Adjudicating decisions in accordance with the rule of law 
and performing functions in transparent and participatory manner are interconnected 
while the rule of law as common heritage of State parties to the Convention, as stated in 
the Preamble of the Convention. The performance of the Court’s functions can be seen 
in the Court’s Rules as well as in the Convention’s provisions. According to Jackson 
procedural legitimacy is dependent on the perception that the procedures are legalistic, 
that is particularly because “absent coercion, people are not likely to accept and consent 
to the judgments of a tribunal perceived to lack “legalistic” procedures.”784  
Therefore, the procedural dimension is about the Court’s judicial-making process and 
on the acceptance that its reasoning leads to certain judgments. The Court’s judicial-
making process consists of delivering Chamber judgments in closed sessions, while 
                                                 
780 Jackson (n 21), 784.  
781 Similar division of the Court’s legitimacy can be found in Cali, Koch and Bruch (n 42) where there are 
three dimensions of legitimacy: The Constitutive dimension; the Performance dimension and the Social 
dimension and they generally encompass the same issues as the above stated five models. 
782 Jackson (n 21), 794 (quoting Anthony Estella, The EU Principle of subsidiary and its Critique (OUP 2003), 
39). 
783 Ibid, 95 (paraphrasing Vanessa A. Baird, ‘Building Institutional Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural 
Justice’ (2001) 54 POL. RES. Q. 333, 350 and Mattias Kumm ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A 
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’ (2004) 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907, 911).  
784 Jackson (n 21), 795. 
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Grand Chamber session are open to the public, but both processes of drawing up 
judgments are made in closed sessions. However, since the Court is obliged to give 
reasoning for its judgments and make their judgments public, we can attribute legitimacy 
to this part of performance dimension.785 However, this legitimacy is most controversial 
and if the Court continues with its extensive and inconsistent interpretation, it will fail 
on the legitimacy test.  
The main reason for questioning this model of legitimacy is the issue of the Court’s 
commitment to the rule of law. The rule of law is mainly viewed as a limitation on 
executive power but courts too are subject to the rule of law. There are numerous 
divisions of the rule of law into purposes and elements essential to fulfilling these 
purposes. Professor R. Fallon identified three purposes: “First, the Rule of Law should 
protect against anarchy and the Hobbesian war of all against all. Second, the Rule of 
Law should allow people to plan their affairs with reasonable confidence that they can 
know in advance the legal consequences of various actions. Third, the Rule of Law 
should guarantee against at least some types of official arbitrariness.”786 As to the 
elements Fallon lists, the first one is the capacity of legal rules, standards, or principles 
to guide people in the conduct of their affairs. People must be able to understand the 
law and comply with it. The second element is efficacy. The law should actually guide 
people, at least for the most part. The third element is stability. The law should be 
reasonably stable, in order to facilitate planning and coordinated action over time. The 
fourth element of the rule of law is the supremacy of legal authority. The law should 
rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens. The final element involves 
instrumentalities of impartial justice. Courts should be available to enforce the law and 
should employ fair procedures.787 There are numerous such lists788 but what they all have 
in common is that a commitment to the rule of law must include things like an equal or 
                                                 
785 We might also question the process of the election of judges under this model. However, in my 
opinion, this is not the most problematic issue within the procedural legitimacy, nor is it of much 
relevance for this thesis. 
786 Richard L. Fallon Jr., ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 
97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7-8. 
787 Ibid, 8-9. 
788 See Cass. R. Sustein ‘Problems with Rules’ (1995) 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 971-978; and Antonin Scalia 
‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1176. 
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impartial application of law, the predictability of law, and that law is applied in a non-
arbitrary way.789 
The problematic issue in the context of judgments with significant socio-economic 
elements discussed in the thesis is the equal application of law and its predictability. As 
we have seen, the Court is only consistent when delivering judgments concerning 
violations of Article 3 based on unsatisfactory detention conditions and healthcare in 
prisons790 and when ruling as inadmissible applications concerning the issue of 
providing healthcare in general. However, when it comes to providing healthcare in 
general the Court has shown it might start imposing obligations on states to introduce 
general healthcare measures.791 As to the right to a healthy environment and the right to 
adequate housing the Court has a shown lack of consistency and clear standards that 
would enable states to know their obligations under the Convention. Therefore, the 
requirements of predictability and equality in application of law can be questioned. The 
Court is placing obligations on states to which they have not agreed when signing the 
Convention and even more, it is very often doing so in an inconsistent manner. By 
doing so, it is creating uncertainty among states as to what their obligations under the 
Convention are and which state’s behaviour will be characterised as a violation of the 
Convention and which will not.  
Although states have so far, on most occasions, accepted the Court’s reasoning and 
have not questioned the Court’s actions regarding respect of the rule of law, if the Court 
continues to broaden the scope of the Convention’s provisions into the socio-economic 
sphere of human rights protection, particularly if it continues doing so in an inconsistent 
manner, states might start opposing the Court’s reasoning. In conclusion, the fulfilment 
of procedural legitimacy requirements is seriously compromised nowadays because of 
the Court’s entrance into the socio-economic sphere of human rights by which it 
imposes obligations on states to which they have not agreed when signing the 
Convention. Furthermore, the Court is often reading in these new rights in an 
inconsistent manner, creating ever-greater uncertainty and compromising its legitimacy 
even more.  
                                                 
789 Brauch (n 11), 124. The Court itself also pointed out that it is in the interests of legal certainty, 
forseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reasons from its previous 
case- law. Chapman v United Kingdom (n 11) [70]. 
790 Although see Stojanović v Serbia (n 736) and N. v United Kingdom (n 568). 
791 Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania (n 231). 
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Third type of legitimacy is social legitimacy. According to J.L. Jackson social legitimacy 
is “gauged by an institution’s ability to command acceptance and consent, as well as by 
ability to generate compliance with the decisions of the institution.”792 Furthermore, 
“acceptance, consent and compliance are based on conscious decisions resulting from 
the perception that a particular institution is formally and procedurally legitimate.”793 
When looking at the high rate of compliance by states with the Court’s judgments and 
the increase in the number of applications,794 one might presume that the Court has 
social legitimacy.   
Since the Court has no available sanctions in case of states’ non-compliance, it relies on 
its persuasive abilities to get states to execute its judgments.795 The Court has so far 
largely enjoyed respect and only rarely have states rejected to accept the Court’s 
judgment and refused to execute it.796 Therefore, when talking about this aspect of 
legitimacy, the Court has, so far, fulfilled the necessary preconditions.797 However, will it 
remain that way? With the Court delivering judgments with significant socio-economic 
elements this aspect of legitimacy, looked at from the perspective of the states’ readiness 
to execute the Court’s judgments, might also become questionable in the very near 
future. Also, as we have seen in the previous chapters, sometimes even when states are 
willing to execute judgments, its socio-economic constraints make only progressive 
realisation possible. Therefore, because of the Court’s imposition of obligations with 
significant socio-economic elements the execution process is also compromised and it 
might become even more endangered if the states start to oppose the execution of 
judgments containing obligations to which they did not agree when they signed the 
Convention. 
Later on, Jackson points out two more dimensions or models of legitimacy: normative 
legitimacy and legal legitimacy. He differentiates social legitimacy from normative 
                                                 
792 Jackson (n 21), 796. 
793 Ibid. 
794 See n 9. 
795 Dzehtsiarou (n 777), 536. 
796 Speech of V. Putin concerning Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, House of Commons, Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Global Security: Russia, Second Report of Session 2007-2008, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/51/51.pdf> accessed 11 July 
2012 [38]. 
797 Although the necessity of states’ consent for the legitimacy has nowadays been questioned, for 
example Letsas claims that the issue of consent is much less relevant after 50 years of existence of the 
Court (George Letsas, ‘The truth in autonomous concept: how to interpret the ECHR’ 2004 15(2) E.J.I.L. 
279, 304; while Macdonald wrote that the whole system of the European human rights protection rests on 
the “fragile foundations of the consent of the Contracting Parties.” Macdonald, ‘The Margin of 
Appreciation’ (n 192), 123.  
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legitimacy, saying that while social legitimacy is contingent on subjective perceptions of 
an institution’s formal and procedural legitimacy, normative legitimacy can be seen “as 
conferring legitimacy though the institutionalization and protection of “higher order” or 
constitutional norms.”798 Since the Convention is a supranational document on human 
rights, we can attribute normative legitimacy to the Court when deciding whether the 
violations of rights contained in the Convention, rights that can be considered as high 
order norms, occurred. As to the rights not clearly in the Convention the Court has, so 
far, never clearly stated that it is including a new right but it invoked exceptional 
circumstances or activist interpretative methods for extending the scope of a certain 
right. However, if it continues to broaden the scope of the Convention into areas 
protected under different human rights instruments, this type of legitimacy will also 
become threatened.   
Finally, legal legitimacy can be considered as a “synthesis of the formal, procedural, 
social and normative models.”799 Therefore, the legal legitimacy of the Court exists as a 
derivative of it having legitimacy under the four models presented above, where formal 
and procedural legitimacy are considered to be essential.  
The main reason for the Court to be considered legitimate is the fact that the 
Convention system has been operating for almost 60 years now and it has never been 
questioned by the High Contracting States, nor have states ever withdrawn themselves 
from the Convention.800 Even more importantly, states have willingly and freely ratified 
the Convention and thereby the jurisdiction of the Court.801 Even today, when there are 
a huge number of applications followed by a large number of the Court’s judgments 
finding a violation of a Convention, states do not show any sign of “desire to dismantle 
the Court out of a suddenly appeared conviction that its activities are constitutionally 
questionable or disreputable.”802 Also, since the Court has no direct coercive mechanism 
to enforce its judgments, the fact that the States willingly enforce its judgments shows 
that they consider it to be legitimate. Furthermore, when it comes to the national courts, 
advocating an increased level of judicial activism may be considered inappropriate, but 
                                                 
798 Jackson (n 21), 797-798. 
799 Ibid, 798. 
800 Only Greece has withdrawn is membership of the CoE and therefore it also withdrew from the 
Convention in 1970, however that was for the purely political reasons, and not because it questioned the 
legitimacy of the Convention system.  
801 This is following on from the changes to the Convention system from 1998 and Protocol 11, when the 
jurisdiction of the Court became compulsory for all the States parties to the Convention.  
802 O'Boyle, ‘The Legitimacy of Strasbourg Review…’ (n 770), 492. 
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the Court had to develop and ensure that the rights protected are effective and 
practical.803 The Convention has from its very beginnings been perceived as a living 
instrument capable of evolution. However, in the process of evolution the Court must 
strike a balance between change and consistency, if it wants to preserve its legitimacy. 
The Convention has to evolve in a predictable and consistent manner, by doing so it can 
increase its legitimacy instead of endangering it.804  
Despite general acceptance of the Court’s legitimacy, it is being questioned now more 
than ever by scholars and politicians, particularly in the United Kingdom.805 In order for 
the Court to maintain its validity and legitimacy it must base its judgments on a 
consistent application of the Convention, clear rulings, dialogue between the Court and 
national authorities, and by providing clear guidance to Contracting States,806 all in 
relation to the commitment to the rule of law. This is not something that the Court 
appears to aspiring towards today; rather, it is departing from these legitimacy 
requirements more than ever. As we have seen, its procedural legitimacy is most 
seriously threatened because of judgments with significant socio-economic elements 
that include rights already protected by different CoE instruments to which the states 
have not signed up to under the Convention. Also, often the Court is delivering such 
judgments in an inconsistent manner, and in turn it is compromising its procedural 
legitimacy, that is dependent on the commitment to the rule of law, even more. Finally, 
as we have seen, because judgments with significant socio-economic elements are often 
inconsistent its normative and social legitimacy is becoming more and more 
compromised. Instead of endangering and compromising its legitimacy by entering the 
sphere of human rights protection clearly not stipulated for protection under the 
Convention but under other human rights instruments, the Court should aspire to 
remain the most effective human rights protector in Europe and to retain its legitimate 
role. 
                                                 
803 Ibid, 1713. 
804 Ibid, 1714. 
805 See (besides the above presented Lord Hoffman’s opinion) James Slack, Named and Shamed: The 
European Human Rights Judges Wrecking British Law, DAILY MAIL (5 February 2011) 
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806 Kanstantsin Dzehtsiarou and Alan Greene, ‘Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of 
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CHAPTER X 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In revisiting the research hypothesis, the main issues that have arisen in the course of 
the thesis are the problems that arise when the Court delivers judgments interpreting the 
Convention so as to read significant socio-economic elements into Convention rights. 
Such interpretation of the Convention rights is especially problematic where this leads 
the Court into areas that fall within the sphere of other CoE instruments, in particular 
the ECS and the ECPT. Although theoretically interpreting the Convention rights as to 
include rights with significant socio-economic elements and protecting them through 
the Court’s binding decisions might look attractive, in practice it is rather complex and 
problematic. There are numerous problems arising when the Court delivers judgments 
with significant socio-economic elements. Those problems have been discussed 
throughout the thesis, most notably concerns regarding the implementation of 
judgments and the Court’s workload, as well as issues such as the lack of consistency in 
the Court’s judgments and finally the legitimacy of the Court’s actions. The thesis 
focused on four areas where these problems arose: detention conditions and healthcare 
in prisons, the environment, healthcare in general, and housing. 
First, the execution of judgments having significant socio-economic elements often 
brings considerable difficulties for the states concerned. In most cases, compliance with 
such judgments is financially demanding and time-consuming, and requires general, 
rather than individual, measures to be taken. Secondly, by reading a significant socio-
economic dimension into many Convention rights, the Court encourages more 
applications, thereby adding to its already excessive workload. As we have seen, despite 
the substantial increase in the Court’s productivity and its output in general, the caseload 
continues to rise considerably, putting the effectiveness and credibility of the 
Convention system in serious danger. Because the Court has at times inconsistently read 
in rights with significant socio-economic elements to which states have not agreed when 
signing the Convention, the Court also threatens its overall legitimacy, because its 
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overall legitimacy depends upon the aggregate legitimacy of the five models discussed in 
chapter IX.    
It is true that is often hard to give a clear-cut distinction between civil and political 
rights and economic and social rights since both groups of rights can give rise to both 
positive and negative obligations, have budgetary implications and can sometimes be 
achieved only progressively. However, on a regional and global level the fact is that, 
despite constant stressing of indivisibility and interconnection of civil and political and 
economic and social rights, these rights are generally still not indivisible. The division of 
the rights into different instruments illustrates doubt about their indivisibility. Within 
the CoE, economic and social rights and civil and political rights are strictly separated 
within different human rights instruments. The ECHR is the only document on civil 
and political while its counterpart in economic and social rights is the ESC. Another 
important instrument for this thesis is the ECPT which, although it is not a document 
on economic and social rights, has a compliance body, the CPT, that deals exclusively 
with protecting persons deprived of liberty from various forms of ill-treatment. Only 
rights guaranteed under the Convention are protected by the Court that delivers binding 
judgments on states while the ESC system, because of the Collective Complaints 
system, can be regarded as quasi-judicial and the ECPT protects rights through a non-
judicial body, the CPT.  
At the time when the Convention was drafted the idea of judicial protection of human 
rights at the regional level was just ‘born’ and it was left to see where it would lead. The 
Convention contains a short list of civil and political rights which should have been 
subjected to certain judicial interpretation if it was to provide an effective protection of 
rights. The Court had already in the early years of its work shown it would interpret the 
Convention in accordance with its object and purpose relying more on the activist 
methods of interpretation. Nowadays, it mostly uses the living instrument doctrine and 
the doctrine of effectiveness to justify its progressive reasoning together with the margin 
of appreciation to stress the Court’s subsidiary role.  
When the Court first started using the living instrument doctrine, conditions were much 
different to those pertaining today. In 1978, when the Tyrer judgment was delivered, the 
number of States parties to the Convention was 16 and from the date of delivering its 
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first judgement in the Lawless case807 until the end of 1978, the Court had all in all 
delivered 31 judgments.808 Comparing that with the today’s situation, where there are 47 
State parties and when in 2011 alone 64,547 applications were allocated to judicial 
formation (with judgments delivered in 1,511 applications), we can see that the situation 
has changed dramatically.809  
Looking back at the areas on which this thesis has focused, the right to satisfactory 
detention conditions and healthcare in prisons was first discussed. The Court has started 
guaranteeing the right to satisfactory detention conditions and the right to healthcare in 
prisons under Article 3 which prohibits torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and 
punishment. From 2001 and the Dougoz judgment, when the Court for the first time 
found a violation of Article 3 based on unsatisfactory detention condition, it has dealt 
with numerous applications concerning these issues. What can be concluded after 
presenting the Court’s case-law is that the execution of judgments concerning detention 
conditions and healthcare in prisons has numerous socio-economic elements and 
includes numerous general measures which are financially demanding and time-
consuming. Also, detention conditions and healthcare in prisons usually affect a large 
group of detainees and are thereby more collective than individual. The Court is 
currently overwhelmed with detention condition cases and it takes years for states to 
execute detention conditions judgments in their entirety. For that reason, I conclude 
that the issue of general detention conditions should be left to the CPT to deal with, 
particularly since this is an issue not originally intended for protection under the 
Convention and has numerous socio-economic elements in its execution. The CPT, 
although a non-judicial body, has established numerous standards on detention 
conditions and healthcare in prisons and it expects states to immediately takes steps to 
bring situation in conformity with those standards. It is aware that doing so can only be 
achieved gradually and it regularly examines states’ progress. Furthermore, the Court 
mainly relies on the CPT findings when it examines whether the situation concerning 
detention conditions and healthcare in prisons is satisfactory, and the CoM is doing the 
same when supervising the execution of judgments. Under Chapter IV, the Court’s 
case-law, the CoM supervision of execution of those judgments and the CPT reports 
                                                 
807 Lawless v Ireland (n 196). 
808 Data retrieved from the HUDOC database, 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOC+database/> accessed 1 June 2012. 
809 European Court of Human Rights in facts and figures 2011 (n 156), 10. 
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have been discussed to show that the detention conditions and general prison healthcare 
issues are better left for the CPT to deal with. It has been argued that whether the 
pressure on improving the detention conditions and healthcare service in prisons is 
coming from the CPT or from the Court and the CoM will not make a difference in 
terms on improving the situation. It will only add to the Court’s already excessive 
workload and compromise the importance of Article 3 since even when the state is 
willing to comply with the judgement and execute it, most of the time introducing 
measures in order to comply with those judgements will be a long and extremely 
expensive process. Despite the fact that not much inconsistency can be found in the 
Court’s case-law regarding detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, it is an issue 
that is better left for the CPT to deal with, leaving the Court to deal with more serious 
violations of Article 3.  
Regarding the right to a healthy environment, the Court has through its interpretation of 
Article 8 (and occasionally Article 2) started guaranteeing the right to a healthy, sound 
and decent environment. The Court is doing so even though the idea of making an 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on the right to a healthy environment had been 
rejected twice, in 2003 and 2009 by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
(CLAHR) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. The CLAHR’s Rapporteurs 
rejected the idea of making such additional protocol and stated that to include the 
protocol to the Convention which was so vague would lead to uncertainty and be a 
substantial increase for the Court’s caseload. Despite these opinions, the Court 
continued in guaranteeing the right to a healthy environment under the Convention, 
mainly under its Article 8. However, the Court has not made clear standards as to when 
it will allow states wide and when narrow margins of appreciation in the healthy 
environment cases. It is rather unclear when the interests of the applicant for a healthy 
environment will prevail over the interest of the economic well-being of the state. 
Therefore, the biggest deficiency of guaranteeing the right to a healthy environment 
under the Convention is the Court’s inconsistency when deciding on the healthy 
environment issues. Also, even when the Court narrows the state’s margin of 
appreciation and decides that the applicant’s interests will prevail, the execution of such 
judgments is long and financially demanding. Unlike the Court, the ECSR has set out 
clear standards regarding the right to a healthy environment, both under its Reporting 
and under the Collective Complaints system and placed it within the mainstream of 
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human rights.810 Furthermore, the ECS is suitable for collective complaints whilst the 
Convention system only deals with individual complaints and, as we have seen, 
environmental issues usually concern a large group of people rather than one individual. 
Despite the fact that the ECSR case-law is not nearly as numerous as the Court’s, it is 
constantly developing and is much better suited for dealing with the right to a healthy 
environment.  
As to the right to a healthcare in general the Court is still rather reluctant in 
guaranteeing it both under Article 8 and under Article 2, constantly stressing its socio-
economic implications. However, the Court has shown certain indications it might look 
into applications concerning the right to a healthcare in general and it has even delivered 
a judgment, Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v Romania, where it found a state to be in 
violation of Article 8 for not taking general and preventive healthcare measures. This is 
not a good idea, not only because of the possibility of even bigger increase of 
applications that might come before the Court but also because the Convention is not 
suitable for dealing with general healthcare issues. The right to a healthcare is guaranteed 
under the ESC and it has numerous socio-economic characteristics: it is more collective 
then individual, it has strong financial implications for a state and it can only be 
achieved progressively.  The Court has only dealt with the healthcare issues of detainees 
under Articles 2 and 3. As to the Article 3 the Court has also dealt with healthcare issues 
in deportation cases where the applicants invoked lack of satisfactory healthcare in 
countries where they were supposed to be deported. Although the Court was willing to 
discuss the deportation cases, it has shown inconsistency and again compromised the 
absolute nature of Article 3. On the other hand, Article 11 of both the Original and the 
Revised ESC guarantees the right to health and unlike the Court, the ECSR has shown 
great deal of consistency when deciding cases concerning healthcare issues and it has set 
out clear standards concerning the right to healthcare through its conclusions and 
decisions.  
Finally, when it comes to the right to adequate housing the Court has again shown great 
reluctance and inconsistency in decision-making while the ECSR has set out clear 
guidelines and standards. The right to adequate housing as guaranteed by the Court has 
been discussed in Chapter VII and the adequate housing cases were divided in three 
groups. Within the first group of cases the situation is clear since the Court always 
                                                 
810 Trilsch (n 507), 532. 
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found a violation of Article 8 where state agents were directly the cause of the 
applicants’ destruction or eviction from their homes. However, within the second group 
of cases, where the actions of state bodies caused applicants to lose or move from their 
homes, the situation is rather unclear and the Court has shown a great deal of 
inconsistency. As to the third group of cases the main issue was the scope of positive 
obligations attributed to states regarding the right to adequate housing and here the 
Court, just like with the healthcare cases, decided to make a distinction between 
economic and social and civil and political rights. All the housing cases under the 
Convention were decided under Article 8 except for one case, M.S.S. v Belgium and 
Greece, where the Court delivered one specific judgment stating that not providing the 
applicant with satisfactory living conditions amounted to a violation of Article 3. It is yet 
to be seen whether the Court will decide to follow this reasoning in its future case-law. 
Under the ESC, the right to housing is guaranteed under three provisions (Articles 31 
and 23 of the Revised ESC and Article 16 of both the Original and the Revised ESC). 
The ECSR has set out clear standards and guidelines as to what is expected from states 
in various housing issues. We have seen that when it comes to providing adequate 
housing for vulnerable groups, such as Roma people, the ESCR has placed clear 
obligations on states and set out standards regarding necessary protection of Roma 
people through its decisions and conclusions. Unlike the ECSR, the Court has 
concerning the right to adequate housing of endangered minorities (such as Roma 
people) shown great deal of ambiguity, uncertainty and inconsistency. Nowadays, it is 
unclear what are the Court’s standards and expectations regarding the right to adequate 
housing, where it sometimes stresses that housing issues are a matter of political and not 
judicial decision and sometimes that applicants need special assistance, and then it 
decides on the scope of that special assistance under the Convention. The ECSR may 
not bring binding judgments, but through its conclusions and decisions it has pointed 
out states’ obligations regarding the right to housing and although maybe there is a 
certain amount of imprecision there is no inconsistency or ambiguity. The Court should 
leave the issue of adequate housing to the ESCR to deal with. 
Leaving the ESC system to deal with the right to a healthy environment, the right to 
healthcare and the right to adequate housing would not increase, at least not 
significantly, the workload of the ESCR. Under the ESC system only collective and not 
individual complaints are allowed therefore the number of complaints would not be as 
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nearly as high as the number of individual complaints before the Court. Also, today 
there are already numerous situations where the ESCR and the Court are dealing with 
the similar issues thereby duplicating each other’s work. Therefore, leaving those issues 
to the ESC system would not significantly increase the workload of the ESC but it 
would significantly decrease the workload of the Court.  
One cannot ignore the deficiencies of the ECS system, both under the Reporting system 
and under the Collective Complaints procedure. States are not obliged to accept all the 
ESC provisions; it takes a long time between reports on a certain provision; there is a 
great amount of information the ECSR requires from states under the Reporting system 
that makes it hard for it to make a final decision on state compliance; there is a small 
number of states that have ratified the Collective Complaints Protocol; and particularly, 
there is reluctance of the CoM to issue recommendations, both under the Reporting and 
under the Collective Complaints system. One of the things the CoE bodies could do is 
urge the CoM to issue recommendations every time after the ECSR finds the state to be 
in non-compliance with the ESC provisions and to make stronger resolutions. Issuing 
recommendations to states as well as clearer and stronger resolutions, after the ECSR 
has found that the state is not in compliance with certain ESC provision should be 
common practice of the CoM and not an exception. Furthermore, within the Reporting 
procedure there should be less governmental involvement, since because of the 
involvement of both the Governmental Committee and of the CoM, it can be said it is 
not sufficiently independent of the State parties to the Charter811 and there are long time 
periods between the state reports and the CoM recommendations (when and if the CoM 
issues them). However, despite these problems, it has been argued throughout the thesis 
that the ESC system, that is constantly developing and improving, is still better for 
protection of economic and social rights then the Convention system. 
We have seen numerous problematic issues arising out of the Court’s jurisprudence 
concerning rights from the ESC ambit, from the long time it takes for states to execute 
such judgments, to the lack of clear standards established by the Court which creates 
uncertainty as to what states obligations under the Convention are, and finally to the 
Court’s inconsistency in decision-making.  
                                                 
811 Khaliq and Churchill, 'The European Committee of Social Rights: putting flesh…’ (n 29), 431. 
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Examples of inconsistency in the Court’s case-law concerning the right to satisfactory 
detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, the right to a healthy environment, the 
right to healthcare in general and the right to adequate housing were discussed under 
Chapter VIII. The Court has been consistent only in cases concerning satisfactory 
detention conditions and healthcare in prisons, mostly because of the standards set out 
by the CPT that are used as guidelines by both the Court and the CoM. In all the other 
areas the Court has shown great deal of inconsistency, which only adds to numerous 
problems it is facing nowadays.  
Finally, reading in rights with significant socio-economic elements not envisaged or 
foreseen for protection under the Convention but under other CoE instruments and the 
inconsistency in their protection compromises the Court’s overall legitimacy. First of all, 
the Court’s procedural legitimacy is endangered since one of the preconditions of its 
procedural legitimacy is commitment to the rule of law. Commitment to the rule of law 
must include things like an equal or impartial application of law, the predictability of 
law, and that law is applied in a non-arbitrary way.812 As seen, the problematic issue in 
the context of judgments with significant socio-economic elements is the equal 
application of law and its predictability, or the lack of it. Although not bound by 
precedents, the Court should deliver its judgments in a consistent manner. The Court 
threatens its legitimacy by imposing on states obligations that they have never signed up 
to, by often not setting clear standards when interpreting the Convention, and by being 
inconsistent in its judgments, thereby making it impossible for States parties to know 
their obligations under the Convention. Furthermore, its social legitimacy, dependant on 
state compliance with the judgments, is also compromised. Despite the Court being the 
sole body with judicial powers, when it comes to rights with significant socio-economic 
elements, their realisation is not that dependent on the body that adopts a decision but 
on the state’s financial resources and willingness to execute a decision. It takes years for 
states to execute judgments containing significant socio-economic elements because of 
their financial implications and although so far states have not directly objected to 
executing such judgments, if the Court continues to bring judgments concerning socio-
economic issues not envisaged for protection under the Convention, states might start 
opposing execution. Finally, while it is legitimate for the judges of the Court to interpret 
                                                 
812 Brauch (n 11), 124. See also Chapman v United Kingdom (n 11) [70]. 
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the Convention,813 in order for interpretation to stay within the ambit of legitimacy it 
should not read new rights into the Convention, but give meaning to existing rights. 
Reading in new rights endangers another type of legitimacy, normative legitimacy, which 
can only exist if the Court protects the rights already guaranteed under the Convention. 
Therefore, the Court’s overall legitimacy is nowadays seriously threatened. The Court 
should, instead of delivering inconsistent judgments with significant socio-economic 
elements not envisaged for protection under the Convention but under other CoE 
instruments, try to keep consistency and predictability in its decision-making.  
The Court is intended to protect a narrow range of civil and political rights and despite 
having wide interpretative powers it should not protect rights already guaranteed by 
other European instruments. In order to provide better protection of economic and 
social rights within the CoE system greater emphasis should be placed on improving the 
ECS system, particularly the work of the CoM and on pressuring states into ratifying the 
Collective Complaints Protocol. Furthermore, attention should be given to supervisory 
systems envisaged for monitoring compliance with the CPT reports and the ECSR 
conclusions and decisions. 
The Court is currently overloaded with pending applications and the number of 
judgments before the CoM that are waiting to be executed is growing rapidly. Reading 
significant socio-economic elements into Convention rights by the Court is not only 
likely to add to its large workload, it has already threatened its legitimacy and ultimately 
risks endangering the protection of the civil and political rights originally guaranteed 
under the Convention. The Court should therefore leave the protection of economic 
and social rights to the bodies established by the Council of Europe for this purpose. 
 
                                                 
813 Popović, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law… (n 12); Dworkin 'Law as Interpretation'(n 
12). 
 248 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Books 
-  — — Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgements of the 
European Court of Human Rights 1st Annual Report, 2007, Council of Europe (March 
2008) 
- — — Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (Council of 
Europe 2008)  
- — — European Social Charter: Short Guide (CoE Publishing 2000)  
- — — Key concepts of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Education 
for Legal Professionals, (CoE Publishing 2009) 
- — — La conscience des droits : mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Paul Costa / [ouvrage coordonné 
par Patrick Titiun et réalisé avec l'assistance de Patricia Dumaine]. (Paris : Dalloz 2011) 
- — — Manual on Human Rights and the Environment, Principles Emerging from the case-law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (CoE Publishing 2006)  
- — — Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria (CoE 2011) 
- Alston P and Tomaševski K (eds), The right to food (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984)  
- Baderin M A and McCorquodale R (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 
(OUP 2007)  
- Barak-Erez D and Gross A M (eds), Exploring Social Rights Between Theory and Practice 
(Hart Publishing 2007)  
- Bayefsky A F (ed), The U.N. Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law 
International 2000)  
- Blanplain R (ed), The Council of Europe and the Social Challenges of the XXIst Century 
(Kluwer Law International 2001)  
 249 
- Breintenmoser S, Ehrenzeller B et al (eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: 
Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007)  
- De Burca G and de Witte B, Social Rights in Europe (OUP 2005)  
- Cali B and Bruch N, Monitoring the Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights, A handbook for non-governmental organisations, 2011  
- Cali B, Koch A and Bruch N, The Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: The 
view from the ground (UCL 2010)  
- Carrese P O, The Cloaking of Power: Montesquieu, Blackstone and the Rise of Judicial Activism 
8The University Chicago Press 2003) 
- Clark I, Legitimacy in International Society (OUP 2005)  
- Van Dijk P et al. (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th 
ed, Intersentia 2006)  
- Dworkin R, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 
- Eide A, UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, The Right to Adequate Food as a 
Human Right: Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, (1987) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23  
- Eide A et al (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A textbook (Kluwer Law 
International 2001) 
 - Estella A, The EU Principle of subsidiary and its Critique (OUP 2003)  
- Franck T, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (OUP 1990)  
- Fredman S, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008)  
- Ghai Y and Cottrell J (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Practice, The Role of 
Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Interights 2004)  
- Gomien D, Harris D J and Zwaak L, Law and Practice of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the European Social Charter (CoE Publishing 1996)  
 250 
- Greer S, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights (CoE Publishing 2000)  
- — — The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects (CUP 
2006) 
- Harris D, O’Boyle M and Warbrick C, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(2nd ed, OUP 2009) 
- Harris D and Darcy J, The European Social Charter (Ardsley N.Y. 2001)  
- Janis M W, Kay R S and Bradley A W, European Human Rights Law: Text and Materials 
(3rd ed, OUP 2008)  
- Joseph S, Schultz J and Castan M, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary (2nd ed, OUP 2004)  
- Kaikobad K H and Bohlander M (eds), International Law and Power: Perspectives on Legal 
Order and Justice. Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009)  
- Keller H and Ulfstein G (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (CUP 
2012)  
- Kennedy D, A Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press 1997) 
- Koch I E, Human Rights as Indivisible Rights: The Protection of Socio-economic Demands under 
the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009)  
- Lambert-Abdelgawad E, The Execution of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Human rights files No. 19, 2nd ed, CoE Publishing 2008) 
- Langford M (ed), Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (CUP 2008)  
- Leach P, Taking a case to the European Court of Human Rights (3rd ed, OUP 2011)  
 251 
- Leach P, Hardman H, Stephenson S and Blitz B K, Responding to Systemic Human Rights 
Violations - An analysis of pilot judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and their impact 
at national level (Intersentia 2010) 
- Letsas G, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2009)  
- Loucaides L G, The European Convention on Human Rights: Collected Essays (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers 2007)  
- Macdonald R St. J, Matscher F and Petzold H (eds), The European System for Protection of 
Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994)  
 
- Melish T, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-American System: A 
Manual on Presenting Claims (Orville H. Schell Jr. Center for International Human Rights, 
Yale Law School and Centro de Derechos Economicos y Sociales, Ecuador 2002)  
- Merrills J G, The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights 
(Manchester University Press 1993)  
- Moecki D (eds), International Human Rights Law (OUP 2010)  
- Morgan R and Evans M (eds), Protecting Prisoners, The Standards of the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture in Context (OUP 1999)  
- Morgan R and Evans M, Combating torture in Europe: the work and standards of the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) (CoE Publishing 2001)  
- Morrison C C, The Dynamics of Development in the European Human Rights Convention System 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1981)  
- Mowbray A, Cases and Materials on The European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed OUP 
2007)  
- — — The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights ( Hart Publishing 2004)  
- Murdoch J, The Treatment of Prisoners: European Standards (CoE Publishing 2008)  
 252 
- Nolan A, Porter B and Langford M, The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: An 
Updated Appraisal (Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper Series 
No. 14, New York University and the Committee on Administration of Justice 
Northern Ireland 2007)  
- Orlu Nmehielle V O, The African Human Rights System, Its Laws, Practice, and Institutions 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2001)  
- Popović D, The Emergence of the European Human Rights Law, An Essay on Judicial Creativity 
(Eleven International Publishing 2011)  
- Reid K, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (3rd ed, 
Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2008)  
- Reidy A, The Prohibition of Torture, A guide to the implementation of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Human Rights handbooks, no. 6, CoE Publishing 2003)  
- San Jose D G, Environmental Protection and the European Convention on Human Right (CoE 
Publishing 2005)  
- Savić O (ed), The Politics of Human Rights (Verso 1999)  
- Schulz W F (ed), The Future of Human Rights, U.S. Policy for a New Era (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2009)  
- Shue H, Basic Rights, Subsistence, Affluence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton University 
Press 1980)  
- Ssenyonjo M, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (Hart Publishing 
2009)  
- Strenio E, The Inter-American Human Rights System (Human Rights Education 
Association 2003) 
- White R C A and Ovey C, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th ed, OUP 2010)  
- Xenos D, Positive Obligations of the State under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(Routledge 2011)  
 253 
 
 
Book Chapters  
- Alston P, ‘Putting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights back on the Agenda of the 
United States’ in Schulz W F (ed), The Future of Human Rights, U.S. Policy for a New Era 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2009) 
- — — ‘Assessing the Strength and Weaknesses of the European Social Charter’s 
Supervisory System in De Burca G and de Witte B, Social Rights in Europe (OUP 2005) 
- An-Na’im A, ‘To Affirm the Full Human Rights Standing of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights’ in Ghai Y and Cottrell J (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
Practice, The Role of Judges in Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Interights 
2004) 
- Baderin M A and McCorquodale R ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights: Forty Years of Development’ in Baderin M A and McCorquodale R 
(eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007)  
- Van Boven T ‘Categories of Rights’ in Moecki D (eds), International Human Rights Law 
(OUP 2010) 
- Brems E ‘Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights’ in Barak-Erez D and Gross A M (eds), Exploring Social Rights Between Theory and 
Practice (Hart Publishing 2007) 
- Cassese A ‘Are Human Rights Truly Universal?’ in Savić O (ed), The Politics of Human 
Rights (Verso 1999) 
- Churchill R and Khaliq U ‘Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The 
Current Use and Future Potential of the Collective Complaints Mechanism of the 
European Social Charter’ in Baderin M A and McCorquodale R (eds), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007)  
 254 
- Clements L and Simmons A ‘European Court of Human Rights’ in Langford M (ed), 
Social Rights Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2008) 
- Dremczewski A ‘Fact-finding as Part of Effective Implementation: The Strasbourg 
Experience’ in Bayefsky A F (ed), The U.N. Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century 
(Kluwer Law International 2000) 
- Eide A ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Eide A et al (eds), 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, A textbook (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
- Evju S ‘The European Social Charter’ in Blanplain R (ed), The Council of Europe and the 
Social Challenges of the XXIst Century (Kluwer Law International 2001) 
- Gomez V ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Right in the Inter-American System’ in Baderin M 
A and McCorquodale R (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (OUP 2007)  
- Harris D ‘Collective Complaints under the European Social Charter: Encouraging 
Progress?’ in Kaikobad K H and Bohlander M (eds), International Law and Power: 
Perspectives on Legal Order and Justice. Essays in Honour of Colin Warbrick (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2009) 
- Van Hoof G J H ‘The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. A 
Rebuttal of Some Traditional Views’ in Alston P and Tomaševski K (eds), The right to 
food (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1984) 
- Khaliq U and Churchill R ‘The Protection of Economic and Social Rights: A Particular 
Challenge?’ in Keller H and Ulfstein G (eds), UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and 
Legitimacy (CUP 2012)  
- Khaliq U and Churchill R ‘The European Committee of Social Rights: putting flesh on 
the bare bones of the European Social Charter’ in Langford M (ed), Social Rights 
Jurisprudence, Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (CUP 2008) 
- Macdonald R St. J ‘The Margin of Appreciation’ in Macdonald R St. J, Matscher F and 
Petzold H (eds), The European System for Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 1994) 
 255 
- McRae D ‘Approaches to the Interpretation of Treaties: The European Court of 
Human Rights and the WTO Appellate Body’ in Breintenmoser S, Ehrenzeller B et al 
(eds), Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2007) 
- O’Boyle M ‘The Legitimacy of Strasbourg Review: Time for a Reality Check?’  in La 
conscience des droits : mélanges en l'honneur de Jean-Paul Costa / [ouvrage coordonné par 
Patrick Titiun et réalisé avec l'assistance de Patricia Dumaine]. (Paris : Dalloz 2011) 
- Warbrick C ‘Economic and Social Interests and the European Convention on Human Rights’ 
in Baderin M A and McCorquodale R (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action 
(OUP 2007)  
 
 
Journal Articles 
- Alston P and Quinn G, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9 Hum. Rts. Q. 
156 
- Alvarez J E, ‘The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of The Power of Legitimacy 
Among Nations by Thomas M Frank’ (1991) 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199 (book 
review)  
- Atapattu S, ‘Right to a Healthy Life or the Right to Die Polluted: The Emergence of a 
Human Right to a Healthy Environment under International Law’ (2002-2003)16 Tul. 
Envtl. L.J. 65 
- Baird V A, ‘Building Institutional Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural Justice’ (2001) 
54 POL. RES. Q. 333  
- Boyle A, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment’ (2007) XVIII 
Fordham Environmental Law Review 471  
- Brauch J A, ‘The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law’ (2004-2005) 11 Colum. J. Eur. L. 113 
 256 
- Buyse A, ‘Strings attached: the concept of “home” in the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 3 E.H.R.L.R  294 
- Carozza P G, ‘Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: 
Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (1998) 
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1217  
- Churchill R and Khaliq U, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social 
Charter, An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social 
Rights?’ (2004) 15(3) Eur.J.Int.Law 417  
- Cullen H, ‘The collective complaints system of the European Social Charter: 
interpretative methods of the European Committee of Social Rights’ (2009) 9(1) H.R.L. 
Rev. 61  
- DeMerieux M, ‘Deriving Environmental Rights from the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2001) 21(3) Oxford J 
Legal Studies 521  
- Dennis M J and Stewart D P, ‘Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Should there be an international complaints mechanism to adjudicate the right to food, 
water, housing and health?’ (2004) 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 462  
- Dinstein Y ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’ (1976) 25 Int'l & 
Comp. L.Q. 102 
- Downs J A, ‘Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environment: An Argument for a 
Third Generation Right’ (1992-1993) 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 352  
- Dubault R A ‘The ADA and the NLTRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights’  
(1994-1995) 70 Ind. L.J. 1271 (1994-1995) 
- Dulitzky A, ‘The Inter-American System Fifty Years Later: Time for Changes’ (2011) 
(special edition) Quebec Journal of International Law 127  
- Dworkin R, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 527  
 257 
- Dzehtsiarou K, ‘Does consensus matter? Legitimacy of European consensus in the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) Jul P.L. 534  
 - Dzehtsiarou K and Greene A, ‘Legitimacy and the Future of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Critical Perspectives from Academia and Practitioners’ (2011) 12(10) 
German Law Journal 1707  
- Eralp Y ‘Individual Rights versus Collective Rights’ (2010) 18 Global Political Trends 
Center 1 
- Fallon R L Jr, ‘“The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse’ (1997) 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1  
- Franck T, ‘Why a Quest for Legitimacy?’ (1987-1988) 21 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 535  
- Gibson J L and Caldeira G A, ‘The Legitimacy of Transnational Legal Institutions: 
Compliance, Support, and the European Court of Justice’ (1995) 39 AM. J. POL. Sci. 
459  
- Green L ‘Two Views on Collective Rights’ (1991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 315 
- Greer S, ‘Protocol 14 and the Future of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 
Spr P.L. 83  
- Happold M, ‘Bankovic v Belgium and the territorial scope of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2003) 3 (1) H.R.L.R. 77  
- Hartney M ‘Some Confusion Concerning Collective Rights’ (1991) 4 Can. J. L. & 
Jurisprudence 293 
- Harvey P, ‘Human Rights and Economic Policy Discourse: Taking Economic and 
Social Rights Seriously’ (2002) 33 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 364 
- Heyns C, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System: The African Charter’ (2003-
2004) 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 679  
 258 
- Hughes D and Davis M, ‘Human rights and the triumph of property: the 
marginalisation of the European Convention on Human Rights in housing law’ (2006) 
Nov/Dec CONVPL 526  
- Jackson J L, ‘Note: Broniowski v Poland: A Recipe for Increased Legitimacy of the 
European Court of Human Rights as a Supranational Constitutional Court’ (2006-2007) 
39 Conn .L. Rev. 759  
- Jacobs L A ‘Bridging the Gap Between Individual and Collective Rights With the Idea 
of Integrity’ (1991) 4 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 375 
- Kenna P, ‘Housing rights: positive duties and enforceable rights at the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (2008) 2 E.H.R.L.R. 193  
- Koch I E, ‘The Justiciability of Indivisible Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 3  
- Kumm M, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of 
Analysis’ (2004) 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 907  
- Lambert-Abdelgawad E, ‘The Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights: Towards a Non-coercive and Participatory Model of Accountability’ 
(2009) 69 ZaöRV 471  
- Langford M, ‘Closing the Gap- An Introduction to the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2009) 27(1) Nordisk 
Tidsskrift For Menneskerettigheter 1 
- Leach P, ‘The effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers in supervising the 
enforcement of judgements of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) Aut P.L. 
433  
- Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Universality versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 
E.H.R.L.R. 73  
- Letsas G, ‘The truth in autonomous concept: how to interpret the ECHR’ 2004 15(2) 
E.J.I.L. 279  
 259 
- Lixinski L L, 'Treaty interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
expansion at the service of the unity of international law' (2010) 21(3) E.J.I.L 585  
- Madge N, ‘Housing and human rights: lessons from Strasbourg: Part 4’ (2008) 11(3) 
J.H.L. 47  
- — — ‘Housing and human rights: lessons from Strasbourg: Part 5’ (2008) 11(5) J.H.L. 
89  
- Mahoney P, ‘Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint in the European Court of 
Human Rights: two sides of the same coin’ (1990) 11 Hum.Rts.L.J. 57  
- — — ‘The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice’ (1998) (19)1 
Hum.Rts.L.J. 1  
- Marcus D, ‘The Normative Development of Socioeconomic Rights through 
Supranational Adjudication’ (2006) 42 StanJIntL 53  
- Marks S P, ‘Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?’ (1980-1981) 
33 Rutgers L. Rev. 435  
- Morenham N A, ‘The Right to Respect for a Private Life in the European Convention 
on Human Rights: a Re-examination’ (2008) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 44  
- Mowbray A, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 H.R.L. 
Rev. 57  
- — — ‘An examination of the European Court's approach to overruling its previous 
case-law’ (2009) 9(2) H.R.L. Rev. 179  
- Mutua M W, ‘The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?’ (1999) 21 
Hum. Rts. Q. 342  
- Nolan A, ‘”Aggravated violations”, Roma housing rights and forced expulsions in 
Italy: recent developments under the European Social Charter collective complaints 
system’ (2011) 11(2) H.R.L. Rev. 343  
 260 
- — — ‘Addressing economic and social rights violations by non-state actors through 
the role of the state: a comparison of regional approaches to the “obligation to protect”’ 
(2009) 9(2) H.L.R. Rev. 225  
- Obinna Okere B, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comparative Analysis with the European and 
American System’ (1984) 6 Hum. Rts. Q. 141  
- Palmer E, ‘Protecting Socio-Economic Rights through the European Convention on 
Human Rights: Trends and Developments in the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2009) 2(4) Erasmus L.Rev. 397 
- — — ‘Beyond arbitrary interference: the right to a home? Developing socio-economic 
duties in the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2010) 61(3) N.I.L.Q. 225  
- Palmer S, ‘Wrong Turning: Article 3 ECHR and the Proportionality’ (2006) 65(2) 
C.L.J. 358  
- Pedersen O W, ‘The Ties that Bind: the Environment, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law’ (2010) 16(4) European Public Law 571  
- Popović D, ‘Prevailing of Judicial Activism over Self-Restraint in the Jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2008-2009) 42 Creighton L. Rev. 361  
- Roxtrom E, Gibney M and Einarse T, ‘The NATO bombing case (Bankovic et al. v 
Belgium et al.) and the limits of Western human rights protection’ (2005) 23 BU ILJ 55  
- Sanders D ‘Collective Rights’ (1991)13 Hum. Rts. Q. 368 
- Scalia A, ‘The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules’ (1989) 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175  
- Schaefer M, ‘Al-Skeini and the elusive parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction’ (2011) 
5 E.H.R.L.R. 566  
- Scott S, ‘Reaching Beyond (Without Abandoning) the Category of “Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights”’ (1999) 21 Hum. Rts. Q. 633  
 261 
- Shelton D, ‘The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisprudence in Europe’ (2003) 13 
Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 95  
- Sustein C R, ‘Problems with Rules’ (1995) 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953  
- Tinta M F, ‘Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Inter-
American System of Protection of Human Rights: Beyond Traditional Paradigms and 
Notions’ (2007) 29 Hum. Rts. Q. 433  
- Trilsch M, ‘European Committee of Social Rights: The Right to a Healthy 
Environment’ (2009) 7(3) I.J.C.L. 529  
- Vasek K, ‘A 30-Year Struggle: The Sustained Efforts to give Force of Law to the 
UDHR’ (1977) 30(11) UNESCO Courier 29  
- White R C A and Boussiakou I, ‘Separate Opinions in the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2009) 9 H.R.L. Rev. 37  
- Wildhaber L, ‘The European Court of Human Rights in Action’ (2004) 21 
Ritsumeikan Law Review 83  
- Wiley E, ‘Aspirational Principles of Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-
economic Rights in National Law’ (2006-2007) 22 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 35  
- Williams J, ‘Al Skeini: A flawed interpretation of Bankovic’ (2005) 3(4) WILJ 687 
- Yamin A E, ‘The Future in the Mirror: Incorporating Strategies for the Defense and 
Promotion of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into the Mainstream Human Rights 
Agenda’ (2005) 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 1200  
 
Newspaper articles, speeches and web pages 
- African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights  
<http://www.african-court.org/en/> accessed 13 July 2012 
 262 
- Committee of Ministers, Recommendations- European Social Charter 
<http://www.coe.int/t/cm/adoptedTexts_en.asp> accessed 13 July 2012 
 
- Council of Europe webpage 
<http://www.coe.int/> accessed 13 July 2012 
- Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, About the Committee of Ministers, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/cm/aboutCM_en.asp> accessed 1 July 2012 
- Council of Europe, European Social Charter, About the Charter, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/AboutCharter_en
.asp> accessed 17 July 2012 
- Council of Europe, The Margin of Appreciation 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/ECHR/Paper2_en.a
sp> accessed 1 June 2012 
- The CPT webpage 
<http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/> accessed 1 July 2012 
- The CPT, ‘About the CPT’ 
<http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/about.htm> accessed 1 August 2012 
- Daily Telegraph (7th February 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/8307782/UK-should-
withdraw-from-European-Court-of-Human-Rights.html> accessed 11 July 2012 
- David Davis and Jack Straw, The Spectator (18 January 2011)  
<http://www.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/6626533/davis-and-straw-unite-against-
prisoner-voting-rights.thtml> accessed 13 August 2011 
- Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights (CoE 2008), 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a3f52482.html> accessed 6 August 2012 
- European Convention’s preparatory work 
 <http://echr.coe.int/echr/en/50/50_Preparatory_Works> accessed 13 July 2012 
 263 
- European Court of Human Rights, Statistics 2011 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/7B68F865-2B15-4DFC-85E5-
DEDD8C160AC1/0/Stats_EN_112011.pdf> accessed 13 July 2012 
- European Court of Human Rights in facts and figures 2011 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C99DDB86-EB23-4E12-BCDA-
D19B63A935AD/0/FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2012_VERSION_WEB.pdf> 
accessed 20 July 2012 
- European Social Charter webpage 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp
> accessed 4 July 2012 
- European Social Charter, Collective Complaints list and state of procedure 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Complaints/Complaints_en.as
p> accessed 15 May 2012 
- European Social Charter database, Conclusions on Article 31, 
<http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/esc2008/query.asp?action=page&page=4&timestamp=4171
1.92> accessed 18 July 2012 
- European Social Charter, Table of Accepted Provisions (situation at July 2012)  
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/ProvisionTableR
evJuly2012_en.pdf> accessed 14 December 2012 
- Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Presentation/About_en.asp> 
accessed 1 July 2012 
- Guet M, Support Team of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for 
Roma Issues, ‘Council of Europe Standards Regarding Roma Housing’ 
<http://www.romadecade.org/czech_housing_conference> accessed 11 July 2012 
- HUDOC database  
<http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-
Law/Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOC+database/> accessed on 1 June 2012 
 264 
- Inter-American Human Rights System  
<http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413> accessed 13 July 2012 
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights webpage 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> accessed 13 July 2012 
- International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights webpage 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm> accessed 13 July 2012 
 
- Introductory Memorandum on the Implementation of judgements of the European 
Court on Human Rights the Committee of Legal Affairs and Human Rights from 26 
May 2008 
<http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2008/20080526_ajdoc24_2008.pdf> 
accessed 1 July 2012 
- Library of the European Court of Human Rights, “Travaux preparatoires” of the 
Convention, Article 3  
<http://www.echr.coe.int/library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART3-
DH%2856%295-EN1674940.pdf> accessed 13 August 2012 
- Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Maastricht, 22-26 January 1997 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> accessed 13 
August 2012 
- Member States of the Council of Europe and the European Social Charter 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/Presentation/Overview_en.asp
> accessed 11 August 2012 
- Ramirez Cleves, G.A., The Interamerican system for the protection of human rights 
and a reflection of the Colombian situation 
<http://www.eplo.eu/alfaII/docs/The%20Interamerican%20System%20for%20the%
20Protection%20of%20Human%20Rights,%20and%20a%20Reflection%20of%20the%
20Colombian%20Situation.pdf> accessed 13 July 2012 
- Slack J, Named and Shamed: The European Human Rights Judges Wrecking British Law, 
DAILY MAIL (5 February 2011)  
 265 
<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1353860/Named-shamed-The-European-
human-rights-judges-wrecking-British-law.html> accessed 11 July 2012 
- Speech of V. Putin concerning Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia, House of 
Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Global Security: Russia, Second Report of 
Session 2007-2008, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/51/51.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2012 
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Group Rights 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-group/> accessed 23 December 2012 
- Statement to the Convention to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union <www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/statements/EU.doc> 
accessed 13 July 2012 
- ‘The Universality of Human Rights’, Speech by Lord Hoffmann at the Judicial Studies 
Board Annual Lecture 2009  
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2009/speech-lord-hoffman-
19032009> accessed 11 July 2012 
- Karl Zemanek on Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, United Nations 
Audiovisual Library of International Law 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/vclt/vclt-e.pdf> accessed 13 August 2012 
 
 
Committee of Ministers Recommendations and Resolutions  
- Interim Resolution ResDH(2003)123 concerning the judgment of the European Court 
of Human Rights of 15 July 2002, final on 15 October 2002 in the case of Kalashnikov 
against the Russian Federation (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 4 June 2003 
at the 841st meeting of the Ministers' Deputies) 
- Recommendation no. R ChS (95) 4 on the application of the European Social Charter 
by Greece during the period 1990-1991 (13th supervision cycle - part I) on Greece  
 266 
- Recommendation no. R ChS (98) 4 on the application of the European Social Charter 
by Turkey during the period 1993-1994 (13th supervision cycle, part IV) on Turkey  
- Recommendation no. R ChS (2001) 1 on the Collective Complaint No. 6/1999, 
Syndicat national des Professions du tourisme against France (Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 31 January 2001 at the 738th meeting of the Ministers Deputies  
- Recommendation no. R ChS (2002) 1 on the application of the European Social 
Charter by Turkey during the year 1995-1998 (15th supervision cycle, part II) on Article 
11-1 of the Original ESC  
- Resolution ResChS (2006) 4 on the Collective Complaint no. 27/2004 by the 
European Roma Rights Centre against Italy, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 
3 May 2006 at the 963rd meeting of the Ministers' Deputies  
- Resolution CM/ResChS(2008)1 on the Collective Complaint No. 30/2005 by the 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (MFHR) against Greece (Adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers on 16 January 2008 at the 1015th meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies)  
- Resolution CM/ResChS(2010)1 on the Collective Complaint No. 46/2007 by the 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) against Bulgaria, Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 31 March 2010 at the 1081st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies  
- Resolution CM/ResChS(2010)8 on the Collective Complaint No. 58/2009  by the 
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) against Italy, Adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers on 21 October 2010 at the 1096th meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies   
- Resolution CM/ResChS(2011)6 Collective Complaint No. 52/2008 by the Centre on 
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) against Croatia, Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 5 May 2011, at the 1113th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies  
- Resolution CM/ResDH(2007)133, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 
October 2007 at the 1007th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies 
 267 
- Resolution CM/ResDH(2008)57, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 25 June 
2008 at the 1028th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies  
- Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)127 (Peers v Greece), Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 3 December 2009 at the 1072nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies 
- Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)128 (Dougoz v Greece), Adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 3 December 2009 at the 1072nd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies 
- Resolution DH(95)252, Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 20 November 
1995 at the 549th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies  
 
Committee of Ministers, Current state of execution of judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
 Akdivar and others v Turkey, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Akdivar&StateCode=TUR&SectionCode=> accessed 16 July 2012  
Budayeva and others v Russia, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Budayeva&StateCode=RUS&SectionCode=> accessed 1 June 2012 
Cenbauer v Croatia, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=&StateCode=CRO&SectionCode=> accessed 1 July 2012 
Connors v United Kingdom, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Connors&StateCode=UK.&SectionCode=> accessed 17 July 2012  
Giacomelli v Italy, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Giacomelli&StateCode=ITA&SectionCode=> accessed 11 July 
2012 
 268 
Kalashnikov v Russia, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=&StateCode=RUS&SectionCode=> accessed 15 June 2012 
Kehayev v Bulgaria 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=&StateCode=BGR&SectionCode=> accessed 17 July 2012 
McCann v United Kingdom, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Mc+CANN&StateCode=UK.&SectionCode=> accessed 16 July 
2012 
Moldovan and others v Romania, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=moldovan+and+others&StateCode=ROM&SectionCode=> 
accessed 20 June 2012 
Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine (lead) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=&StateCode=UKR&SectionCode=> accessed 1 July 2012 
Onedryildiz v Turkey, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=48939%2F99&StateCode=TUR&SectionCode=> accessed 1 June 
2012 
Poltoratskiy v Ukraine, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Poltoratskiy&StateCode=UKR&SectionCode=> accessed 17 July 
2012 
Tatar v Romania, 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Reports/pendingCases_en.asp?Ca
seTitleOrNumber=Tatar&StateCode=ROM&SectionCode=> accessed 11 July 2012 
 
 269 
Committee of Ministers documents 
- Committee of Ministers, Ministers' Deputies, Information documents 
CM/Inf/DH(2011)37  
- Human rights working methods—Improved effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers’ supervision of 
execution of judgments, CM/Inf(2004)8 Final, April 7, 2004 
- Ministers’ Deputies Information documents CM/Inf/DH(2007)7 13 February 2007, 
Industrial pollution in breach of the European Convention: Measures required by a 
European Court judgment  
 
Other Rules, Opinions, Reports and Recommendations 
- African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Principles and Guidelines on the 
Implementation on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (November 2010) 
- ECPT, Explanatory Report (CPT: Reference Documents CPT/Inf/C (89) 1 [EN], 
Strasbourg, 26.XI.1987)  
- European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court, Registry of the Court (July 
2009)  
- European Social Charter, 15th National Report on the Implementation of the 
European Social Charter and 1st National Report on the implementation of the 
European Social Charter (Revised) submitted by the government of Turkey, Articles 11, 
12, 13 & 14 for the period between January 1, 2003 to July 31, 2007 (1961 Charter) and 
August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007 (Revised Charter) Articles 3, 23 & 30 for the 
period between August 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007 (Revised Charter) Cycle 2009 
RAP/RCha/TU/I(2009)  
- European Social Charter, 19th report on the implementation of the European Social 
Charter and 5th report on the implementation of the 1998 Additional Protocol submitted 
by the Government of Greece (Articles 3, 12 and 13 for the period of 01/01/2005-
 270 
31/12/2007; Articles 11, 14 and Article 4 of the Additional Protocol for the period 
01/01/2003-31/12/2007), Cycle 2009, RAP/Cha/GR/XIX(2009)  
- Inter-Am.Comm.H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1993, OAE/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc.9 rev (11 
February 1994) 
- Open-Ended Working Group on the Right to Development, Report of the Open-
Ended Working Group on the Right to Development, 20 March 2001, UN Doc 
E/CN4/2001/26  
- Opinion on the Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (Jan 
Helgesen, Giorgio Malinverni, Franz Matscher and Pieter van Dijk), Opinion 
No.209/2002, CDL-AD (2002) 34, 18 December 2002  
- Parliamentary Assembly, Doc. 8357 (March 1999), Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights, Report 
of the Social Health and Family Affairs Committee 
- Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 8433 (2 June 1999), Opinion of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights on Additional protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights 
- Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Preparation on an additional protocol to The European 
Convention on Human Rights, on the right to a healthy environment’, Opinion, 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 12043, 29 September 2009 
- Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Preparation on an additional protocol to The European 
Convention on Human Rights, on the right to a healthy environment’, Opinion, 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 9833, 19 June 2003 
- Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1415 (1999), Additional Protocol to the 
European Convention on Human Rights concerning fundamental social rights 
 271 
- Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1795 (2007) ‘Monitoring of commitments 
concerning social rights’, (Text adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of 
the Parliamentary Assembly, on 24 May 2007) 
- Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments 
and the terms of friendly settlement, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 May 
2006 at the 964th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies  
- Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Suggestions on solutions in the event 
of slowness in the execution of judgment, DH-PR (2005)001 (26 April 2005) 
 
 
 272 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 273 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 274 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 275 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 276 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 277 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
